E-Notes

Cross-Strait Relations: Past, Present, Future
Remarks by The Honorable C. J. (Chien-Jen) Chen

The 2003 Cynthia P. Robinson Memorial Lecture

February 21, 2003

On January 16, 2003, Representative C.J. Chen delivered FPRI’s Annual Cynthia P. Robinson Memorial Lecture. Created to honor the memory of the wife of the late Harry C. Robinson, an early supporter of FPRI, the Cynthia P. Robinson Lecture is an annual lecture designed to further understanding of international affairs and America’s role in the world. Throughout her life, Mrs. Robinson pursued her interest in international affairs and supported organizations that fostered diplomatic training and public awareness of international diplomacy. This lecture was established with a bequest from the estate of Harry C. Robinson. The Honorable C. J. Chen is Representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington, D.C.

I know that the most pressing international issues at the moment involve Iraq and North Korea and that, in contrast, cross-strait relations appear to be quite tranquil. But, I am also sure that you know cross-strait relations are highly sensitive. Both now and for the foreseeable future, cross- strait relations directly affect not only Taiwan but also U.S. interests in the Western Pacific and peace and security in the entire region. So, this is a topic that merits further discussion.

Of course, to understand where cross-strait relations stand at present and to see where they might stand in the future, one must know something about the historical background of Taiwan’s relationship vis-a-vis the Chinese mainland. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “Upon this point, a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”

I. The Past

Over the course of the last four centuries, Taiwan has been transformed from a neglected backwater and unsettled frontier into a prosperous modern democracy of 23 million people. During this time, control over the island has passed through the hands of a succession of masters: indigenous tribes, Dutch colonizers, Han Chinese pioneers, Manchu officials, Japanese imperialists. In 1945, the island reverted to Chinese control under the Republic of China government. But just four years later, in a tragic twist of fate, China itself was divided by a Civil War into two parts: the free and capitalistic ROC on Taiwan and the tightly controlled and authoritarian People’s Republic of China on the Chinese mainland. Throughout the Cold War, the two sides faced each other across the narrow Taiwan Strait in a tense confrontation marked by enmity, rancor, and distrust. For the past 16 years, my government has been working to break the impasse and facilitate reconciliation with the other side. In some respects, we have made much progress. In others, we have met with disappointment.

For the sake of brevity, I will not delve into all the twists and turns of Taiwan’s fascinating history. But, I do want to point out that several factors and historical truths continue to influence cross-strait relations today and will likely shape them in the future.

First, Taiwan is situated on China’s strategic periphery at the very nexus of international trade routes that crisscross East Asia. The Taiwan Strait, which is as narrow as 90 nautical miles in some places, is the only geophysical feature separating Taiwan from the Chinese mainland.

Second, the vast majority of people on Taiwan are Han Chinese whose ancestors arrived in Taiwan at different times over the course of the last four centuries. They share many ancestral, historic, cultural and linguistic ties with the people across the strait.

Third, owing to their geographical proximity and cultural affinity, economic exchanges between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland have been nearly unavoidable and usually beneficial to both sides.

Fourth, owing to that fact that Taiwan and the Chinese mainland were united for less than five years in the 20th century and the fact that the PRC regime on the mainland has never ruled Taiwan even for a single day, distinct political, economic, and social systems have developed on each side.

Fifth, the long separation has also produced on either side of the Taiwan Strait different values, perspectives, visions, and even identities.

Sixth, cross-strait relations are dynamic, fluid, malleable. Taiwan’s relationship to the Chinese mainland has changed a number of times in the past, is not static at present, and will likely evolve in the future. It is our hope that the relationship will change for the better.

II. The Present

That certainly was the motivation of our government, which, in 1987, sensed that the time had come to break the impasse between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait by allowing veterans on Taiwan to visit their relatives on the Chinese mainland. In the years following, private exchanges (i.e., travel, mail, phone calls) between the people on both sides have grown enormously as have indirect trade and investment. Along the way, our government unilaterally declared the end of hostilities against the Chinese mainland (1991) and amended the ROC Constitution to formally recognize that our jurisdiction covers the Taiwan area only. Just as significantly, both sides of the Taiwan Strait set up liaison agencies to discuss practical issues arising from the various forms of interaction across the Taiwan Strait.

Now let us take a look at current developments — both positive and negative — in the relationship.

Positive

To give you a sense of the scope of that interaction, allow me to cite a few statistics. In addition to exchanging millions of phone calls and letters with people on the mainland, residents of Taiwan have, over the last 16 years, made nearly 27 million trips there, including more than 3 million trips in 2002. And during these trips to the mainland, they have spent roughly 30 billion U.S. dollars. At the same time, thanks to the gradual relaxation of our policy regarding visits from the people of the mainland, they have been able to make 817,000 short trips to Taiwan in the last few years.

Such exchanges have led not only to family reunions but also to the formation of new bonds as well. The number of cross-strait marriages already surpasses 150,000, and hundreds of thousands of people from Taiwan are now residing in the mainland.

