E-Notes

How to Deal with Mexico’s Zapatistas

January 29, 2001

by George W. Grayson

George Grayson, an associate scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, teaches Government at the College of William & Mary. He has written a dozen books and monographs on Mexico, including A Guide to the 2000 Mexican Presidential Election, published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies. He also serves in the Virginia state legislature.

Political correctness has eclipsed sound judgment in Mexican President Vicente Fox Quesada’s overtures to the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). Rather than heed the views of Xochitl Galvez Ruiz, 38, who heads Fox’s recently created Presidential Indigenous Affairs Office, the new chief executive has relied heavily on the advice of Foreign Secretary Jorge Castaneda, 47, and National Security Adviser Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, 51. Castaneda and Aguilar are bright, articulate, and well-connected internationally. But they are also leftist intellectuals, ever ready to make shrill charges of “victimization” — whether it’s at the United States for perceived exploitation of illegal Mexican immigrants or at the landowning elite’s subjugation of Indians in the poverty-ridden, southern state of Chiapas. During his successful race for the presidency, Fox vowed to bring peace to Chiapas, where the Zapatistas— headed by Subcomandante “El Sub” Marcos— spearheaded a revolt on New Year’s Day 1994. And since taking office on December 1, 2000, Fox has made numerous goodwill gestures to restart negotiations with the rebels. Yet, Marcos and the EZLN continue to deride the government’s overtures as “insufficient,” “too little,” or “inadequate.” Unless a breakthrough occurs soon, Fox may find himself ensnared with a political tar baby, diverting attention, resources, and presidential capital from other initiatives vastly more important to the half of Mexico’s 98.5 million inhabitants who suffer abject poverty

Background

Just over seven years ago, the middle-class-led Zapatistas seized a dozen towns to protest “500 years … of dictatorial exploitation” of the indigenous population. After twelve days of fighting that took 150 lives, the combatants agreed to a cease-fire to usher in protracted bargaining. Although never implemented, the February 1996 "San Andres” accords — struck between the guerrillas, captained by Marcos, and the quasi-official Peace and Conciliation Commission (COCOPA)— called for (1) respect for the “diversity” of indigenous communities, (2) “greater participation” of these peoples in making decisions and spending public monies, and (3) “autonomy of indigenous communities and their right of free determination” within the law.

Although loudly lamented by domestic human-rights zealots, foreign NGOs, and “political tourists,” the failure of the negotiations excited little interest among middle class Mexicans, once titillated by the Zaptistas' Sturm und Drang. In the wake of the worst economic downtown since the Great Depression, erstwhile EZLN enthusiasts in Mexico City coffee houses had shifted their gaze from the Chiapan rainforest to their Visa cards when interest rates soared to 90 percent amid a 6.9 percent fall in gross domestic product and 55 percent inflation level. At the same time, to diminish his mystique, the government unmasked “El Sub,” who once described himself as “owner of the night, lord of the mountain, man without a face and with no tomorrow.” They identified Marcos as Rafael Sebastian Guillen Vicente, 37, a prize-winning sociology student and son of a well-heeled proprietor of furniture stores in Tampico.

A Mexican standoff crystallized as the army brought in thousands of troops, encircled the Zapatistas, and forced their adversaries deeper into the Lacandona jungle. Marcos, who loves the center stage, chafed at his escalating irrelevance. Only the late-1997 murder of 45 pro-EZLN Tzotzil Indians in the Chiapan village of Acteal breathed new life into the Zapatista movement. This massacre prompted Fox to commit himself to settle the imbroglio. In one rhetorical flight, the six-foot-five-inch presidential candidate— dubbed the “Marlboro Man” because of his height and rugged good looks — even claimed that he would need only “15 minutes” to cut a deal with the subcomandante

Fox Weighs in with Legislation

In his December 1 inaugural address, Fox announced that he would submit the San Andres accords to Congress. Whether the nation’s new leader simply wanted to shift the problem from his plate to that of the legislators remains to be seen. In any case, Marcos responded with three preconditions to his returning to the bargaining table: (1) fulfillment of the San Andres agreement, (2) freeing all rebel prisoners, and (3) demilitarizing “Zapatista territory.” In addition, he expressed a readiness to come to Mexico City with two dozen sidekicks to lobby legislators on behalf of the peace package.

