E-Notes

U.S. Policies Toward Latin America

by William Perry

April 19, 2001

William Perry, a former director of Latin American Affairs for the National Security Council, is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and President of William Perry and Associates in Washington, D.C.

Related FPRI E-Notes include “Chaos in the Andes,” by Michael Radu (March 2001); “Aid to Colombia: A Study in Muddled Arguments,” by Michael Radu (February 2000); and “Latin America: A Scorecard,” by William Perry (January 2000).

On the eve of President Bush’s visit to Quebec for the Third Summit of the Americas, it is clear that trends are drawing the United States into closer relations with its hemispheric neighbors. That Mexico has emerged to displace Japan as our second largest trading partner — behind only the other member of NAFTA, Canada, is fairly well known. But few appreciate, for example, that Brazil surpasses China with respect to our trade and investment, and Venezuela is now the most important foreign supplier of petroleum to our economy. In fact, commerce with the region as a whole is growing so fast that it could surpass that with Europe and Asia over the course of the coming decade. And some time around 2005 we are scheduled to become members of an inter-American free trade area with over 800 million inhabitants.

Moreover, the traffic in people across the border with our neighbors to the south continues to expand geometrically (a two-way street to be sure— with Americans visiting on business, vacationing, and retiring there in increasing numbers). Indeed, we have ourselves become the fifth largest “Latin American country” in terms of population— and the cultural evidence of this is all around us, particularly in the more dynamic southern and western parts of our nation. Individuals tracing their roots to this region are rapidly coming to comprise our single largest ethnic community, and this will have predictable consequences in domestic and foreign affairs, as they demand increasing attention to their places of origin.

Under these circumstances, the course of events in the rest of the Hemisphere has already come to have at least as great an impact on the lives of average Americans as do developments in any other part of the globe. This situation creates many great opportunities for the United States. But it also means that our neighbors’ troubles will inevitably have a strong impact upon the vital interests of this country— upon even the fabric of our domestic society, as already evident in the form of drug-trafficking and illegal immigration. We must therefore ensure that Latin America comes to comprise an important asset, rather than a debilitating liability to the United States, in the competitive, uncertain world of the future.

Moreover, it is important to appreciate that the Latin American/Caribbean area no longer enjoys the unambiguously positive prospects which seemed to be emerging in the late 1980s and early 1990s— when the practice of democracy came to embrace virtually the whole region, market economics was the unquestioned wave of the future, local conflict appeared to be diminishing, and prospects for international cooperation flourished to an unprecedented extent. Great promise continues to exist. But still-fragile democratic institutions and liberal economic policies are now coming under serious pressure in a growing number of countries. Indeed, an ominous constellation of new-age security threats to local societies has arisen— including powerful drug-trafficking organizations operating across international borders, hybrid forms of insurgency and terrorism, greatly expanded rates of common crime, shocking corruption of law enforcement agencies and other governmental institutions, and even signs that could point to neo-authoritarianism in some venues.

What should U.S. strategy be? It does not require any particular genius to provide the answer— just enlightened projection of our basic national interest, a dose of imagination, and a great deal more ongoing commitment to the Hemisphere than has been evident before.

First, we must concentrate on preservation and extension of market-based economic policies toward (and within) the region as the best means of realizing the developmental aspirations throughout the Americas. Our country needs the resources, markets, and competitiveness-enhancing, production-partnership opportunities that this Hemisphere offers in abundance, as well as the cooperation of these nations in expansion of a free-enterprise-based economic system worldwide. And they need our import-consumption capability, technology, and management skills to satisfy their population’s developmental aspirations, sustain democratic government, and stabilize social situations that now often give rise to excessive emigration.

This should impel us to accelerate the recently lagging pace of formal economic integration with the Hemisphere— by securing “fast-track” (now being called “trade promotion” authority) for our new president and proceeding with all dispatch to conclude negotiations aimed at creating the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the already agreed-upon date of 2005 (or earlier, if at all possible). It should be noted here that this accord will require ratification by our Congress, as well as by a number of others around the Hemisphere. Remembering the colossal battle over Mexico and NAFTA, we should already be preparing public and legislative opinion for this eventuality. In addition, it will be necessary to encourage other regional governments to stay the course toward liberalization, understand the socio- political difficulties that this occasions for many of them and, when necessary, be prepared to provide support of their efforts — directly or through international financial institutions (as in the case of Mexico in early 1995 and Argentina today). (Some of those institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, will also have to be reformed to meet the new kinds of challenges that they are likely to encounter in the future.)

