From a “A revolution is not a dinner party” to “It does not matter if the cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice”: Challenges and Patterns of Politics and Governance in the People’s Republic China

Jacques deLisle
University of Pennsylvania and Foreign Policy Research Institute

History Institute for Teachers
U Penn / FPRI
Philadelphia, March 19-20, 2011
The Mao Years, 1949-1976

• The Chinese Communist Party Comes to Power
  – “property-less class”: a (party-led) peasant revolution
  – The Party and Army: a civil war victory (political power grows from the barrel of a gun)
  – “China has stood up”:
    a nationalist victory
  – A “wealthy and powerful China (developmental state)
The Mao Years, 1949-1976

• Initial consolidation (1949-~1953)
  – Prior success: revolutionary triumph and legitimacy
  – Concerns: residual enemies and holdovers; challenges of rule (esp. development, urban)
  – Major events: campaigns against counterrevolutionaries, “Five Anti”; “Three Anti”; Football stadium justice

• Planning, Blooming and Contending (~1953-~1958)
  – Prior success: rapid consolidation of power, socialization of ownership...toward Soviet planning (lite)
  – Concerns: “losing touch” by the “revolution in power”; need for economic skills; (later) fast-emerging criticisms of CCP rule (esp “intellectuals”)
  – Major events: Constitution-making / institution-building; Hundred Flowers to Anti-Rightist Campaign
  – Revolution’s focus: “means and relations of production” (socializing and building);
  – Political and social effects: loosing and losing the intellectuals...
The Mao Years, 1949-1976

- The Great Leap Forward (~1958-~1961)
  - Prior success: development gains, ideological innovation (cf. “revisionist” Soviets);
  - Concerns: bureaucratism / departmentalism in governance at home, communism’s troubles abroad;
  - Major events: rural communes--massive scale, absurd targets and reports, “leaping to communism” (mess halls) and leaping to industrialization (backyard steel); low tech and self-sufficiency;
  - Revolution’s focus: The power of organization (> institutions or material foundations) to achieve great things; tuning to the more grassroots part and against the central government/state
  - Political and social effects: Massive famine, peasant alienation, raising the stakes of top elite purges and Mao dominance… retrenchment….
The Mao Years, 1949-1976

• The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
  – Prior success / resources: partial recovery from GLF (through policies later revived and extended in early Reform Era); Mao’s last stand...
  – Concerns: Waning of the revolution(ary) — Party-state apparatus “so tight that [Mao] cannot insert a pin”; Capitalist Roaders in the Power; younger generation must learn to make revolution by making revolution....
  – Major developments: Elite purges—Peng, Deng, Liu, trial of Wang Guangmei
    Student Red Guards—factionalism and conflict
    Shutting down party and government institutions
    Ill-fated Shanghai Commune; Brink of civil war;
    Shutting down the masses, sending in the PLA (3-in-1 committees, Lin as Mao’s “best pupil”, sending down the students
    Retrenchment / restoration (incl. Deng and later-reform-like policies)
    Renewed radicalism: the Gang of Four, Deng’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} fall and Mao’s final days
The Mao Years, 1949-1976

- The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
  - Revolution’s focus: “migration to the superstructure”: the power of correct Maoist ideology / “standpoint” (including retroactively defined), mobilization/direct participation of masses ideas/culture matter much
  - *Hai Rui Dismissed*; Jiang Qing’s rev. art works
  - Political and social effects: “struggled to death”; destruction of institutions, loss of legitimacy among the masses (1976 Tiananmen Incident)

... toward Reform Era’s “not that” politics of:
  - “reject CR as chaos” institution-rebuilding;
  - “reject CR as tyranny” retrenchment of party-state, ideology, leader cult toward economic performance legitimacy and pragmatism
The Reform Era, 1978-on

• A Basic periodization:
  – Founding: 3rd Plenum of the 11th CC (Deng’s consolidation)
  – Experiments and extensions of reform to 1989
  – Tiananmen Incident, retrenchment and succession instability (Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin)
  – Deng’s *nanxun* and restarting reform
  – Jiang Zemin era (1990s-2002)—the political economy of accelerating growth, opening and inequality
  – Hu Jintao era (2002-12)—more concern with equality, populism, chill winds for liberal / democratic agendas?
  – Toward greater “institutionalization”: elite succession, policy and lawmaking, interest representation...
Political Structure

• Party, state and party-state
  – Party’s “leading role”; setting of policy/law agenda
  – Personnel—*nomenklatura* and penetration
    State President / Party General Secretary Hu Jintao [term limits]
    Politburo Standing Committee / Premier Wen Jiabao [term limits]
    70 million+ Party Members [high % of govt]

