E-Notes

New Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

by Shelley Rigger

September 5, 2003

Shelly Rigger is Brown Assistant Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College and a Senior Fellow at FPRI. She will be speaking at the 32nd Annual Sino-American Conference on Contemporary Chinese Affairs, cosponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia) and the Institute of International Relations (Taipei) on Sept. 18-19, 2003. This year the theme of the conference is “Democratization and Its Limits in Greater China.”

Early this year Taiwanese politicians unveiled a controversial proposal to resolve some of the island’s thorniest policy debates through referendums. The proposal provoked heated discussion, in part because it would circumvent the normal legislative process, but more importantly by arousing suspicions in Beijing and Washington (as well as within Taiwan) that President Chen Shui-bian and his party were embarking on a course that would eventually undermine the stability of the Taiwan Strait. With U.S.-ROC-Sino relations in precarious balance, why did Taiwanese politicians introduce a proposal they knew would shake that equilibrium? And how should the U.S. respond?

Background

The constitution of the ROC guarantees the right of referendum, but Taiwan has never exercised that right at the national level, and the Legislative Yuan has never passed a bill establishing procedures for a referendum. That is not to say, however, that Taiwanese have only just discovered the idea. In 1991, expatriate activist Trong Chai (Cai Tongrong) founded the Association for a Plebiscite in Taiwan to campaign for a plebiscite on Taiwan independence. That same year, Taiwan’s first and most significant opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), formally adopted the goal of establishing an independent Taiwan through referendum. These early conversations about referendum, both of which assumed that the purpose of a referendum would be to achieve independence, created a link between the two issues in the minds of many U.S. and PRC observers.

Enthusiasm for referendums waxed and waned over the years. In 2001, a controversy erupted over construction of a fourth nuclear power plant in Taiwan. When the legislature blocked the Chen government’s efforts to cancel the project, Chen promised a referendum on the topic. But in July 2001 the government dropped the idea, citing the risk of increased social and political tension and the absence of legal guidelines for holding a binding referendum. To resolve the latter dilemma, the Cabinet sent forward a proposal to create enabling legislation in April 2002.

In March 2003, the referendum movement picked up steam when anti-nuclear activists began pressing for a referendum on the nuclear power plant to coincide with the March 2004 presidential election. In May, a new issue jumped to the fore when the PRC blocked the SARS-stricken island’s efforts to attain observer status in the World Health Organization. President Chen called for a referendum on WHO membership, stating that “A referendum would highlight the consensus and determination of Taiwan to participate in the WHO.” (Taipei Times, May 21, 2003) The value of such a referendum would be entirely symbolic: even a unanimous vote would have no power to compel the WHO to admit Taiwan. With two issues on the referendum table, other policy issues subsequently gained the attention of referendum advocates, including proposals to reduce the size of the legislature and to eliminate then National Assembly.

Before any of these referendums could be carried out, however, Taiwan needed to establish procedures for the vote. Thus, the debate returned to the matter of enabling legislation. The first proposal put before the legislature came from independence fundamentalist Trong Chai and would have allowed referendums on changing the national boundaries, formal title, and national anthem, all topics guaranteed to provoke a strong reaction from Beijing. Chai’s proposal, which had strong support from the Sino-phobic Taiwan Solidarity Union, was sharply opposed by the conservative parties, which boycotted the measure. Mainstream DPP leaders, cognizant of Beijing’s objections, sought to distance themselves from the whole matter.

Still, the referendum idea would not die. None of the leading political parties wanted to oppose referendums in general. Thus, in April, DPP moderates put forward a proposal that specifically excluded referendums on questions of independence or unification, national security, and military matters. A KMT think tank proposed a similar text and the TSU a more provocative text, which was defeated on June 5.

