

multilateral institutions, with priority placed on developing mechanisms to handle international economic crises on a systematic, not ad hoc, basis. This implies new forms of collaboration with international business, and within the U.S. government, in particular among the White House, the Federal Reserve system, and the State and Treasury Departments.

The books reviewed here make a powerful case that globalization reaches far beyond buying and selling, borrowing and lending, production and consumption, capital and labor. The genius of Adam Smith and succeeding political economists was to perceive the dynamic relationship between economic and political change. History teaches that any assumption of a peaceful and comfortable status quo is invariably misleading and potentially disastrous, and that change is beyond the control of even a superpower. Nevertheless, the United States now has an unavoidable role as a global leader; a role that requires sustained attention to foreign policy. Its success in that position will depend on how the country draws on or squanders its enormous strengths in such areas as technology, education, and social diversity to help shape the social, political, and economic consequences of globalization.

The Future of America's Profession of Arms by **Michael P. Noonan**

Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the Twenty-First Century. By Dr. Don M. Snider, Major John A. Nagl, and Major Tony Pfaff. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 1999. 50 pp.)

Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps. By Leonard Wong. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2000. 30 pp.)

Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service. By Michael S. Neiberg. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. 264 pp. \$39.95.)

The geopolitical revolution begun in 1989 has caused much consternation for the practitioners and analysts of international affairs, but the U.S. military has arguably had the most difficult time reacting to and accepting the unfolding international security environment. Although some saw the demise of the

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Soviet Union as ushering in a new era of peace that afforded a drawdown in military capabilities, a paradox developed: despite a reduction of more than 30 percent in the size of the force over the last decade, the military's rate of deployment (its operational tempo) has increased by over 300 percent.¹ More significantly, however, the Cold War–era task of preparing for and deterring major wars has been supplanted by missions of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian intervention. The requirement to do more with less and the friction over the proper use of military power have created turbulence both between the American profession of arms and its civilian leadership and within the profession itself. The works under review here explore the implications of this turbulence and suggest ways in which it might be resolved.

Making the Officer Corps

Ever since the formation of organized fighting forces, officers (assisted in some cases by noncommissioned officers) have disciplined their troops, trained them for war, and, when the need arose, led their charges into battle. Throughout most of history, aristocratic privilege and royal patronage largely determined the extent of one's rise through the ranks. Beginning with the French Revolution, however, and advancing as democracy and industrialization transformed war, the modern principle of promotion on the basis of merit alone came to characterize Western military institutions (at least in theory). The spread of democratic norms also had another effect on the military, namely, a distrust of standing armies, which in the American case was due in no small part to the former colonists' experiences with King George's troops. It is no surprise, therefore, that Samuel Adams said of a standing military establishment that "a wise and prudent people will always have a watchful & jealous eye over it. . . ."²

Until the Cold War, the American people heeded that advice and, except in wartime, maintained only small professional armed forces. Even the establishment of the military and naval academies in the early nineteenth century was intended to produce skilled engineers and maritime specialists, respectively, rather than warriors.³ According to the renowned military historian Russell F. Weigley, the American military did not develop any degree of professionalism until the years leading up to the Civil War.⁴ As the

¹ Between 1991 and 1999 the military was used overseas 37 times, an average of one deployment every eleven weeks. Michael P. Noonan, "Warfighting vs. Peacekeeping: The Historical Record of U.S. Interventions Abroad, 1798–1999," a paper delivered at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society's Biennial International Conference, Baltimore, Md., Oct. 24, 1999.

² "A Letter from Samuel Adams," in *The Military in America: From the Colonial Era to the Present*, ed. Peter Karsten (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 18.

³ West Point, in fact, did not create a department of tactics until 1858 (Neiberg, p. 17).

⁴ Russell F. Weigley, "The American Civil-Military Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the

geopolitical circumstances for the United States changed and the technological means of warfare expanded, the American military gradually moved away from a system in which elected officers commanded volunteer units toward truly professionalized armed services.

