The Bigger Picture: China’s Energy Exploration in the East China Sea and Japan’s Security Debate

Last week Japan released its annual defense review.  For the first time, it revealed photographs of Chinese offshore drilling rigs operating in the East China Sea.  The images reminded many of the international controversy that China stirred up in May 2014 when it sent the Hai Yang Shi You 981 offshore drilling rig (pictured below) into waters claimed by Vietnam.  The photographs reinforce the narrative that China is intent on pursuing its own interests, regardless of the consequences for its neighbors.  That, along with its island-building activities in the South China Sea, has made it increasingly difficult for Asian countries, like Indonesia and Malaysia, to set aside their concerns over Chinese actions in the region.

China offshore energy exploration

China’s foreign ministry quickly denounced the Japanese disclosure of the photographs.  It decried them as inflammatory and declared that Japan’s use of the photographs “provokes confrontation between the two countries, and is not constructive at all to the management of the East China Sea situation and the improvement of bilateral relations.”[1]

China maintains that the offshore drilling rigs that it has erected in the East China Sea are on its side of the median line through the two countries’ claims.  Thus, China has every right to develop the energy resources there.  Unfortunately, man-made demarcations cannot so neatly divide the East China Sea’s oil and natural gas deposits.  Rather, they tend to migrate towards areas of lower pressure.  Those occur whenever wells are drilled nearby.  Hence, Japan fears that Chinese wells will siphon off the oil and natural gas deposits under its claim from across the median line.

That prospect was thought to have been put to rest in 2008, when China and Japan agreed to jointly develop energy resources in the disputed waters of the East China Sea.  Neither side would unilaterally drill for oil or natural gas there.  But those were different times.  Since then, China has become not only more powerful, but also more willing to openly assert its power in the region.  Japan (whether consciously or not) antagonized China when Japan’s central government bought the disputed Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu in China) from private Japanese owners in 2012.  That prompted a sharp rise in the number of clashes between Chinese fishing boats and the Japanese coast guard around the islands, and China to establish an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the disputed waters in November 2013.  At the same time, China did begin to unilaterally explore for oil and natural gas in those waters, as Japan’s photographs attest.

Even so, China may be correct to discern a political rationale for Japan’s photographic disclosure, though perhaps not the one that its foreign ministry seemed to intimate.  The main reason behind Japan’s disclosure may not have been to embarrass China, but rather to support Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s effort to pass security legislation that will enable Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to participate in collective self-defense—or in other words, to fight alongside an ally when either it or Japan is threatened.  Indeed, the photographic disclosure was made only a week before the upper house of the Japanese Diet starts debate on Abe’s new security bills.

The photographs surely boost the argument of Abe’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), that there is a clear and present danger to Japan’s national interests and more must be done to protect them.  But a chorus of Japanese politicians of different political stripes has joined in opposition to Abe’s effort to push through the security legislation without a thorough debate.  Many, including some within the LDP, are concerned about passing the security bills without a clear understanding of the circumstances in which Japanese military forces could be used.  The ultimate vote could be a close one, given that the LDP holds a slim majority in the upper house.  Pictures may be worth a thousand words, but Abe may hope that they are worth a few votes too.

[1] “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on Japan’s Disclosure of China’s Oil and Gas Exploration in the East China Sea,” China Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, July 23, 2015, .

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Modi Flexes His Muscles: India’s Cross-Border Raid into Myanmar

June 16, 2015

Last Tuesday, India launched a punitive raid into Myanmar.  Seventy commandos from the Indian 21 Para (Special Forces) Battalion crossed India’s eastern border to strike two militant bases.  The commandos quickly overran the bases and killed between 20 and 40 militants.  The raid was prompted by the ambush of an Indian army patrol about 110 km south of Imphal five days earlier.  Eighteen Indian soldiers were killed and another 11 were wounded in what was the deadliest attack on Indian security forces in decades.  According to some Indian officials, Myanmar’s government consented to the raid, though Naypyidaw later claimed that the raid occurred on the Indian side of the border.

India Myanmar Raid

Whatever the case, the raid was remarkable.  It reflected Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s willingness to not only use military force, but also take decisive action.  As soon as the ambush on the Indian army patrol occurred, Modi directed National Security Advisor Ajit Doval to coordinate an Indian response.  Within five days, India successfully planned, resourced, and executed the two cross-border missions.  That required not only military, but also diplomatic coordination, if India really discussed the matter with Myanmar.

Modi is surely a different kind of prime minister than India has had in the past.  He demonstrated that when he visited China in May 2015.  He directly communicated to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang “the need for China to reconsider its approach” on issues that hold back their relationship, particularly the territorial disputes between their two countries.  Modi’s predecessors had consistently shied away from such frank discussion, typically sticking “to uninterrupted pledges of friendship and good relations.”[1] While Modi’s visit to China yielded no breakthroughs on the border issue, it was clear that China should take note.

Modi has also embarked on active diplomacy around the world.  Toning down India’s traditional adherence to non-alignment, he has edged close to Australia, Japan, and the United States.  He is clearly interested in having India play a greater role not only in South Asia, but also beyond it.  His ability to act decisively will make that a more likely prospect.

[1] Benjamin Haas, “India’s Modi tells China to ‘reconsider’ approach,” Agence France-Presse, May 15, 2015.

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Strategic Intentions: China’s Military Strategy White Paper

On Tuesday, China published its latest defense white paper.  Unlike its’ eight predecessors, this document was the first time that China publicly unveiled parts of its military strategy.  Even the paper’s title was changed from China’s National Defense to China’s Military Strategy.  Rather than the opaque and retrospective generalities found in earlier versions, the new white paper offered details about China’s strategic intentions and the future development of its military.