When no referendum legislation passed in the regular session, the government stated its intention to create enabling rules through administrative action, an idea that provoked outrage among conservative legislators. The KMT and PFP called for a special legislative session to consider the matter, which was finally held the second week in July. At that session, which considered several other items of legislation besides the referendum proposals, KMT and PFP legislators pursued a complex strategy aimed at foreclosing the possibility of a referendum on Taiwan’s status while at the same time embarrassing the DPP and establishing their own pro-referendum credentials. Instead of opposing referendum altogether — a position that had become politically untenable — KMT legislators planned to vote for Chai’s proposal after amending it to exclude a referendum on Taiwan’s status. They knew the DPP caucus would oppose the measure, since the party’s own bill was still before the legislature. They hoped to use the DPP’s votes against Chai’s referendum bill to argue that the DPP was inconsistent in its support for referendum.

In the end, the speaker of the Legislative Yuan, KMT member Wang Jin-pyng, ended the session without calling a vote on the referendum bills, citing the need for further inter-party consultations. KMT and other conservative legislators were furious, and while DPP legislators leapt to Wang’s defense, his party brethren hurled abuse from the floor. Wang later commented that no progress was likely before the next legislative session, scheduled for November. Even then, he said, passing the legislation would be difficult.

With enabling legislation stalled, President Chen’s cabinet moved to create a framework for a referendum administratively and issued its guidelines in early August. However, the framework’s legality is in doubt, and local politicians representing the KMT and PFP have said they will refuse to carry out a referendum under administrative guidelines. On September 4, the cabinet spokesman announced a plan to “mobilize policemen, teachers, employees of state-run enterprises and local taxation offices” to carry out referendums where local officials resist. In short, the battle lines are drawn for a showdown if the DPP tries to push forward with a referendum in the absence of an enabling law.

Motive

No matter how earnestly he promises to exclude and eschew independence as a referendum topic, PRC leaders believe Chen is dissembling. Once the machinery of referendums is in place, they fear, the parameters will change, and Taiwanese will vote on independence.

There is more than just the historical link between independence and referendum to support this fear. The enabling legislation would permit Taiwan, should the PRC launch a military attack on it, to declare independence quickly and seek international recognition and assistance. Without having the enabling legislation in place, it might be impossible to carry out a referendum in a crisis. The DPP proposal preserves the option for a “defensive referendum,” but this option may not be necessary. If missiles (or paratroopers) were landing in Taiwan, all bets would be off, and the legalities of referendum would matter little. Still, the argument’s existence lends support to the belief in Beijing that “creeping independence” lies at the heart of the referendum movement.

But the desire to move the independence cause forward would not explain why referendum has caused the hubbub it has this summer. Other motives add up to a more convincing explanation.

Ideology. The DPP, born out of a desire to democratize Taiwan, has a longstanding commitment to reforming Taiwan’s institutions to make them more democratic. Most Taiwanese believe that referendums are a standard feature of democratic systems, and referendum is guaranteed by the constitution. It is nearly impossible, then, to make an ideological case against referendum in Taiwan. Once the issue was raised, it was difficult for any party to oppose it entirely.

Politics. Referendums, especially symbolic ones like the WHO membership proposal, can help the DPP politically. Organizers anticipate that giving Taiwanese a chance to vote on these issues will mobilize the party’s committed base. If the referendum is held on or near the day of the presidential election (March 20, 2004), the enthusiasm for it should spill over into the presidential race. The DPP and its candidate, Chen Shui-bian, will need this boost. If Chen wins a second term, it will be by a narrow margin: he currently trails the KMT-PFP ticket by about 10 points.

To make matters worse, social movement activists recently formed an alliance aimed at driving Chen to the left on social issues. The alliance is considering running a candidate in the presidential race. Finding ways to keep alliance voters on Chen’s side is important, and his enthusiastic endorsement of referendums is one strategy for achieving this. (If the alliance asks anti-nuclear activist Lin Yi-hsiung, a former DPP chairman, to be its candidate, as it has said it may, this would have to be aimed at pressuring Chen to sponsor a referendum on the nuclear issue.) Finally, the DPP can use referendum to draw votes beyond its traditional supporters, appealing to patriotism and promoting the DPP as Taiwan’s most devoted advocate.

