

60th Anniversary Edition

THE BEST OF FPRI'S ESSAYS ON America and the West

+ 1993 – 2015 +



FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE



The Best of FPRI's Essays on America and the West, 1993- 2015

Center for the Study of America and the West
Edited by Ronald J. Granieri

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The Foreign Policy Research Institute was founded in Philadelphia in 1955 by Robert Strausz-Hupé on the premise that a nation must think before it acts. Thus, FPRI brings the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance US national interests. Strausz-Hupé is credited with introducing “geopolitics” into the American vocabulary with the publication in 1942 of his book *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power*. Simply put, geopolitics offers a perspective on contemporary international affairs that is anchored in the study of history, geography and culture, or, as FPRI’s James Kurth has put it, in the study of the “realities and mentalities of the localities.” Strausz-Hupé embedded that perspective in FPRI and it remains today our method or, to use the contemporary lingo, our “brand.” With the world in such turmoil, that mission and method have never been more needed than they are today.

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The Center for the Study of America and the West was founded at FPRI in 1997 when the great debate over the shape of the post-Cold War world order was at its peak. At FPRI, it seemed critically important in either case for Americans to remember the roots and values of the United States and inquire about its role within Western Civilization and the role of Western Civilization in modern world history. Since the events of September 11, 2001, and the onset of the war against violent extremist forms of Islam, FPRI can only assert that the mission of the Center for the Study of America and the West has become even more critical.

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FPRI’s has produced several volumes such as this over the years, focusing on specific issues of perennial interest. Readers of this volume may also be interested in:

Paul Herbert and Michael P. Noonan, ed. *American Military History: A Resource for Teachers and Students*. Philadelphia: FPRI, August 2013. E-book.

Robert Strausz-Hupé et al. *Building the Atlantic World*. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. et al. *The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969.

The Best of FPRI’s Essays on America and the West is part of a series being produced by each of FPRI’s programs throughout 2015. The following volumes have already appeared:

Tally Helfont, ed. *The Best of FPRI’s Essays on the Middle East*. Philadelphia: FPRI, March 2015. E-book.

Maia Otarashvili, ed. *The Best of FPRI’s Essays on Democratic Transitions*. Philadelphia: FPRI, July 2015. E-book.

FOREWORD

By Ronald J. Granieri

Executive Director of FPRI's Center for the Study of America and the West

July 2015

Sixty Years of FPRI, Two Decades of the Center for America and the West: An Anniversary Collection

From its founding in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute has always been deeply interested in the relationship between the United States of America and Europe, the two main constituent parts of the cultural, political, and historical community of the West. Born in the early days of the Cold War, when the Atlantic Alliance both constituted the primary bulwark of Western Civilization and formed the centerpiece of American grand strategy, FPRI has developed many sophisticated analyses of the past, present, and future of this relationship. One of FPRI's most important early publications, for example, edited by its Founder Robert Strausz-Hupé, along with James Dougherty and William Kintner, was *Building the Atlantic World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), which combined historical/political analysis and policy advocacy to assess the current state of the West. Although FPRI and its affiliated scholars have also produced high-quality work on other regions and topics over the succeeding decades, we have never lost sight of the enduring significance of the West for understanding the modern world and the American role in it.

After the Cold War came to an unexpectedly abrupt and apparently happy conclusion in the tumultuous years of 1989-1991, scholars and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic asked whether the Atlantic Alliance, and the general concept of the West, made sense as either policy priorities or subjects of study in a world increasingly shaped by globalization. The challenges of the post-Cold War world, including the sober realization that the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of History or the advent of a new era of perpetual peace, encouraged FPRI to reassert the importance of the study of the West within its larger global identity, leading to the foundation of the Center for the Study of America and the West in 1997. Since then, the Center has explored the roots and values of the United States, its connection to Europe and role within Western civilization, and the role of Western civilization within modern world history. Through sponsorship of original research, meetings of our Inter-University Study Group, public lectures and symposia, as well as in history institutes for high school teachers, the Center has encouraged critical analysis of the West as both an intellectual community and a political force.

In honor of FPRI's 60th Anniversary, this essay collection aims to demonstrate the range of topics and approaches sponsored by the Center over the years. Readers will see that while some concerns have remained consistent, the Center's scholars have offered a wide range of perspectives, reflecting the lively interchange of ideas that is a hallmark of the West.

The essays have been grouped under subject headings to reflect the variety of approaches to the study of the West within the Center, and also to highlight the (sometimes quite pronounced) differences of opinion among our scholars. Within each section, the essays have been organized in roughly chronological order, with introductory information noting both the date of initial publication and the positions held by the authors.

The first section offers insights into some of the basic ideas animating the Center, primarily through analyzing the life and thought of the late Robert Strausz-Hupé, founder of FPRI. An Austrian émigré, scholar, and diplomat, Strausz-Hupé believed firmly in the necessity of Western unity in the face of the totalitarian challenges of the 20th Century, and his spirit still guides both FPRI in general and the Center in particular. In this section, we have collected appreciations of his work from former FPRI President Harvey Sicherman and the Center's Chair, Professor Walter McDougall, as well as the reflections of a former Chair of the Center's Study Group, Prof. James Kurth on the mission of FPRI, written in honor of our 50th Anniversary. Following those contributions, we have included one of Strausz-Hupé's last publications for FPRI, in which he updated some of his classic reflections on "protracted conflict," a term he initially deployed in analyzing the Cold War. Finally, to reinforce the significance of the concept of the West, this section also includes one of the first essays commissioned by the Center upon its founding, in which Prof. William McNeill, famous for his magisterial work, *The Rise of the West*, asks the most fundamental question: "What do We Mean by the West?"

Section II offers examples of Center publications that relate the history of the United States to the larger history of the West. Two essays on the meaning of the Fourth of July, by Adam Garfinkle and Walter McDougall, examine the ideas and ideals that shape American identity and its relationship to the wider world. They are followed by McDougall's consideration of American Grand Strategy (or lack thereof) and James Kurth's analysis of the rise and apparent fall of American conservatism from the beginning of the modern era to the present. Alongside those essays, readers will also find two documents from the Center's History Institutes: a summary of a 2004 symposium that placed the American Founding within a larger historical context, and a 1998 Keynote Address from John Lewis Gaddis on "The New Cold War History," both of which demonstrate how FPRI uses such Institutes to relate the most recent academic scholarship to the work of our nation's teachers.

The most visible organizational expression of the Atlantic Community has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is the subject of the third section. Although NATO members celebrated the end of the Cold War as a success, the loss of a common enemy in the form of the Soviet Union called into question the continued necessity and future role of the alliance. Ultimately, its members chose not only to maintain NATO in the name of maintaining formal ties between Europe and the United States, but also to expand it to include former Warsaw Pact members, in the hope of extending the stability of Western Europe to the East. Along the way, NATO found itself embroiled in its first “out of area” conflict when it took up the cause of Kosovo in 1999, and then again after 9/11 when NATO participated in the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The contributions to this section trace the contours of NATO’s post-Cold War identity crises. Former NATO Supreme Commander Gen. Alexander Haig offers his perspective on the alliance in the 1990s, while Michael Radu and Harvey Sicherman discuss Balkan complexities. Finally, James Kurth analyzes the post-9/11 role of NATO, while Ronald Granieri reflects on the role of alliance politics in bringing about the end of the Cold War.

Alongside NATO, the European Union has also been a crucial feature of the modern West. Strausz-Hupé believed an integrated Europe was “most consistent with the American ideal, American declaratory policy, and American security,” even if the realities of European integration have not always kept pace with either the hopes or the fears of observers. This selection of essays reflects the ongoing debate over the shape, scope, speed, and direction of European integration, from Walter McDougall’s ambivalent celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome to Michael Radu’s reflections on the EU’s relationship to Turkey, from George Weigel’s cultural autopsy of European malaise to the geopolitical critiques of Andrew Glencross, Jakub Grygiel, Ronald Granieri, and Jeremy Black. In each essay, readers will find the mixture of hope and disappointment, skepticism and optimism, which has accompanied the movement for a unified Europe since the end of World War II.

Any discussion of the West begs the question of how the individual parts relate to the whole, and how states across and along the borders of the West construct their relationship to it. The fifth section thus offers examples of national studies, focusing on the crucial states of Britain, Germany, and Russia. Mitchell Orenstein analyzes the European vision of Russia’s Vladimir Putin; Andrew Glencross considers the identity crises of the United Kingdom; and Felix Chang and Adam Garfinkle each offer their perspectives on the past and future role of Germany in an ever-changing Europe.

Finally, our examination of the West concludes with essays that look both to the past and to the future. The high hopes of a New World Order in the 1990s have given way to deeper pessimism about the future of the West as well as the individual futures of its states. These essays offer some of both, examining both the enduring and the contingent factors that have

shaped and will continue to shape the West and its relationship to the larger world. Walter McDougall offers a sense of the continuing relevance of Geography, and Adam Garfinkle considers the lessons our children should draw from 9/11, while Paul Rahe reflects on the enduring significance of classical writers such as Herodotus for American society. George Weigel reflects on how an individual such as St. John Paul II transformed international relations, while Alan Kors outlines the challenges facing the West on the eve of the 21st Century as it attempts to understand and build on its intellectual heritage. Finally, Jeremy Black and Ronald Granieri each engage with the contemporary debate on Islam, immigration, and European identity, considering what that debate tells us about the meaning and destiny of the West.

Whether hope or fear will be more appropriate for understanding the West remains to be seen. As these essays demonstrate, however, FPRI and the Center for the Study of America and the West will continue to play their vital role in furthering our understanding of both past and present, to help fellow scholars and the larger public to prepare for the challenges and opportunities of the future.

In honor of FPRI's 60th anniversary, this volume is meant to provide the reader with a taste of the quality analysis we produced from 1993-2015 on a diverse array of topics. If you enjoy what you find here, visit us on the web (<http://www.fpri.org/research/west>) to read, see, and hear more. Even better, become a member or partner of FPRI, and support the sustained production of quality scholarship and analysis on America and the West.

Acknowledgements

The Center for the Study of America and the West owes special thanks to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for its continued support, as well as other donors, members, and supporters of the Center and to its Inter-University Study Group. For the completion of this volume, the editor thanks FPRI's President, Alan Luxenberg, as well as the authors of the individual essays, with special gratitude for help in production to Tally Helfont of FPRI and to FPRI Intern Samuel Koffman.

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PART I: FOUNDING PRINCIPLES

The Wisdom of Robert Strausz-Hupé

By Walter McDougall

March 1999

Walter McDougall is a professor of History and the Alloy-Ansin professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania. An Illinois native, he graduated from Amherst College in 1968. After serving as a sergeant for the United States Army in Vietnam, he completed his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago in 1974, concentrating on Germany, Central Europe, and European Imperialism. McDougall is Chairman of the Board of Advisors at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Director of the Center for the Study of America and the West. He was also formerly on the board of Editors of Orbis. This essay stems from a speech in honor of Robert Strausz-Hupé's ninety-fifth birthday, delivered at a party held at the Union League Club in Philadelphia on March 26, 1998. It was published on FPRI Wire, the predecessor to FPRI's E-Notes.

Mr. Ambassador, General Haig, Dr. Sicherman, ladies and gentlemen. I am deeply honored to have been asked to speak tonight about the amazing life of Ambassador Strausz-Hupé. I am also wholly inadequate. It may be so that insofar as I direct the International Relations program he founded at Penn, and edit the journal he founded for FPRI, I walk in his footsteps. But I certainly don't fill his shoes. Nor could anyone do justice, in an after-dinner address, to a man who was both a thinker and doer, scholar and teacher, author and editor, intellectual and intellectual impresario, administrator, statesman, and visionary, whose careers span the century.

I am reminded of one of the last lectures given by the late Robertson Davies. Asked to honor a fellow Canadian novelist, he said, "There are some things I shall avoid. One of these is the biographical information which some speakers cannot refrain from, and another is the list of [my subject's] works, in chronological order.... For the age of an author is of no consequence; if they are any good, they were born old and wise.... The only other fact I consider relevant is that [my subject] was educated at seventeen different schools, which suggests either a restless or unruly temperament, but both of these are characteristic of writers as a tribe." [1]

The Ambassador will scoff at the notion, but it seems to us youngsters that he was born old and wise, and that he, too, was educated all over the place, if you count schools of hard knocks. So I shall say of him only that the first patriotic anthem he learned as a child in Vienna began: "*Gott erhalte Franz den Kaiser, unseren guten Kaiser Franz*"; that the ideal of multinational harmony symbolized by that Austrian Hapsburg monarchy disappeared in 1918 when Robert was fifteen; that he later recognized in America the only viable model for a new

multinational harmony; and that he then served his adopted country throughout its fifty years' crisis, from Pearl Harbor to the end of the Cold War, by teaching Americans how to reconcile the exigencies of geopolitics with their liberal values, by inspiring a generation of students at Penn, by helping to found the academic discipline of international relations, [2] by establishing the FPRI as a feisty alternative to Establishment opinion, and, finally, by advising presidents and serving five times as Ambassador.

One might think, given his lifetime of “preaching daily at the Temple,” that Strausz-Hupé is well-understood. The truth is almost the opposite. You may recall the interview Barbara Walters once did with Henry Kissinger, in which she asked him to sum up his personality in one word. He cleared his throat and replied, “Complicated.” So is Strausz-Hupé. But another reason he is misunderstood is that he always occupied that limbo which the French call *hors de categorie*, that is, outside the categories of hawk or dove, right wing or left, realist or idealist. And the reason for that is that while others were obsessed with the Cold War crisis of the day, Strausz-Hupé offered a strategy, philosophy, and vision that saw the Cold War as ephemeral and spied in the institutions of the West the foundations of an order that would replace the Cold War. No wonder critics on the Left and Right knew not what to make of him: he was decades ahead in his thinking. Indeed, he named his new journal *Orbis* way back in 1957 to imply that the FPRI's quest was for a *novus orbis terrarum*—an altogether New World. [3]

In the meantime, of course, the Cold War did have to be won, and Communism, as Reagan later put it, transcended. And Strausz-Hupé was concerned that the Containment strategy was not up to the job. Influenced no doubt by the Hungary and Suez debacles of 1956, and the shock of the Soviet Sputnik in 1957, he deplored the fact that the West let the Communists operate on the principle of “what's mine is mine, what's yours is negotiable,” and feared that under current policies time would not be on the side of the West. Later, in the 1960s, he deplored the catastrophic half-measures taken by the Johnson administration in Vietnam, and it was then that Penn's antiwar movement branded him a dangerous hawk who “incriminated” the university by association with American militarism.