One Chinese military official went so far as to state that the greater transparency of the new white paper was a sign of a more confident China.  That said, many of the revelations contained in the document were hardly novel.  It profiled China’s decades-old “active defense” strategy, which maintains that China would always remain strategically defensive–though perhaps not so at the operational or tactical levels.  It also detailed the Chinese military’s primary aim: to prepare itself to fight “local wars under conditions of informationization”—in other words, regional conflicts in which command, control, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (C4ISR) would play major roles.  That too was already known.[1]

But other revelations in the white paper were more illuminating.  It showed that China intends to focus its force development in four domains: cyberspace (it will boost its cyber warfare capabilities); outer space (it will take steps to defend its interests there, even though it is opposed to the militarization of that domain); nuclear forces (it will build a reliable second-strike capability); and finally the oceans.

Yueyang - China frigate

That last domain is what currently worries China’s neighbors the most, given Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas. Indeed, the white paper highlighted Beijing’s intentions to further expand the Chinese navy and extend the range of its operations—shifting from “offshore waters defense” to “open ocean protection.”  The white paper argued that China’s growing overseas interests have changed the country’s focus from being a continental land power to a maritime power.  That has led China to prioritize its navy in its military modernization plans.  In what once would have been heresy in the Chinese military, the white paper declared that “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned.”[2]

That means that in the future China would not only defend its coastline from attack, but also its sea lanes of communications through international shipping routes, including those from the Middle East through which over half of China’s oil flows.  That, in turn, means countries like India will have to get used to seeing more of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean.  By the same token, Japan and the United States should expect more Chinese naval and air patrols in the Pacific Ocean and maybe one or two more Chinese aircraft carriers.

The white paper also listed China’s strategic concerns.  Chief among them was America’s “rebalance” toward Asia, under which the United States has increased its military presence and strengthened its alliances in the region.  The white paper also noted Japan’s push to revise its military and security policies, characterizing them as “sparing no effort to dodge the post-war mechanism.”  China’s “offshore neighbors” warranted mention too for their “provocative actions [to] reinforce their military presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied,” no doubt referring to the Philippines and Vietnam in the Spratly Islands.

While the white paper’s greater transparency may be the product of a more confident China, it is still a country that has not escaped the classic security dilemma.  As the white paper itself observes, China’s neighbors are rearming and helping the United States bolster its security alliances.  So, even as China strives to improve its security, it has prompted its neighbors to seek ways to improve their security situations, thereby reducing the effectiveness of its own efforts.  That is something that China’s military strategy probably did not intend.

[1] “China sticks to ‘active defense’ strategy,” interviewee Senior Captain Zhang Junshe, Vice President of the China Naval Research Institute, China 24, CCTV, Beijing, May 26, 2015,  http://english.cntv.cn/2015/05/27/VIDE1432675208303328.shtml; “White Paper highlights ‘active’ defense strategy,” interviewee Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, China Ministry of National Defense, host Han Bin, China 24, CCTV, Beijing, May 26, 2015, http://english.cntv.cn/2015/05/26/VIDE1432614727198411.shtml.

[2] China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015); “China’s defense white paper,” interviewee Senior Captain Zhang Junshe, Vice President of the China Naval Research Institute, host Wang Yizhi, Dialogue, CCTV, Beijing, May 26, 2015, http://english.cntv.cn/2015/05/27/VIDE1432668717544907.shtml.

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Japan’s Security Role in Southeast Asia (and the South China Sea)

Only a few years ago, it would have seemed inconceivable that Japan would have any security role outside of Japanese territorial waters.  But in a January 2015 interview, Admiral Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, related that Washington would welcome Japanese maritime air patrols in the South China Sea.  He said that they could help to stabilize the region by balancing China’s growing naval strength there.  That broke a long-standing taboo in Japan on public discussion of such uses for the Japanese armed forces.  While it still may be some time before Japan mounts maritime air patrols over the South China Sea, yesterday it held an historic naval exercise in those waters.

It was the first time Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force ever conducted a bilateral exercise with the Philippines.  Two Japanese destroyers and a Philippine corvette practiced how to deal with “unplanned encounters at sea.”  They exercised near Subic Bay, a big Philippine (and former U.S.) naval base that is only 260 km from Scarborough Shoal—the spot where Chinese and Philippine patrol boats were locked in a months-long standoff in 2012 and where the Chinese coast guard used a water cannon to drive away Filipino fishermen just last month.[1]

Even before the naval exercise, the Japanese and Philippine coast guards held a smaller drill in Manila Bay a week ago.  Later this year, Japan will deliver the first of ten offshore patrol boats that it promised the Philippines in 2013.  Manila plans to use them to better monitor its territorial waters in the South China Sea and prevent intrusions into them.  Security ties between the two countries have grown substantially.  Last year, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe invited Philippine President Benigno Aquino III to Tokyo to discuss greater security cooperation.  At the time, Aquino went so far as to say that “nations of goodwill can only benefit if the Japanese government is empowered to assist others… especially in the area of collective self-defense,” giving a nod to Abe’s efforts to loosen Japan’s constitutional constraints that prevent his country from defending allies under attack.[2]

South China Sea - Japan

Japan has also expanded its security activities with other Southeast Asian countries.  Early this year, it mended ties with Thailand, whose coup led to a surge of Chinese influence there and strained relations with its longtime ally, the United States.  In March, Japan signed an accord with Indonesia to enhance military exchanges and collaboration on defense equipment development.  And Japan has steadily expanded its military cooperation with Vietnam, another claimant in the South China Sea dispute.  Japan promised it offshore patrol boats too.  In fact, immediately after the Japanese coast guard finished its drill in the Philippines last week, one of its cutters proceeded to Vietnam to participate in an exercise there.[3]  Japan has clearly sought a greater role in the security of the region.

Nonetheless, there is a question of whether Japan’s military can sustain a wider role.  Contrary to China’s claims, Japan’s defense budget has not grown much.  It rose less than three percent in the last year (and not at all in U.S. dollar terms).  Any real expansion of Japanese military presence in Southeast Asia will have to run on a shoestring until Tokyo can afford a true increase in military spending.  That is not to say Japan is without options.  Its new long-range P-1 maritime patrol aircraft would be useful for patrols over the South China Sea.  Moreover, Japan could enlarge its navy by simply slowing the pace at which it decommissions older warships, many of which are still highly capable.  But there are limits too.  Keeping older warships in service entails higher maintenance costs which may crowd out investment in new weapon systems.