• Party hierarchy: nominally bottom-up, in practice top-down (w/ some checks/choice)
  – Party Congress, Central Committee, Politburo, Standing Committee, General Secretary

• Party secretaries: Provincial and below
Political Structure

• Legislative Institutions: nominally indirect democracy, in practice, managed contestation and centralized power
  – National People’s Congress and Standing Committee; provincial, lower congresses
  – Roles in legislation and in government / judicial oversight
  – Rise of staff and specialized committees
  – Changing interest representation, membership
Political Structure

- Administrative State (2): Provincial, city/county and township governments
- “dual rule” and *tiao vs. kuai*
- New complexities: Party vs. governmental roles . . . secretary and governor; metrics of cadre evaluation
- Institutionalization but persistence of informal power
- Courts [appointments, budgets, style, PLC];
- PLA (and CMC)
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

• East Asian Model / Authoritarian Developmental State:
  – Rapid economic development through (or at least with):
    • Market consistent and relatively open economic policies, but steered and constrained by state policy
    • Informality of economic regulation / relations between state and firm
    • Not strongly law-structured relations among firms
  – Absence of democratic politics
    • Lack of meaningfully contested elections for the posts that matter functionally
    • Lack of government-under-law
    • At least selective repression of political dissent / dissidents
  – Cultural foundations in emphasis on harmony, hierarchy, group interests?
  – Structural / situational foundations in “late developer” advantage or place in international system (constraints /opportunities)?
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Performance Legitimacy:

- Nominal GDP in $US
  - $4.3 to 4.8 trillion
  - Growth rates 10% +/- during Reform Era
    - 1987-1997 10.3%; 1997-2007 9.5% (World Bank)

- Per capita income in $US
  - $2940 (nominal—World Bank 2008)
  - $6500 in 2009 (PPP—CIA)

- Poverty reduction:
  - 300-400 million in Reform Era
    - Life expectancy at birth: 72 (LMI: 69) (WB)
    - Infant mortality: 20/1000 (LMI: 41) (WB)
    - Literacy: 91% (CIA)

- 19.47 million private cars
  - [PRC NBS 2009]
  - 1000 new/day in Beijing

- 500 million cellphone users
  - 90m/yr [Economist 2008]

- Middle class 87 million
  - PCY US$6000-$25000
    - (from near zero 1980s) [Mastercard 2007]
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism? Challenges:

- Perceptions of eroding equality / illegitimate wealth through corruption and connections / collateral damage:

  Pew top issues big (very big) (2008)
  
  Rising prices 96 (72)
  Rich / poor gap 89 (41)
  Corrupt officials 78 (39)
  Pollution (air) 74 (31)
  Unemployment 68 (22)
  Pollution (water) 66 (28)
  Corrupt business 61 (21)
  Crime 61 (17)
  Working conditions 56 (13)
  Manufactured Goods 55 (13)
  (Food 49 (12), Medicine 46 (9)}
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Challenges: Inequality

- Inequality (very high) (World Bank data)
  - Gini: 0.47 (2009)
  - Urban: rural 3+:1
  - Richest: poorest (provincial) 10+:1
- U.S.$ Billionaires
  - 108 in 2007 (#2 to US)
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Challenges: Popular Unrest

- Protests: 100,000? “incidents” per year
  - Defining “incidents”
- Petitioners’ villages
- Letters and Visits
- Media storms
- Issues / Causes
  - Property Seizures
  - Unpaid Wages
  - Environment Issues
  - Official misbehavior
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Property Seizure/Compensation

Chongqing’s Nailhouse

– Wu Ping, Yang Wu and the Blogosphere

– Invoking the Constitution and Property Law

– Media attention and winning compensation
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Property Seizure/Compensation

– Taking rural land rights for real estate/industrial development
  • 70 million farmers victims of land seized between 1994 and 2004
  • Between 2003 and 2005, $600 billion worth of land seized

– Mechanisms of under-compensation:
  • Corruption/lawlessness—limits on takings, disposition of compensation funds, unaccountable government
  • Peasant vulnerability from lack of legal documents
  • Reclassification and the “surplus”
  • Allocating the surplus: estimated 60%-70% of profits from land transfer to local officials (PRC scholars in The Guardian, 5/27/06)

– Redress: reducing levies; pressing compensation and takings rules; increased political representation of peasants....
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Challenges: Environment