The National Defense Act of 1916 solidified the movement toward professionalism by institutionalizing a trinity of armed forces that still exists today: an active-duty component, federal reserve forces, and the National Guard (for the army and, after 1947, the air force) organized by the states. More germane to the discussion here, the act also established the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). In *Making Citizen-Soldiers*, Michael S. Neiberg, an associate professor of history at the U.S. Air Force Academy, has provided a detailed examination of ROTC from 1950 to 1980.⁵

ROTC may actually be seen as an expansion of the Morrill Act of July 1862, which mandated a place for officer training on civilian educational campuses. Prior to the outbreak of the Cold War, the central function of ROTC was to produce *reserve* officers. The Cold War, however, shifted ROTC's focus to turning out officers for active duty. In 1964, for instance, the air force expected that 50 percent of its officers and the army that 75 percent of its officers would emerge from ROTC programs (p. 87). Current figures are somewhat smaller, but still considerable. For instance, in fiscal year 1998 ROTC produced 31.2 percent of all commissioned officers, more than the service academies and officer candidate schools combined.⁶

Throughout his book, Neiberg's central thesis is that ROTC is an effective commissioning source for the United States because it supports the moderate democratic tradition of keeping the military strong enough to achieve the nation's political and economic goals without posing a threat to civilian liberties and oversight (p. 13). Both the military and the universities supported an on-campus presence for the military—at least until the Vietnam War. The military saw ROTC as advantageous because of: (1) its desire for an on-campus presence (the better to compete with private industry); (2) its desire to maintain good relations with universities (which were particularly important to military research); (3) its belief that ROTC instilled patriotism and civic awareness; (4) the cost effectiveness of ROTC vis-à-vis other commis-

Present," prepared for the Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies (TISS) conference on the Gap between the Military and Civilian Society, Wheaton, Ill., Oct. 1999. Samuel P. Huntington defines military professionalism as a force in which the officer corps shows expertise (the management of violence), responsibility (for the defense of the state), and corporateness (institutional self-awareness and organization). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practise of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), pp. 8–18.

⁵ It is important to note, however, that Neiberg's research and archival sources relate primarily to the ROTC programs—army, navy, and air force—of ten public land-grant schools, including the Universities of Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Pittsburgh, Texas, and Washington, and Georgia Tech, Kansas State, Kent State, and Rutgers.

⁶ The remaining 40 percent of officers came from direct appointments (11 percent), warrant officers (8 percent), health professional scholarships (5.6 percent), the Marine Corps platoon leader's course (0.1 percent), and other sources (14 percent). See "Where We Get Our Officers," Department of Defense website (<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/people/officers.html>).

sioning sources; and (5) its desire to please members of Congress who supported on-campus military instruction. For their part, university administrators and faculty members saw ROTC as beneficial because of: (1) their belief that American higher education had an obligation to assist in the prosecution of the Cold War; (2) their desire to please the military in an era of lucrative government contracts; (3) their fear that negative statements about the military would be construed as “un-American”; (4) their belief that ROTC contributed to both good order and good citizenship on campus; (5) their conviction that ROTC could (beneficially) instill civilian ideas in the military; and (6) their need to please important groups of supporters such as trustees and state legislators (p. 41).

None of this is to suggest that the relationship was always smooth. Neiberg’s extensive archival research reveals the many conflicts among and within universities over the intellectual validity of ROTC, the qualifications of instructors, and even the titles bestowed upon those appointed to the military instructional cadre. The Vietnam War and its aftermath especially brought clashes—both literal and figurative—over ROTC’s continued place on campus, and many of the nation’s elite universities, including Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, and Stanford, abolished their programs. Other rifts developed over the geographical shift of detachments from the East and West Coast to the South and Midwest, and over the difficulty of recruiting and retaining cadets and midshipmen through to commissioning. This last issue necessitated the use of financial incentives such as scholarships and increased stipends for contracted cadets and midshipmen, beginning in the 1960s and expanding after the creation of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973.⁷