As Japan expands its security role in Southeast Asia, new questions will arise.  Foremost among them is whether Japan’s new role will lead to greater stability or instability?  On the one hand, the absence of an adequately balancing force in Southeast Asia has given China a free hand to assert itself in the South China Sea, as marked by its massive land reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands.  Given how grindingly slow America’s rebalance to Asia has been, Japan’s security support could be just what the region needs.

On the other hand, any minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces in the South China Sea could easily escalate tensions between their two countries.  Anyone who remembers the accidental collision between an American EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese J-8 fighter in 2001 can imagine how a similar incident between Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and intercepting Chinese fighters could spiral into a major crisis.  Let us hope deterrence prevails.

[1] Mynardo Macaraig, “Philippines and Japan hold historic naval drills in flashpoint waters,” AFP News, May 12, 2015; Manuel Mogato, Adam Rose, and Ben Blanchard, “Philippines, Japan coast guards hold anti-piracy drills,” Reuters, May 6, 2015.

[2] Louis Bacani, “Aquino: Beneficial if Japan can defend allies under attack,” Philstar.com, Jun. 24, 2014, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/06/24/1338501/aquino-beneficial-if-japan-can-defend-allies-under-attack.

[3] Rosemarie Francisco, Manuel Mogato, Linda Sieg, Tim Kelly, and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Japan steps up maritime engagement with Philippines, Vietnam,” Reuters, May 12, 2015; “Japan – Indonesia Joint Statement: Towards Further Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership Underpinned by Sea and Democracy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mar. 23, 2015; Mitsuru Obe, “Japan Reaffirms Economic Ties With Thailand,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 9, 2015; Bagus BT Saragih, “Indonesia and Japan improve military ties,” Jakarta Post, Jan. 30 2013.

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Decline in Oil Prices, Currency Pairs, and National Power

Last autumn, headlines began to declare national “winners and losers” from the precipitous drop in oil prices over the second half of the year.[1]  They contended that the United States and its friends would benefit from the fall in oil prices; and that its most strident adversaries would not.  While largely true, the headlines did not capture the whole story.

Since international prices for oil are quoted in U.S. dollars, the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and another country’s currency (a currency pair) also matters when calculating the real impact of a change in oil prices on that country.  Take Russia for example.  Much has been made of the fact that half of Russia’s government budget is based on revenues from oil.  One might suppose, because oil prices have fallen about 50 percent over the last six months, that Russia’s government budget would be pinched by about 25 percent (reflecting the 50 percent fall in oil revenues on half its budget).  Such a contraction would be catastrophic for the Russian government and Russia’s economy, given its high dependence on government spending.  That might lead Western policymakers to believe they can easily wait out Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive designs.

But one must remember that the Russian government does not pay for domestic goods and services in U.S. dollars, but rather in Russian rubles.  Any drop in the value of the Russian ruble against the U.S. dollar allows Russia to reap more rubles for its dollar-based oil revenues.  (Even so, a sudden devaluation in a country’s currency can still wreak havoc on that country’s wider economy, because it fails to let people adjust to the benefits of devaluation, before they feel its negative impacts.)  Given the devaluation in the Russian ruble (which has fallen in tandem with oil prices), the real impact of the fall in oil prices is closer to only 8 percent, rather than 25 percent. While that is still a big challenge for the Russian government’s budget, it is a lower hurdle for Putin to surmount.

Similarly, one might expect that Japan, a key American ally in Asia, to unreservedly benefit from the decline in oil prices.  As a country completely dependent on oil imports, any decline in oil prices should boost its economy.  Given that oil prices have fallen about 50 percent over the last six months and that Japan imported about 1.6 billion barrels of oil in 2014, one may naturally assume that Japan is now saving a vast sum that would act as a fiscal stimulus to its economy, making it a stronger country and one better prepared to cope with a rising China.

That has happened, but not to the degree that the halving of oil prices would suggest.  That is because the value of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar has fallen too.  During the second half of 2014, the yen devalued about 15 percent, as a result of the Japanese central bank’s quantitative easing policy.   That shaved one-fifth off the benefit from the decrease in oil prices to 40 percent in yen terms.  Ironically, the lower energy input prices had made it more difficult for the Japanese government to achieve its 2 percent inflation target, which Tokyo believes will help lift the country out of its decades-long deflationary economic stagnation. 

As the cases of Russia and Japan have shown, changes in currency exchange rates can make a real difference on the impact that changes in oil prices have on a national economy, whether they are net oil importers (those shaded in blue in the chart below) or net oil exporters (those shaded in red).

Effect of Exchange Rate Movements on the Decline in Oil Prices in Local Currencies

 

As a region, Asia has benefited from the drop in oil prices.  Almost every country in the region is a net oil importer.  Chief among them is China, whose slightly appreciating yuan against the U.S. dollar, has allowed it to fully benefit from the lower oil prices.  In fact, Beijing has taken advantage of them to less expensively fill its strategic petroleum reserve.[2]  But not far behind have been India and Indonesia.  The currencies of neither country have devalued by more than 6 percent, allowing them to realize almost all of the benefit from the decline in oil prices.  That, in turn, has allowed their central banks to cut their interest rates to spur their economies without having to worry as much about inflation.  Lower oil prices have also enabled Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to slash fuel subsidies, which had been draining government coffers in the past, without a public outcry.  That has freed up resources that they can devote to infrastructure and defense, as both national leaders have promised.

