E-Notes

U.S. Policies Toward Asia

by Avery Goldstein

April 17, 2001

Avery Goldstein is Director of FPRI’s Asia Program and author of Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford University Press, 2000).

In his previous essay in this series (“U.S. Policy Toward China: Try for the Best, Prepare for the Worst”), Dr. Goldstein focused on U.S. policy toward China; in this essay, he explores what U.S. policy should be toward Japan, Korea, the ASEAN states, and South Asia. Related essays include: “Power Vacuum in ASEAN: Indonesia, Regional Security, and the USA,” by Theodore Friend; “U.S. Policy Toward China: Judge China By Its Deeds, Not Its Words,” by June Teufel Dreyer; and “The Challenge Ahead for U.S. Policy in Asia,” by Kurt Campbell.

George W. Bush’s foreign policy team came to office committed to increasing the emphasis on U.S. relations with its allies in Asia. While most observers interpreted this as a criticism of alleged sinocentrism during the Clinton years, the true shape of the proposed new policy remained unclear. What is clear, however, is that all of Asia will demand a great deal of attention from Washington, not only because of changes within the region, but also because of American goals.

Japan

Analysts generally agree that the new administration intends to devote greater attention to Japan, which is certainly necessary, not least because of recent problems in managing the existing American deployments in Japan. Washington must take seriously Japanese misgivings about the “externalities” of the U.S. military presence (a polite phrase covering everything from civilian inconvenience to outrageous criminal behavior). If those concerns are not addressed, events such as the tragic naval accident off Hawaii could accumulate and ultimately corrode the foundation of the United States' most important alliance in the Pacific.

In terms of overall U.S. policy, there is still no consensus as to how the Bush team will likely approach Japan. Skeptics argue that the changes will be little more than symbolic: bureaucracies staffed by those inclined to focus on the role of Japan in U.S. Asia policy, more frequent public references to the U.S.-Japan alliance, and high-level bilateral meetings with Japan that accentuate Washington’s closer ties to Tokyo than to Beijing. Such adjustments, however advisable, are of minor import and basically noncontroversial. In contrast, the more tangible initiatives that the new Bush team seems likely to pursue are not, and they touch on sensitive interests both in the U.S. and Japan.

At the broadest level the U.S. seems poised to prod Japan to move further toward collective defense. This prodding, moreover, may go beyond the familiar refrain about financial burden sharing (about which Tokyo has long been forthcoming) to the stickier issues of weapons deployment, contingency planning, and military exercises that could ultimately transform the U.S.-Japan alliance into a genuine partnership along the lines of NATO. To many Americans, such changes may seem only reasonable and indeed long overdue. Japan, after all, is no longer a nation of defeated militarists who need to be tightly leashed, but rather the world’s second- wealthiest country whose democratic and generally pacifist credentials are incontrovertible. Yet making Japan a full-fledged military partner remains hotly controversial both within Japan and among many of its Asian neighbors, including those friendly to Washington.

Within Japan, the debate is an old one that focuses on virtually sacrosanct constitutional restrictions (Article 9) on deploying military capabilities. In the past few years, however, the taboo on even considering constitutional revision has been eroding. Generational change and shifting perceptions among some of the country’s opinion leaders about the dangers Japan faces and the responsibilities it should assume are resulting in discussions about loosening the tight constraints. Yet the new Japanese “realism” that observers began to note in the mid-1990s has not yet gained the political momentum to produce rapid, major changes in policy. As Japan’s approval of the revised U.S.-Japan security guidelines and its agreement to cooperate in pursuing theater missile defense (TMD) demonstrate, Japan is changing, but it is embracing even modest shifts with a great deal of caution.

American plans for missile defense seem likely to play a central role in the evolution of U.S. relations with Japan. In the 1990s, Japan agreed to cooperate in the research and development of TMD. Now that the Bush administration wants to deploy it, however, debates in Japan are intensifying about both its cost and political implications. The cost issue is the simplest, but cannot be swept under the rug: in the near term, Japan’s top priority almost certainly will be to get a sustainable economic recovery going and end its decade-long stagnation. This does not obviate its military-security concerns, but it does introduce a consideration that might have been relatively unimportant during the economic boom of the 1980s.

The political implications of TMD deployment, however, are likely to pose the greater obstacle to a Japanese consensus. Since the system might be used against missiles launched at targets other than those in Japan itself, would Japan’s involvement violate constitutional proscriptions on collective defense? Legalistic concerns aside, will Japan’s broader interests be served if TMD systems have the potential to protect Taiwan, thereby aggravating relations with China? If the elements of TMD are seen as a stepping stone to, or perhaps even a component of, national missile defenses for the U.S., will Russian and Chinese objections change what is acceptable to Tokyo, especially if the nascent detente on the Korean peninsula reduces the sense of urgency that had originally fed Japan’s willingness to cooperate on missile defense?