That they did so only demonstrated their ignorance of Strausz-Hupé's many books, not least his candid autobiography, *In My Time*, as well as a thorough misreading of his most influential book, *Protracted Conflict*, which they took to be an inflammatory tract that inspired the Vietnam War. I myself believed this the case until I bothered to read it and discovered that as early as 1959 Strausz-Hupé was boldly asserting that the Cold War was merely “the contemporary expression” of a “pervasive conflict” that had enveloped the globe since 1914 when “the august, unchallenged, and tranquil glories of the Victorian Age” were shattered. The revolutionary era which followed, he wrote, would destroy the nation-state system. The only question was whether it would be replaced by universal chaos and tyranny or

by “a universal political-legal order under Western leadership” based on “a voluntary federalism.” [4] The clear and present danger lay in the fact that the Communists knew they were engaged in what amounted to World War III and had a strategy, protracted conflict, for winning, whereas the West was content with a posture that served only to contain its own strength and will. Strausz-Hupé urged the United States to regain its lead in advanced weaponry, but he did not advocate preventive war or urge the United States to commit to an expensive fight for the “minds, hearts, and stomachs of the ‘uncommitted’ world.” [5]

On the contrary, years in advance of the critics, he debunked the notion that foreign aid and state-building could win over the Third World. Rather, he wrote, the very guilt complex engendered in Third World peoples as they abandoned their traditional cultures for modernization created a vast psychological gulf that obliged them to attack the democratic capitalist West even as they lusted after its material benefits. What is more, there would always be a gap between the rising expectations of backward peoples and the assistance the West could provide. The Communists exploited these tensions, but the tensions could not be relieved. Hence, Strausz-Hupé concluded—this is 1959, remember—that the most the West should do in the Third World is pursue a holding action, avoid fixed commitments, and “abstain from action for action’s sake.” Regarding Vietnam, he later rued “the tremendous resources, both material and spiritual, [that] went into this wretched war, which, in my view, should have gone into NATO.” [6]

Speaking as a Vietnam veteran, I weep to think of the tragedies that Vietnam and America might have been spared had Strausz-Hupé been advising the president instead of the McNamaras and Rostows. For according to his logic, the United States ought never to have waded into Vietnam, or else should have mounted a low-cost holding action to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and so enforce a Korea-style stalemate. Strausz-Hupé even wrote in italics, “The current phase of the protracted conflict will not be settled by the battle for the uncommitted areas.” And the contention, often heard in our midst, that the underdeveloped world represents the decisive battlefield of the Cold War bespeaks the success of Communist strategy in distracting our attack from the most vulnerable sector of the protracted conflict—the Communist system itself.” [7]

Strausz-Hupé lost his struggle for the soul of the Political Science department at Penn, or more accurately, he moved on to fight bigger battles and pursue grander visions. The battles concerned the course of American statecraft during the Cold War, and they were not decisively won until the Reagan administration implemented Strausz-Hupé’s strategy aimed at carrying the war to the enemy’s camp, be it in the Third World, Eastern Europe, or the Soviet Union itself, and targeting the enemy’s weaknesses through economic and technological pressures and a rhetoric of freedom that delegitimized Communist rule. But however glorious those

policy battles, it is those grander visions of Strausz-Hupé that elevate him from the ranks of the strategists to the lofty perch of philosopher of history.

Strausz-Hupé named his inaugural article in *Orbis* “The Balance of Tomorrow” after his Ph.D. thesis written in the closing days of World War II. [8] He began by defining the twentieth century as an age when the “bottom layers of the political universe have been set in motion,” one structure after another crumbles away, and “each solemn compact, hailed as a return to order, is overtaken and rescinded by events” (p. 10). He illustrated the point with a startling summary of the reversals of alliances that characterized the world wars and Cold War. Clearly, if there was any meaning to the storms of this century, it lay not in the “desperate tacking of stricken ships of state,” but in the storm itself, in the process.

“The issue before the United States,” he insisted, “is the unification of the globe under its leadership within this generation” (p. 14). That was the only solution to the two threats hanging over humanity, neither of which was the Soviet Union, but rather the demographic and political explosions in Asia combined with nuclear proliferation. Some conservative realists predicted a return to the old multilateral balance of power, the nineteenth-century model of order. But that system could not be revived, thought Strausz-Hupé, because the Judeo-Christian moral consensus and self-restraint it had rested upon had died in the First World War. Hence, the only alternative to anarchy was unity, first among the Western powers, then all over the world. And Americans must lead, because they alone had the power and federative genius to do the job.

Strausz-Hupé, the soi-disant reactionary, an apostle of world federalism? Yes, for the scion of the Hapsburg Monarchy understood that the nation-state is a recent arrival on the historical stage, that it was born of the odious French Revolution, and that unrestrained “by liberal constitutions [or] concern for the common interests of mankind,” it was “the greatest retrogressive force of this century” (p. 17). The solution to a barbaric clash of nationalisms was not the false and tyrannical heresies of Fascism and Communism, but rather “the only truly revolutionary power of this century”: the United States (p. 19). For the United States alone was future-oriented, a nation of many nations, open to limitless assimilation, tolerant, generous, humane, and pragmatic. Americans were also economic revolutionaries dedicated to free enterprise, new technology, and interdependence. Finally, America’s “federative power” was magnified by its de facto control of the Western Hemisphere and Pacific, partnership with Western Europe, and (then) leadership in the UN. But Strausz-Hupé had no illusions about the latter. He thought the UN a weak reed destined to be replaced someday by an expanded NATO community, which was “the nucleus of the world federation-in-the-making” (p. 23). The resulting Atlantic union could then confront even a hostile Asia with confidence, while the

“sheer decency of the American scheme for universal partnership will inexorably persuade the Soviet masses over the heads of the communist bosses to defect into freedom” (p. 24).

Strausz-Hupé’s astounding prescience was original, but his vision of world federalism recalls the theories of many philosophers, not least Immanuel Kant. Writing at the time of the French Revolution, Kant envisioned a new world order based on a confederation of states which, after being exhausted by a series of ever more terrible wars, would flee “the lawless state of savages” and perceive that they could better protect their security and prosperity inside a union of states than by remaining aloof. That great insight was what made Kant’s scheme for “perpetual peace” realistic rather than utopian. [9]

Yet in all of Strausz-Hupé’s books one encounters only two brief references to Kant, and as for Hegel, Strausz-Hupé wrote: “In my attic molders the luggage of German philosophy.” [10] How then did he reach conclusions that parallel so strikingly Kant’s vision of federalism and how it would come about?

His first allusion to a new world order appeared in his *Geopolitics*, written in 1942. Federalism was part of the currency of the European resistance movement during World War II, but Strausz-Hupé came to it along a quite different path. The German geopolitician Karl Haushofer believed that the struggle among races for space and power must end in a world empire. Strausz-Hupé suspected he was right, but of course denied that a Nazi-dominated “heartland” would be the vehicle. He also saw how technology and global economic integration accelerated history anew, altered geography itself, and would “drive men’s thoughts about the world’s political organization into yet untried channels.” [11] The models he saw—this is in 1942, mind you—were Lend-Lease and the Atlantic Charter, which symbolized “the mission of the United States... .” [12] Haushofer himself had identified the United States as the only nation with the potential for global land, sea, and air power, which is why America would be the real arch-enemy of Pan-Germanism if ever it embraced a *Weltanschauung*, or “Pan-Idea,” of its own. [13] Strausz-Hupé sought to provide America with the “Pan-Idea” it lacked.

In 1945, he wrote that mankind faced one of three futures: endless geopolitical conflict, a world hegemony, or a world federation. The third was the “American solution,” [14] but Strausz-Hupé predicted that within a few years the wartime alliance would dissolve. By the time of the Korean war, however—and here is the core of his originality—Strausz-Hupé saw the struggle against Sovietism as the mechanism by which his federalist vision might yet take form. Not through the UN, not through “peaceful coexistence,” not through the alleged convergence of East and West, but through the institutions of the Cold War itself: the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the embryonic European Community. It all depended on whether

or not the Western peoples could summon the will to hang together. And it was by no means certain they would, for Strausz-Hupé observed in 1952 that Europeans and Americans seemed to be losing faith in their own values. The political crisis masked a spiritual one.

He later wrote in his autobiography: “I was raised in the Protestant faith. Of its theological teachings I kept little.” [15] And yet he described, in language similar to Whittaker Chambers’, the demoralization that afflicted Western culture coincident with the rise of scientific-industrial-bureaucratic “mass society.” Cut off from the roots of their own notions of the purpose of life, Europeans and Americans were prey to materialism, to the patrons of race and class warfare who tear men apart, and to the “zone of indifference” inhabited by the postwar existentialists.

Did Americans care enough to save and lead the world, or would they succumb to a selfishness that could not, in the end, save even themselves? It was at that point that Strausz-Hupé sketched the blueprint later to appear in *Orbis*. First, Western Europe must unite. But that required that the United States deter the Soviet Union until the Europeans recovered from the war and learned “new, supranational loyalties.” Once this was achieved, the Soviet bloc would be exposed in bold relief as “a clumsy and backward despotism” and the Eastern Europeans would feel an “irresistible pull.” In the fullness of time the USSR would have to accept a negotiated settlement, pull back its armies, and permit the reunification of Germany. [16] The reunified West would then offer a framework which the rest of the world would beg to join. Thus would the Cold War become “a federative enterprise [that] confers justice and nobility upon the uses of power.” [17] In the decades after those words were written, NATO survived many crises, each labelled terminal at the time. The European Community was born, then deepened and broadened to the point of monetary and political union. East Europeans persevered through numerous heartbreaks, finally broke free of Moscow, and petitioned for membership in the EU and NATO. Germany reunified within the European and Atlantic communities. And the Soviet Union liberalized, de-Communized, shrugged off a neo-Stalinist coup, and peacefully disassembled. Strausz-Hupé even predicted that the Chinese would remain stubborn for a time, the last great power to get with the program.

It remains to be seen whether all this will eventuate in a European or Atlantic, not to mention a global confederation. But when considers the renunciation of war, security and economic collaboration, and interlocking multilateral institutions that define the Euro-American-Japanese orbit today, the thought is less fanciful than at first blush. After all, it was Winston Churchill, no airy idealist, who repeatedly spoke of a “United States of Europe” as the key to all peoples’ “happiness, prosperity, and glory.” [18]

On a more metaphysical plane, however, one may ask whether the political victory of the West may yet be canceled out by the spiritual malaise Strausz-Hupé detected so long ago. Our long fights against Fascism and Communism often brought out the best in us. Will peace bring out the worst? Is the “new world order,” whatever its shape, just a way to make the world safe for nihilism, hedonism, and self-worship—a community for the purpose of evading community? Are we, as Robert Frost feared, finally to quench the fires, only to perish from ice?

An obituary that appeared just last week encourages me to close with a cheerful prognosis. Another famous Central European, another veteran of all this century’s turmoil, another powerful writer and strategist, has died at the age of 102. He was Ernst Jünger, the Stormtrooper whose character was chiseled for life in the trenches of World War I. Jünger killed and observed mass killing with a cynical detachment, and in his masterpiece *Storm of Steel* he wrote of war in a cold and surgical style. Later, he scorned the Nazis because they were “lower-class rabble,” and devoted his retirement to the collection of beetles. He was content, he said, “to watch people eat each other like insects.” [19] When Germany reunited, it moved him not in the least: my only reality, he said, is the Reich of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Jünger was a genius, but he was only part human.

Strausz-Hupé, by comparison a youthful ninety-five, deplored war with a passion. He wrote about power politics, too, but in prose that was always humane and at times sublime. He did not retire from a contemptible world, but engages it still in hopes of liberating humanity from the geopolitics that make men treat each other like insects. And even though his Austrian Kaiser, Franz Josef, was benign, if not always competent, Strausz-Hupé harbors no illusions about the dead age of monarchy. He strains instead to imagine a new golden age and beckons us to see with his eyes. He, too, is a genius, but he is all human.

Let us pray that the spirit of the twentieth century has died with Ernst Jünger, and that the twenty-first century will be infused with the spirit of Strausz-Hupé.

Notes:

1. Robertson Davies, “Honoring Mavis Gallant,” in *The Merry Heart: Reflections on Reading, Writing, and the World of Books* (New York: Viking, 1997), p. 318.
2. Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” *Daedalus* 106, 3 (1977), pp. 41-60.
3. Robert Strausz-Hupé, “The Balance of Tomorrow,” *Orbis*, April 1957, pp. 10+27.
4. Strausz-Hupé et al., *Protracted Conflict* (Philadelphia, Penn.: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1959), pp. 10, 150.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

6. Samuel Hughes, "Robert Strausz-Hupe's Long Walk On the Right Side," *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Oct. 1995, pp. 30+36 (35).
7. Strausz-Hupé et al., *Protracted Conflict*, p. 132.
8. Strausz-Hupé, *The Balance of Tomorrow. Power and Foreign Policy in the United States* (New York: Putnam, 1945).
9. Immanuel Kant, *Thoughts on Perpetual Peace* (1795), quoted by F.H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 62ff.
10. Strausz-Hupé, *In My Time* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965; New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), p. 33.
11. Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics* (New York: Putnam, 1945) p. 193.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 65+67.
14. Strausz-Hupé, *The Balance of Tomorrow*, p. 276.
15. Strausz-Hupé, *In My Time*, p. 278.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 288+99.
17. Strausz-Hupé, *Power and Community* (New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 128.
18. See Robert Mundell, "The Case for the Euro-II," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 25, 1998, sec. A, p. 22.
19. "Obituary," *The Economist*, Feb. 28, 1998, p. 89.

Robert Strausz-Hupé: His Life And Times

By Harvey Sicherman

Spring 2003

Harvey Sicherman was the president of FPRI from 1993 till his passing in 2010. He was also an advisor to three secretaries of state. Taken from the Spring 2003 issue of Orbis, this article commemorates the extraordinary long and varied life of Robert Strausz-Hupé, who died on February 24, 2002, a month short of his 99th birthday.

A penniless immigrant who became an eminent professor and later an ambassador, Strausz-Hupé achieved that rare distinction: a detached love for his country. A critical distance disciplined his enthusiastic patriotism. That combination enabled him to become a preeminent educator, able to speak to both America's strengths and weaknesses. When America moved at last to participate fully in world politics, Strausz-Hupé would be ready to explain why this was necessary and how it should be done. His legacy is well worth pondering for the future.

The Old World

The date and place of Strausz-Hupé's birth—March 25, 1903, in Vienna, capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—bespoke the pre-1914 era of European domination, the “long peace” that few thought would ever end in a long war. Much of the world was shaped by decisions made in European capitals. International security and prosperity depended on the judgment and wisdom of a very few men not often elected, who presided over a common heritage called “Western civilization.” European society, wealth, arts, philosophy, science, and technology offered the international standards of the day against which everyone else measured their achievements.

In his 1965 memoir *In My Time*, Strausz-Hupé wrote a sometimes lyrical description of his youth in this world. Among his earliest memories was the grand celebration held in Vienna in 1908 to commemorate Emperor Franz Josef's sixtieth year on the throne. Strausz-Hupé was destined to serve as a soldier or bureaucrat in the Imperial Service, so he thought, as the sole son of an upper middle-class family with social connections. But then the Great War intervened. Trained as a cadet for a disappearing empire, he and his mother (his parents having separated) found themselves financially ruined. The young man tried many different trades, finally ending as an escort for a wealthy young friend whose aristocratic father quite accurately feared the boy would go wrong. Soon the guardian himself fell prey to adventures as the two young men escaped to the United States. When his charge was forced to return to Europe, Strausz-Hupé decided to stay and try his luck in America.