However, the fall in oil prices has also pinched some American allies.  One such country is Australia.  Though it is a net importer of oil, Australia has ambitions to become among the world’s leading exporters of liquefied natural gas (LNG).  But LNG prices, which are often linked to those of oil, have followed oil’s prices downward.  That has put into jeopardy Australia’s new round of offshore LNG development.  According to the Australian government, it will likely miss out on about AUS$750 million in petroleum resource rent tax over the next four years—about the cost for one of the new diesel-electric submarines that its navy wants.  The situation would have been even worse had the Australian dollar not devalued by 13 percent against the U.S. dollar.[3]

Finally, some countries, like Venezuela, whose currencies are effectively pegged to the U.S. dollar, have felt the full impact of the decline in oil prices.  Unfortunately for Venezuela, it imports most of its consumer and industrial goods—including food, clothing, machinery, vehicles, etc.—and it holds debts mainly denominated in U.S. dollars.  Thus, any devaluation of the Venezuelan bolívar to temper the impact of lower oil prices would also cause the costs of goods to soar and make its U.S.-dollar debts crushing.  To avoid a financial crisis, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has travelled to China this week.  In the past China has agreed to oil-for-loan agreements, in which China provides immediate financing to Venezuela in exchange for future deliveries of Venezuelan oil.  Already existing deals with China have begun to squeeze out Venezuela’s ability to use its oil to bring Latin American countries into its orbit.  Rather, new deals are more likely to move Venezuela close to China’s orbit.[4]

By the first week of January 2015, the benchmark prices for Brent and West Texas Intermediate crude oil had fallen to $51 and $48 per barrel, respectively.  As long as these conditions persist, oil-exporting countries will suffer and oil-importing ones will benefit.  But to really understand whether these countries are weakening or strengthening to the extent that the decline in oil prices suggest, one would be wise to also consider the trajectories of their national currencies.

[1] “Winners and Losers,” Economist, Oct. 25, 2014.

[2] Abheek Bhattacharya, “China’s Petroleum Reserve Builds Shaky Floor for Oil,” Wall Street Journal, Sep. 3, 2014.

[3] Australia is considering a Japanese submarine design for its next-generation submarine fleet.  The most recently launched Japanese Sōryū-class submarine cost $540 million and AUS$750 million converts to $615 million at today’s exchange rate.  John Hofilena, “Japan launches newest submarine Kokuryu amid party atmosphere,” Japan Daily Press, Nov. 04, 2013, Eric Yep, “Falling Oil Spells Boon for Most of Asia’s Economies,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 2015; Max Mason, “Oil price plunge sends petrol to four-year lows as Australia feels it at the pumps,” Sydney Morning Herald, Dec. 22, 2014; James Paton, “Plunging Oil Threatens to Spoil Australia’s Next Gas Boon,” Bloomberg News, Nov 27, 2014.

[4] Eyanir Chinea and Brian Ellsworth, “Venezuela’s Maduro to visit China, OPEC nations amid cash crunch,” Reuters, Jan. 5, 2015; Nicole Hong and Kejal Vyas, “Oil Shakes Venezuelan Debt to Its Foundations,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 2014; “Inside U.S. Oil,” Thomson Reuters, Aug. 22, 2014, pp. 7-8.

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Japan’s Constitutional Reinterpretation and Its Pursuit of New Security Relationships

On July 1, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe announced that his cabinet approved a resolution to reinterpret Article Nine of Japan’s 67-year old constitution.  That article, which stipulates that Japan would forever renounce war as a sovereign right, effectively forbids its military from coming to the aid of allies under attack or, in other words, engaging in what it calls “collective self-defense.”  The new cabinet resolution would remove that restriction.  It would also relax the limits on Japan’s activities in United Nations peacekeeping operations and incidents short of war.  While most outsiders may view the reinterpretation as modest, many Chinese and some South Koreans worry that the change will lead to a more aggressive Japan.  Japanese citizens also worry, but for a different reason.  They worry that Japan could be more easily drawn into conflicts at the behest of its allies, especially the United States.

Abe has had to work hard to get this far.  He had to win over his governing coalition partner, the New Komeito Party.  (New Komeito’s consent may still earn the party a backlash from its pacifist supporters.)  Even now, Abe still faces a full debate in Japan’s Diet before he can make amendments to existing laws that will be needed to implement his cabinet’s decision.  That is Abe’s next hurdle.

But it is a hurdle that Japan will have to overcome, if it wants to not only strengthen its existing security relationship with the United States, but also build new ones with other countries.  Without the ability to take part in collective self-defense, Japan can offer its security partners little more than moral support.  Typically allies expect more than that.  Since Japan, as Abe is keen to stress, sits an in increasingly volatile region, it needs new allies.  To secure them, it is useful for Japan to be able to engage in collective self-defense, which is one of the main reasons why Abe has pushed to have Article Nine reinterpreted.

Not surprisingly, the reinterpretation pleased Japan’s ally, the United States, which has long borne the brunt of the defense burden in their security relationship.  As one senior American official put it, Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation merely “[gets] Japan up to a normal baseline of operations in collective self-defense.”[1]  Under its new guidelines, Japan’s military would have permission to shoot down a North Korean missile heading for the United States or defend American ships under attack in the waters near Japan.

Abe has been working toward this goal ever since his governing coalition’s electoral victory in December 2012.  He has often spoken about how China’s unrelenting assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has raised new concerns in Japan and across the region.  And so, Abe has moved to establish new bilateral security ties with other countries that face similar pressures from China, like the Philippines and Vietnam.  Despite their own wartime experiences with Japanese occupation, both countries have welcomed the new ties.  When Philippine President Benigno Aquino III visited Japan in June 2014, he praised Abe’s efforts to revise Japan’s constitution.  “Nations of goodwill can only benefit if the Japanese government is empowered to assist others,” he argued.[2]  Similarly, Vietnam has supported stronger ties with Japan, signing an agreement to establish an “extensive strategic partnership” in March 2014.  In return, Japan has offered both countries patrol boats to help them better monitor their maritime claims.

Australia has become the latest country to receive Japan’s overtures.  And it too has reciprocated.  In fact, this week Abe is visiting Canberra, where the two countries signed economic partnership pact as well as an agreement on military equipment and technology transfers.  Abe also addressed a joint session of Australia’s parliament and attended a meeting of its national security committee.  Though Australia is a country whose economy has become closely linked to China, it is also increasingly wary of what China’s rise might mean for the region.  Its 2009 strategic defense white paper outlined a need for the country to build a new fleet of a dozen advanced diesel-electric submarines.[3]  On the other hand, Japan is a country with a long history of building such vessels, the latest of which are its Sōryū-class submarines that are equipped with ultra-quiet air-independent propulsion.   After Abe relaxed Japan’s arms export controls in April 2014, the two countries accelerated talks over how Australia could acquire certain defense technologies (and possibly entire submarines) from Japan.  If such acquisitions are eventually made, they would further cement Australia as a true security partner with Japan.