Reform. Referendum also allows the DPP to bypass the legislature to carry out its unfinished reform agenda. The referendum debate began with the idea of a referendum on the fourth nuclear power plant, a policy-driven proposition. But DPP leaders were soon applying the idea to reform proposals that had stalled in the Legislative Yuan, proposing a referendum on reducing the size of the legislature and abolishing the National Assembly. Shrinking the legislature is popular with voters, who believe its large size makes it unruly and inefficient and allows legislators of questionable credentials to win seats. However, the legislature has little interest in streamlining itself. Thus, the DPP argued, the only way to reform the legislature is by going directly to the voters.

Popular Reaction

The idea of referendum has been highly popular with the public. KMT and PFP leaders who initially opposed the idea quickly changed their tune in response to public pressure. The issue has been defined in a way that pits affirming Taiwan’s democracy against the fear that the PRC will look askance. Taiwanese would be disinclined to sympathize with Beijing under any circumstance, much less when Beijing’s reactions appear paranoid or even as evidence of its determination to put Taiwan’s every action into the worst possible light. By opposing referendum, PRC leaders oppose Taiwan’s democracy itself, which wins the PRC no supporters on the island.

If referendum in principle is popular, not all of the issues that have been suggested as topics for referendums are. Clearly, a referendum asserting Taiwan’s right to be included as a participant in the WHO would win overwhelmingly, and a referendum to reduce the size of the legislature would also likely prevail. However, anti-nuclear activists would likely lose any vote on the nuclear power plant, making their fight against nuclear power more difficult in the future. And as for a referendum on Taiwan independence, it would be exceedingly difficult to word this in a way that would give independence more than 15 percent of the vote.

PRC Reaction

Beijing’s reaction to the referendum fracas has been firm, but not overwrought. PRC leaders seem keen to avoid overreacting, which has backfired on them in the past. So far they have moderated between interpreting the issue in the best and worst lights. The worst-case interpretation is that the passage of enabling legislation is a deliberate step toward a declaration of independence for Taiwan; the best-case interpretation is that the referendum proposal is an ill-considered step on an uncharted path that could lead nowhere. So far, leaders in Beijing have chosen not to assume the worst, although they have issued a number of statements warning Taiwan that a referendum on independence would have dire consequences and that Taiwan would be wise to avoid the whole referendum issue.

A central question that seems not to have a clear answer in Beijing is whether Taiwan will cross a red line with Beijing if it holds a referendum on a policy issue. Even if the topic of the referendum has nothing to do with Taiwan’s status or sovereignty, would (and should) Beijing interpret the legislation as a provocation?

The weight of the referendum issue may be as symbolic in Beijing as it is with Taiwanese. The use of referendums to resolve “national” policy issues itself suggests Taiwan statehood. It defines the decisive polity as the people of Taiwan, without consideration of the preferences of Chinese. The Taiwan legislature still includes a number of at-large seats whose origins lie in seats once reserved for representatives of mainland China. The idea of deciding policy questions through popular referendums would bare for the world to see Taiwan’s political separation from the Mainland.

Beijing is clearly anxious that if referendum is a step (though not the final step) on a slippery slope toward statehood, it might be about to miss its chance to avert the process. In the mid-1990s, Taiwanese of all political parties reached a consensus that a declaration of independence was unnecessary because the ROC was already independent and sovereign. This left the PRC struggling to devise a definition of “independence” that Taiwan could not incrementally circumvent. Chinese strategists, unsure what independence will look like, are left to wonder whether they will recognize it when they see it, and how they can be sure that referendum isn’t independence.