Of his youth, he would write fifty years later: “Most of all I remember being desperately unhappy.” Strausz-Hupé’s very name offered a clue to a less fortunate aspect of the Old World. He told me that the Strauszes were his father’s family, well-to-do Hungarian Jews in the grain business. His mother belonged to the Hupés, whom he described as well-connected descendants of prominent Huguenots. Two centuries before they had fled the France of Louis XIV for more tolerant Habsburg realms.

In the highly stratified society of those days, the Strausz-Hupé union was problematical. The Strausz family, mortified by his father’s marriage to a non-Jew, broke off all relations. Robert never knew what happened to them after he left Europe. His status was peculiar: his mother not being Jewish, he did not belong to the Jews yet his father and his name made him Jewish in the eyes of others. Perhaps it was this sense of being in, but not quite of, a society that sharpened his skill at detached observation.

Yet Strausz-Hupé, as Robert Strausz would call himself in America, retained a warm feeling for the doomed Habsburg enterprise. He had an extraordinary recollection of the great families of the realm: who married whom, who did what to whom, incidents that gained or lost someone imperial favor, why certain ambassadors were trusted and others were not. In old age he bridled at even being called an Austrian, declaring that “this Alpine Republic” was foreign to him. “I was a subject of the Emperor!” He was realistic about Franz Josef, however, whom he described as a stubborn man of enigmatic views, few convictions, and skill in using his old age and family sorrows to cultivate public sympathy.

Strausz-Hupé held unusual views about the seemingly solid prewar European political structure. Austria-Hungary, often thought the shakiest of the Great Powers, had a long, successful history of swaying with the winds. An accommodation with the Slavs, the objective of the assassinated Archduke Ferdinand, could have bought another generation after Franz Josef, by which time some sort of federal state might have evolved.

The really weak and dangerous monarchies, so Strausz-Hupé argued, were those of Germany and Russia. Both were ruled by foolish men. Even in the absence of war, he believed neither would have lasted another decade. As for the British, they suffered from a terminal inability to commit themselves until it was too late. They were expert ditherers but too full of mixed signals to hold the ring in 1914.

That said, he laid the blame for much of the disorder in the late Habsburg imperial period on Hungarian obstruction. He remarked that although his father’s family hailed from Hungary, the Hungarians regarded him and his mother as either Jewish or German. But when the town

of Timasoara was transferred by the Versailles Treaty to Rumania, the family was dispossessed of its estate there on the grounds that they were Hungarians! He was equally bitter about Austria in the late 1990s, when Jörg Haider, after cultivating political anti-Semitism and pro-Nazi sentiments, emerged as a major factor in Austrian politics. Strausz-Hupé called these “old tricks.” After all, he had seen Hitler perform in a Munich beer hall in the early twenties. Strausz-Hupé recalled his companion’s description after they left: “What a common guttersnipe!” (Doubtless the German expression was less suitable to print.)

Ultimately, Strausz-Hupé reached his own compromise with his origins. Although raised a Protestant, he had little personal use for organized religion. He recognized the power of religion to bind societies and establish moral codes; these were important social artifacts best described as the “Judeo-Christian heritage.” He seems to have been attracted occasionally to Roman Catholicism and at least in some of his books he attributes much of Europe’s endemic modern ideological temptations to the breakdown of a unified Christianity after the Renaissance. Of Judaism, he knew very little. Yet there was one Hebrew phrase he remembered from his father that, as we shall see, expressed his belief in a mysterious Divinity.

Thus, the young man who entered America at the beginning of the Roaring Twenties already knew the extremes of life: self-confidence and doubt, belonging and not belonging, ease and distress, wealth and poverty. Such experiences may explain a sometimes ill-disguised desire for distinction and membership in the “high classes” of society. He could show a generous disregard of money but more often sought anxiously to accumulate it: “I am not so rich as I seem to be” was his constant refrain. He could distinguish quickly between substantial men of affairs and those simply on the make, and all the bounders in-between. Above all, he had been thrown on his only real resource, himself, and having survived the wreck of the Old World, was quite prepared to tackle the New.

The New World

Strausz-Hupé sought out America primarily for economic rather than political reasons, unlike many in the later, Nazi-driven Central European exodus of the 1930s. He needed work. He lacked any particular skill, but was full of a beguiling charm and a first-rate classical education that included French and English in addition to his native German.

Strausz-Hupé’s critical impressions of America were very European. Steeped in history himself, he found little sense of it in Chicago, his first stop, and even less regard for it on the national level. But it would be a mistake to credit the young immigrant in the twenties with the big thoughts of the thirties, forties, and fifties. By his own confession, he concentrated most on the difficult task of making a living enough to sustain himself and help his mother.

Looking back, Strausz-Hupé told me of his first great stroke of luck. Out of money and with no prospects, he was walking along Fifth Avenue when suddenly he espied a boyhood friend from the fashionable spas where his parents vacationed before the war. This man, Sasha, belonged to the Russian aristocracy and his family had managed to escape the Bolshevik Revolution with a hoard of gold coins and a huge vodka supply. Sasha's spacious apartment contained a large library, its floor-to-ceiling shelves stocked with liquor bottles instead of books. Sasha offered Strausz-Hupé a place to stay until he got on his feet. In prohibition-era America, vodka and gold allowed the Russian émigrés to live much as they had before 1914 except that the "servant problem" in New York was insufferable. No one, it seems, was servile enough.

Strausz-Hupé was traveling in fast company. Eventually becoming a Wall Street runner and then something of a political risk analyst for American holders of European bonds, he accumulated enough money to bring over his adored mother after his father died. Always a bon vivant, he delighted in the company of women, and his reddish hair, impeccable dress, wonderful manners, and amusing speech delighted them. Somewhere in the course of Strausz-Hupé's social activity, he was introduced to Eleanor Cuyler Walker. A tall, forthright woman who knew what she wanted, Eleanor came from an old and prominent Philadelphia family. They were married in 1938, a union that lasted thirty-six years until Eleanor's death in Sweden, where her husband was then posted as ambassador. I stood near Strausz-Hupé in the churchyard the day of her funeral, after her burial. After a silence, he turned to me and said: "My father used to say *Etzbah Elohim* when he saw something miraculous. Eleanor for me was *Etzbah Elohim*" (The words, which mean "finger of God," come from Pharaoh's magicians—Exodus 8:15).

Truly for Strausz-Hupé, Eleanor was a miraculous find, more so even than the chance meeting with Sasha in New York. She gave him financial security and even more important, opened to him the exclusive world of Philadelphia's Main Line society and through it the somewhat larger but still very exclusive ambience of America's upper classes. In short, Strausz-Hupé began to meet the people who ran the United States.

Robert and Eleanor made a tempestuous union. Suffice it to say that they were both strong-willed and had their own circles of close friends. Despite many a spark, however, they held together, and no one who knew them could doubt their love for each other. A friend of both Eleanor and Robert related many years later that Main Line society was fascinated by Strausz-Hupé. But "the Austrian professor," as he came to be known, remained sensitive to his background. As Strausz-Hupé once remarked to me, quoting Disraeli, "I myself was never quite respectable."

Shortly after their marriage, the Strausz-Hupés decamped for Paris, where Robert continued his bond work. Simultaneously, Strausz-Hupé discovered his vocation, and it was not to buy or sell. In the thirties, Strausz-Hupé would have laughed at the idea that he might become a famous professor. But he had been developing a keen interest in European affairs through his bond business. He troubled to read *Mein Kampf* and also chanced upon a book on geopolitics written by a German general named Haushofer. He became convinced early on that Nazi Germany was a serious danger to human liberty and the democracy he had come to cherish. In his view, Hitler was a demented thug whose ascent was made possible only because of the social upheaval that followed World War I. The stability of the middle classes had been destroyed and the aristocrats demoralized and discredited. The new barbarians advanced in the guise of familiar terms although their purposes were revolutionary. Haushofer, “the Nazi Machiavelli,” to use Strausz-Hupé’s words, wrote the user’s manual that justified Hitler’s Lebensraum and racial theories in the language of geopolitics. But Nazi geopolitics meant a German imperium intended to replace, not adjust, the traditional balance of power.

Strausz-Hupé proved unable to convince anyone important of these dangers. He encountered what he called later “the commercial mentality,” and recounted in his memoirs a failed attempt to persuade influential Britons of the Nazi menace. In the end, the great men of England believed that once the Nazis were in power their foolish mouthings would be replaced by a businesslike calculation of costs and benefits. Behind the fanatic lurked the pragmatic. Herr Hitler would adjust the balance of power rather than undo it.

This experience would affect Strausz-Hupé for the rest of his life. He, and indeed many prominent Americans later his allies, worked under what came to be called “the Munich Metaphor”: the unwillingness of democratic leaders to see their enemies realistically and to understand that the Hitlers (and Stalins) of this world were not interested in negotiating an end to conflicts but rather winning them. Recognition of this fact did not mean that war was the only way for the democracies to defend themselves. An effective defense, however, required a keen understanding of the threat, the techniques used by the adversary, and a strategy that exploited his weaknesses.

Geography and War

The Second World War amplified Strausz-Hupé’s message about the Nazis. In those times, when few outside the government were concerned about international affairs, he came quickly to the attention of those who mattered. A lawyer who was also a trustee of the University of Pennsylvania heard him and recommended he join Penn. This was duly arranged. Lacking a bachelor’s degree, Strausz-Hupé enrolled as a special student and, after earning his Ph.D.,

joined the faculty. An extremely popular professor, Strausz-Hupé's lectures and seminars were eagerly attended and long remembered.

Simultaneously, Strausz-Hupé's work on Haushofer brought him to the attention of Isaiah Bowman, then the most eminent geographer in the United States. Again the connection clicked and he found himself Chief of Research on what he described as a typical FDR-style enterprise: a special project on refugee affairs and resources commissioned by and responsible to the president. He became intimately familiar with, among other things, the water resources of the Near East and the economy of China. Through his wife, he became a regular at the salon run by Henry Field, a half-English American heir, anthropologist, and head of the Refugee Project. There he met, among others, the brilliant if somewhat mysterious and always comical Isaiah Berlin.

Eleanor's circle also gave him a role well beyond that of a commissioner and Ph.D. student. One of her closest friends, James Forrestal, had become assistant secretary (he later became secretary) of the Navy. Another acquaintance was Dean Acheson, whose wife was close to Eleanor. Both of these men were to figure significantly in Strausz-Hupé's movement from analyst of Nazi geopolitical schemes to Cold War strategist.

Forrestal was well connected to FDR and possessed a superior knowledge of America's industrial capabilities, gleaned from a successful Wall Street career. Forrestal was on the fast track, ultimately too fast. He was, as his biographers called him, a "driven patriot." By 1944, he had begun to focus on postwar issues, specifically the problem posed by Stalin's Russia. Aroused by Churchill, embassy reports, and his antipathy for Marxist doctrine, Forrestal tried to sound the alarm. He began his campaign to alert his superiors by commissioning a report on Soviet foreign policy and consulted Strausz-Hupé about it.

Strausz-Hupé approached the Soviet Union from both philosophical and geopolitical angles. He thought little of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German philosophy and could be very entertaining about theories that, as he put it, posited a "perfected consciousness" so perfect it could do nothing better than contemplate itself. As an advocate of freedom and democracy, he detested Marxism's pretentious social engineering, intended to produce a new "Soviet man" utterly free of morality save that of "scientific socialism."

On the political front, Strausz-Hupé deemed Marxism a crude scientific fraud that had been turned by Lenin into a vehicle for gaining and then holding absolute power. Stalin's Soviet Union had amalgamated the imperial Russian tradition with the revolutionary overtones of Marxism-Leninism. By background and study, Strausz-Hupé understood them both.

Strausz-Hupé gave Forrestal a word of caution. He related to me that once as he was opining somewhat indignantly on U.S. policy, he noticed Forrestal laughing. What was so entertaining? “Oh,” said Forrestal, “it’s so refreshing to hear you because you are so delightfully naïve about Washington.” In this case, however, Strausz-Hupé offered realistic advice. It would be a mistake, he told his friend, to think that Soviet foreign policy was guided strictly by ideology. (Later, he would say that sometimes it was and sometimes it wasn’t. You could not tell which you were getting, a Soviet or a Russian foreign policy; this was the mystery about it.) He suggested that Forrestal get his report rewritten by someone who could give it diplomatic and geopolitical weight.

Forrestal took Strausz-Hupé’s advice and eventually in early 1946 found George Kennan, whose long telegram, reflected in the famous “Mr. X” article in *Foreign Affairs*, offered an intellectual rationale for the containment policy. Later Kennan recanted some of his arguments. In the late fifties Acheson rebuked him for seeming to suggest that NATO might be unnecessary. Strausz-Hupé said once that “Mr. X” was the only instance of a pen name being wiser than the real author.

Strausz-Hupé had the highest regard for Dean Acheson, whom he described as “one of the greatest public servants in the employment of the Republic.” He could do a wicked mimic of the aristocratic Acheson twirling a mustache while exuding condescension toward some hapless congressman. Strausz-Hupé, like many others, faulted Acheson for not including South Korea (on the eve of the Korean War) in America’s perimeter of vital interests; unlike others, he accepted Acheson’s explanation that he could hardly do otherwise because neither Congress nor the president had accepted it; and they remained firm friends. All of this contradicts of course those who depicted Strausz-Hupé as some sort of reactionary Republican partisan. For him foreign policy was not a party plaything.

Western Man and the Balance of Tomorrow

In 1946, Strausz-Hupé earned his Ph.D. and soon became a leader in the new field of international relations. He pioneered what we call today the interdisciplinary approach that drew on political science, history, economics, and even sociology to gain a better understanding of world politics. Meanwhile, he had reached his own conclusions about the two world wars that wrecked Europe and how to prevent yet another conflagration.

Strausz-Hupé was an early supporter of European unification—or more precisely, European federalism—as the only way to prevent a recurrence of catastrophe. He argued (along with Clarence Streit) that the United States should bring this about as part of an even larger federation. Through an Atlantic Alliance, the United States could solve the German problem

while simultaneously defending Western Europe against Soviet encroachments. The issue was whether democratic statesmen would act in time.

These ideas were similar to those of Acheson and Churchill, both of whom were anxious to commit America to Europe and to keep the Germans down and the Russians out (to paraphrase Lord Ismay's rationale for NATO). For Strausz-Hupé, NATO rather than Monnet's functional "European integration" was the key institution. Integration reminded him of the commercial mentality. It might serve to draw France and Germany together but could never create the political will needed to secure the future. That kind of project, in his view, would not emerge from the exhausted, demoralized, and compromised European states of his youth. Their moment was over. The question was whether the Americans or the Russians would seize the European prize. If America won, then Western civilization had a chance; if Russia won, then the communist night would be hardly less dark than the Nazis'.

In 1952, Strausz-Hupé authored what he considered the most original of his works, titled *The Estrangement of Western Man in Europe and The Zone of Indifference in the United States*. His depiction of Europe was stark. While the old continent was the primary battleground of the Cold War, as it had been for the preceding conflicts, the Europeans themselves, "categories of the defeated," were weak: "its most ancient nations are rent by internecine conflict ... it doubts itself." The issue was whether for the long haul the arrangements made by the United States to rescue Europe from its weakness, including NATO, could count upon "a community of devotion, a culture." The answer was "yes" if Western civilization remained whole, marked by converging cultural developments between Europe and the United States. Did they share similar ideas of freedom, justice, law? Did their "social mind" share personal, interpersonal and social conceptions?