The exchanges also have facilitated increased trade and investment between the two sides. In fact, bilateral trade has surpassed 272 billion U.S. dollars since 1987. In just the first nine months of 2002, two-way trade between Taiwan and the mainland rose 26 percent over the same period the year before to 25 billion dollars. For the first time last year, more than 20 percent of our total exports went to the Chinese mainland, and if our exports to Hong Kong were also included, the figure would be closer to 30 percent. Mainland China has thus surpassed the United States as our biggest export market.

The number of Taiwan-based businessmen investing in mainland China has also risen rapidly since restrictions on travel to the mainland were lifted in 1987. According to my government, which counts only pre-approved cases of investment, as of June 2002, Taiwan’s private sector has invested 24.2 billion U.S. dollars in the Chinese mainland. The number is closer to 60 billion according to PRC government figures, which would rank Taiwan fourth behind Hong Kong, the United States, and Japan as an external source of investment. Other non-governmental sources estimate that Taiwan has actually invested well over 140 billion dollars in the mainland.

Taiwan capital is penetrating the mainland more deeply and more broadly than ever before, bringing markets and people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait closer together.

This trend may continue to strengthen now that both Taiwan and the mainland have acceded to the World Trade Organization. Under the WTO, Taiwan and the PRC are co- equals. They must abide by the same rules and regulations, meet the same standards, abide by the same procedures, and resolve trade disputes through the same mechanisms. The WTO also provides both sides incentives to open their markets further to each other.

Other positive developments include some less-publicized events such as the start of the three mini links between our off-shore islands and the mainland coast, my government’s decision to allow mainland Chinese to visit Taiwan as tourists, its decision to allow Taiwan-based banks to set up representative offices in the mainland, and the present efforts to establish indirect charter flights between the two sides during the Chinese New Year holiday.

Negative

These positive developments have had and will continue to have some impact on the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland, but there have been negative developments as well.

First and most fundamental has been the PRC’s continued insistence that Taiwan is a province of China. And since the PRC equates itself with China, this is tantamount to saying that Taiwan is a part of the PRC and should be subject to PRC leadership. Such a formulation not only runs contrary to the facts on the ground, it also alienates the people of Taiwan.

Second, because it insists that Taiwan is merely a local territory, the PRC also works very hard to deny Taiwan any room in the international community. To this day, the PRC strenuously objects to Taiwan’s presence, participation, or even observership in certain non-political international organizations such as the World Health Organization or the International Civil Aviation Organization, not to mention numerous international activities. When international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank seek to include Taiwan in their various reports about the world economy, the PRC insists that all Taiwan- related information must fall under strange and patently false headings such as “Taiwan province of China.” This has not helped cross-strait relations and has indeed further antagonized the people in Taiwan.

Third, the PRC refuses to resume dialogue with us or our designated liaisons. Many of you will recall that, in 1995, the PRC abruptly terminated its dialogue with us and began firing missiles through our air space. This saber rattling was intended to sway the outcome of the first ever direct election of a president in Taiwan. President Clinton responded by dispatching aircraft carriers to the waters off Taiwan — a gesture that, I can assure you, was greatly appreciated in Taiwan. We then appealed to Beijing to resume talks with us, which it did in 1998 only to halt the talks again the next year. Now the PRC insists that no talks can be held unless we first agree to the so-called “one-China” principle. We, on the other hand, have made it clear that we are willing to discuss any issue with them including the one China issue, but that talks should be held without any preconditions.

Fourth, the PRC still refuses to renounce the use of force against us. In recent years, the PRC has deployed more than 350 advanced ballistic missiles along its coastline opposite Taiwan and is increasing the number of these missiles by 50 a year. These missiles are targeted directly at Taiwan and constitute a clear and present danger to us. In addition, they have increased their military budget by more than 17 percent a year for the past two years and they have been acquiring advanced weapons including Russian warships and fighters.

We cannot but increase our purchase of more and better defensive weapons from the U.S. It is most regrettable that resources, which could have been better used for other more meaningful purposes, must instead be used to finance those purchases.

The ROC’S Policy Pronouncements

Let me now summarize the current policies of Taiwan and the mainland regarding their mutual relationship.

When President Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated almost three years ago, he declared that so long as Beijing has no intention of using military force against Taiwan, he would not declare Taiwan Independence, change our national title, push for the inclusion of the “state-to-state” formulation in our Constitution, or promote a referendum on the question of independence or unification. He also said that the abolition of the National Unification Council or the National Unification Guidelines would not be an issue. This policy, which was quickly named the “five noes policy” by media in Taiwan, remains unchanged.

On January 1, 2002, the president further said, “If the Chinese mainland can renounce military intimidation and respect the people’s free will, the two sides can begin with integration in the cultural, economic, and trade fields, before further seeking a new framework for permanent peace and political integration.”

On January 1 of this year, President Chen reiterated this policy formulation and called upon both sides of the Taiwan Strait to “strive toward building a framework of interaction for peace and stability.” The two sides, he said, should “foster an environment conducive to long-term engagement” and “work together, abiding by the principles of democracy, parity and peace in an effort to resolve longer term issues.”