In sum, from the American perspective, proposals to strengthen the alliance through cooperation on matters such as TMD may seem both generous and mutually beneficial. Ultimately, the Japanese leaders and public may agree. Until then, however, pushing them to move ahead on TMD and other proposals without addressing their understandable concerns risks aggravating rather than improving bilateral ties. To avoid such an outcome, the United States will have to engage in meaningful consultation with Japan before charging forward, and may have to make some adjustments to its own plans. While that may seem to be placing others' interests before those of the United States, it is hard to imagine that American interests are served by an approach that aggravates relations not just with rivals and potential adversaries, but with its principal regional ally as well.

Korea

The Bush administration faces an unexpectedly complex challenge in Korea. Prior to 2000, the threat of North Korean ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction provided a clear argument for strengthening U.S. alliances in the region, and especially for pursuing both theater and national missile defense (NMD). However, as a result of South Korean president Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine diplomacy,” the efforts of former Defense Secretary William Perry, and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il’s own diplomatic initiatives, the North Korean threat appears to have diminished— and with it the stated reason for missile defenses. A clear-eyed assessment begins with the observation that the tangible payoffs from the whirlwind of diplomacy have thus far been small, and the recognition that it is never wise to focus on changeable intentions to the exclusion of capabilities. Nevertheless, Washington cannot simply ignore the shifting context in which it seeks to safeguard American interests and those of its South Korean ally.

The two countries’ common interest in maintaining peace on the peninsula and the security of the Republic of Korea requires no major changes in the well-managed alliance or military forces. But both countries now have the opportunity to advance constructive change in the North. Several general principles should guide the Bush administration’s Korea policy.

(1) As long as the North does not attempt to coerce the South, the process of inter-peninsula rapprochement should primarily be left to the Koreans. After all, any policy changes, especially those that are economically burdensome or militarily risky, will have to be acceptable to the South Korean government and people.

(2) U.S. interests in Korea are inextricably linked to its broader regional interest in peace and stability. Over the long term that means judging American Korea policy with regard to its effect on relations with Japan and China. In all likelihood, this concern will come to a head if reduced tensions between North and South Korea lead to a reevaluation of the U.S. troop presence in South Korea. As the situation on the peninsula evolves, the United States should avoid steps that either confuse others about the durability of its commitment to Asia or suggest implacable hostility (especially toward the Chinese). The Bush administration may want to explore recent indications that not only Seoul, but also Pyongyang and Beijing may be prepared to accept the idea of a stabilizing U.S. military presence in the South even if the threat of renewed North-South conflict fades.

(3) Washington should consult with Seoul about how to respond to the prospect of greater economic interaction with the North. In the wake of Kim Jong-Il’s recent visit to Shanghai, reports indicated his growing interest in initiating a Chinese-style economic reform program. Whatever the prospects for the success of such a program, it may well create opportunities for realistic American engagement with North Korea. If so, there will also be considerable pressures to seize them. Washington and Seoul should together study the terms on which the U.S. would undertake such a dramatic policy shift.

(4) The U.S. justification for missile defense will have to be redefined in ways that are not so dependent on the currently frozen North Korean program. Most obviously, a continued focus on the North Korean missile threat, even if theoretically justifiable, may be politically unsustainable and counterproductive if it undermines the process of North-South reconciliation. In revisiting the rationale for Asia-oriented missile defenses, the United States may have to face up to the almost inescapable conclusion that the only plausible contingency for which they would be deployed is China.

ASEAN

Compared with the mid-1990s, the Southeast Asian countries have recently been more successful at managing disputes with China over maritime claims in the South China Sea. To be sure, China and Vietnam have not yet delimited their maritime boundary, nor have China and the ASEAN claimants managed to reach any agreement (although they have come close) on a code of conduct for the South China Sea. Yet the likelihood of armed clashes on a scale that might prompt American involvement is now low. As long as peace and stability prevail and freedom of the seas is respected, the United States has no reason to wade into the complex negotiations among the principals.

Some observers, however, have urged the United States to strengthen its modestly revived military alliance with the Philippines, the ASEAN state with the most recent record of active maritime clashes with China. Advocates propose this as part of a comprehensive effort to counter Beijing’s growing regional influence. However, present circumstances suggest that it would be unwise to make opposition to China the centerpiece of a U.S. alliance with the Philippines. This would not only unnecessarily complicate relations with China, but also worry other American friends and allies in Asia who do not view China as a threat that must now be confronted and who fear the potential economic and military consequences of a provocative neo-containment strategy. Bolstering the Philippine alliance in ways that clearly seek to counter Chinese capabilities would also be divisive within the Philippines. After the post-Marcos period of estrangement, the United States finally enjoys a modicum of good will from Filipinos again. The existing alliance already codifies the American commitment to the Philippines’ vital security interests, though not American support for contests over disputed territories. In the eyes of potential adversaries, the fundamental commitment of the United States is not in question. Instead, the more urgent task is for the United States to do what it can to facilitate the return to economic prosperity and political stability in the Philippines.