Neiberg does a commendable job of providing an institutional and social history of ROTC from 1950 through 1980, although that cutoff date, however understandable it may be, excludes a period that is clearly ripe for future study. The end of *détente* and the renewed emphasis on American military strength under Ronald Reagan offer a rich historical record for the interaction of ROTC detachments and universities. This is particularly the case because of the effects of the Vietnam War on the personal politics of university faculty members. (Speaking anecdotally, I can well remember the stern and disdainful glances of a particular Jesuit philosophy professor whenever I wore my uniform to class following the 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests by an El Salvadoran “death squad” at the Central American University.)

In discussions of a growing gap between civilian and military culture over the past decade, ROTC has been offered up as a means to ensure the representation of a broader segment of American society in the military, especially if, for example, ROTC detachments returned to Ivy League cam-

⁷ “Contracted” refers to those cadets and midshipmen who are obligated to military service, either as active-duty or reserve officers, upon graduation and commissioning (or in the enlisted ranks, should graduation and commissioning not be satisfactorily completed or attained).

puses. But as Neiberg shows, the geographical shift in ROTC programs is due in large part to the ability of schools in the South and Midwest to attract greater numbers of participants. The self-selection of students who enroll in ROTC is obviously an important factor. In other words, even if ROTC programs were expanded to elite liberal arts schools, they would probably not produce a great many officers (particularly for combat arms roles), and those they did produce would most likely hold worldviews similar to their peers in ROTC programs at less-competitive educational institutions. Research has shown that the attitudes of officers produced by ROTC are virtually identical to those produced by the service academies.⁸ Whatever its flaws, ROTC remains an effective and indispensable means of producing active and reserve officers.

Intergenerational Angst

The organizational structure of the armed services can be roughly described as two triangles, one pointing up, the other down. The first triangle represents the number of service personnel: at the base, the greatest number of people occupy the lowest ranks, and numbers diminish with ascending rank. The inverted triangle represents the authority and responsibility of service members: a general officer has more responsibility than a field-grade officer, a field-grade officer more than a company-grade officer, and so on. The logic of this structure is that qualified and experienced individuals must advance in order for the military to remain capable of executing its war- and peacetime functions.

In the U.S. Army today, that process is ceasing to function. Captains, those with direct responsibility for a company of between 100 and 150 troops or holding key battalion and brigade staff positions, are leaving the service in record numbers. In 1989, 6.7 percent of army captains left the service voluntarily, whereas ten years later the figure had shot up to 10.6 percent.⁹ In order to maintain effective command and control, the army is therefore forced to fill the voids at the captain level from a pool of lieutenants still lacking crucial experience and tactical proficiency. This in turn may have deleterious effects on operations, in light of the higher learning curve of those officers given responsibility for larger formations of troops.

⁸ Don M. Snider, Robert A. Priest, and Felisa Lewis, "The Influence of Professional Military Education (PME) at the Accession Level on Changing Civilian and Military Opinion," prepared for the TISS conference on the Gap between the Military and Civilian Society, Oct. 1999.

⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, "More Than Rank Splits Army's Stars and Bars," *Washington Post*, Nov. 19, 2000. Field-grade officers are leaving as well. For instance, between 1992 and 1995 only six colonels declined commands, but since 1996, 171 lieutenant colonels and full colonels have done so. See Rowan Scarborough, "Army Colonels Reject Choice Assignments," *Washington Times*, Nov. 1, 2000.

In his groundbreaking study *Generations Apart*, retired army lieutenant colonel Leonard Wong, a staff member of the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, examines the roots of this exodus and determines that a booming civilian economy is not the primary motivation for early departures. Rather, an attitudinal divide has emerged between Baby Boomers (born between 1943 and 1960) and Generation Xers (born between 1960 and 1980) (p. 6).