Japan and U.S. Security Relationships in the Asia-Pacific

What has been particularly impressive is the ease with which Japan has developed its new security relationships, all of which were formed in the last year.  (See map.)  A few of these intersect with the many bilateral security ties the United States maintains in the region, whether they are formal treaties (blue) or simply close relationships (green).

Japan is not alone.  Vietnam has extended its search for friends to India and Russia and recently took the step of cooperating with the Philippines, a rival claimant in the South China Sea.  Meanwhile, the Philippines has strengthened its alliance with the United States through a new security pact, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (formerly known as Increased Rotational Presence).  Other Southeast Asian countries have begun to take precautions too.  Even historically quiescent Indonesia has moved to reaffirm its claim to the exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands, a portion of which overlaps China’s South China Sea claim.  Indeed, as long as China forcefully presses its maritime claims and Abe can move Japan towards collective self-defense, Tokyo may find more Asia-Pacific countries receptive to its offer of new security relationships.



[1] Martin Fackler and David E. Sanger, “Japan Announces a Military Shift to Thwart China,” New York Times, Jul. 2, 2014, p. A1.

[2] Sui-Lee Wee and Ben Blanchard, “China says Philippines stirring tensions after Aquino supports Japan,” Reuters, Jun. 25, 2014

[3] Australia, Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009), p. 70.

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Friends in Many Places: Vietnam’s Diplomacy

Last Wednesday, Vietnam feted the 60th anniversary of its victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu.  But earlier that week, Hanoi lodged a protest against Beijing for allowing a Chinese offshore oil rig to drill in the waters near the Paracel Islands, which are disputed between China and Vietnam.  Hanoi also complained that Chinese ships intentionally rammed two Vietnamese coast guard vessels which were dispatched to the oil rig site on Sunday.  Several Vietnamese sailors suffered minor injuries.[1]  Fortunately, the outcome of the incident was far less severe than Vietnam’s March 1988 naval clash with China in which 70 Vietnamese personnel were killed and three ships lost after Chinese forces fired on them near Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands.

That China and Vietnam have had a long history of mistrust, reaching far before the 20th century, is well known.  The fact that both countries eventually became single-party states with a common communist ideology did not make them comrades.  During the Cold War, Vietnam allied itself with the Soviet Union, not China.  And in 1979 China and Vietnam fought a short, but intense war, in which Beijing sought to “teach Vietnam a lesson” for its invasion and occupation of Chinese-backed Cambodia.  But by the end of the conflict, China, after losing over 30,000 troops, learned that Vietnam was no walkover.  What Vietnam learned was the rarity of reliable friends.  Despite a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that Hanoi signed with Moscow a year earlier, the Soviet Union did not come to Vietnam’s aid when China invaded.  Unfortunately for Hanoi, after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, it had even fewer friends than before.

South China Sea - Paracel Islands - Spratly Islands - Vietnam

But with growing unease across the Asia-Pacific over China’s rise (and attendant assertiveness), Vietnam has found other countries receptive to friendlier ties.  Unlike the Philippines, which has sought to maximize its long-time relationship with the United States (and a more recent one with Japan), Vietnam has cast a wider net for friends.  Over the last 15 years, it has made fast friends with a number of external powers, including India, Japan, Russia, and the United States.[2]  These have paid off in different ways.

Like Vietnam, India has become wary of China.  New Delhi has wanted to push back against what it sees as China’s efforts to exert influence into South Asia, in countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.  Moreover, India has its own territorial disputes with China over large sections of the Himalayan Mountains.  And so, India has pursued new ties with Southeast Asia through its “Look East” diplomatic strategy, and in doing so found common cause with Vietnam.  So, even as China drilled for oil in waters that Vietnam contests, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation had already agreed to lease exploration blocks from Vietnam in waters that China contests in the southern part of the South China Sea.[3]  India has also extended military support to Vietnam.  Since 2000, the Indian navy has deployed ships into the South China Sea (and on occasion ignored warnings from China’s navy that they were entering Chinese waters).  In 2010, Vietnam signed an agreement that granted the Indian navy access to Vietnamese port facilities.  In turn, India agreed to expand Vietnam’s naval logistics capabilities and, in 2013, offered to help train new Vietnamese submarine crews (since India has long operated the same class of submarine that Vietnam is now acquiring).[4]

Vietnam’s relations with Japan have also grown.  The rift between China and Japan over the disputed Diaoyu (in China) or Senkaku (in Japan) Islands in the East China Sea has made Tokyo as interested as Hanoi in developing new security ties with its neighbors.  In 2011, Japan and Vietnam signed a memorandum of understanding that facilitated the creation of bilateral defense ties, ministerial visits, and exchanges between the two countries’ armed forces.  And when Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Tokyo in December 2013, the two sides discussed further collaboration, including providing Japanese-built patrol boats to the Vietnamese coast guard.  (Japan made a similar offer of ten patrol boats to the Philippines in July 2013.)  That was followed up with an accord between Japan and Vietnam to establish an “extensive strategic partnership” during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s visit to Hanoi in March 2014.  The partnership envisions many areas of engagement, most notable among which is Japan’s assistance to enhance Vietnam’s maritime law enforcement capacity.[5]

Of course, Vietnam’s relationship with Russia extends back to the days of the Soviet Union.  But that relationship has been revitalized over the last decade.  Russia is once again doing a brisk business as Vietnam’s principal arms supplier and ranks among Russia’s top five arms export recipients.  In April 2014, Vietnam took delivery of the second of six Kilo-class submarines that it ordered from Russia.  Before that came orders for 32 Su-30MK2 fighters, two batteries of P-800 mobile land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (part of the K-300P Bastion-P coastal defense system), six Svetlyak-class fast-attack craft, and four Gepard-class frigates.  Vietnam also contracted Russia to upgrade its venerable naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, where Russia maintained a naval presence until 2002.  Meanwhile, Vietnam has tried to broaden its relationship with Moscow by allowing Russian state-owned companies, like Rosneft, to acquire stakes in its energy sector.  When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Vietnam in late 2013, the two sides agreed to several deals that included a joint investment in a major refinery and a contract for a nuclear power plant.  But more interestingly, Hanoi offered Rosneft concessions in two offshore exploration blocks, both of which sit near or within China’s “nine dash line” that demarcates Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea.[6]

