E-Notes

Terrorism and the Battle for Homeland Security

by Seth G. Jones

May 21, 2004

Seth G. Jones is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation and adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. From 2002 to 2003 he was an analyst for the Gilmore Commission (formally called the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction).

Three years after 9/11, is the United States better prepared to prevent and respond to homeland security threats? Has the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) materially improved the coordination and analysis of intelligence on terrorist threats to the United States? Numerous recent government and think-tank reports concluded that U.S. counterterrorism coordination was abysmal before September 2001. [1] In June 2002, when it announced plans to establish DHS, the White House envisioned it as one department to “synthesize and analyze homeland security intelligence from multiple sources [and] coordinate communications with state and local governments, private industry, and the American people about threats and preparedness.”

However, this hope has not been realized. DHS has struggled for relevance and become increasingly sidelined in the analysis and dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence. Meanwhile, the CIA’s homeland security role has been bolstered through its creation of a Terrorist Threat Integration Center in 2003, and the FBI has devoted substantial resources to improving its homeland security- related counterterrorism and intelligence capabilities.

DHS’s struggle to find its niche fulfills the following observation made in 1888 by Lord Bryce, a British historian and ambassador to the U.S.:

There is among political bodies and offices … of necessity a constant strife, a struggle for existence similar to that which Mr. Darwin has shown to exist among plants and animals. [T]his struggle stimulates each body or office to exert its utmost force for its own preservation, and to develop its aptitudes in any direction where development is possible. [2]

While the United States is better today at collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on terrorist threats to the homeland than it was prior to 9/11, little of this is attributable to DHS. The FBI and CIA, supported by the White House and some in Congress, have strongly resisted handing over counterterrorism and intelligence responsibilities to DHS.

A Leading Role for DHS?

To counter terrorist threats to the homeland, the U.S. must gather and assess intelligence about enemies planning attacks on the United States or on U.S. targets abroad. Which individuals and organizations are planning attacks? Where are they located? What equipment and methods are they using? When are they likely to attack? Intelligence is critical for law enforcement organizations seeking to deter or prevent attacks from occurring. State and local police, the FBI, Coast Guard, and other organizations need sound information to monitor and arrest adversaries. The challenge is the large number of federal, state, local, and private- sector actors involved in intelligence.

Consequently, DHS was established in December 2002 to fulfill three primary objectives: (1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, (2) reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and (3) respond to any terrorist attacks and natural disasters that do occur. DHS integrated a number of agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, and Coast Guard, in the largest federal government restructuring effort since the creation of the Department of Defense after World War II. The DoD, FBI, Department of Justice, and CIA would still play important homeland security roles, but DHS would be the focal point.

A critical DHS function would be analyzing and assessing terrorist threats to the U.S. and better coordinating intelligence information. Of its four directorates, the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) was intended to be the most important, tasked with coordinating and analyzing intelligence information about terrorist threats to the U.S., assessing vulnerabilities to U.S. infrastructure, and disseminating information to the private sector and to relevant federal, state, and local officials. It would “fuse and analyze intelligence and other information pertaining to the homeland from multiple sources-including the CIA, NSA, FBI, INS, DEA, DOE, Customs, DOT, and data gleaned from other organizations.” The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which officially created DHS, did not mandate the IAIP to collect intelligence, though it could receive "raw intelligence" from the CIA and FBI and task other agencies to collect information.

The Struggle for Power

However, the CIA and FBI, eventually supported by the executive and legislative branches, strongly resisted handing over significant power to DHS. Both agencies increased, rather than decreased, their homeland security functions. Despite initial backing from the White House and many on Capitol Hill, support for DHS faded quickly. Most policymakers believed either that DHS was unable to perform terrorist threat analysis adequately, or that other departments within the federal government could do it better.

CIA. The CIA increased its homeland security power through the creation in May 2003 of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). The CIA has traditionally been the primary government agency dealing with terrorism, though it is barred from collecting intelligence or conducting operations within the United States. It established a Counterterrorism Center in 1986 under the Directorate of Operations to help combat international terrorist threats, including on its staff personnel from the broader intelligence community. Directorate of Intelligence officers served in its analytic components to provide regional and functional expertise, making it the first permanent unit at the CIA to combine analysis and operations.

September 11 highlighted for the intelligence community the need to improve coordination. A new interagency terrorism center with greater participation from throughout the U.S. government was more politically palatable than simply revamping the Counterterrorism Center. But under whose roof should it set up shop? One option was the DHS’s Directorate of IAIP. However, CIA officials vigorously lobbied to keep the center under the jurisdiction of the Director of Central Intelligence, arguing that the CIA had the most competent terrorism analysts. DHS analysts had little experience in handling complicated legal and security intelligence matters or in co-handling foreign and domestic intelligence. Furthermore, some argued that it would be most efficient to have a single agency-the CIA-with de facto control over both offensive capabilities (e.g., penetrating terrorist organizations and attacking them through preemptive strikes) and defensive capabilities (e.g., preventing future attacks by analyzing threats to the homeland). [3]

Therefore, TTIC was created under the Director for Central Intelligence (DCI), to coordinate and provide comprehensive analysis to the president and federal agencies on terrorist threats-the very task originally envisioned for DHS. TTIC integrates and analyzes all terrorist threat information collected domestically and abroad in a central location and houses a database of known and suspected terrorists that federal, state, and local officials across the country can access. It examines regional threats, such as Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, as well as functional threats, such as WMD and cyber attacks. It is also responsible for putting together the president’s daily threat matrix.