While he notes that generational rifts have always existed in the officer corps, the differences today are atypical because of the increased responsibilities of captains and the fact that many are "blaming their departure on senior officer lack of understanding" (p. 5). He then identifies essential differences in the general sociological characteristics of each generation. Baby Boomers grew up during times of economic expansion, were heaped with attention, taught to "work well with others," and entered adulthood optimistic and driven by the relentless pursuit of goals. Generation Xers, on the other hand, grew up with high divorce rates, an increased need for self-reliance due to the expanded role of women in the workplace, a sense that authority must be earned rather than asserted, a heightened sense of the importance of educational attainments, and the notion that work was a means to earn a living rather than a *raison d'être* in itself (pp. 6–8). Wong goes on to observe that

lieutenants and captains are almost exclusively Generation Xers, while lieutenant colonels and above are almost all Baby Boomers. While self-selection and the socialization process of the Army soften many potential aspects of generational conflict, the hierarchical nature of the Army puts Boomers clearly in "senior" ranks and Xers in the "junior" ranks. This is in contrast to many civilian corporations where Xers are increasingly entering the workforce in more senior positions due to entrepreneurial and technological skills. With all the Boomers in the key decision and policymaking positions in the Army, it is easier for Xers to place the blame for Army problems on generational differences rather than the classic line versus staff tension (p. 9).

Examining numerous surveys administered in 1988 and 1998 to army captains of year groups 1981 (Boomers) and 1991 (Xers), respectively, Wong finds significant differences in responses to almost two-thirds of the questions related to the observations described above. Xer captains, for example, are more confident in their abilities to attain higher ranks and find employment outside of the military than their Boomer predecessors. They also tend to view loyalty as a bond of trust between institution and individual rather than as a promise of lifetime employment, and seek more balance between private life and work. Xers are typically not impressed with rank, although Wong goes on to observe that Boomers and Xers share nearly identical views of professionalism and levels of satisfaction with pay and allowances (pp. 11–18).

To bridge some of the gaps between generations—and thereby retain more young officers—Wong recommends, among other things, creating more balance between work and personal time, decreasing the military's reliance on traditional hierarchical leadership, and using high technology to ease the burden of the more mundane administrative aspects of an officer's duties (pp. 18–25). While these recommendations make sense, one wonders whether a reduced operational tempo and quality-of-life improvements (as candidate Bush advocated) or even a downturn in the American economy might reverse the exodus of officers.

If qualified personnel did stop leaving en masse, then the services would once again have to become more selective in their promotion decisions. But they should take care in establishing criteria. The simplest way for any of the services to differentiate between individuals is to look for *disqualifying* blemishes on candidates' records, an approach that has led to the most pernicious aspect of the post-Cold War drawdown: the “zero-defects” mentality.

In his memoir, *My American Journey*, retired general Colin Powell relates a story from his days as a second lieutenant. In his haste to move out during an exercise in Germany, he had lost his .45 calibre sidearm. Realizing his quandary, Powell reported this to his company commander, who, after giving the platoon leader the scare of his life, returned the weapon and told him to be more careful in the future. Powell observes that if such a mistake were to happen today, “the Army would have held an investigation, called in lawyers, and likely have entered a fatal black mark on my record.”¹⁰ As Wong notes, problems with the “zero-defects” mentality are almost universally acknowledged, but nobody acts to correct them “simply because senior leaders are too concerned about the performance of their unit during their watch” (p. 23). The inverted triangle of authority and responsibility, by overloading the upper ranks and keeping power out of the hands of junior officers, ensures the persistence of a flawed system.

Reinstilling Professionalism

A nightmare for army public relations occurred in the fall of 2000. Press reports began to surface about the misconduct of members of the elite 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. To a man, all had volunteered at least twice—once for the army and once for airborne training—and should have represented the zenith of American military capabilities. Instead, the men “experienced difficulties tempering their combat mentality.” (The battalion's motto, “Shoot 'em in the face,” should perhaps have given senior leaders reason to question the men's

¹⁰ Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), p. 45.

suitability for the tedious functions of peace operations.) Assigned with the tasks of peacekeeping, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Ellerbe, pursued the task of “identify[ing] and neutraliz[ing]” Albanian splinter groups. The battalion’s actions ranged from the interrogation at gunpoint of an ethnic Albanian civilian to the rape and murder of an eleven-year-old Kosovar girl. The soldier involved in the latter incident was convicted; nine other soldiers, including Ellerbe and three junior officers, were either reprimanded or faced possible charges for their misconduct.¹¹ While an extreme case, to be sure, what can this situation tell us about the state of army professionalism?

