E-Notes

Toward a Resolution of the Taiwan Strait Problem: Chen Shui-Bian’s “Theory of Integration”

by Lorna Hahn

May 21, 2001

Lorna Hahn, Ph.D., is Executive Director of the Association on Third World Affairs, Washington, D.C.

For a related essay in this series, see “Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bian: A President’s Progress,” by Harvey Sicherman, FPRI E-Notes, May 11, 2001.

After a turbulent political ride, Chen Shui-bian celebrated his first anniversary as President of Taiwan (or, the Republic of China, as they say in Taiwan) on May 20. The former mayor of Taipei came to office with only 39 percent of the vote in the first democratic change of political power in the history of Chinese civilization. He faced daunting challenges from without and within.

His island country was, and still is, isolated diplomatically and threatened militarily by the massive forces of mainland China. As the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocates an independent Taiwan Republic, Chen is distrusted by Beijing. As a result, Beijing actively courts Taiwan’s opposition party leaders and legislators, evidently in the hope that Beijing can marginalize Chen.

Within Taiwan, the minority president has found himself road-blocked at every turn by a powerful political opposition that dominates the legislature.

Some observers have already posted his political obituary. A New York Times story described Chen as “an isolated ineffectual figure,” while Hu Chong-shinn’s book, The Arrogance of Power, described Chen’s first year in office as a “litany of failures.” Yet, the seasoned political gladiator has turned adversity to his advantage and emerged stronger for the experience.

Chen Shui-bian survived a concerted effort by the political opposition not only to block his policy initiatives, but also to wrest power from him, even to impeach and unseat him. The opposition coalition had both the will and the numbers in the legislature— the KMT itself has 113 seats, Chen’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 66. They stopped short of impeachment and recall, however, because the people would not tolerate it. The polls, reflecting popular distaste for the idea, saved the day.

Chen also survived a near constitutional crisis over his decision to block construction of Taiwan’s fourth nuclear power plant, a long-held DPP aim. When the supreme court reversed his decision to terminate the nuclear project, Chen responded by mediating the issue between his own party and the opposition so as to avoid further political turmoil, and the issue was resolved in early spring.

On the cross-strait front, Chen’s political opponents virtually wrested control of cross-strait relations from him for several months, pursuing their own dialogues in Beijing. Chen subsequently regained control of cross-strait policy, forbidding any negotiations with China without his authorization. His implicit message to Beijing was: if you wish to talk to Taiwan, you must go through me.

Chen’s New Middle Course

Chen began to unfold his own cross-strait strategy at the beginning of his term. He saw it as his mission to steer the ship of state between the rocks of reunification with China and the shoals of independence, to a safe but undefined harbor. Refusing to become ensnarled in the semantic battle over “one China,” Chen embraced the ROC Constitution, which implies one China. He is still responsive to a constituency that does not trust the Chinese leaders and contends that Beijing will always consider “one China” to be the PRC.

By the turn of the year, he was fleshing out the principles that would guide policy:

Taiwan’s security is paramount. Therefore, the president must be guided not by the DPP platform which calls for "independence,” but by his assessment of the realities of the situation. Translation: War is not an acceptable alternative. Therefore, neither is de jure independence, which would provoke war.
Taiwan is already independent. Therefore, there is no need to declare independence. The need, rather, is to sustain the country’s de facto independence, to protect the status quo.
The creation of a stable cross-strait environment is vital.
Taiwan should approach the mainland in the spirit of conciliation and cooperation.
Cross-strait economic relations should be normalized. Island and mainland should put aside political disputes and step up economic and trade exchanges. That would help to put the bilateral ties on a steady track leading to permanent peace and stability.

Integration Theory

At the core of the President’s new middle course is his concept of economic integration of island and mainland, leading to political integration. It is a work in progress.

Chen introduced the idea of economic and political “integration,” in his New Year’s Day address. The term has since been upgraded by his spokesmen to “integration theory,” a theory that appears to distinguish between “integration,” which is a process, and “reunification,” which is an end. Before the end can be reached, the relationship must journey through a process of bringing the two sides closer together. No one can claim that Chen’s integration concept is a harbinger of separation.

Does integration assure reunification? Not necessarily — that will be a function of time and felt mutual benefit. The people of Taiwan will have the final say. And that decision will be heavily influenced by the state of political affairs in mainland China. Democracy on the mainland would be conducive to reunification; continued authoritarian Communist Party rule would not.

Chen next launched a search for a political framework for his “integration theory.” He told EU Parliament members visiting Taiwan in March that the mainland and Taiwan should seek permanent peace through “political integration,” be it in the form of a federation, confederation, commonwealth or something like the European Union. At the same time, to reassure his people, Chen declared that the constitution should not be compromised by any form of political integration.

In the meantime, Chen has lost no time putting his idea of “economic integration” to work:

He called for construction of a new model for cross-strait economic relations, one that would incorporate them in a global market context with adequate risk management.
He unilaterally ended restrictions on direct travel, commerce and communications between the ROC islands of Chen-min (Quemoi) and Matsu and the Chinese mainland.
He called for early cross-strait talks to negotiate terminating all such restrictions (the “three no links” policy) between Taiwan and mainland.
He stated his desire to remove limitations on Taiwanese investment in mainland China, pending PRC assurances to protect investors.
He endorsed former KMT premier Vincent Siew’s proposal to promote a common market with China. In return, Vincent Siew endorsed Chen’s integration theory, saying mutual trust can only be built when political issues are set aside. Thus, in one fell swoop, President Chen forged a strategic alliance with the KMT on the delicate cross-strait issue. The common market initiative should strike a chord with PRC premier Zhu Rongji, who last year proposed a common market for Southeast Asia.

The President’s initiatives have resonated well in Taiwan: an April 29 survey showed a 57 percent approval rating for Chen despite the economic slowdown and record unemployment (4 percent).

One might expect Beijing to applaud such initiatives that would bring island and mainland closer together. But the Chinese leaders remain aloof.

Meanwhile, economic, business, and cultural ties between the two sides of the strait flourish, remaining largely unaffected by the political impasse. Chen’s vision of economic and cultural integration is being realized without intervention by the political authorities.

Because of the PRC leaders' rigid mind set, all of Chen’s efforts to find a modus vivendi might ultimately prove to be an exercise in futility. Yet, ironically, Chen Shui-bian may be the best representative in Taiwan to negotiate with Beijing because his native Taiwanese identity and DPP affiliation will insulate him from accusations of selling out the Taiwanese people, just as President Nixon’s anti-communist credentials protected his opening to China in 1972. Indeed, during the runup to his election, Chen compared himself to Richard Nixon. The comparison may turn out to be prophetic.

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E-Notes

Toward a Resolution of the Taiwan Strait Problem: Chen Shui-Bian’s “Theory of Integration”

Chen’s New Middle Course

Integration Theory

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