Fox extended the olive branch by shuttering four of the seven military bases near the EZLN enclave that El Sub wanted closed, removing 2,100 soldiers, dismantling 53 check-points, halting fly-overs of the “conflict zone,” releasing 20 of some 100 Zapatistas who were behind bars, and reopening the state to pro-guerrilla foreigners. The chief executive has also appointed Luis H. Alvarez, an original COCOPA member and one of the nation’s most respected politicians, as Chiapas Peace Coordinator

Unanticipated Consequences

Mexican officials have self-servingly interpreted Marcos’s initial statements as “positive.” There are, however, aspects of the San Andres pact which, if not fundamentally revised, could boomerang on Mexico’s nascent administration:

While sounding benign, “local autonomy” can enable the strong to suppress the weak in a state riven with feuds between the EZLN and its foes, Protestants and Catholics, progressive and conservative Catholics, landowners and the landless, Mexicans and Guatemalans, and Fox enthusiasts and militants in the recently vanquished Institutional Revolutionary Party.
Self-determination can create a “state within a state,” as municipalities file law suits for control of minerals, timber, and water resources located within their boundaries, asserting that these assets belonged to them before either Hernan Cortes landed in 1519 or Mexico declared independence 300 years later.
Even if handled responsibly in Chiapas, autonomy there would spark cries for similar treatment in the nine other states where Indians constitute 14 percent or more of the population— a process that could Balkanize the country.
Adoption of Indigenous practices — called “uses and customs” (“usos y costumbres”) could find elders dictating how villagers vote— as well as continued male domination of females— at a time when Mexico is winning accolades for democratic advances.

With respect to the last point, Xochitl Galvez, who pulled herself up from abject poverty to become a high-tech star, lambasted the San Andres compact before Fox named her to her current post. The fair-skinned daughter of a Otomi father and mestizo mother, Galvez decried the racist assumptions imbedded in the accords. “How much Indian blood must flow through your veins in order to belong to one Mexico or the other?” she asked tartly. “Or if you are 100% Indian you must respect the proposed law and, if not, you don’t have to? As a member of the Fox team, she has agreed to try to improve the San Andres pact, although her influence pales in comparison to that of Castaneda and Aguilar.

Apart from the polarizing effects of the San Andres provisions, a Marcos visit to the capital would afford an irresistible occasion for firebrands in universities, squatter groups, and labor organizations to paralyze main thoroughfares. The city’s populist mayor, leader of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), has already turned sit-ins from an art form into an exact science. For instance, the SME Electrical Workers would use the likely brouhaha to strike a blow against critically needed energy reform. To drum up such support, on January 3 the media- savvy rebels opened a Zapatista Information Center in San Cristobal de las Casas, the major city that they temporarily seized seven years ago. The center will not only disseminate reports about the EZLN’s reaction to official overtures, it will also collect money for the rebels. Furthermore, this so-called “bridge” will publicize the departure date, itinerary, and public events planned by the guerrilla delegation that hopes its numbers will mushroom as it sets forth for Mexico City next month.

For their part, the business community has raised unshirted hell about the Zapatistas trooping into the capital. “Remember that interest rates depend on the confidence that world markets show toward our country,” said Raul Picard, president of the National Manufacturing Chamber of Commerce. “Therefore, we must not risk a situation that could get out of hand. In recent years, we have seen too much violence in our country,” he added. Nongovernmental agencies, local churchmen, and PRD rabble-rousers have applauded Fox’s lofting Chiapas to the top of his agenda. Meanwhile, average Mexicans cite jobs, higher salaries, improved health care, quality schools, and safe streets as higher priorities.

And while a nuisance, the EZLN presents no security threat to the Mexican army, whose commanders evince far more concern about well-trained insurgents in Guerrero and Oaxaca. Regrettably, the ordered withdrawal of units from Chiapan bases — bombarded by demeaning catcalls in some cases— paves the way for other irregular forces to fill the void. On January 4, for instance, two masked gunmen, backed by hundreds of militants of the leftist-nationalist PRD, stormed into the village of Zinacantan to demand the ouster of the PRI mayor. The intruders left without shedding blood, but this incident may presage the settling of old scores by traditional antagonists, freed from the army’s intervention

Conclusion

Marcos is a lousy strategist, but a gifted tactician. His bravado combined with mixed messages from Mexico City have permitted the crafty El Sub to whisk the initiative away from the government. It’s as if he’s doing the regime a favor by deigning to issue his Dephic communications and consider opening formal parleys.

Thus, Fox should demand that the EZLN chief rip off his theatrical ski-mask, publicly agree to swap bullets for ballots, and renounce divisiveness in favor of democracy before discussions proceed. Otherwise, Mexico’s astute, immensely popular Marlboro Man should not squander valuable political ammunition on the Zapatistas, but instead concentrate his aim on crime-prevention and social programs to improve the well-being of all citizens.

Related FPRI Bulletins

Mexican Politics: PRI in Sauce in Tabasco, George W. Grayson 11/2000
Ruling Party’s Loss in Chiapas Holds Profound Significance for Mexico, George Grayson, 8/2000
Mexico’s President Vicente Fox Quesada, George Grayson, 7/2000
The U.S. Stake in Mexico, George Grayson, 6/2000
The Election in Peru: A First-Hand Account, Michael Radu, 4/2000
Aid to Colombia: A Study in Muddled Arguments, Michael Radu, 2/2000
Latin America: A Scorecard, William B. Perry, 1/2000

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