Vietnam has even courted the United States, a country against which it fought a bitter conflict in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  When Russia’s lease on Cam Ranh Bay was about to expire in the early 2000s, Vietnam turned to the United States.  Hanoi informally discussed granting the United States access to the naval base, which it had used during the Vietnam Conflict.  At the time the United States demurred, concerned about China’s reaction.  Even so, Vietnam has welcomed U.S. Navy port visits, which have averaged once per year over the last decade.[7]  Nonetheless, the relationship between Washington and Hanoi only really took off after they began holding annual bilateral defense and security talks in 2008.  Vietnam was particularly pleased in 2010 when the United States declared that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to be in its “national interest.”  That American assertion was reinforced in late 2013 when Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the United States would provide Vietnam with $18 million and five fast patrol boats to improve its coast guard’s ability to properly police its waters.[8]

Whether Vietnam eventually finds these external powers to be fair-weather friends remains to be seen.  Certainly, China has tried to plant the seeds of doubt, warning Vietnam not to be misled by professions of friendship from other countries.  Of course, a country like Russia must weigh its growing strategic relationship with China against its military and economic ties to Vietnam.  Other countries must also consider how far they are willing to go for Vietnam.  Thus far, these sorts of questions have not hindered Hanoi from pursuing a foreign policy that aggressively makes friends around the globe.  Perhaps one day France may be counted among them too.



[1] “Sea incident not clash: China Vice-Minister,” China Daily Asia, May 8, 2014, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/news/2014-05/08/content_15134173.html; “Chinese vessels deliberately ram Vietnam’s ships in Vietnamese waters: officials,” Tuoi Tre News, May 7, 2014, http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/19513/chinese-vessels-deliberately-rammed-into-vietnamese-boats.

[2] Vietnam also developed closer security ties with Australia, Germany, Italy, and Sweden.  In 2010, Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation with Australia and further strengthened its ties in 2013 with a new joint training program.  In the same year, it contracted with Sweden’s Unmanned Systems Group for unmanned aerial vehicles.  Julian Kerr and James Hardy, “Australia, Vietnam signal closer defence ties,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Mar. 21, 2013.

[3] That same region was a zone of contention in the early 1990s when China and Vietnam leased exploration blocks abutting one another to Crestone and Mobil Oil, respectively, both American energy companies.  Philip Bowring, “China Is Getting Help in a Grab at the Sea,” New York Times, May 6, 1994.

[4] Rahul Bedi, “Indian Navy to train Vietnamese submarine crews,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Dec. 2, 2013; Hao Zhou, “China warns India against oil exploitation,” Global Times, Dec. 5, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/748314.shtml; Desikan Thirunarayanpuram, “USA, China frown at Navy’s S China Sea exercise,” The Statesman News Service, May 8, 2000.

[5] “Vietnam-Japan ties lifted to extensive strategic partnership,” Tuoi Tre News, Mar. 19, 2014, http://tuoitrenews.vn/politics/18447/vietnamjapan-ties-lifted-to-extensive-strategic-partnership; Jon Grevatt, “Japan, Vietnam pave way for further defence collaboration,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Mar. 19, 2014; “Japan extends patrol ship carrot to Vietnam, plus ¥96 billion loan,” Japan Times, Dec. 15, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/15/national/japan-extends-patrol-ship-carrot-to-vietnam-plus-%C2%A596-billion-loan/#.U2vRp7Stzj4.

[6] Alexei Anishchuk and Ho Binh Minh, “Russia’s Gazprom, Rosneft sign Vietnam energy deals on Putin visit,” Reuters, Nov. 12, 2013 ; “Russia to Deliver 12 Su-30 Fighter Jets to Vietnam – Source,” RIA Novosti, Aug. 21, 2013; Nguyen Pham Muoi, “Vietnamese Defense Minister in Russia to Boost Military Ties,” Wall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 2013; “Russia Will Help Vietnam Build a Submarine Fleet, Shoygu Says,” RIA Novosti, Mar. 8, 2013.

[7] The most recent U.S. Navy port visit occurred in April 2013 when the guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon and salvage ship USNS Salvor docked at Da Nang.

[8] “Kerry announces new US maritime security aid to Vietnam amid China tensions, pushes reforms,” Associated Press, Dec. 16, 2013; Malcolm Moore and Praveen Swami, “Vietnam offers navy base to foil China,” The Telegraph, Nov. 8, 2010; John Pomfret, “Clinton wades into South China Sea territorial dispute,” Washington Post, Jul. 23, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/07/clinton_wades_into_south_china.html ; Nayan Chanda, “Cam Ranh Bay manoeuvres,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Dec. 28, 2000-Jan. 4, 2001, pp. 21-23.

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Obama’s Visit to Asia and U.S. Alliances

As foreign trips go, President Barack Obama’s visit to Asia in April 2014 was more important than most.  It was originally scheduled to coincide with the APEC summit in October 2013, but domestic problems prevented him from travelling at that time.  But even then, such a trip was needed.  Many in Asia already had become concerned over his administration’s commitment to its strategic “pivot” or “rebalancing” towards the region.  Both its economic and security legs had come to little.  Despite the administration’s goal to complete the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade talks in 2013, they were nowhere near a final agreement (and still are far from one).  Meanwhile, doubts emerged about the seriousness of the U.S. military rebalance.  A major part of that rebalance hinged on the U.S. Navy’s shift from a force that was equally balanced between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to one that would be tilted, 60 percent, toward the Pacific.  But given that the administration’s concurrent efforts would reduce the overall size of the U.S. Navy, many wondered whether its tilt would provide any boost to U.S. capabilities in the region.  And, more broadly, the United States still seemed more willing to engage itself in places like Libya and Syria, than in the East or South China Seas.