Such policy pronouncements, I believe, fully demonstrate our sincere goodwill and pragmatic approach to cross-strait relations.

The PRC’S Policy Pronouncements

For its part, the PRC has toned down its rhetoric somewhat. In 2000, PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen, who also serves as the deputy director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs, proposed a new three-part thesis on “one China.” According to Qian, “(1) In the whole world there is only one China. (2) The mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China. And (3) the sovereignty and territory of China cannot be divided.” But the essence of the PRC’s version of “one China” has indeed not changed at all, as their actions and other statements have proven thus far.

Last October and again yesterday, Qian also said that the establishment of direct air and shipping links between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait was a purely economic issue that need not by influenced by political factors. But, the PRC still insists on its “one China” principle and refuses to accept the role of our government whose participation is inevitable if links are to be established.

And, in his New Year remarks earlier this month, Jiang Zemin himself “wished the people of Taiwan happiness and good health in the coming year.” But then again he also said that the PRC “firmly holds on to its policy of ’one country, two systems,’” a policy that he knows has been consistently rejected by a large majority of people living in Taiwan.

The fact is, the PRC still refuses to renounce the use of force against us. It still seeks to isolate us internationally. It still targets us with missiles, and it still insists that we must accept its “one China” principle before dialogue can be resumed. Just recently, when Jiang Zeming suggested the PRC might consider reducing these missile deployments in return for reductions in U.S. defensive arms sales to Taiwan, it was obviously an attempt to deflect criticism from their unprovoked arms buildup and their refusal to renounce use of force against us. We are glad the American people, and your leaders, see through such cynical gestures.

The U.S. Can Be a Positive Influence

Most Americans appreciate the fact that Taiwan is strategically important to U.S. national interests. Your government, under either Republican or Democratic leadership, has frequently declared that the Taiwan Strait issue should be resolved peacefully, with the freely given assent of our people. It is very clear this policy has broad bipartisan support in your country.

Let me emphasize that we are grateful for American support of our democratic system and right of free choice. It’s not really all that surprising that the United States, as the world’s first and foremost democracy, should insist upon popular consent for any future solution to cross-strait issues. Nor is it surprising that Americans are opposed to any use of military force to resolve these issues. Like us, you are peace-loving people who oppose force.

The PRC depends greatly on U.S. trade, investment, cultural, and other relations. So we think Washington can be a very effective, positive influence in persuading Beijing to sit down and resume dialogue with us. People on Taiwan have confidence in President Bush and his very direct statements that if the mainland ever decides to take hostile action against Taiwan, America will help us defend ourselves. Resolute and prudent U.S. policy commitments can go a long way towards preventing aggression and encouraging peaceful talks. Taken together, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances of 1982, which have governed U.S. policy towards Taiwan for many years, are crucial to the trust underlying our relationship. And they are critical for peace across the Strait.

Let me point out that we have never asked the United States to act as a mediator between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. That’s not our intention. But we do hope the U.S. continues to play an active role as a stabilizer to encourage peace across the Strait. We appreciate that the U.S. handles its relationships with both Taiwan and PRC in a very even-handed way. Balanced treatment serves the United States’ own interests as well as ours.

III. The Future

What does the future hold for cross-strait relations? No one can be sure. Some 10 years ago, several scholars co-authored a paper describing 43 different models of unification, and there could easily be as many models for independence, so it is very risky to make predictions about what shape cross- straits relations might take in the years ahead. Leaders in Taipei and Beijing will no doubt continue fashioning cross-strait policies in light of tangible economic and security interests as well as intangible cultural and value-laden interests. But, cross-strait relations are also influenced by other sets of bilateral relations including our close and friendly relationship with the United States as well as by changes in the international environment.

Furthermore, we must keep in mind that many intractable differences remain between the two sides. Indeed, the entire so-called “one China” issue reflects all these various differences: (1) Our disparate economic and political systems. (2) Our different standards of living. (3) Our distinctive mentalities and outlooks. And, (4) the lingering sense of misunderstanding and distrust. Until and unless the gaps in those areas can be narrowed and/or until and unless a better appreciation and acceptance of the differences between the two sides can be realized, cross-strait relations can only proceed at a slow and deliberate pace.

And yet, there are also a number of reasons for guarded optimism. For one thing, the governments and the people on both sides seem to understand peace, security, and continued economic development are in the interests of both sides. Secondly, to meet real needs, exchanges are sure to increase. Dialogue, though interrupted, is inevitable. And, with dialogue, the two sides eventually may reach some accommodation. Third, the twin processes of globalization and technological advancement are causing both sides to move toward a higher degree of interaction, understanding, and perhaps common interests.

How all these various different factors, trends, developments, and interests play out in the long run, only time will tell. It is an enormous challenge. What is required now is patience, wisdom, and goodwill. These three things we possess in ample quantity, so I am reasonably optimistic and hopeful that a better relationship between the ROC and the PRC is in the cards.

I would therefore encourage you to keep an eye on cross-strait relations, to lend your support for positive change, and to help us bring lasting peace and prosperity to the entire Western Pacific region.

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