Perhaps the most explosive and unpredictable problem in Southeast Asia that the Bush administration inherits from its predecessor is Indonesia. Indonesia’s domestic fragility generates myriad foreign policy challenges: a disintegrating state, inhumane treatment of an ethnic group that prompts calls for international intervention, the outflow of persecuted refugees, and economic collapse triggering political unrest. Vexing as these problems are, it is difficult to imagine that there is much the U.S. can do to ameliorate them, beyond encouraging Indonesia’s own attempts to reach an acceptable post-Suharto equilibrium. Indonesia policy is one area where Washington should welcome the potential of multilateralism, if only because the problems there are ones where exercising American leadership (either unilaterally or bilaterally in cooperation with Jakarta) has many costs and risks and few obvious benefits.

South Asia

Some observers have proposed India as a more worthy Asian strategic partner than China for the U.S. Certainly, there is plenty of reason to revisit American ties to the world’s largest democracy, a country that has abandoned its prior hostility to market economics and is a rising economic and military power. In the late 1990s, however, New Delhi’s nuclear ambitions strained bilateral relations, especially after India’s May 1998 nuclear weapons tests. When President Clinton finally visited India in spring 2000, expectations about U.S.-India relations soared. Some Indians hoped that the visit represented a breakthrough in their efforts to achieve the level of respect that Washington has accorded China. They also hoped the visit signified the end of the Cold War legacy of U.S. support for Pakistan.

But in the end, no summit meeting could alter underlying interests, and Clinton’s visit did not decisively transform U.S.-Indian relations. Although both Washington and New Delhi share concerns about the future course of China’s foreign policy, neither faces an immediate threat of the sort that would drive them together despite other differences. Indeed, while seeking to improve ties with the U.S., since 1999 India has simultaneously pursued rapprochement with China.

More broadly, India is not interested in becoming a junior partner of the United States. On the contrary, Indian foreign policy elites carry forward their predecessors' nationalist vision of their country as an independent great power on the world stage, able and willing to act on its own definition of its interests. Thus, India dissents from American arguments that universalistic political principles (originating in the West) may imply limits on sovereignty. On a more concrete matter, India’s pride and independence have also been reflected in its heavily criticized nuclear arms policy. Both before and after the weapons tests of 1998, Indian leaders argued that they have the same right to choose the means for ensuring their national security that others enjoy. Although this conviction does not preclude discussions about ways to manage its arsenal safely and enhance stable deterrence, it does rule out agreements that would deny India what it sees as its most fundamental sovereign right of self-defense.

Where does this leave matters for the Bush administration? In order to maintain and perhaps improve bilateral relations with New Delhi, U.S. policy will need to accept that important areas of disagreement (especially on international intervention and nuclear arms) will persist and do not preclude the pursuit of common interests (especially on economic issues, combating international terrorism and, depending on future trends, perhaps responding to China’s role in Asia). If the administration insists on making nuclear weapons policy a litmus test and holds firm to the belief that New Delhi will "come around" because it so values ties to the U.S., continued friction is all but inevitable.

As with other important US relationships in Asia, an early test may arise over the plans for missile defense. India worries not only about systems that could neutralize small arsenals such as its own, but also about a Chinese response that might include a missile buildup. The United States could demonstrate that the importance it attaches to its relations with India is not limited to summitry and rhetoric by promptly undertaking discussions with New Delhi about missile defense plans as part of our broader dialogue about nuclear issues such as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. The timing and level of consultations with India should not be an afterthought to similar talks with our European and Asian allies, the Russians, and especially the Chinese.

Finally, U.S. relations with Pakistan have long been linked with broader American strategic interests in Asia. Today, however, Pakistan is no longer a partner against the defunct Soviet threat, and Washington has no need for a Pakistani counterweight to India. Instead, the chief U.S. interests in Pakistan are two. First, on both humanitarian and practical grounds, the United States has an interest in averting a South Asian war over Kashmir that could result in catastrophic damage to the participants and their immediate neighbors. Second, the U.S. has an interest in avoiding Pakistan’s transformation into a radical and militantly religious state that possesses nuclear weapons and tolerates international terrorism. Therefore, the Bush administration should not lean so heavily in India’s direction as to lose its limited leverage over Pakistan or further traumatize Pakistan’s already fragile domestic politics. The United States should continue to insist that the military regime fulfill its pledge to restore democracy, but should balance the effectiveness of economic or military sanctions against its interest in working with the current leaders to encourage moderation on Kashmir, cooperation in fighting terrorism, and dialogue about the safe management of Pakistan’s small nuclear arsenal.

In sum, although the Bush administration faces a raft of challenges in Asia, the problems it inherits should not be exaggerated. Early post-Cold War fears that Asia would quickly become the new locus of great power military conflict have so far proved exaggerated. In most respects regional tensions are lower at the start of this decade than they were at the start of the last. And in most respects the U.S. position in Asia is more favorable, not less. Yet the potential for deterioration and conflicts engaging vital American interests remains. As the Bush administration translates its campaign platform into official policy, it must not only address the region’s lingering tensions, but also be sure that policy innovations designed to promote U.S. interests are not counterproductive. Managing the mixture of common and conflicting interests with Asia’s varied states will pose a stiff test of presidential leadership. To pass this test, attractively simple answers about the risks and opportunities faced and the diplomatic and military means that best serve American interests are unlikely to suffice.

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