During the intervening six months, tensions in Asia have climbed even higher: from China’s declaration of an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea (November 2013) and its quasi-maritime blockade of the Philippine-held Second Thomas Shoal (March 2014) to Japan’s decision to build a new radar base on Yonaguni Island (April 2014) to North Korea’s artillery barrages and missile tests (March and April 2014).  Layered on top of all that has been the Ukraine crisis, in which the Obama administration has allowed Russia to violate Ukrainian sovereignty without any serious repercussions.  That itself follows Obama’s failure to act in 2013 after Syria crossed his “red line” on the use of chemical weapons.  Little wonder that such worrisome events have made U.S. allies in Asia nervous.

Such was the backdrop for Obama’s visit to Asia over the last week.  Without a doubt, his main objective was to reassure U.S. allies in the region.  Obama visited all three U.S. security treaty partners during his trip: Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

In Japan, Obama plainly stated that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would cover all territories administered by Japan.  That means the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu Islands in China) in the East China Sea would be defended, since they are administered by Japan (though his later reply to a press question as to whether his statement represented a “red line” in the East China Sea slightly muddied its impact).  Still, it was the first time that an American president directly addressed the issue.  That must have heartened Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe.  And though there was no breakthrough in the bilateral TPP negotiations between Japan and the United States during Obama’s stay, some incremental progress was made in the days afterwards.

Obama then touched down in South Korea, where he warned Pyongyang against further military provocations.  Already this year, North Korea fired artillery into and short-range ballistic missiles over South Korean waters.  Now, there is the prospect of a North Korean nuclear test.  And so, Obama sought to do more warning.  He also worked to coax Japan and South Korea into overcoming their historical animosities.  Given that both countries and the United States must deal with the threat from North Korea (and perhaps China in the future), the administration hoped that America’s two security treaty allies could find a way to work together, rather than against each other.  Lastly, Obama’s presence in Seoul helped South Korean President Park Geun-hye demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-South Korean alliance to the Korean National Assembly.  That was important, since it soon will consider a major increase in its financial support of U.S. forces in South Korea, as part of a larger agreement reached seven years earlier in which wartime operational control of combined U.S.-South Korean forces would transition from an American general to a South Korean one.

Finally, just before Obama’s arrival in Manila, American and Philippine representatives signed a ten-year accord called the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.  Under negotiation for much of the last two years, that agreement was originally dubbed the Increased Rotational Presence Framework Agreement, largely because that was its intent: to enable U.S. forces to more regularly rotate through the Philippines in order to conduct joint exercises with the Philippine armed forces.  The final agreement also allows the United States to keep the equipment that it uses for those exercises at Philippine military bases.  The frequency of those exercises could be increased to the point at which there would be a near-continuous American military presence in the Philippines.  That would represent a meaningful change in U.S. force posture in the region and send a strong signal of American commitment to the Philippines.  The successful conclusion of the agreement was a victory for Philippine President Benigno Aquino III, who faced domestic opposition to it.  The agreement offers the Philippines some breathing space to rebuild its own external defense forces and pursue greater security cooperation with its Southeast Asian neighbors.

While in Southeast Asia, Obama also began to build new economic and security bridges to Malaysia, which had developed somewhat cozier relations with China than the United States since the 1990s.  Hence, it was notable that Obama and Prime Minister Najib Razak elevated their countries’ relationship to one of a “comprehensive partnership.”  (That matched the status which Malaysia conferred on China a year earlier.)  But little more was accomplished for the time being, due to popular resistance in Malaysia to the American-led TPP.

Upon Obama’s return to the United States, he can rightly claim that American allies in the region feel more reassured.  But American reassurances will ultimately need to be matched with American deeds.  Sadly, Obama’s reticence to persuade members of his own party to grant him “fast track” authority to streamline the TPP’s ratification process belies to some degree his own words of commitment.  An even bigger question is whether his words will impress China or North Korea.  No doubt, his words will be tested.  Questions about American commitments to its Asian allies were not fashioned overnight, nor will they be dispelled with a presidential visit.

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Railway to Somewhere: Thailand’s Politics and China’s Reach in Southeast Asia

Despite elections last Sunday, Thailand remains riven by political conflict.  On the one side is the current government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (and nominally her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted from power in 2006).  Their supporters dominate Thailand’s north and northeast.  On the other side is the Democrat Party, whose adherents are largely drawn from Bangkok’s middle class, southern Thailand, and the royalist establishment.  While many issues divide the two sides, the outcome of their struggle may have an impact on China’s reach in Southeast Asia.

Countries have long dreamed of a railway connecting China and Southeast Asia.  A century ago, both the British and French governments hoped to link their Southeast Asian colonies with China.  But ultimately terrain and war halted those ambitions.  The Cold War poured further cold water on the idea, as revolutionary China seemed more intent on exporting communism than trade.

But a decade after China implemented its market reforms, things began to change.  By the mid-1990s, the ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development Cooperation revived hopes for a railway between China and Singapore.  But a lack of funding prevented its progress.  Finally in 2011, the Asian Development Bank, working with the region’s countries, agreed to finance a circuitous railway that ran from China, down the length of Vietnam, across Cambodia, through Thailand, and finally down to Malaysia and Singapore.  Railway construction costs were held down by the fact that the route knitted together several existing railway lines, though a substantial sum would be needed to upgrade existing rails and rolling stock.

But China has since upended the plan.  It sought a more direct route to Southeast Asia.  It had already built a railway from Kunming (in southern China) to its border with Laos.  Then China’s railway minister pushed for $5 billion worth of Chinese financing to extend that railway to Vientiane, the Lao capital.  The early 2013 downfall of that minister on corruption charges (and the elimination of his railway ministry) left some to wonder whether the proposed railway would proceed.  But that uncertainty was lifted a few months later when Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the creation of a China-backed Asian infrastructure development bank, part of his new charm offensive in Southeast Asia.  One of the infrastructure projects that he highlighted was the proposed railway.  However, even if its financing looks more settled, the railway still faces the challenge of construction.  While its route is more direct, it will require scores of bridges and tunnels to wend its way through Laos’ mountains.  Meanwhile, at the other end of the hoped-for railway, China has expressed interest in the expected tender for the Malaysia-Singapore segment later of it in 2014.