After positing the triumphs of a West that was shaped by Greece, Rome, Christianity, and geography into a distinctive culture, Strausz-Hupé traced its sudden, dramatic decline: its geographic shrinkage in the face of a resurgent Asia (Soviet Russia qualified as "half Asiatic") but most important the disjuncture between its technology and its spirit. Formed in agrarian societies, Western values now stood assailed by the very products of technological prowess: mass organization, impersonal machinery, atomized societies. If the sources of its living culture dried up, then superior technology would not long outlast it. "Man may master even vaster natural resources; he may no longer master himself," he wrote.

Strausz-Hupé then described the great dangers for Western culture as a series of imbalances: the useful division between church and state that, pressed too far, destroyed the "binding sanction of a transcendental order"; a materialism that in its hubris reduced man to an engineering problem, exemplified by "positivism, the philosophy of social mathematics and

hence of perfectly organized boredom”; disintegrationist philosophies that left the individual at the mercy of his instincts and anxieties and thus prey to the promise of extreme ideologies. Most of all there loomed the menace of “relativism.” If there was no absolute standard of morality or truth, there could be no moral code or social order.

Against all of these, America stood resistant. A product of the late Enlightenment, the United States mastered industrialization without alienating its population from the country’s founding values, not least of which was “a healthy skepticism toward the intellect.” Western civilization in the end had come to survive “by the grace of American power.” But if Europe had succumbed to the absolutes of nationalisms that filled the void of religious faith, then America had also failed to reconstruct the West on a sound basis. “Wilsonianism” through Versailles “extended the Balkans into the center of Europe.” Thus, the ills afflicting Europe were reinforced by American intervention. Neither Europe nor the United States could afford another such mistake.

Strausz-Hupé argued that, after 1945, there were but two choices. One was to concentrate power in an American imperium with Europe as a province. No matter how kind the master, Strausz-Hupé believed that the relationship would corrupt both America and Europe. Besides, the Americans were simply not cut out to do it. The other, better alternative was to reintegrate the Western community through social reconciliation at home and a federal system that allowed for autonomy among the variegated parts of Europe, “building down rather than vertical integration ... opposing the growth of shapeless gigantism.” The great task was “to find the common ground upon which the leading powers of Europe, Great Britain and France, can join hands in the making of European unity.” Germany could not but follow, and a successful Western Europe, secured against Soviet intimidation and communist subversion by the Atlantic Alliance, would ultimately shake Central and Eastern Europe loose from the unsustainable Russian grip.

Strausz-Hupé recognized the obstacles to this second choice in Europe itself and was particularly solicitous of Britain’s difficulties. Yet the absence of England would leave that proud country a second-rate, isolated power and simultaneously reduce the European experiment to a “functional” economic unity that fell well short of redemption. He appealed for statesmanship. A Europe united along his lines would “possess the military power to insure its security and to share with the United States the burden of Western defense the world over.”

Strausz-Hupé concluded *Estrangement* with an appeal for cultural and intellectual change. Scientism and irrational hankering for absolutist “laws” of human nature had to be discarded. Room had to be made for faith, a religious dimension to life.

These ideas, which seem so current now, give a prophetic quality to Strausz-Hupé's least known work. Employing elements of his own experience, his vast reading of history, an unusual excursion into sociology and an already astounding mastery of international politics, the book was also distinguished by an entrancing style. Strausz-Hupé's orotund, nineteenth-century cadences were punctuated by a mordant wit. *The Estrangement of Western Man* offers the bedrock of Strausz-Hupé's moral and political philosophy. His later writings would draw upon its ideas, although usually expressed in less sophisticated form. He had found the key problems, isolated the choices and offered the vision. Strausz-Hupé would spend the rest of his life educating others to these truths. He was not yet fifty.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute and Protracted Conflict

Strausz-Hupé did not find the new Eisenhower administration or the American foreign policy establishment particularly hospitable to his ideas. He did not care for John Foster Dulles' blend of moralism and legalism and was critical of America's overemphasis on nuclear weapons in its defense strategy. He strongly opposed Eisenhower's humiliation of the British and French in the Suez crisis, arguing that it badly harmed NATO and added fuel to de Gaulle's case against the alliance. The German revolt (1953), the Hungarian uprising (1956), and Khrushchev's "deStalinization" campaign all confirmed his views about Russia's tenuous hold on Eastern Europe and the chronic malfunctioning of the Soviet system. But the West was not winning the Cold War and its technical lead in weapons was being fiercely challenged by Soviet achievements such as the Sputnik space launch in 1957.

Strausz-Hupé's own vision, along with his wide range of political and academic contacts and his dissatisfaction with American policy, led him to create a new institution. In 1955, he persuaded the University of Pennsylvania and the Smith Richardson Foundation to establish the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Its central idea was to bring the best of scholarship to bear on international problems, offering a new sense of strategy that integrated "the long view" with current policy.

The Institute assembled under its auspices top-ranking academics, many of whom had Washington experience, to describe the issues and debate a course of action. Government officials were also sometimes present. Dr. James Dougherty, then a graduate student at Penn recalled elegant dinners held under the solemn gazes of ancient Pharaohs at the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology and Anthropology or at the posh Cosmos Club in Washington, with Strausz-Hupé presiding over free-ranging discussion among the Institute Associates, as the participants were called. Frequently the ideas became articles or books. Among the original luminaries were Hans Kohn, the great historian of nationalism; William Y. Elliot of Harvard, a founder of the CIA; William R. Kintner, then head of the Army's

Planning Staff and later to be Institute Director; and, among the younger set, Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger. Reflecting Strausz-Hupé's broad outlook, the Associates also included economists (notably Lawrence Krause of Brookings) and regional specialists. After the initial grant, the Institute relied on the A. W. Mellon Foundation in Pittsburgh (in particular, Adolph Schmidt and later R. Daniel MacMichael) plus the occasional government contract (usually classified) to make its way.

As a full professor, Strausz-Hupé could devote only part of his time to the Institute. Yet the output of the organization was astonishing, producing a dozen books and innumerable articles over its first decade. In 1957, not content with *Foreign Affairs* in New York, where he never published an article, Strausz-Hupé began *Orbis*, a quarterly journal that in those days contained an anonymous editorial section he often wrote himself.

The main activity, however, was the development of a strategy for the West to win the Cold War. Strausz-Hupé and Kintner traveled widely in 1956–57, gathering information abroad and then working the results through seminars and consultations. The research unfolded in two stages: first, the Soviet adversary had to be understood, especially Moscow's methods of conducting the conflict; second, a strategy had to be developed that countered Soviet strengths and exploited their weaknesses.

Strausz-Hupé laid out his objectives in the inaugural issue of *Orbis*. His essay "The Balance of Tomorrow" began boldly: "The issue before the United States is the unification of the globe under its leadership within this generation." He concluded no less boldly: "The mission of the American people is to bury the nation-states, lead their bereaved peoples into larger unions and overcome with its might the would-be saboteurs of the new order who have nothing to offer mankind but putrefying ideology and brute force... ." Reread today, the essay still pulsates with urgency. Strausz-Hupé had clearly shifted from his 1952 alternative of a federal Europe toward the other, less attractive but more likely concept of an American empire. Doubtless the Suez crisis and the near collapse of France over the Algerian crisis suggested that the Europeans were simply incapable of any initiative.

Strausz-Hupé's most famous work, *Protracted Conflict*, published two years later, offered even more stimulus for action. This book and its subsequent companions, *A Forward Strategy for America* (1961) and *Building the Atlantic World* (1963) were no longer his alone. The multiple authors reflected both the discussions that gave birth to the concepts and a committee method for producing books at a rapid clip. Yet no one reading them will mistake the style. Drafts were written by others but Strausz-Hupé put his rhetorical stamp on the results. As James Dougherty recalled, the experience could be vigorous. Strausz-Hupé sat at his desk rewriting extensively while the hapless authors of the draft stood around him, called upon

occasionally to defend an awkward phrase. The Master took special offense at the adjective “appropriate” and using verb forms of “implement.” Anything that smacked of scientism would fall under a withering glare. He replaced the word or phrase then raised his eyes, read it and said: “um, um?” It took a brave soul to contest his changes.

Protracted Conflict did to the Soviet Union what *Geopolitics* had done to Nazi Germany. It outlined the methods by which the Soviets and their allies were conducting a “protracted conflict” that, in the style of early Islam, posited a realm of peace (the Soviet bloc) off-limits to democratic influence and a realm of war (the West) to be worn down. There might be periods of truce, called *détente* or peaceful coexistence, often dictated by Soviet weakness, but these were just temporary. (Communist ideology would never permit a real peace.) As by any measure, the United States and its allies exceeded Soviet strength, Moscow’s strategy would press conflict short of confrontation while encouraging defeatism in the West through psychological warfare. (The book’s appendix on such warfare was written by one of Strausz-Hupé’s close intellectual soul mates, Stefan Possony, a refugee from Hitler’s Germany then working for the U.S. Air Force. Possony wrote originally under a pseudonym.) *Protracted Conflict*’s rhetoric is strident and wide-ranging. Its argument, *New York Times* columnist C. L. Sulzberger wrote, “is profound, and its conclusions are direct, logical and terrifying.” The reader emerges with a view that the Soviets were a many-headed hydra bent on disabling the West and that the West’s prospects in the late fifties were not very good. Democracies seemed ill-suited to this subtle warfare and inclined to see the best until too late, when only increasingly desperate measures could save the day. *Protracted Conflict* also offers an extended critique of containment as it had become known, not the “halt and reverse” ideas of the Forrestal-Acheson era but the passive “wait ’til they strike” strategy that allowed the Soviets great tactical mobility. Not surprisingly, Acheson himself endorsed the book, as did a host of other luminaries including Kissinger. As Strausz-Hupé said years later, the book proved popular because it struck a public nerve already there.

A Forward Strategy for America, finished in November 1960 and published in 1961, included some of the same thinking, although it reads much more like a committee project. It proposed to counter protracted conflict tactics with pressure all along the Soviet periphery while making solid the edifices of Western unity and military strength. An active Western tactic along these lines would force the communists to make strategic decisions that passive containment did not. Bereft of tactical flexibility and confronted by superior force, the Soviet threat could be defeated by the West. The authors insisted that American strategy “must be based upon the premise that we cannot tolerate the survival of a political system which has both the growing capability and the ruthless will to destroy us.” *Forward Strategy* thus advocated what we would call today “regime change.”

The finale of the trilogy, *Building the Atlantic World*, emerged in 1963. Authored by the familiar cast of Strausz-Hupé, Dougherty, and Kintner, the book draws on favorite ideas from a platoon of contributors, many of whom attended an FPRI conference on the North Atlantic Community held in Bruges, Belgium (1957). Its progenitor included a study on U.S. policy contracted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; the preface includes a quote from the committee's Chairman J. W. Fulbright. The book issued a clarion call dear to Strausz-Hupé: the transformation of NATO into a model for Hans Kohn's "age of global history," the passing of the nation-state system into a supranational unity. If NATO did not founder on the complexities of nuclear strategy, the United States had the chance to consolidate the Atlantic (Western) world, thus permanently weighting the balance of power against the Soviets. This ought to be, the authors argued, the highest American international objective. Otherwise, "Western disunity supplies the openings for communist penetration."

Eclipse

Strausz-Hupé rode high in the years 1959–63. His books were widely acclaimed and his professorship at Penn one of the University's crown jewels. Moreover, the public mood seemed most receptive to his thinking. As he noted ruefully later, the new Kennedy administration, like Eisenhower's in 1953, voiced the rhetoric of a more active American prosecution of the Cold War across all fronts. The evidence suggests that Strausz-Hupé expected big things. When *Protracted Conflict* was reissued in paperback in 1963, it contained an epilogue (written before the Cuban Missile Crisis) that carefully praised Kennedy for increasing the defense budget despite the absence of an immediate crisis. This was always a Strausz-Hupé litmus test of political courage in a democracy.

Yet within three years Strausz-Hupé would write *In My Time*, making no reference to either FPRI or the book trilogy. The preface says, "My barque will never float again;" the last chapter offers a somewhat weary philosophical digression from a man who, at age sixty-two, saw his career as over. Meanwhile, even his work at the University was imperiled as both his methods and FPRI came under increasing criticism.

What had happened? The answer lay in the rapid shift of American politics following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy assassination, the presidential election of 1964, and the Vietnam War. In 1962, Strausz-Hupé's ideas were center-right, counting many Democrats and Republicans; by 1964 he was cast as right-right, a discredited Goldwater adherent.

Strausz-Hupé always thought that the risk of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis had been grossly exaggerated by pro-Kennedy propagandists who sought to disguise the real cost of the settlement for the United States. Like Eisenhower, whose conversation with Kennedy was

captured on a recently revealed Oval Office recording, Strausz-Hupé thought the Kremlin would never trade Moscow for Havana. American nuclear superiority ensured that much; otherwise why would Khrushchev have put nuclear missiles in Cuba? Yet the United States had secured a removal of the missiles only at the cost of guaranteeing Castro's tenure. At that time, very few Americans knew that Kennedy had also agreed to the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey, something concealed for years.

After the crisis, the Kennedy administration abruptly shifted course, seeking a *détente* with the USSR based on a nuclear arms agreement. This was completely antithetical to Strausz-Hupé's approach: he deemed American military superiority to be fundamental. Arms control agreements created a misleading balm that left Moscow free to meddle politically elsewhere. Increased American involvement in Southeast Asia, the other main U.S. effort, might be justified if it succeeded in repelling yet another communist subversion. But neither arms control nor Vietnam constituted the main theater, which remained Europe.

In 1964, Strausz-Hupé found a ready recipient for his ideas in the Goldwater campaign, and he emerged as a strong public supporter of the candidate. The Johnson campaign, however, succeeded easily in portraying Goldwater as a dangerous extremist. The Republican was repudiated in a landslide.

Strausz-Hupé was now typecast as a man whose ideas might lead to nuclear confrontation with the USSR. Senator Fulbright, so lauded in *Building the Atlantic World*, began his opposition to Vietnam, which would expand to a critique of containment and pave the way for McGovern's "Come Home America." Fulbright attacked Strausz-Hupé by name. On the University campus, increasing unrest focused on classified research performed for the government; the FPRI was a major target. Finally, the hated "scientism" had made its way into the Political Science Department. History, philosophy, and case studies were out; statistics, logical positivism, and moral neutrality were in. By the late sixties, Strausz-Hupé was an increasingly isolated figure at Penn and his creation, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, was itself under attack, eventually becoming independent of the university in 1970—in his view a necessary though regrettable decision.

Revival

In the very year that began Strausz-Hupé's eclipse he unknowingly planted the seed of his revival. In 1962, *Orbis* featured his magisterial article on "The Sino-Soviet Tangle and U.S. Policy." It was Strausz-Hupé at his best. He argued eloquently that reports of ideological disagreement between Moscow and Beijing were either exaggerated or, in any event, did not matter much. On the ground, where it counted, both communist states continued their efforts

to undo the West. Yet there was another angle: Marxist-Leninism had a weak spot, its defective analysis of nationalism. Russian encouragement of Chinese revolutionary independence might backfire, especially because Tsarist conquests of the last century were deeply resented in China.