TTIC is staffed by representatives on assignment from the CIA, FBI, DHS, and other bodies from the Departments of Defense and State such as the NSA, National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency), and Defense Intelligence Agency. Staffed with several hundred personnel in early 2004, it will likely increase in size to some 2,000 by the end of the year. It is legally not part of the CIA, since it reports to the DCI. However, in practice the distinction is much less clear, and the CIA wields a preponderant amount of influence in the center. TTIC is currently placed under the CIA’s budget and is located at CIA headquarters, though there have been some indications that it could move to neighboring Tyson’s Corner.

FBI. The FBI has traditionally played the leading role in responding to terrorism within the United States, though it was severely criticized for being insufficiently proactive before 9/11. Since 2001, it has adopted a preemptive strategy, increased its counterterrorism resources, and established an Office of Intelligence, motivated in part by a desire to remain the lead counterterrorism agency for homeland threats.

The FBI’s attempt to redefine itself from an agency that investigates crimes after they occur to one that is proactive in gathering intelligence before attacks occur is articulated in its reformulated vision statement, “FBI Vision 2010.” Since 2001, the FBI has disrupted alleged terrorist cells in Buffalo, Detroit, and Portland, Oregon; charged nearly 200 suspected terrorist associates with crimes; and deported at least 500 suspected terrorists. FBI Director Robert Mueller has also tried to change the FBI’s traditional system of decentralized management, in which significant power was in the hands of the 56 field offices, by increasing the number and importance of analysts and policymakers at headquarters. [4]

When Director Mueller made counterterrorism the FBI’s top priority, he implemented a major reorganization and increased resources for the Counterterrorism Division. More than 500 field agents were permanently shifted from criminal investigations to counterterrorism. On September 11, 2001, the FBI had roughly 635 agents working on counterterrorism issues full time; it how has more than 2,000. [5] It established an Operations Center to serve as a clearinghouse for information sharing and collaboration. It created 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, which include state and local law enforcement officers, and FBI agents. Finally, it expanded its international counterterrorism presence in Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia by adding FBI legal attach, (LEGAT) offices and deploying agents abroad. There are currently more than 50 LEGAT offices and several hundred FBI employees overseas. The FBI has played a key role in investigating recent terrorist bombings in Bali, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other countries. Given the rising threat from international terrorist organizations and the increase in transnational organized crime, the FBI’s overseas presence should and will continue to increase.

In January 2003, the FBI also bolstered its analytical capabilities by creating an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence and an Office of Intelligence. The office is responsible for identifying emerging threats and crime problems that impact FBI investigations and overall strategies. It is the FBI’s primary interface for coordinating intelligence on terrorist threats to the United States and sharing information with the U.S. intelligence community, the legislative branch, foreign government agencies, state and local law enforcement, and the private sector, and also places the FBI in direct competition with DHS.

Each FBI field office also has a Field Intelligence Group to centrally manage, execute, and coordinate the FBI’s intelligence functions in that field office. The expectation is that a cadre of nationwide intelligence analysts will be built up over the next few years.

Left Out in the Cold

These developments have made it difficult for DHS— particularly its Directorate of IAIP— to find a role for intelligence analysis and dissemination, and it has established little power and capability to do this.

One of its problems is that IAIP does not have significant analytical power: the FBI and CIA retain primary power for analyzing raw terrorist intelligence. This has left DHS with a paucity of competent intelligence analysts, who have been much more willing to go to the CIA, FBI or intelligence bodies within the Departments of Defense and State. [6] Numerous reports on DHS have given the impression of an organization that is in serious turmoil regarding personnel, facilities, infrastructure, and mission. Paul Redmond, IAIP’s first assistant secretary, served for only a few months before resigning. As a Markle Foundation Task Force recently concluded, DHS “does not appear to have taken the necessary steps to build the communications and sharing network required to deal with the threat, or to begin producing regular, actionable intelligence products for other agencies.” [7] The one exception is infrastructure protection, in which DHS performs vulnerability assessments of key U.S. infrastructure targets. DHS inherited the National Infrastructure Protection Center, formerly part of the FBI, which develops and distributes daily classified and unclassified infrastructure warnings.

