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If there is no one long-standing American grand strategy, one nonetheless sees through the course of U.S. history the tracks of a grand strategy. It started with the idea of a U.S. monopoly in the Western Hemisphere, along with balances of power in the chief theaters of the world; with belief in the primacy of sea and air power and the need for an economic system to support these; and the objective of transforming international politics. Since 9/11, even if the strategic hierarchy, intensity, and political basis have changed, the Bush administration has largely been continuing in this same project, with a sensible strategy but poorly considered tactics.
Despite the vast amounts of rhetoric one hears in the United States on the role of morality in international politics, the nation lacks a coherent position on the appropriate application of morality to foreign policy. History reflects two prominent and contrasting views on the subject. The first is that morality is irrelevant to national foreign policy; the second applies common principles of individual morality—compassion, generosity, forgiveness, benevolence, and tolerance—to interactions between states. Though elements of each are evident in the Bush administration’s foreign policy, the limits on them restrict the efficacy of either. As the application of morality to foreign policy becomes both more necessary and more difficult, prudence and decency—more than self-righteousness or power—should provide the primary inspiration for American foreign policy.
The post-9/11 threats to American security require a complete revision of American national strategy. For too long, presidents have had to favor quick, cheap solutions to crises, unable to count on support from the “homebody” public for long, drawn-out conflicts. “Cheap hawks” among them have hoped that apocalyptic rhetoric will suffice when resources fall short; “cheap doves” hope that by ignoring the threat, it will go away. But with the war on terror, the revival of geopolitics, and ever-accelerating globalization, the U.S. tradition of bellicose rhetoric backed by underwhelming force is a recipe for failure. To effectively manage its threats, America needs a new catechism and to make sure its economic, energy, and military policies support this.
The quality of the U.S. military has improved steadily since the end of the Cold War, but technological and managerial advancements cannot compensate for the inadequate size of the American armed forces. The post-Cold War years saw a shift from the Westphalian, state-ordered world to one where Western states are at war with transnational, substate terrorist groups. This requires adjustments in the American military establishment. Improvements in quality must be matched by an increase in quantity in order to meet U.S. security needs. As interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven, a minimalist force may be sufficient to win a war, but where nation-building is required, it will find it difficult to win the peace.
As globalization accelerates, U.S. foreign policy makers have become less convinced of the influence geopolitics and power politics have on international affairs. They now risk losing touch with rising competitors like China that continue to view the international system in geopolitical terms. Chinese geopolitical strategists have great influence with the country's defense policy makers, who are focusing increasingly on the need for China to establish command of the seas—a goal that threatens conflict between it and the United States throughout Asia. In order to prevent a return to a world dominated by aggressive, geopolitically driven actors, the United States cannot afford to assume that China shares its worldview and that geopolitics has disappeared from international relations.
For the first time since the late 1940s, Washington is attempting a comprehensive analysis of the role and performance of the American intelligence system. In rethinking intelligence, it needs to address that the sixth column—Islamist terrorists residing in states that knowingly or unknowingly give them sanctuary—is the weak underbelly in the war on terror. To defeat this sixth column, important personnel, doctrinal, and cultural issues need to be addressed. The experience of other countries that have had success in fighting terrorism suggests that the United States must focus on offensive counterintelligence, penetrating terrorist groups, and creating mistrust among them.
Since the Russian-supplied Afghan army overthrew progressive President Daud in 1978, the nation has endured the long Soviet-Afghan war, the Taliban, and the arrival of U.S troops. These military actions have only heightened the historical alienation of the Pashtun tribes who overspread the long-contested border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These are the people who are almost certainly sheltering Osama bin Laden. The Alienated Frontier is a centuries-old problem that must be solved if we are to win the war on terror, and solving it will require rebuilding the infrastructure, developing alternatives to poppy cultivation, and solving the “Pashtunistan” question. The capture or elimination of given individuals will achieve little if the conditions that allow radicals to thrive are not addressed.
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