Strausz-Hupé noted that if the West were to play the geopolitics of the balance of power between the Soviet Union and Maoist China, ideological preconceptions should be abandoned. As in nineteenth-century Europe, the swing power would choose the weaker, not the stronger, with whom to ally. That dictated China rather than Russia as America's choice of temporary partner, although both were morally reprehensible. He concluded, "The responsible statesman cannot dismiss these considerations out-of-hand, however distasteful he may find them."

Strausz-Hupé's article attracted the attention of a then-failed politician, former vice president Richard Nixon, who had also been impressed earlier by *Protracted Conflict*. In October 1967, Nixon published "Asia After Vietnam" in *Foreign Affairs*, which hinted at what became his revolutionary policy to exploit Sino-Soviet differences. The article's reasoning closely resembled that of Strausz-Hupé's, especially its approbation of the Atlantic Community, its recognition of the rise of Asia and its argument that China might have its own independent role to play.

When Nixon narrowly won the 1968 election, Strausz-Hupé's career suddenly brightened. The posting he got from Nixon (helped by Republican operative Bryce Harlow) was originally supposed to be Ambassador to Morocco. But Senator Fulbright blocked the confirmation of a man he described as "the very epitome of the hard-line, no compromise"; Strausz-Hupé's record of supporting Israel in the 1967 War was enough to put off King Hassan's government. It proved another stroke of luck. Denied the Moroccan appointment, he missed the king's 42nd birthday party in July 1971, where one hundred guests including the French ambassador (but not the king) were killed in a coup attempt.

Strausz-Hupé's own preference was not an embassy at all but rather the National Security Advisor position that Nixon gave to Henry Kissinger. The deciding factor, Strausz-Hupé told me, was his view on Vietnam. Strausz-Hupé had advised Nixon that the United States should take the war to the North and get it finished, or abandon what appeared an endless morass deeply dividing the country and gravely weakening it against the real threat, the Soviet Union. Nixon had seemed to agree, but Strausz-Hupé later became convinced that the widely published idea of "Vietnamizing the war" associated with Nelson Rockefeller and Kissinger was closer to Nixon's real view.

One wonders whether Strausz-Hupé would have worked well as National Security Advisor. He was already sixty-five and had never been much of an administrator or a committee man. At Penn, Strausz-Hupé evinced little enthusiasm for academic intrigue. The cutthroat world of Washington politics would not have caught him at his strengths. I sense that he understood this, yet he always felt that he could have done more than diplomatic work.

Ambassador

Blocked by Fulbright on Morocco, Strausz-Hupé was nominated successfully for Ceylon (Sri Lanka) with the help of Col. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Kissinger's military assistant. Thus began a diplomatic career that stretched over two decades, ending in 1989, when he was eighty-six years old. He went from Ceylon to Belgium, thence to Sweden, and in 1975 he achieved the summit of his expectations, U.S. Ambassador to the NATO Council. Strausz-Hupé conducted important business at several of these posts. Among other things, he negotiated with Britain for America's use of Diego Garcia as a military base. At NATO, he became an early advocate of deploying U.S. Pershing II missiles against the Soviet build-up of SS-20s, designed to prevent NATO's reinforcement capability, which was crucial to the Alliance's military strategy and political cohesion.

During these years, Strausz-Hupé made important contacts. He hosted Governor and Mrs. Reagan in Brussels; the future president was a wholehearted admirer of *Protracted Conflict*. At NATO, he worked closely with General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., then Supreme Commander, who was also instrumental in securing for Strausz-Hupé his last embassy in Turkey in 1981.

Strausz-Hupé surprised everyone with his diplomatic facility. He told me once that he had to do some acting. In the United States, he was "the barefoot boy from Newtown Square saying things so simple even Washington could understand them." Abroad, in an embassy full of Foreign Service officers naturally resentful of a political appointee, Strausz-Hupé pretended to be the absent-minded professor. Thus underestimated, he could sort out quickly the trustworthy from those who were not. Of one Deputy Chief of Mission he observed. "He attempted to make me his enemy but he did not succeed." Nonetheless, it could not have been entirely easy. Strausz-Hupé was not accustomed to checking with others or informing subordinates in detail when one of his plans was underway. Sometimes he preferred to be the sole junction between foreign officials and his superiors in Washington. But his cables made good reading and were widely circulated.

Strausz-Hupé also astonished his hosts. The late Sri Lankan Prime Minister Bhandaranaike was an ardent socialist not fond of America. The Swedish leader Olaf Palme epitomized a flamboyant anti-Americanism. Strausz-Hupé charmed both by locating a common interest,

whether it was dental trouble, tennis, or modern philosophy, then took it from there. Policies may not have changed, but he reduced the heat and gained a respectful hearing for U.S. positions.

Gerald Ford's defeat in 1976 cut short Strausz-Hupé's career at NATO before he could do much work, an immense disappointment. Yet there were real satisfactions, especially in the turnabout of his reputation on Capitol Hill. At his confirmation hearing for the NATO post, Strausz-Hupé was delighted when Senator Hubert Humphrey moved a resolution of approval saying that "Robert Strausz-Hupé was the right man in the right place at the right time." As he remarked after the hearing, patience in politics is sometimes a great virtue if you have the patience for it.

In 1977, Strausz-Hupé returned to White Horse Farms in Newtown Square, the home he and Eleanor had fixed up so many years before. He had been working on "Maxims," several dozen of which appeared in the now-defunct transatlantic literary magazine *Encounter* even while he was ambassador. (Many more were published in *Orbis* during the 1990s.) These were acute observations: "It is more difficult to unravel a half-truth than to spot a falsehood. Only fools tell complete lies." "To govern is to make no more decisions than necessary." "The best conservative causes have been lost by inflexibility, and the best liberal ones by vacillation." But he was far from finished as a diplomat. He had become close friends with General Haig, who spent a year at the FPRI after retiring from NATO. As Reagan's first Secretary of State, Haig supported Strausz-Hupé's nomination to become ambassador to Turkey.

It was a troubled time for that crucial NATO ally. The Turkish military had overthrown a corrupt and incompetent civilian leadership, putting its government at odds over human rights and civil liberties with its NATO partners at a critical moment of the Cold War. As Strausz-Hupé wrote: "The junta and Washington had suspended all diplomatic relationships except for routine matters." President Reagan's instructions were brief: "Keep Turkey with us."

Toward the end of his life, Strausz-Hupé was collecting material to write about his experiences, especially the Turkish embassy. Various other sources have given a picture of him at work. Evidently sensing that his own State Department could not manage the Turkish generals, indeed could barely understand them, Strausz-Hupé ran interference for the Defense Department, thereby preserving the relationship through some turbulent times. This got him into a good deal of trouble with Foggy Bottom. During Reagan's second term, there was a determined effort to replace him. The Department chose unwisely to make its case to Reagan on grounds of age, leading the President to observe that he preferred to have someone in government older than he himself.

I spent a few days with the Strausz-Hupés in Ankara in 1983 while on a speaking tour. After Eleanor died in 1974, Robert had married Maerose Nugara of Sri Lanka, who was a gracious hostess and keen observer of the guests. The ambassador ran quite a salon. He conducted it as if he were back at the Institute, choosing a group from all aspects of Turkish life. The conversation ran freely, and Strausz-Hupé intervened himself only to sharpen a point or summarize a topic. Later, tired from several hours of repartee, I sought to nap. The eighty-year-old Strausz-Hupé was deeply disappointed that I could not join him for a vigorous game of late afternoon tennis.

Another account comes from the celebrated American playwright Arthur Miller, who led a delegation of PEN writers to investigate civil liberties in Turkey. To Miller's surprise, Strausz-Hupé readily conceded that things could be better, but here they were discussing freedom freely. The Turks wanted to improve; that was most significant. But Miller and company wanted something more exciting and eventually they got it. As the overly lubricated celebrities took their leave, one created a scene only to be ordered out of the house by an indignant ambassador.

Strausz-Hupé supported the main lines of Reagan's foreign policy, which was a lineal descendent of what he had advocated twenty years before. The Soviet protracted conflict could be defeated if Western leaders kept the moral issues clear and supported their foreign policies with superior military forces. Writing in *Orbis* in 1992, Strausz-Hupé singled out the deployment of the Pershing IIs, his old NATO project, as a key step that led to strategic decisions in Moscow.

It could not hope to break down the military and political barrier of containment.... President Reagan's policies forced the issue. It was the buildup of NATO's forces during the years of his presidency and the consistency of his foreign policies that broke the back of a regime that had nothing better to offer its people than a stagnant ideology and the lifestyle of the nomenclature.

Strausz-Hupé, of course, was greatly pleased by the outcome. The Cold War had not been a pleasant trip, he remarked, but it was well worth the destination. The democracies had outrun the Soviets after all.

The Last Hurrahs

Strausz-Hupé's diplomatic career ended in 1989. He left an unpublished brief fragment, written in 1996, that summed up his own years of his diplomatic achievements. These included critical intelligence on the then-secret relationship between the Sri Lankan government and

that of Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi; the lease on Diego Garcia; the F-16 deal with Turkey, two major air bases, and a salvaged relationship that kept Turkey in NATO. At eighty-six, he felt himself fit for more public service but came to conclude reluctantly that his age told against him. He returned to Philadelphia, again taking up the post of Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at FPRI. A Heritage Foundation Fellowship gave him the opportunity to spend time in Washington.

Although troubled by a heart ailment that forced him to give up tennis, Strausz-Hupé was still in fighting form, able to lecture for an hour without notes on almost any subject. In Philadelphia, Strausz-Hupé also had a comfortable home, a loving wife, and intellectual stimulus at the Institute. As he said to me, he never thought his life would go on so long. What would he do with the rest of it?

Strausz-Hupé began to write another memoir to cover what *In My Time* had omitted, notably his activity at FPRI and the books. In addition, he could review his twenty years of diplomacy. Yet in short order, he decided not to do it. Perhaps it was too great an effort; something so personal he would have reserved for his own hand and that hand was no longer so strong. “There is nothing wrong with me,” he exclaimed once, “except I am ninety-three years old!”

Perhaps there was another reason. Strausz-Hupé did not wish to finish his story. The future was more interesting “short as my horizon might be.” Approached by a publisher to reissue *In My Time* in 1995, Strausz-Hupé wrote a new preface. He noted that he no longer knew the man he had written about thirty years earlier. What is more, he was no longer interested in him. His message instead: read this about a man shaped by the old world but remember that the new world is fundamentally different.

It was indeed the new world that preoccupied him in retirement. “The ascendancy of mass society” and its impact on foreign policy was the subject. After cobbling together various grants, he wrote *Democracy and American Foreign Policy*, published in 1995. Ostensibly an examination of Alexis de Tocqueville, the brilliant early analyst of American society, it became Strausz-Hupé’s opportunity to write his final words on a variety of subjects.

How could American foreign policy hope to succeed, given the famous defects Tocqueville had identified: its lack of secrecy, dispatch, and a distracted public opinion? Strausz-Hupé’s answer: these defects were “a challenge rather than an irremediable deficiency.” Despite “inordinate subservience to domestic politics,” the Constitution’s clash of checks and balances did manage to work, “though scandalously wasteful ...whatever peace there is on the earth is due to the exertions of its flawed and paradoxical system.” The book then becomes a set of essays that argue on geopolitical terms that demographic, technological, and ecological

problems are breaking down the nation-state system. (Years earlier he had called these the “uninvited guests” at the table of industrialization.) Only the United States could lead the world toward a new political order, a “federation of the democracies.”

These were ideas directly derived from his writings of forty years earlier, “the balance of tomorrow” now all the stronger because the Soviet menace had disappeared. Strausz-Hupé was disappointed in his book’s reception. He was even more disturbed by the course of American foreign policy following the Cold War which, to him, exhibited most of the bad habits: a careless self-indulgence and a rising to responsibility only after things had gone badly wrong. The Balkan crisis reminded him of his youth; he had a sure hand in analyzing the breakup of Yugoslavia. He recommended an early decisive military intervention so that the region could be returned to obscurity once more.

As for the big powers, Strausz-Hupé argued for a reversal of alliances. Relations with Russia should be cultivated, the better to restrain what he feared might be an arrogant Chinese assertion of Asian hegemony. He also wanted the U.S. to forge an alliance with India, “If,” he said with a knowing sense of New Delhi’s prickliness, “that is possible.”

The Europeans frustrated him. He regarded the European Union as “a powerful stomach muscle” but little more, and he discerned in EU-U.S. frictions the old follies of wishing to be free of the Atlantic Alliance. Strausz-Hupé supported NATO expansion into the old Habsburg realm but would have stopped at the Baltics. Better not to push the bear too hard. It was better, too, not to disturb the Germans. “They want to stay at home,” he said once, “and any policy that encourages them to stay at home is a good one.” Keeping the Turks out of the EU, on the other hand, was more than stupid. After all, the Ottomans had been part of European history and the balance of power for centuries. A democratic state of Muslims aspiring to Western politics and economics was the best antidote to the failed despots and archaic monarchies of the Arab lands.

Strausz-Hupé remained puzzled to the end of his life by the Holocaust. He knew Austrian and German anti-Semitism, but such a gigantic moral failure had never seemed in the offing even in the bad days following World War I which, in his view, were far more severe than the 1930s. He strongly criticized the only institution that he thought might have risen to civilization’s defense, the Catholic Church. Pius XII was a good diplomat, Strausz-Hupé said, but the Church had needed a man who would have sacrificed all, including his own person, to oppose the Holocaust. This was a moral failing that, in his view, ensured the eclipse of Christianity in postwar Europe, which the current Pope has been anxious to revive by renewed evangelism.

Turkey was a favorite subject. Strausz-Hupé thought highly of Turkey's President Turgut Ozal and shared his view that the United States should have knocked out Saddam at the end of the Gulf War. He worked incessantly to promote a "peace pipeline" that would convey Turkish fresh water to Israel and the Arabian desert, seeking to join the Turks, the Israelis, and the Saudis in a great functional undertaking that like Monnet's Coal and Steel Community, would ease tensions. (Shortly after Strausz-Hupé's death, Israel did buy some water from Turkey.) Strausz-Hupé, both as ambassador and afterwards, encouraged closer Turkish-Israeli relations.

Strausz-Hupé gradually became aware that his long life was making of him a semi-legendary figure. This pleased and amused him. When a former student declared, "Professor Strausz-Hupé, you are a legend in your own time," he leaned on his cane and said with a smile, "You behold the wreck of the legend"! At his 95th birthday party, hosted by the Institute, he declared, "the only advantage of great old age is that my critics have fallen silent, one by one, until only my voice is heard!" Yet he never ceased to be interested in the future. Reminiscence was interesting. The future mattered.