Moreover, DHS has had significant competition from other federal agencies in disseminating information to state and local authorities, the private sector, and other areas, despite President Bush’s July 2003 Executive Order giving the Secretary of Homeland Security primary authority for sharing homeland security information. This is probably largely due to overlapping responsibilities. For example, the FBI is responsible for sharing intelligence information with state and local law enforcement through its Joint Terrorism Task Forces, but also disseminates information to state and local governments. Another cause may be proactive efforts by state and local governments. Senior intelligence officials have noted that some intelligence sharing between the CIA and state and local actors is initiated by state and local entities. [8] And while DHS and other agencies are trying to improve information-sharing, their efforts have been insufficient so far. [9]

Salvaging Homeland Security

The culture the CIA has developed over the years is effective for collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence information, penetrating foreign organizations and governments, and conducting covert attacks. The agency’s work necessitates dealing with unsavory characters, protecting sources and methods used to gather information, and keeping a close hold on intelligence. It has rigid standards for employment, requiring prospective employees to take a polygraph and psychological examinations. Above all, it is deeply reluctant to share information. But this culture is at odds with what is needed for homeland security, and it raises concerns about the CIA’s influence in domestic matters. [10] The CIA is not the agency best suited to analyze intelligence from both domestic and foreign sources and quickly disseminate it as appropriate. [11]

Placing much of the power to collect and analyze data on homeland security threats with an agency that is fundamentally geared toward secrecy and has no legal domestic jurisdiction compromises homeland security. It is not that intelligence hasn’t been— or wouldn’t be— shared if there is a specific threat about an attack on the United States, but that important intelligence won’t be shared efficiently with state, local, private sector, and health entities when the threat is more ambiguous.

Drawing clear jurisdictional boundaries and ensuring sufficient cooperation between DHS and the FBI has proven the hardest challenge since the DHS was created. To correct this, the U.S. Congress should plan to transition TTIC away from the DCI within the next few years. It could be placed within DHS, so that authority would flow through the Secretary of Homeland Security to the President. [12] But DHS lacks the analytical capabilities for this task. Alternatively, TTIC could become a stand-alone domestic intelligence agency along the lines of Britain’s MI-5, reporting directly to the President. [13] However, the start-up costs for this would be great. The third-and most sensible-option is eventually to transition TTIC to the FBI, assuming that the FBI continues to improve its counterterrorism and intelligence competencies. The FBI has a clear and legal domestic jurisdiction, a good working relationship with state and local actors, a Counterterrorism Division already in place, and proven willingness to become more proactive.

Additionally, DHS should be officially authorized to collect domestic intelligence. The FBI gathers information through its field offices, agents, and state and local law enforcement. DHS’s Customs, Border Patrol, and Coast Guard components offer a goldmine of useful information. These agencies constantly interact with people and goods at airports, seaports, land checkpoints, coastlines, and other border areas. Collected information can be coordinated through TTIC, regardless of whether the FBI or another government agency is in charge of it.

In the nearly three years since 9/11, progress in intelligence sharing has come mostly in spite of DHS, rather than as a result of its actions. While DHS certainly has an important role to play in the collection of information and infrastructure protection, this is not the mandate initially envisioned by the White House and some in Congress. Fortunately, this is not a bad development. DHS has little experience and few capabilities to take on its original mandate. It would accordingly be unwise to shift more power to DHS, regardless of who wins the November elections. Rather, the FBI should be the lead agency for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on terrorist threats to the homeland, with support from DHS, the CIA, and the intelligence community as a whole.

Notes

^ These include reports by the Gilmore Commission, a Joint Inquiry by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, and Markle Foundation.
^ From Lord Bryce, The American Commonwealth, quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1963), p. 171.
^ Interviews with senior intelligence officials, Aug. 6 and 13, 2003.
^ Dick Thornburgh, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, June 18, 2003.
^ Interview with senior FBI official, Feb. 26, 2004.
^ John Mintz, “At Homeland Security, Doubts Arise Over Intelligence,” Washington Post, July 21, 2003; Edward Alden, “U.S. Fails to &#ref8217;Connect the Dots&#ref8217; By Pooling Its Terrorist Watch Lists,” Financial Times, July 16, 2003; “September 11 and Today,” Christian Science Monitor, July 29, 2003.
^ Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security: Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force (Washington, D.C.: Markle Foundation, December 2003), p. 3.
^ Interview with senior intelligence official, Aug. 6, 2003.
^ Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-03-760 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, August 2003).
^ Dan Eggen, "Center to Assess Terrorist Threat," Washington Post, May 1, 2003; Robert Bryant, John Hamre, John Lawn, John MacGaffin, Howard Shapiro, and Jeffrey Smith, "America Needs More Spies - Intelligence and Security" Economist, July 12, 2003.
^ Bruce Berkowitz, "A Fresh Start Against Terror," New York Times, Aug. 4, 2003; Siobhan Gorman, “FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart,” National Journal, Aug. 1, 2003.
^ On moving TTIC to DHS see James B. Steinberg, Hearing of the SGAC, Feb. 14, 2003; Berkowitz, “A Fresh Start”; Markle Foundation, Protecting America&#ref8217;s Freedom in the Information Age (2002), pp. 71-72; “Lieberman Hails Intelligence Analysis Center As Necessary; Says it Belongs in Homeland Security Department, Not CIA,” Press Statement, SGAC, Jan. 29, 2003).
^ The Gilmore Commission laid out the logic for this in its Fourth Annual Report: Implementing the National Strategy, pp. iii-v, 42.

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