- Magnitude of the problem:
  - 12 of 20 world cities with worst air pollution (particulate) are in China (WB)
  - Acid rain “seriously affects” 30% of China (WB)
  - 70% of 7 major river systems “severely polluted” (WHO)
  - 650,000 (of global 2,000,000) premature deaths due to air pollution (WHO 2007)
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Challenges: Environment

- Environmental critics: Dai Qing
  - Journalism on Three Gorges
- Protests and lawsuits
  - 50,000 environmental protests per year (2005);
  - 2000 environmental NGOs / middle class activism
  - Netizens, cellphones and stopping approved projects:
    the Xiamen chemical factory case (2007)
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Challenges: Public Safety and Confidence in the Regime

Confucius:
First secure, then enrich, then enoble the people?
Give up weapons, then wealth, but last the confidence of the people

• Toxic Products:
  – Sanlu melamine-tainted milk; regime response
    • Joint-venture company (43% N.Z. owner)
    • Tainted with melamine, blamed on milk protein suppliers
    • 50,000+ injuries, 13,000 hospitalized, 4 deaths
    • Investigations/arrests; Wen Jiabao statement/interview
    • Free medical care
    • (Limited) compensation without (full) adjudication
    • Bankrupt company
  – Other product safety scandals /responses
    SFDA Zheng Xiaoyou ($850K bribe for drug approvals);
    GAQSIQ Wu Jianping suicide (corruption investigation, Sanlu issues)

top-level task forces; legal reform (including suits)
international cooperation
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Challenges: Public Safety and Confidence in the Regime

• Sichuan Earthquake, response (2008)
  – 70,000 dead; 4 million homeless
  – Heroic and popular response efforts
  – Wen Jiabao, PLA, civil society
  – Blaming local officials: Building codes, corruption
  – Suppressing coverage and calls for accountability, modest compensation

•
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism?

Challenges: Official Corruption

57th rank (World Democracy Audit)

China 31.1%ile (WB)

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism? Challenges: Official Corruption

- **Magnitude:**
  - **Estimates:**
    - 2-3% / year “direct costs” (Pei 2006)
    - 13-16% GDP “total cost” (Hu Angang, 2002) or more
  - China’s low rank
    - World Bank 41.1 %ile (2008), 33.8 (2007); LMI avg 38.5
    - Transparency Int’l CPI: 3.5 (of 10), 72-38/180
  - Foreign investor and Chinese business people complaint
    - State Council Survey: 37% rate local officials bad/very bad
  - Regime responses: party discipline, publicity, prosecution

- **Notorious cases:**
  - **Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong (1995-1998)**
    - Bribes or construction permits/ RE speculation ... and rivalry with Jiang Zemin, association with Tiananmen 1989
  - **Shanghai Party Chief Chen Liangyu (2006-2008)**
    - Misuse of pension funds / losses; aiding relatives in business; real estate scandals . . . and resisting Beijing
  - **SFDA Head Zheng Xiaoyu (2007)**
    - Bribes for approvals . . . and lax oversight / widening product safety concerns
Political Practice: Resilient and/or Reforming Authoritarianism? Challenges: Official Abuse

• Examples:
  – Sun Zhigang—custody and repatriation, the unfortunate recent graduate, media coverage, legal argument and political response
  – Yang Jia—sympathy for a cop-killer, handling mentally ill defendants
  – “I am the son of Li Gang”—local hit and run case w/ arrogance of expected de facto immunity
  – Polls on popular attitudes toward central vs. local government
  – Anti-corruption drives and institutions

Li Lianjiang 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Trust</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Township</th>
<th>Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively low</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So-so</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively high</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: n = 1,259. Because of rounding errors, columns may not total 100.
Democracy?

EIU ranking: 136/167 (2008); World Bank: 5.8%ile

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.
**CHINA**


- Voice and Accountability
- Political Stability
- Government Effectiveness
- Regulatory Quality
- Rule of Law
- Control of Corruption

**Country's Percentile Rank (0-100)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentile Range</th>
<th>Color</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90th-100th Percentile</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th-75th Percentile</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th-25th Percentile</td>
<td>Pink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th-90th Percentile</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th-50th Percentile</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0th-10th Percentile</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2009: Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008

**Note:** The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.
Democracy?

- Village elections’ mixed record
  - 610,000 villagers committees
  - 35% free nomination; 40% secret ballot; 70% open count
  - Incumbent / orthodox candidate advantages
  - Checking functions....
- Non-extension to higher levels
  - Buyun township and other experiments
- Local “deliberative” government?
  - Budgets and other matters
- Highly constrained contests for higher office:
  - Local people’s congress elections
  - Above the local level more input/choice
  - Fixing the rotten boroughs in MPC
Democracy?