After 1999, Strausz-Hupé noticed his own weakening, which eventually made it difficult for him to get out. "I am a victim of my own good health," he complained. "There are too many parts inside that should have been removed years ago." This from a man who smoked incessantly from age twelve until ninety-two when he finally gave up his favorite thin cigars. A series of small strokes and heart problems slowed him. Increasing deafness made conversations sometimes difficult. Still, the mordant humor: when I rang him at hospital once he said he was attached to a machine. I asked, "What does it do?" "Oh," he said, "it trolls for money." Yet, he continued to work, reading books and writing an occasional short piece.

Strausz-Hupé retained a sharp judgment even in his final days. He recognized that September 11 had ended an era. In a last effort, published posthumously, he saw the war on terrorism as another protracted conflict. Like the Cold War, it had to be won, not compromised. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, he had warned in the 1990s, could bring measureless catastrophe in the wrong hands. Yet he was confident that America would win out. Things had been worse, much worse, during his lifetime.

Robert Strausz-Hupé died peacefully in his sleep on February 24, 2002. Life, Strausz-Hupé sometimes remarked, had been kind to him. The "finger of God" was there when he needed it. He wrote in the 1995 edition of *In My Time*: "I examined my own life and what history did to it. I now see it as a bridge between the Europe I left and the America I found, the land in which the immigrant's boldest dreams come true." His story was truly American with a European accent.

Strausz-Hupé was a child of his times. He understood the balance of power and how to operate it; a League or United Nations held no appeal for him. But after 1914 and 1939, he wanted desperately to “civilize” the balance, and the only system that could do it was American-style democratic federalism. America truly was the “world’s last best hope” as Lincoln said (quoting Thomas Jefferson’s first inaugural speech). As conservatives went, Strausz-Hupé could not be easily pegged. He was suspicious of absolutism, whether in political philosophy or political science. He preferred order to chaos, evolution to revolution, and first class to steerage. Yet Strausz-Hupé had experienced all manner of men. Moral crusading and rampant do-goodism left him cold and suspicious. He was far more tolerant of individual weaknesses and variations; vice never surprised him.

Strausz-Hupé’s scholarship stands the test of time. His footnotes are reliable and his work his own. At the forefront of the multidisciplinary approach, Strausz-Hupé never found in statistics or the theories imitating the natural sciences a substitute for the hard business of establishing evidence case by case, essentially the method of historians but pointed toward conclusions useful for the future.

Any appreciation of Robert Strausz-Hupé must also address the question, what difference did he make to his chosen objective, a more effective American foreign policy? By his own lights, he failed once and he succeeded once. He began by exposing the reality about Nazi statecraft in his pioneering work on geopolitics but had little effect until too late. Determined to prevent another such outcome, he took upon himself the education of the American people and their leaders to the realities of protracted conflict with communism.

Unlike so many others who did so much less, Strausz-Hupé wrote, “I will not claim that I have won the Cold War.” Yet he could certainly claim that without him the blunders would have been greater, the recovery less assured, and those who led to victory far less informed about their work. He could have been describing himself when he defined a statesman’s duty: “His is the task to persuade the people to ‘silence their immediate needs with a view of the future.’ The history of democratic foreign policy is the history of men who succeeded or failed at this task.” Robert Strausz-Hupé was surely a man who succeeded. The history of the Cold War is the unfolding of a protracted conflict eventually won by the West in a way strikingly similar to his ideas.

I see him now in my mind’s eye, sitting in his study surrounded by his books, dressed in a rakish sport coat and ascot. A cup of tea sits on a sideboard, illuminated by the late morning sun, the art on the walls shaded in half tones. Several newspapers lie at his feet, recent well-thumbed biographies by his side. We talk of some famous men and some infamous episodes.

But what of the future? I ask. Does the twenty-first century hold your vision of a new world arrangement that federates the failed nation-state system into another “long peace” under American leadership, this time one that avoids a 1914? “A very interesting question,” he would say. He takes a short puff on his cigar. The face crinkles, the eyes twinkle, and he says in a slightly English accent, “but not half as interesting as the answer.”

History and Geography: A Meditation on Foreign Policy and FPRI's 50th Anniversary

By James Kurth

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Fifty years ago, the United States was engaged in an epic struggle on a world scale: the Cold War with the Soviet Union and international communism. At the time, there were two dominant ways of thinking in America about world affairs. One, the mode of most practitioners of foreign policy, was pragmatism. Drawing upon a pervasive and long-standing American philosophical approach, it tended to look at the particulars of each distinct case. The results were foreign policies and strategies that were usually short-term and often short-sighted. In 1955, there was considerable evidence—most recently the stalemating of the United States in the Korean War; the defeat of America's ally, France, in the Indochinese War; and the Soviet development of H-bombs—that this approach was no way to win the Cold War.

The second way of thinking, the mode of many scholars of international politics (most notably Hans Morgenthau), was scientism. This also drew upon a pervasive and long-standing American philosophical approach: the belief that important problems could be solved by scientific laws and technical innovations. The results were policy and strategy recommendations that, however elegant in theory, were too abstract to be helpful in practice.

In 1955, there was also considerable evidence—the U.S. reliance upon abstract nuclear strategies of massive retaliation and upon largely formal alliance systems, such as the Baghdad Pact and the South East Asian Treaty Organization—that this approach was also no way to win the Cold War. Neither pragmatism nor scientism paid much attention to the ways history and geography shaped the actual realities of the foreign challenges America faced.

It was in this conceptual context that FPRI founder Robert Strausz-Hupé decided that there was a better way of thinking about world affairs, which was geopolitics. By this, he meant an

emphasis upon history and geography. Strausz-Hupé knew that America's greatest adversary, the Soviet Union, grounded its own foreign policy and strategy in an interpretation of history and geography, and that the Soviets viewed their struggle against the United States through a long-term perspective, i.e., they had developed a strategy of protracted conflict. He also believed that, although communist ideology helped to make the Soviets implacable, it was an error to try to predict Soviet behavior from communist ideology alone; rather, Soviet foreign policy and strategy were also greatly shaped by the history and geography of Russian imperialism. For the United States to prevail in this protracted conflict with the Soviet Union, it would have to develop its own understanding of history and geography and its own strategy of protracted conflict.

In order to expound this geopolitical understanding of world affairs, Strausz-Hupé founded FPRI in Philadelphia in 1955, as an antidote to the twin deformations of pragmatism and scientism. Drawing upon the best of scholarship, the Institute would perform an educational role with respect to two audiences. First, it would help to enlighten political leaders and policymakers about the nature of the protracted conflict, the historical and geographical realities that shaped it, and how to win it. Second, it would help to educate other opinion-makers, who in turn would help to inform the wider public. Hence, the debate over American foreign policy, heretofore limited to a small elite, would be "democratized."

The world has turned over many times since 1955. The Cold War, the Soviet Union, and communist ideology are no more, and in large measure this is because the United States did prove capable of waging a protracted conflict over the long-run. But as most of the articles in this issue of *Orbis* attest, America is now engaged in a new protracted conflict on a world scale, this time with Islamist insurgency and terrorism. In the more distant future, there may also develop a protracted conflict with the rising economic and military power of China, although this is not inevitable.

It would be an error to try to predict the behavior of Islamist insurgents and terrorists on the basis of Islamic theology or even Islamist ideology alone, particularly since Islamists take their own understanding of their history very seriously. Rather, an American understanding of the history and geography of the variety of Islamist threats is essential. Similarly, it would be an error to try to predict Chinese behavior from communist ideology or even from abstract notions of the Chinese national interest alone. The Chinese certainly take their own understanding of their history and geography very seriously, and so should we.

[...]

As in 1955 and the fifty years since, so too today and very likely in the fifty years to come, FPRI will seek to comprehend the world and to aid U.S. foreign policy and strategy. FPRI's scholars will pay special attention to those protracted conflicts that make tragedy an enduring

condition of world affairs. It will do so by contributing a distinctive way of thinking: one that emphasizes history and geography and focuses on the perennial and the long term, especially those ideals that sustain the American experiment.

The New Protracted Conflict

By Robert Strausz-Hupé

April 2002

Robert Strausz-Hupé was the founder of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and its flagship publication, Orbis. Born in Vienna in 1901, Strausz-Hupé immigrated to the United States between the wars, serving as foreign advisor to US financial institutions and eventually joining the faculty at the University of Pennsylvania—where he proved a prolific writer and acute commentator on world affairs. Strausz-Hupé later served as U.S. Ambassador to multiple countries, including Sri Lanka, Sweden, Belgium, and Turkey, in addition to NATO. Some of his works include Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, Protracted Conflict, and The Balance of Tomorrow. This essay, his last before his passing in 2002, was published posthumously as the introduction to the spring 2002 issue of Orbis.

In 1959 I wrote a book called *Protracted Conflict*, which became my most popular work. Perhaps this was because the central idea spoke to the times and because, although a professor, I did not let too much learning interfere with the theme.

What I proposed was simply that after a dozen years of Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, a pattern was in place that would continue until one side or the other was transformed. Either the United States would cease to be a democracy or the Soviet Union would cease to be a Leninist dictatorship. The ideological divide was too deep and wide for any lasting peace, and while tensions might grow or diminish, these were tactical decisions dictated by geopolitical convenience, not strategic changes. Try as Western statesmen might to bridge this divide with detente or, from the Soviet side, with the ideological sleight of hand called “peaceful coexistence,” the conflict would not end until one side or the other triumphed.

I thought it was supremely important for Americans and their statesmen to understand that we were in for a “protracted conflict.” This ran against our national preference for quick solutions and our tendency to believe that goodwill and money would always turn an enemy into a friend. We would have to stay alert, dispense with illusions about the other side, and keep ourselves mobilized. It would indeed be a severe test of our democracy to prevail.

There were times when I feared we might persuade ourselves that the conflict was over when it was not, and that then the dangers would remain or even grow in the face of our weakness. Many wagered against us, impressed only by our material cravings, political cacophony, and apparent attachment to foreign policies predicated on avoiding a fight. But they were wrong.

This was one story with a happy ending. The Soviet Union disappeared and that protracted conflict was over.

I have never been of an apocalyptic frame of mind, and so the end of the Cold War did not strike me as the end of history. The last decade, although peaceful and prosperous, was still disfigured by ethnic slaughter and the ascendancy of hostile doctrines, not least the simple envy of American success. The American people, led by their government, thought all of this was very far away. After September 11, we knew that it was not.

This struggle will be difficult and protracted. Our opponents deem us evil and some of them see an attack on us as the best and shortest route to paradise. This is a formidable stimulus to action. Terrorism is the instrument of the weak, and many of our adversaries are weak. Americans still want quick solutions, still like to be liked, and still see force as the very last resort. Our leaders must keep a psychological balance between despair and euphoria as the campaign proceeds, as most campaigns do, in fits and starts, on a field of battle obscured by smoke, some of it rhetorical. There can be no successful foreign policy without semantic leadership.

Still, we start with several advantages that the Cold War generation lacked. There is no serious domestic opposition to President Bush's strategy, at least not yet, no agitation for detente and no arguments over arms control with our enemy. Furthermore, all the major powers are ranged on our side. That Vladimir Putin's Russia has seen fit to ally itself with us is not an adverse development so long as we do not take it too far out of gratitude, for instance by extending Moscow a veto over NATO. As for the Atlantic alliance itself, this is another challenge to its role in a post-Cold War world and one that extends beyond welcome military solidarity to domestic affairs. Our European allies share with us issues of home security. One hopes also that this time at least, Turkey's indispensable contributions— as a member of NATO and a Muslim state that seeks rather than rejects association with America and the West— will be recognized. These are all important assets that must be conserved.

My main point, however, is that this protracted conflict, like the last one, will end only when one side vanquishes the other. Either the United States, at the head of the international order— such as it is— will forfeit its leadership, or international terrorists and the states who use them will find violence against innocent civilians a tactic too dangerous to be used.

I have lived long enough to see good repeatedly win over evil, although at a much higher cost than need have been paid. This time we have already paid the price of victory. It remains for us to win it.

What Do We Mean by the West?

By William H. McNeill

Fall 1997

William H. McNeill taught history at the University of Chicago from 1947 to 1987. During that time he wrote many books, the most important of which were The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (1963), Plagues and Peoples (1976), Pursuit of Power (1982) and, in retirement, Keeping Together in Time (1995). Based on his keynote address to FPRI's History Institute on "America and the Idea of the West" held in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, on June 1-2, 1996, this text has been revised for publication by the author and the then-editor of Orbis, Walter McDougall.

The subject today is the meaning of "the West" in the sense of Western Civilization. The first and most obvious point to make is that the meaning of the West is a function of who is using the word. Those who feel themselves to be part of the West—who think of the West as "we"—will surely have flattering things to say about their civilization. Those who think of the West as the "other" are likely to define it in less flattering terms. The basic meaning of the word is "where the sun sets"—one of the cardinal directions. Chinese geomancers drafted elaborate and codified rules about what that direction meant as opposed to the East, North, or South. But we in the West have nothing so precise as the Chinese: to us the West connotes all sorts of characteristics desired by some, eschewed by others.

In the United States, for instance, the West conjures up the Wild West of our historic frontier, a place of freedom, open spaces, new starts, and a certain manliness. But it was also a place where danger, loneliness (largely due to the paucity of women), and lawlessness often prevailed. At the same time, Americans have habitually embraced a contradictory meaning of the West. For inasmuch as all North America was the West vis-a-vis the Old World that colonists and later immigrants had left behind, the West was considered a "more perfect" place conducive, not to danger and lawlessness, but to liberty, equality, and prosperity. Americans were "new men under new skies," as Frederick Jackson Turner proclaimed.

And yet, at the same time, Americans undeniably brought much of the Old World with them to the New. Hence, whatever qualities were to be found in both worlds tended to unite them and bespeak a broader notion of the West. At first, it encompassed the Atlantic littoral of Europe (the British Isles, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, and Iberia) plus America. In time, it came to encompass Australia, New Zealand, and all other European overseas settlements. The West, therefore, could be imagined as a civilization independent of locale. Finally, one hears today of a West that includes not only nations populated by European

stock, but also non-Western nations that have assimilated Western institutions, techniques, and to some extent values: Japan, for instance.

What the West means in a given context, therefore, depends entirely upon who is invoking the term and for what purpose. But it is fair to say that virtually all definitions of Western Civilization drew a line somewhere across Europe placing Germany (at times), Poland and Eastern Europe (at times), and Russia and the Balkans (at all times) beyond the pale of Western civilization. A Briton might joke that “the Wogs begin at Calais,” a Frenchman dub the Rhine the frontier of civilization, a German insist that “at the Ringstrasse the Balkans begin,” and a Pole that Asia begins with the westernmost Orthodox church; but wherever drawn, that line is the most enduring political/cultural demarcation in the history of Europe.

The meanings we give to the West today, in the United States, are by and large translated from the usage of Western Europeans in the late nineteenth century: the era when the British and French colonial empires bestrode the world and Germany and Italy were, by comparison, marginalized. But the outskirts of this Anglo-French core—Germany to the east and America to the west—might demand to be recognized as part of the West at the same time as they rivaled Western Europe for power and influence. The story of Western Civilization in the twentieth century, in fact, might be organized around the theme of the alternative visions of Western Civilization that Germany and the United States each pressed, by force, on the Euro-Atlantic core.