Recent statements by Chinese officials suggest they will not treat referendums as a red line. The State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office has said that China would firmly oppose any attempt to use a referendum to change Taiwan’s status, but according to a report by the Hong Kong-based Wen Wei Po, knowledgeable observers interpreted the statement to mean that referendums on policy issues unrelated to national sovereignty would be acceptable to Beijing. Similarly, the Chinese official responsible for Taiwan affairs, Zhou Mingwei, said China could live with policy referendums, given reassurances from the U.S. that Taiwan would not go beyond public policy issues to change Taiwan’s status. The U.S. may not welcome being responsible for controlling Taiwan’s referendum debate, but should be assured by these statements that China has decided not to assume the worst about the referendum issue and is willing to trust U.S. officials’ conclusion that the referendum need not become a source of conflict.

U.S. Reaction Vis-à-Vis the PRC

Clearly, U.S. officials have advised leaders in Beijing not to panic or otherwise overreact to the referendum debate, which is the correct approach to take. Nor are these assurances disingenuous: Taiwan’s political leadership is simply too divided and disorganized to plan and execute a strategy of independence, whether by stealth or other means, even if it wanted to.

Support for immediate independence is very weak. Support for eventual independence is stronger, but most Taiwanese are well aware of the costs of precipitous action in pursuit of formal independence. They support actions to enhance Taiwan’s international status, but only if they estimate the cost of those actions to be manageable. Most Taiwanese hope to preserve Taiwan’s dignity, but they are cognizant of the threats facing their country. The primary reason they want to increase Taiwan’s international recognition is their belief that isolation leaves the island vulnerable to PRC annexation.

If PRC leaders want to reduce what support there is for Taiwan independence, their best bet is honey, not vinegar. Weak support for independence will strengthen if Taiwanese perceive the PRC as aggressive. In particular, the PRC’s intransigence on the issue of observer status for Taiwan in the WHO is counterproductive, as are its efforts to downgrade Taiwan’s status in the World Trade Organization and exclude it from track-two activities. China can send a clear message that Taiwanese moves toward formal independence will not be permitted, but it does not need to insult Taiwanese at every opportunity. Ambassador Sha Zukang’s spiteful rejoinder to Taiwanese journalists at the World Health Assembly in Geneva this May (“Who cares about you?”) did unnecessary harm to cross-strait relations.

U.S. Reaction Vis-à-Vis taiwan

The U.S. should address the referendum issue through private channels as well as public statements. It should publicly acknowledge that referendums are a tool of democracy that Taiwan has the right to use. At the same time, Washington should reiterate its confidence that Taiwan is prudent enough to not take precipitous action to achieve symbolic ends. It could also provide some context and perspective from the U.S. experience with referendums (including in California). Specifically, Taiwanese should know that referendums are a clumsy way to make public policy, and often have unintended consequences. As frustrating as it is, the legislative process is usually a better way to resolve complex policy issues. U.S. officials could also stress the constitutional limits on referendums that exist in all democracies. Ruling out a referendum on Taiwan’s national definition is no less appropriate than ruling out a referendum aimed at silencing dissident speech would be in the United States.

Privately, Washington should continue to urge Taiwanese leaders to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of referendums, being candid in describing the shortcomings of referendums as a policy-making tool and as a shortcut to democracy. Circumventing the legislative process will have long-term consequences for the legitimacy and authority of Taiwan’s political institutions. Taiwanese leaders might be reminded of the many issues of importance to the United States that remain unresolved, including defense reform and WTO compliance.

Finally, U.S. officials might want, while reminding them of the risks involved in provoking the PRC, to call Taiwanese leaders’ attention to the current state of U.S. defense commitments and to remind them of the United States’ reluctance to be drawn into Taiwan’s domestic politics. Especially to the extent a particular referendum proposal is meant to influence the outcome of the March election, Taiwan should not expect a hearty U.S. endorsement of the proposal. In sum, with the war on terrorism in progress, this is a terrible time to start a problem for Washington.

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