A partial answer to that question may be gleaned from Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff’s study of the contemporary roles of professionalism, the military ethic, and officership. Anyone interested in military personnel issues should read this monograph from cover to cover. The authors, all at the United States Military Academy, contend that the healthy adaptation of the army’s sense of military professionalism is being impeded by “the officer corps’ intellectual muddle over the purpose of the Army and their ethical muddle over the role of self-sacrifice in the profession’s ethos” (p. 2). Force protection—the minimization of the military’s exposure to casualties—is seen as the most insidious cause of the eroding professional ethic of the army.

Minimization of casualties is the most insidious cause of the eroding professional ethic.

Snider and his colleagues examine military professionalism through a framework borrowed from Sam C. Sarkesian, which analyzes the military-technical, ethical, and political components of professionalism with regard to society, the military institution, and the individual soldier.¹² The military-technical component encompasses society’s view of issues such as the proposal for a ban on land mines and America’s involvement in military operations other than war (MOOTW); the military institution’s conceptions about the revolution in military affairs, resources, recruiting, and declining professionalism; and the individual soldier’s perspectives on skills and retention. The analysis of the ethical component takes into account the postmodern (“truth is a relative concept”) and egoist (“what is best for me”) trends in society; the military’s professional ethic and emphasis on force protection; and the effect on individual soldiers of contradictory notions from society and the military institution. Lastly, the political component examines the conflicts arising out of casualty aversion and differing views of military intervention across the three levels of analysis (pp. 3–16).

¹¹ See Robert Burns, “Training Is Blamed for U.S. Soldiers’ Abuses in Kosovo,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Sept. 19, 2000; and Thomas E. Ricks, “Officer Facing Discipline Gets Elite Post,” *Washington Post*, Oct. 19, 2000.

¹² Sam C. Sarkesian, *Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).

The most valuable contribution of this monograph is its utterly damning arguments about the effects of force protection on the military profession. The profession of arms is unique in modern American society. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines operate under an unlimited liability clause that places their lives at risk even in routine training exercises.¹³ Hence, while the desire to keep troops out of harm's way may seem laudable, the authors note that it ultimately erodes the conception of self-sacrifice on which a successful military depends.

When the military is involved in MOOTW, such as in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, it receives mixed messages from civilian and military leaders as to mission goals and the need to minimize casualties. As a result, when the mandates of force protection and mission performance collide, the mission does not get performed. All of this stems from the notion that the American people will not accept casualties, even though research has shown repeatedly that they will support any operation so long as they are convinced that it is in the national interest and will be seen through to completion.¹⁴

The myth of casualty aversion therefore provides the political and military leadership with cover. Politicians can be seen as intervening in foreign locales without the attendant risks of footage showing U.S. service members returning in body bags. At the same time, the imperative to protect forces allows military leaders to carry out their orders for operations—in which they often see little inherent value—in a perfunctory manner that keeps their personnel out of the enemy's crosshairs.

Unfortunately, the charade above only further isolates junior officers from their superiors. The former, say Snider and his colleagues, accept and believe in the notions of self-sacrifice and MOOTW while the latter largely reject MOOTW and are therefore unwilling to make sacrifices. Before delineating several principles for reviving the professional military ethic (pp. 36–40), the authors spell out the dire consequences of the rift within the officer corps in no uncertain terms.