Perhaps the most profitable way to proceed, therefore, is to trace so far as possible where this Western European self-conception came from, how it was received in the United States around the turn of this century, and how it was subsequently embodied in our own high school and college curricula.

The Classical Cradle

The birth of a concept of a West as opposed to an East can be dated exactly to events that occurred on either side of the Aegean Sea in the years 480 and 479 BCE. That may seem exceedingly strange—to wit, that the West of Anglo-French imagination sprang from a Persian imperial invasion of Greece some 2,500 years ago—but it is nonetheless so. The army of the Persian Empire crossed the Hellespont to assault a ragged confederacy of some twenty-odd city-states. The imperial side deployed perhaps 60,000 professional soldiers with an abundant supply train stretching fifteen hundred miles. The Hellenic side could field mere militia forces composed of citizen-soldiers. And yet, against all odds and apparent reason, the Empire lost and the militias won. That they did so posed a logical quandary even for the Greeks. But the classical answer offered by Herodotus was simply that free men fight better than “slaves.” This classical explanation of Greece’s deliverance was so powerful, persuasive, and it must be said, flattering to the Greeks that it echoed throughout the rest of Mediterranean antiquity.

The only life worth living, it held, was that of a free citizen who might take part in the public deliberations that affected his fate up to and including the risk of death in battle in defense of freedom. So mighty was this ideal that it survived the conquest of the city-states themselves and entered into the public consciousness of their conquerors, Macedon first, and then Rome. And even though those empires liberated the Greeks themselves from their internecine warfare, the Greeks never ceased to mourn their lost freedom.

The republican spirit born of the love—and power—of liberty pervaded most of the classical texts that have come down to us: not only the histories of Herodotus, Tacitus, and Livy, but the oratory of Demosthenes, Cicero, and Cato, and the theater and poetry of Greece and Rome. The same spirit burst forth again in Renaissance Italy when city-states similar to those of the ancients reemerged, and in time it came to infuse the educational systems of all western Europe thanks to the Humanist revival of the classics. Indeed, that spirit could still be descried in the early twentieth century, playing on the minds and the feelings of Europe's elites, calling them to honor its collectivized ideal of heroic virtue.

I say “collectivized” because the republican spirit always extolled, not personal heroism, but heroism and sacrifice in the service of polity and country. To live, and perhaps to die, for the patria was the only way to fulfill human destiny in its most complete sense. So it was that the French revolutionaries would consciously imitate the Roman Republic, nineteenth-century Germans consider their land the modern equivalent of ancient Greece, and the British Empire invoke the universality and virtues of ancient Rome.

But the phrase “so it was” is a loaded one. It may indeed appear natural that Renaissance Italy would notice its resemblance to Classical Greece, but trans-Alpine Europe was a region of dynastic territorial states, even national kingdoms, and thus hardly an analog to the original West of Athens, Sparta, and republican Rome. What is more, the Christian heritage, which was much stronger in northern Europe than in Italy (“the nearer the papacy, the farther from God,” quipped Machiavelli), was utterly at odds with the heroic republican ideal of antiquity. The Church taught obedience and humility as the paths to holiness and salvation, and a life and death given to God, not the state. How was it then, that republican virt[ue] born at Thermopylae and reborn in Italy's glorious *quattrocento*, in effect inspired the West as nineteenth-century English and French defined it?

The West of the Renaissance

To address that question, however inadequately in a short talk, we must stretch our minds back beyond even Athens and Sparta to the megalithic cultures of the second millennium BCE. Little is known about them and their mysterious monuments, but it is clear that they spread around the shores of Europe from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic, carrying with them the message that when a human being died, the soul migrated west to the Isles of the

Blessed, to follow the sun and, like the sun, to rise once again. This doctrine of immortality most likely originated in Egypt, but it took root among many peoples, the Celts especially.

In time, of course, an overlay of Christianity obscured the older megalithic cultures of Western Europe, but the dream of the West as a sort of heaven, the place one goes to escape the crowding, pain, and heartaches of mortal life in an imperfect East, lived on. To the peoples residing near the coast of Atlantic Europe folk wisdom taught that the West is always a better place, a place whither one's ancestors went, a place to be reborn.

To view the East as impure, even dark, could not have clashed more sharply with the early Christian aphorism *ex oriente lux*: enlightenment comes from the east, the land of the rising sun. And indeed the initial political cleavage between a self-conscious West and East dates from the division of the Roman Empire under Constantine, the first Christian emperor, in the fourth century CE, and the removal of the imperial capital from Rome to Constantinople (Byzantium). Within a century and a half the Western Roman Empire fell before the barbarians, but the Eastern Roman (or Byzantine) Empire survived for a thousand years as a center of power, wealth, and Classical culture.

The West, by comparison, was laggard, poor, and soon divided into semi-civilized Germanic or Celtic kingdoms. Even after Charlemagne revived the Western empire in the late eighth century, Western Europeans remained threadbare country cousins to the magnificent, grandiose Byzantines. And yet, as is always the case when less “civilized” peoples encounter comparatively richer, mightier, and more highly skilled cultures, the West felt a deep ambivalence toward the East. Yes, those “Greeks”—as they referred to the Byzantines—may be grander than we in material terms, but they are also decadent, corrupt—and heretical. For whatever its other shortcomings, the Catholic West could boast of the papacy and the maintenance of true religion and virtue. The pope, as successor to Peter the Prince of the Apostles, was the guardian of correct Christian doctrine both in theory and, as ecumenical councils invariably recognized, in practice as well. The papacy, therefore, became the sole principle of unity and authority and the focus of consciousness and self-assertion in Catholic Europe, and the line that resulted from the peripatetic activity of missionaries from Rome on the one hand and Byzantium on the other came to divide Europe more deeply and lastingly than any geographical, ethnic, political, or economic one. The West meant Latin, Catholic Christendom, and a balance between church and state; the East meant Greek Orthodoxy and caesaropapism.

But however much the reach of papal authority defined the West, the very tension between spiritual and secular authority in a disunified West meant that the papacy had to cope with enemies within. The Holy Roman Empire, ruled by Charlemagne's heirs, embodied the imperial principle in the West; the autonomous city-states of Northern Italy (that grew rich,

ironically, off the Crusades) embodied the republican principle, and both opposed papal pretensions to Western unity based on a hierarchical church and dogmatic faith. Their long-simmering rivalries boiled over in the Renaissance and split all northern Italy into the warring camps of the propapal Guelfs and proimperial Ghibellines, purporting to incarnate the civic humanism of the ancients.

What made the conflicts of Renaissance Italy of surpassing importance to Europe and the world was that the Italians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were the cultural, intellectual, and, not least, economic leaders of all Europe and the Mediterranean (the Byzantine Empire having shrunk to a rump besieged by the Turks). The Italian project was nothing less than to organize the western promontory of the Eurasian landmass into a single, integrated market economy through commerce, specialized production, new credit mechanisms and new means of mobilizing capital such as the joint-stock company. The city-states themselves pioneered tax systems that allowed them to mobilize relatively enormous resources, floating public debt that allowed them to amortize the cost of wars and public works over decades, and efficient new political/military administrations that magnified the power of civil government (in Florence and Venice at least; in Milan the military escaped civilian control).

This was the achievement—this congeries of skills enhancing power and wealth—that accounts for the otherwise anomalous fascination for things Italian that gripped trans-Alpine Europe from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. The kingdoms of Spain (and through Spain, the Low Countries), France, and England imported Italian methods and so developed such powerful central monarchies that the Italian city-states themselves were soon eclipsed. The French invasion of 1494 sounded the death knell for Italian independence, and yet the wars that followed only hastened the diffusion of Italian knowledge to the north and west of Europe, including the Classics, the ancient philosophies about how to lead a good life, the ideal of collective patriotic effort in war and in peace, a curiosity about (and glorification of) the natural world, and the pursuit of Humanist, not strictly Christian, virtue.

Not surprisingly, this spreading and eager embrace of what appeared to be secular values provoked a backlash among the pious. We call it the Reformation, and it occurred just where one would expect, in the region of Europe that had not absorbed nor benefited from the new Italian ways of life, but in fact felt exploited by them: Germany. Luther thus represented a reactionary movement, but even so, he and Calvin employed Humanist literary techniques in their effort to elevate the authority of Scripture. The imperatives of survival in the so-called Religious Wars that lasted more than 150 years then forced Protestant and Catholic states alike to learn and use the tools of power forged in the Renaissance. But the concepts of citizenship and republican virtue were the special province of Calvinists, first in Geneva, then in the Dutch Republic, and in Cromwellian England.

All the while, of course, the great Age of Exploration, the invention of printing, and all the discoveries of the Scientific Revolution gradually persuaded Western Europeans, for the first time in history, that they might actually know more than the ancients, and if so, know more than anyone in the world! To be sure, those annoying Ottoman Turks seemed to belie this new Western conceit. The largest and most enduring of the “gunpowder empires” of the Early Modern centuries, Ottoman Turkey swallowed almost all of Araby, Byzantium, and the Balkans, and cast its shadow over Central Europe. A religious interpretation of the Ottoman phenomenon might dismiss it, not as a sign of Western inferiority, but as God’s scourge for the sins of the Christians. Certainly, neither the Turks nor the Europeans believed they had aught to learn from the other and an intense mutual disregard was their preferred posture. But whether one viewed the Turks as punitive agents of God or (like Voltaire) as an interesting, if frightening Asian apparition, no Westerner doubted that his civilization was freer, truer, and in the long run stronger than that of the East, notwithstanding the fact that Protestants and Catholics within the West fought for differing definitions of freedom, truth, and strength.

Birth of the Anglo-French West

Now, so far as the future United States is concerned, the intense (or intensifying) conflict between a definition of the West based on republican virtue and liberty, and a definition based on true doctrine as upheld by the papacy, threw up two major landmarks. They are utterly familiar to Anglo-American audiences, but still worth recalling. The first was the series of English Revolutions from 1640 to 1660 and 1688. In one sense these were as reactionary as Luther’s revolt in that they rejected the efficient “modern” royal government crafted by the Tudors and Stuarts in the name of Parliament’s medieval powers, not to mention sectarian strife. Yet in another sense, by one of those slights of hand by which history is so often turned inside out, after 1688 the “reactionaries” in Parliament invented what amounted to an entirely new kind of sovereignty in what came to be known as Great Britain. It was government by consent of the taxpayers, representative government that asserted rights over the crown and thus preserved a private sphere for differences of religion and much besides, that made private property sacred and thus pulled the sting from the arbitrary tax collector, and that rested, though a monarchy still, on a vigorous dose of republican virtue and liberty. For the English system could not have functioned for a season without the recognition by the enfranchised possessing classes that they must pay, they must serve, as the legal forms of parliamentary consent prescribed. The Glorious Revolution proved to be a remarkably effective compromise that preserved a broad zone of personal freedoms and security against the power of the state, yet permitted the state to mobilize the nation for common action under parliamentary cabinet government.

So successful was Britain in its wars, mostly with France, after 1688, and so alluring was its economic expansion, that the British system became a model for many other European

reformers. The English Revolution was a dramatic demonstration of how a movement that began by kicking against the pricks of modernity ended by inventing a sort of super modernity that left all its foreign competitors gasping for breath (The leaders of Japan's Meiji Restoration, who overthrew the *shogunate* in the name of seclusion only to launch a crash modernization campaign, provide a later example). By the late eighteenth century, therefore, the French in particular recognized that the institutions established by the Bourbon kings were hopelessly superannuated, laying the groundwork for the second great landmark, the French Revolution. Many Enlightenment thinkers, such as Montesquieu, proposed that France reform its institutions along British lines, but others sought to get to the very roots of things, which is what being "radical" means. What the British called "the rights of Englishmen" the French radicals set out to improve upon by invoking "the rights of all mankind." Where British liberalism meant oligarchical rule by taxpayers, French radicalism would mean democratic rule by all male citizens, displaying (even imposing) the republican ideals of Athens and Rome: a worship of reason, virtue, liberty, equality, and fraternity. And where the British practiced a certain tolerance and reconciled their freedom with an established Christian church, the French revolutionaries explicitly repudiated the Christian tradition and replaced it with a secular, civic cult.

The excesses and contradictions of the French Republic of Virtue need no elaboration. But it must not be forgotten that the methods of military and financial mobilization employed by the French Republic (and later by Napoleon) were so shockingly successful that Britain, Prussia, and the Austrian Empire had no choice but to copy French techniques or perish. In fact, the demonstration of what democratic government ... *la française* could achieve in war was so compelling that even after Waterloo no part of the Western world could afford to neglect it. Taking the common people into active partnership with government and catering to social elites became, quite simply, an imperative of success and even survival in the competition among sovereign powers. Even tsarist Russia and Tokugawa Japan, after their respective humiliations at the hands of the Anglo-French in 1856 and by the Americans in 1854, were obliged to abolish legal inequality and embrace Western methods of national mobilization with all their implications for "citizenship." Indeed, we may say that the mobilization of the masses became the principal political agendum of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

And that, of course, was the essence of the West—the Anglo-French West—that imposed itself on the rest of the world between 1750 and 1914, and loomed as a model when America's national career began. It was a model to be imitated, but it also struck Americans as a seat of the corruptions that they yearned to cast off as they crossed the Atlantic and breathed Western air. The United States would be better, purer, freer, even though more ignorant, crude, and clumsy: the same ambivalence Medieval Europe felt toward Byzantium, that northwestern Europe felt toward Renaissance Italy, that Germany felt toward France.

But the United States caught up expeditiously. Favorable geopolitics permitted it to realize Manifest Destiny and build a continental state of enormous proportions by comparison to anything in Western Europe. It did not occur painlessly, as the Civil War graphically proved, but Americans caught up with the core European West by the late nineteenth century and developed that chip on the shoulder borne of an inability to decide whether we ought to imitate or repudiate the Old World. The crisis point came with the First World War. Should the United States join the Anglo-French West in its fight against Eastern barbarians and so merge into the West once and for all, or stay out? Under Woodrow Wilson, Americans chose to engage: and at that moment what we think of as Western Civilization, Western Civ, was born.

The West of American Schools

The courses and curricula in the history of Western Civ that became ubiquitous from about 1930 to 1960 were first crafted in response to U.S. belligerence in 1917. Initially, at least at Columbia University, Western Civ was designed to teach soldiers what it was they would be fighting for in Flanders Fields. Imitations proliferated, textbooks were written to accommodate them, and the texts bred a certain standardized interpretation, which in turn formed the intellectual bedrock for two generations of American college students and governing elites. The West as understood in the United States, therefore, was a product of what those students heard in the lecture hall, read in the texts, and expressed in their own words in the essays and examinations assigned in Western Civ courses.

Now, by the time I myself took such a class in the 1930s, Western Civ had evolved (at the University of Chicago and elsewhere) into a powerful and frankly missionary enterprise. The curriculum was based upon a systematic polarity between reason and faith—"St." Socrates versus St. Paul—and the notion that truth was an evolving, discovered thing rather than a fixed, dogmatic certainty laid down once for all in the Bible or church doctrine. The effect of this on young people was to give them a sense of emancipation from old religious identities, often ethnically transmitted, a sense of common citizenship and participation in a community of reason, a belief in careers open to talent, and a faith in a truth susceptible to enlargement and improvement generation after generation.