Such a railway would have strategic value for China.  Just as the transcontinental railways across the United States helped bind its eastern and western halves in the late 1800s, China’s north-south railway would help better integrate Southeast Asia—a mainly seaward-facing (and American-leaning) region—with its economy and political interests.  In addition to being more direct, the route that China’s railway has chosen would tighten the connection between it and its ally Laos and entirely avoid Vietnam, a country with which China shares a long and quarrelsome history.

Whether the north-south railway from Kunming to Singapore is completed depends on Thailand, which sits in the middle of its projected path.  Thailand’s current government has already discussed with China the possibility of building a connecting line between Vientiane and Bangkok, using concessionary Chinese loans.  (Rather than replace the existing railway, a new high-speed one would be built next to it.)  That connecting line would bring construction jobs to Thailand’s economically-lagging northeast.  But there are those in the region who are concerned about the schemes of China and Laos, due to their unfettered hydroelectric dam development on the Mekong River and its tributaries (those dams could cause droughts or floods on their agricultural lands if they are poorly managed).  Should the Democrats succeed in displacing the current government from power, one might expect that talks with China over the railway would continue, given that many of their Bangkok supporters also favored hydroelectric dam construction on the Mekong River.  However, in the tit-for-tat nature of Thailand’s politics, grudges can be deeply held and if the proposed railway between Vientiane and Bangkok is too closely associated with the current government, the railway could become a casualty of the domestic politics between the two factions.

Just how concerned should observers be about a railway that ties Southeast Asia more closely to China?  In the short run, they probably need not worry too much.  After all, China financed and built a port and pipeline in Myanmar that linked its coast to China’s border, but Myanmar still sought to build stronger relationships with Japan and the United States.  But over the long run, as economic interests in the infrastructure become entrenched and if they come to influence a country’s government, then national interests can shift.  Thus, it would be wise for Japan and the United States to encourage the speedier construction of the Asian Development Bank’s railway route through Vietnam.  That route would not only encourage stronger Cambodian bonds with Thailand and Vietnam, but also enable Cambodia to become less reliant on Chinese foreign direct investment for its economic growth.

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Fox Hunting: China’s Response to Japan’s Diplomatic Campaign

Last November, I wrote a blog entitled What Does the Fox Say? that outlined once-hesitant Japan’s efforts to raise its stature abroad.  Since then, those efforts have continued at a relentless pace.  Following a multi-country tour through Southeast Asia after the APEC summit, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe capped off his regional efforts with an ASEAN-Japan summit in Tokyo.  Without missing a beat, he then took Japan’s active diplomacy beyond Asia and has taken steps at home to better orchestrate its implementation.

During a well-publicized tour through Africa two weeks ago, Abe visited Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Mozambique.  But wherever he went, he could not escape Chinese criticism of Japan’s Second World War history.  China’s representative to the African Union went as far as holding a press conference to denounce Abe as “the biggest troublemaker in Asia,” while holding up old photographs of Chinese civilians that he said were massacred by Japanese troops.  Chinese ambassadors around the world made sure that that message was pressed home.  In so doing, China has attempted to respond to Japan’s diplomatic campaign with one of its own.

Paying little heed to China’s rebukes, Abe has forged ahead.  In a demonstration of its strategic engagement in Asia, Tokyo made a substantial contribution to the reconstruction efforts in the Philippines, after Typhoon Haiyan devastated that country’s central islands last year.  Through the Japan International Cooperation Agency, it signed an agreement with Manila to establish a Post-Disaster Stand-by Loan worth about $500 million.  For those in the Philippines, it further distanced Japan’s response to the disaster from China’s meager one.

Still, Japan’s foreign policy coordination has historically been challenging to do.  But in late November, Abe pushed through the Diet a bill that established Japan’s National Security Council (NSC), modeled on similar ones in the U.S. and Europe, to improve that coordination.  (China created its own at about the same time.)  And so, one would assume that going forward, Japan’s foreign policy setting and execution will work more smoothly.

But there are still kinks left to work out.  A month after its NSC was formed, Japan appeared to stumble when Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine without first explaining to Japan’s neighbors and allies the reasons for his visit.  The shrine commemorates all of Japan’s war dead, including—as the Chinese are quick to remind—fourteen “Class A” war criminals from the Second World War.  Abe’s visit drew predictable condemnation from China (and South Korea).  But it also prompted the United States to express its “disappointment” over the visit, which China was all too happy to re-broadcast.  Only afterwards did Abe offer an explanation of his intent “to pay his respects and pray for the souls of the war dead and renew the pledge that Japan shall never again wage war.”  Though the practical damage from his visit was limited, it did appear to take some wind out of Japan’s diplomatic sails.

Is Japan trying to, in the words of China’s ambassador to the United States, “change the verdict” of the Second World War or was Abe using his visit to make it clear that Japan was willing to stand firm, even on contentious issues?  No doubt, there are a few in Japan who would like to whitewash its imperial past, but as time passes a growing number of Japanese have come to view China’s criticisms as a way to push Japan around.  Still, many in China believe that Japan has not yet properly atoned for its wartime record that resulted in the deaths of millions of Chinese.  (Though they might also ponder how much the Chinese Communist Party has done to atone for its part in the Great Leap Forward or Cultural Revolution.)  Perhaps, Abe, like earlier West German leaders who visited the sites of German atrocities in neighboring European countries, should consider also paying his respects at places like Camp O’Donnell in the Philippines (the terminus of the Bataan Death March).

But even without those visits, Southeast Asian countries, which were once occupied by Japan during the Second World War, have already begun to welcome Japan as a balancer in the region.  They seem to have largely set aside their anxieties about Japan’s 73-year old aggression and have made their concerns about China’s current assertiveness a higher priority.

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