The trust in operational commanders' ability to accomplish missions prudently and competently, irrespective of the number of American casualties, must be restored, and immediately so. Without that, few officers aware of the profession's need to maintain its unique ethic will seek command. Ultimately there will be no profession, only an obedient military bureaucracy with no autonomy, one which responds in an un-

¹³ While members of law enforcement, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians may also operate under these conditions, members of the active-duty military (and, increasingly, selected members of the federal reserve and National Guard) can be called up at any time and sent anywhere on operations of indefinite duration.

¹⁴ See Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996); James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1999, pp. 53–78; and Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, "The Civil-Military Gap and Casualty Aversion," prepared for the TISS conference on the Gap between the Military and Civilian Society, Oct. 1999.

thinking and uncritical manner to the requests and directives of civilian leaders. We doubt the military effectiveness of such a bureaucracy (p. 26, italics in original).

The (Long) Way Forward

The election of George W. Bush may alleviate some of the problems discussed above, if he makes good on his campaign promises to limit American involvement in MOOTW and improve readiness and the quality of life in the military. But not even increased resources and a reduced operational tempo can effect a miraculous turnaround of long-term trends. Addressing them will require sustained attention and specific policy changes in several areas.

Strategy. While it is well and good to call for reduced American involvement in MOOTW, the fact remains that the United States, for the foreseeable future at least, faces an international security environment in which the low-level threats of ethnic cleansing, humanitarian crises, and terrorism will far outnumber traditional high-intensity conflicts. The military should never be used in wanton fashion in MOOTW, but the American people will occasionally expect action from their leaders when they see egregious human suffering abroad. The military must therefore prepare for the possibility of war while also tending to the more mundane needs of peace operations.

Leadership. The new administration must aggressively seek, through top-down directives, to eliminate the “zero-defects” mentality and the burdensome restrictions of radical force protection. The service secretaries should reassert their authority over promotion decisions within their service. The military leadership should be put on notice that mistakes—particularly at the junior level—are to be expected and that mentoring must complement mere discipline and rewards. Furthermore, prudent risk taking must be encouraged throughout the ranks. Similarly, military leaders must be able to carry out their missions without an overriding necessity to protect their troops. When intervention is necessary, the civilian leadership must clearly articulate the mission’s goals and objectives while also realistically and authoritatively acknowledging its risks.

Education. Professional military education must be utilized as much as possible, across all ranks, to raise the awareness levels of service personnel about the histories of their particular services. Doing so would accomplish two goals. First, it would raise professional knowledge and instill pride in one’s service. Secondly, it would convey the extraordinary nature of the Cold War in America’s military history. Lessons about U.S. involvement in operations such as the China Relief Expedition of 1900, the Philippines campaign of 1899–1902, and the Punitive Expedition to Mexico in 1916 would show service members that today’s “nontraditional” missions in fact have numerous antecedents.

Personnel. The current difficulties in the areas of recruiting and retention must be used to reexamine the “up or out” rationale of the promotion systems. Some officers and enlistees should be allowed to remain in their present ranks without facing time-in-grade penalties. Retaining personnel in this fashion would preserve essential experience and expertise within certain fields and create a broadly competent cadre that could be used virtually interchangeably in key command and staff assignments. In exchange for such career sacrifice, these individuals might at retirement be granted the benefits of the next higher rank without ever holding it, or perhaps receive targeted pay bonuses.

Furthermore, the individual services should consider establishing officer cadres that maintain expertise, both operational and intellectual, in the intricacies of peace operations. Each service could select and cultivate a critical mass of qualified individuals charged with creating doctrine, developing and executing realistic training programs, and leading deployments in the field. Tracking the career orientation of a limited number of officers in this fashion would build a useful repository of institutional memory for the services and form a core group that would be culturally attuned to the politico-military realities of MOOTW as a discrete functional area.

Only time will reveal the effects of this past decade’s turbulence within the military. The next several years should offer some evidence of either the advance or retreat of problems within the profession, evidence that is bound to provide plenty of fodder for yet another electoral campaign. In the end, however, only the next large *military* campaign will clearly demonstrate the competence and abilities of the men and women in American uniform.