Second, it is of equal importance to make clear our continued dedication to democracy (as well as perfection of the institutional pillars that sustain it) as the right of all peoples of the Americas. This means that the effective practice of democratic government is a sine qua non for membership in our emerging hemispheric community and that regressive tendencies toward authoritarianism— of whatever stripe— must be resisted by all its governments and societies. At the same time, experience has taught us that periodic elections and constitutional government alone — while indispensable foundations— are not always sufficient to guarantee the rights that all citizens deserve. Therefore, more attention ought to be devoted to “second generation” political and social reforms aimed toward ensuring greater honesty, transparency, access, fairness, and efficiency on the part of government, as well as impartiality, protection, and justice from judicial institutions and law enforcement agencies in this Hemisphere.

Third, we should be making a much greater common effort to defend democratic government and societies from a host of new threats that have emerged as real dangers to local countries— as well as our own. Ultimately, this means adding an effective politico-security counterpart to the economic community already in the process of emerging. In this regard, the Organization of American States (and such other venerable entities as the Inter-American Defense Board and Inter-American Defense College), as well as certain structures within our own government (especially DOD), will need to be significantly reformed, integrated with embryonic institutions emerging from the FTAA process and now-regular hemispheric summit meetings (including those of the Defense Ministers) or replaced. This is more quickly and easily said than done. In the interim, we will have to look imaginatively to new forms of bilateral, functional, and sub-regional cooperation in order to confront situations that cannot await the outcome of this process of attitudinal and institutional evolution.

Finally, on the basis of mutual respect and self-interest, the nations of this Hemisphere need to be seeking out fresh avenues of cooperation to meet the new opportunities and challenges that confront them. This potentially includes more effective joint treatment of issues ranging from dispute resolution and peacekeeping, through ensuring hemispheric energy self-sufficiency, protection of the environment, and the representation of inter-American views to the wider world. In the end, a general forum for discussion and decision-making — some more effective version of the OAS — will need to be created to give full voice to the Americas in the 21st century.

In sum, the following initiatives are needed:

prompt appeal to Congress for restoration of “fast-track” (“trade promotion”) authority.
energetic, unceasing efforts to complete negotiation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement by 2005 (or earlier) and its prompt ratification.
comprehensive review of inter-American politico-security institutions (and the U.S. government agencies that should be interacting with them) aimed toward significantly enhancing their effectiveness, both in providing immediately improved multilateral cooperation on regional problems now being faced and, over the longer term, to constitute an appropriate counterpart to the Western Hemisphere economic community presently being forged.
significant reform and strengthening of efforts to control drug-trafficking and other forms of cross-border criminal activity, including more intense and effective cooperation with regional military, law enforcement and judicial institutions; rethinking of present annual drug “certification” requirement and process.
much greater bilateral collaboration on energy issues and strategy; ultimately, the establishment of a comprehensive energy component to the FTAA, aimed at ensuring long-term self-sufficiency for the Western Hemisphere.
forging of much more intensive cooperation with Mexico in such areas as energy, counter-narcotics efforts, control of illegal immigration, and disaster relief; establishment of a new and substantial guest workers program, commensurate with U.S. employment needs and providing adequate safeguards to the participants.
unrelenting pressure for an end to the Castro dictatorship and the soonest possible return of Cuba to the mainstream of hemispheric life, with due regard for the interests of the long-suffering people of that island.
full-scale reappraisal of our policy toward the deplorable situation that continues to afflict the population of Haiti.
attempt to provide the Caribbean Basin countries (including Central America) with trade treatment as close as possible to parity with that of Mexico, especially if there is any significant delay in the FTAA process.
enduring and, if necessary, greater economic and military support to the government of Colombia, as well as the enlistment of other nations in this effort, in its struggle to regain full control of the country from guerrillas (by negotiations, if possible), narco-mafias, and para-military groups.
a prudent, firm and watchful policy toward developments in Venezuela in the hope that the Chavez government stays within the bounds of democratic political practice and reasonable relations with its regional neighbors.
priority attention, as well, to the difficult situations obtaining in the other Andean countries; renewal of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) this year as an interim measure on the path toward the FTAA.
respectful recognition of Brazil’s role as both a significant international actor and the largest Latin American component in all future developments toward inter-American integration, most particularly the FTAA.
appreciation of Argentina’s outstanding collaboration on global security matters and support for current efforts to stabilize its economic situation.
acknowledgement of Chile’s role as regional leader on the path toward economic liberalization and conciliation of past domestic difficulties within a democratic political framework; prompt movement toward a bilateral free trade accord in the event that the FTAA is not moving with sufficient speed.

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