- Advocates for change:
  - Charter 08
    - Electoral democracy, constitutional review, separation of powers, etc.
  - Contrast 1978 (Democracy Wall), 1989 (Tiananmen), 2008-09 (Charter 08 / Liu Xiaobo)...

- Influential Intellectuals: A mixed pattern
  - Examples: Pan Wei and Yu Keping
Democracy?

• Official attitudes:
  – “Peaceful Evolution”/”Color Revolution”
  – Wen Jiabao (2007): Democracy a goal, but 100 years off
  – Hu Jintao (2009): No “western style” democracy with multiparty system, separation of powers, etc.
  – “Intra-Party Democracy?"
    • Institutionalized pluralism
    • with party co-optation and control

• Long-term trends?
  – Development and Democracy
  – China and the East Asian Model revisited
  – Persisting fears of democracy (as chaos):
    • Elites; urban middle classes; intellectuals;
Rule of / by Law?

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.
Rule of / by Law?

- **China’s Ambiguous Metrics:**
  - 4.5 million civil suits
    - 40% (?) enforcement rate (compare to US)
    - Litigant perception / satisfaction surveys (fairness, corruption)
    - Litigation rates: plateauing or falling
      - Frustration? Completed transformation? (Some) dysfunctional courts
  - **Renewed emphasis on mediation/policy**
    - Administrative litigation suits
      - 10,000 suits; expanding subjects
      - 20%-40% success rates (compare to West)
      - Ambiguities of base rates, informal repair; retaliation
    - 100,000 “incidents”
  - Letters and visits
    - 4 to 8 million
  - 150,000 lawyers
    - Education and training
Rule of / by Law

• Under-enforcement / Poor implementation
  – Resources and training, stature and competence
  – Weak and dependent courts
    local protectionism; political intervention
  – Corruption and low “law consciousness” courts, state society
  – Rational (bounded) self-interested parties

• Unevenness: level, locality, subject matter...
  – Shanghai per capita income 6x national average
  1/6 of all lawyers; Judges’ educational level
  2x national avg (90% college); litigant surveys
Rule of / by Law

• Constituencies/forces for “more law”:
  – Functional demands of a sophisticated and globalized economy;
  – SES, middle class
  – “Mission creep,” “spillover” or “ideological space” of regime instrumental commitments
  – Lawyers, judges, legal intellectuals, etc.
  – Demands from / economic habits for “winners”
  – Demands for justice from “losers”

• Resistance / “pushback”
  – Harassment of lawyers / weiquan
  – Preemptive policy responses
    Criticizing autonomous laws and legal institutions as possible “color revolution”;
    “three supremes” (law, policy, public opinion)
    mediation / informality / Maxiwu style
China and the World: Legitimacy, nationalism and soft power?

• Peaceful rise, peaceful development and harmonious world?
• Rising power—still “rejoining the world” and seeking access... or ...“G2” and regime-shaper?
• Inevitable rival, responsible stakeholder?
• Soft power / Charm Offensive or useful foil and economic benefactor but unappealing “China Model”? 
Repression: Monopoly of coercive force

• Falun Gong
  – April 25, 1999, Zhongnanhai incident
  – Differentiated response—
    100s to 1000s? deaths in custody; 6000 imprisoned;
    labor reeducation?; torture (USDoS HR Rept 2009)

• Ethnic Unrest: Tibet
  – March 2008 uprising (toward 40th anniversary); 2009
  – 100+ protests; 300 sentenced for Lhasa riots; 20-200 dead;
    1000 missing; torture/abuse (USDoS, CRS)
  – Dalai Lama’s role and Beijing’s response

• Ethnic Unrest: Xinjiang
  – National Security and terrorism?
  – 1000+ prosecutions (2008, increase for terrorism, separatism, extremism)
  – August 2008 Kashgar police station assault;
  – 2009 resurgence of unrest

GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA
-- Internet police force;
-- blocking
-- ISP cooperation
-- $.50 party
Government effectiveness and political stability

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources or for any other official purpose.
Popular Satisfaction and Stability

Pew 2008 survey: global comparative perspective

China: 86 (direction); 82 (economy)

US: 23 (direction); 20 (economy)

Issues with Pew data (sampling)
Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2009: Governance Matters VIII: Gov
Indicators for 1996-2008
Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality
of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey res-
pondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of:
- think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.
The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank
to allocate resources.