This was indeed a liberating message for many Americans in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s: it conveyed membership in the great cultivated, reasonable, sophisticated world of "us", the heirs of a Western tradition dating from Socrates and surviving all the tribulations of the Medieval and Early Modern eras. World War II and the cold war only intensified, even as they perhaps narrowed, the agenda of a unified West led by America fighting for freedom and reason and tolerance, and mobilizing itself through an appeal to republican virtue, against new Eastern tyrannies, be they German or Russian.

Yet, oddly, the 1960s were the very moment when college courses in Western Civ began to be abandoned. One reason for this was that young teachers of history, be they graduate teaching assistants or junior faculty, simply refused to become apprenticed by their elders to serve as “slave labor” in the sections of large Western Civ courses. Instead, they tended to stake out their little private kingdoms built around the subjects of their Ph.D. theses. It does not really matter what one studies, they insisted, for one piece of history is as good as another. What is more, the senior professors always teach courses around their projected next book, so why shouldn’t I? After all, I must write books, too, in order to get promoted to tenure. So how dare you indenture me to somebody else’s course whose naive ideas I do not want to propagate anyway?

That attitude was, I believe, a highly destructive and narrowly careerist response to what were real deficiencies in the way Western Civ was taught at the time. But more recently, perhaps since the late 1970s, the debate has taken a different twist as more and more historians agree that the overspecialized “smorgasbord” curricula of the 1960s were disastrous, but disagree about the nature of the survey courses that ought to be reintroduced. Some call for a revival of Western Civ, albeit updated in such a way as to accommodate new historiographical trends. Others insist on world history courses as necessary to introduce young Americans to the globalized, multipolar world they live in today. Unfortunately, world history itself has often been contaminated by what I regard as patently false assertions of the equality of all cultural traditions. Every flower has an equal right to bloom, say the multiculturalists, just as the young rebels of the 1960s said that every subspecialty had equal value in the curriculum. Neither of these propositions is true.

One cannot know everything, hence one must make choices. And just as some facts are more important to know than others, so certain cultures have displayed skills superior to others in every time and place throughout history. Simply imagine living in proximity to a competitor—be it a business, tribe, ethnic group, or nation—possessed of skills greater than yours. There is no use asserting that your culture is just as good as his. It palpably is not, and you must do something about it. Perhaps you will borrow from your rival in an attempt to catch up, in which case your differences shrink, or perhaps you will rally your people to repel the rivals to keep them at a distance, in which case your differences magnify. But one way or another you must change your own ways.

Superiority, real and perceived, and inferiority, real and perceived, are the substance of human intercourse and the major stimulus to social change throughout the course of history. Those actions and reactions, ambivalences and conflicts born of perceived disadvantage, have made human beings what we are and conditioned our behavior. Now, in terms of Western Civ and what our young people need to know about themselves and their world, it seems to me that the obvious globalization of human contacts and interactions means that the study of

civilizations in isolation no longer suffices. We must teach and learn world history so as to prepare ourselves to live in a world in which the West, no less than “the rest,” must respond to challenges from abroad. World history must make space for all the peoples and cultures in the world, but it must also recognize the fact that events in some places and times were, and are, more important than others. And the principle of selection is simply this: what do we need to know in order to understand how the world became what we perceive it to be today?

Thus, we must focus the attention of our students on the principal seats of innovation throughout history, while remaining aware of the costly adaptations and adjustments, and in many cases the suffering of those conquered or displaced by dint of their proximity to those seats of innovation. The main story line, therefore, is the accumulation of human skills, organization, and knowledge across the millennia, which permitted human beings to exercise power and acquire wealth through concerted action among larger and larger groups of people across greater and greater distances until we reach our present era of global interaction.

Now, in the last four or five centuries the West defined as the European core plus overseas periphery is certainly the major player. But it has not been the only one, and lately we see signs that the center of highest skills may indeed be migrating to the Pacific Ocean littoral, just as it shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic littoral after the year 1650. A proper history of the world needs to make clear that such shifts have occurred in the past and may occur again in the future, and that the mechanism by which they occur is successful borrowing from the prior centers of superior skill and incorporation of such skills into a different cultural context able to make new use of them, innovate further, and so become a new center of superior skills.

That is how the West became dominant in the first place, by borrowing from China above all. China had, quite transparently, been the leading center on the globe between 1000 and, say, 1450: just think of gunpowder, printing, and the compass. Francis Bacon was the first to state explicitly that those borrowed skills were the principal secret to the rise of the West, and he was certainly correct to a large degree. One ought to add the Chinese notion of meritocracy, the examination system for recruitment into a bureaucracy, imported to Europe in the eighteenth century. These four tools of power, technology, and organization Europeans took from China, domesticated into European culture, and exploited in more radical and far-reaching ways than the Chinese themselves had done.

One of the most visceral issues in our current debate over history curricula is how to reconcile this vision of the human past, which is true to the intellectual purpose of history, with the desire to preserve and pass on American institutions and cultural values, which is true to the civic purpose of history. That is no small problem because liberal multiculturalists are loath to admit the true inequality of cultures, and sometimes undermine our specific national heritage by denigrating it, while conservatives are loath to admit the contingency and possible

inferiority of Western and American ways. Yet the conservative response is dangerous too. In fact, it makes the same mistake the Chinese made when confronted by the Europeans. Their past was so brilliant that they could not believe the “South Sea barbarians” mattered. Unfortunately, they found out after 1839 that it did not suffice to tell Europeans that they were immoral to trade in opium. They came anyway, bearing guns with which the Chinese could not cope.

The Turks had exactly the same history with respect to their confrontation with Europe except that it happened earlier, after 1699. They had steadfastly paid no attention to the West until it was too late for them to catch up and adjust their institutions to the European challenge.

If we Americans likewise believe that we possess all the truths that matter—for instance, those expressed by the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and so forth—and need only recite them piously, we will not be able to react intelligently to changes that may occur, or are already in train, in the world around us. We must instead continue to adapt lest we, too, be left behind, and cultivate an open-mindedness towards the rest of world, and be at the ready to borrow ideas and skills of value. To do so, of course, may require that we adapt, adjust, and even reject treasured aspects of our past.

One obvious example is what I regard as Americans’ almost obsessive individualism as compared to commitments made to primary groups in which fellow spirits may meet and share and make life worthwhile. I firmly believe that groups are needed to maintain that private sphere of freedom and fulfillment and creative variety that emerged so stunningly in seventeenth-century England. But the preservation of that zone of freedom requires that individuals in fact join in groups and choose to devote themselves to common undertakings conducive to the polity’s health. That is not to say that groups organized around treasured grievances or anger against all who are different, as displayed by some of the militias and eccentric sectarians today, do not indeed threaten public order and perhaps even the wide world beyond. But for people to spurn all groups, even the family, in the name of individual satisfaction, is no less destructive of culture.

Thus, the choices we make every day about which groups to join and how fully, enthusiastically, and loyally to participate in them will shape the future of our country and the world. I must say that the Internet and other new forms of communication will presumably permit new groups to form around national, ethnic, political, professional, religious, even sports loyalties. Indeed, loyalty to everything from the nuclear family to nationhood to the human race and—if you want to get really cosmic—the DNA form of life is the potential stuff for a group loyalty even as the rise and fall of groups is the stuff of history. Conflicts among loyalties pose the central moral problem of human life. We all belong to many groups and

embody many identities, and how to reconcile them effectively one with another has been the ethical challenge to human beings ever since tight-knit, separate primary groups of hunters and gatherers ceased to be the sole form of human society.

In recent centuries the group called the “nation” has come to the fore. But there is nothing eternal about it, and no one knows what new forms of community may emerge and what new challenges they may pose. It seems to me, therefore, that understanding how groups have interacted in the past is the only preparation for responsible, effective action in the future. And that means that world history is a far better guide than Western Civ alone, which is, in the largest frame, a mere episode in the human saga: an important one, to be sure, which no rational world history would leave out, but an episode just the same.

So insofar as a concept of the West excludes the rest of humanity it is a false and dangerous model. Situating the West within the totality of humankind is the way to go, and we should in our classrooms move as best we can in that direction, believing always in the ennobling effect of enlarging one’s circle of sympathies, understanding, and knowledge, and aspiring to share that belief with our students. There can be no higher calling for historians, and above all, for teachers of history.

PART II: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST

What the World Teaches America: A Fourth of July Reflection

By Adam Garfinkle

July 1993

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Much attention is being paid lately to how America should respond to the post-Cold War international environment, to what America should do in and for the world. The challenge is so important that it sometimes obscures the fact that the world is also doing something to and even for America. Through the reflective power of negative examples, it is offering us some powerful lessons—if we are wise enough to learn them.

What do we Americans see this July 4th when we look around this beautiful but troubled planet? Most of us would agree that we see a sobering picture.

Militarized and politicized religion threatens communal peace and diplomatic effort in much of North Africa, and South and Southwest Asia. Islamic fundamentalism is roiling the Near East and North Africa, its atavism undermining social stability and threatening governments from Rabat to Cairo. Hindu chauvinism and Sikh extremism stoke the fires of separatism and violence in India, and the civil war in Sri Lanka between Tamil and Sinhalese, too, is fueled by rising Hindu-Buddhist antagonisms.

Even more sobering to most Americans, resurgent nationalism in Europe is destroying hopes for peace and prosperity. Nationalism is not always a malign force; the imperial subjugation of peoples is a political sin of equal magnitude, and national assertion can right such wrongs. But the sadder side of nationalism is more in evidence today, especially in the Balkans, and the Russian Federation's potential problems in this regard are orders of magnitude more grave and consequential to the world at large.

Beyond these most dramatic examples, political weakness and uncertainty abound in both democratic and non-democratic states. Half of the Italian political elite is either in or on the way to jail; France courts political paralysis with a lame-duck socialist President vying with a right-of-center parliament; bombs rattle London. Spain and Belgium show signs of falling to political pieces. The post-World War II Asian democracies—Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and even Japan—show themselves either economically edgy, politically troubled, or both.

Meanwhile, the post-Soviet states in the Baltics, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Europe (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine) are convulsed by new responsibilities even as they stand paralyzed by poverty. China is heading for inevitable instability with a major generational shift in leadership. Southeast Asia remains mired in repression, poverty, and incipient war-again-in Cambodia. In the horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan) things are even worse. Economic advancement and political life remain fitful and fragile in most of sub-Saharan Africa, and the same can be said for much of Latin America. South Africa, like Russia, stands at a pivotal moment of decision, and could plunge into gruesome civil war as easily as rise to successful political reform.

If all this weren't enough, the trade in deadly conventional weapons and the danger of CBN (chemical/biological/ nuclear) proliferation grow; and global environmental problems still mount.

And then there is America. Consider the contrasts.

While America produces a David Koresh or a Jim Jones from time to time, we happily lack an institutional clergy driven by megalomania, hatred, and the desire to divide. With each passing day, the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in relegating religion to the private sphere looks better and better. God help us if we ever fail to appreciate this sublime arrangement.

Far more important, the American experience shows that people of different origins and beliefs can live together, notwithstanding the mean claims of alienated "multiculturalist" intellectuals. America bears witness today to what religious intolerance and ethnic chauvinism can do to heterogeneous societies whose members forget their common humanity. Surely it should teach us that the answer to our own racial and ethnic problems is not to exalt in the hyphens we have put after our parochial origins and before our Americanness, but to work patiently to excise them ultimately from our vocabularies.

As for American politics, we all know that there are problems. The system can be fairer and more responsive, less corrupted by money and bad habits of unearned privilege. But compared to most peoples, we live within a rampart of constitutionality, representative institutions, and stable democratic traditions. Anyone who can't see this just doesn't want to look.

When it comes to the proliferation of deadly weapons, America is on balance part of the solution, not the problem. As to our own vulnerabilities, they are modest, partly for reasons of geography, but also because, unlike almost every great power in history, America has not made lasting enemies out of its immediate neighbors. We may have our differences with Canada and Mexico, and problems of sorts with Cuba and Haiti, but they are certainly not about to lead to major war.

Even with regard to environmental problems, Americans are lucky. There's still many a mess from the past to clean up, and vigilance against those who would mortgage everyone's future to their next bottom line must be unceasing. But environmentalism is an American invention, and things have improved mightily over the past dozen years. If you don't believe it, spend a year living outside the United States—almost anywhere will do—and you will believe it. Little by little, too, the rest of the world is learning from the American example.

When all is said and done, then, what can the political state of the world today teach us? Humility, gratitude, and hope will do for starters. Humility because we can do better, gratitude for what we have achieved, and hope that the rest of mankind will in some way benefit from our experience. God bless America.

Meditations on a High Holy Day: The Fourth of July

By Walter McDougall

July 2004

I. Nation with the Soul of a Church

Last September a group of apprehensive students gathered for the first meeting of a seminar I was offering for the first time. They weren't sure they wanted to take the class. Indeed, they weren't even sure what it was about. Imagine, then, their discomfort when I dispensed with all introductory remarks and bade them sit still for 32 minutes while I played a videotape of the entire presidential inaugural ceremony from January 2001. "Forget whether you favored Al Gore or George W. Bush," I admonished, "and try to ignore Bill Clinton's smirks in the background. Just watch the proceedings and think about what is transpiring."

After the last ruffles and flourishes I asked the students—in a seeming non sequitur—what sorts of activities make up the liturgy of a church or synagogue service. Prayers, they answered, and hymns, psalms, a sermon. Did we just observe those activities on the tape, I asked? We certainly did, if we agree that inaugural addresses function as political sermons. Did we witness a solemn procession, invocation of the Divine, and convocation in which the congregation celebrates its shared beliefs? Yes, we did. How about a call to repentance and amendment of those ills that beset our society? Yes, again. And a dismissal in which the newly installed high priest calls on the assembled to go forth in faith and do good works? Indeed. Well then, I asked, if a presidential inauguration possesses all the properties of a religious service, what is the religion it serves? That, of course, was the mysterious subject of our semester's quest "In Search of the American Civil Religion."

The spiritual qualities of public rhetoric in American politics, courtrooms, churches, schools, and patriotic fetes used to be so pervasive, familiar, and unobjectionable that we citizens just took it for granted (until the advent of litigious atheists). Our national motto is "In God We Trust." Our Pledge says we're a nation "under God." Our Congress and Supreme Court pray at the start of sessions. Presidents of all parties and persuasions have made ritual supplications that the United States might be blessed with divine protection. The last stanza of "America" begins "Our father's God to thee, author of liberty, to thee we sing" and ends by naming "great God," not George III, "our King." The last stanza of the "Star Spangled Banner" asks our "heaven rescued land" to "praise the Power that has made and preserved us a Nation." "America the Beautiful" asks that "God shed His grace on thee."

Most Americans, even today, would likely agree with Boston Puritans John Winthrop, John Adams, and Jonathan Mayhew, Princeton Presbyterian Jonathan Witherspoon and his disciple

James Madison, Virginian Anglican (and Freemason) George Washington, and Deists Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin that Americans are “called unto liberty” (a phrase from Paul’s epistle to the Galatians)—that we are a new chosen people and ours a new promised land, and that our mission is to bestow liberty on all mankind, by example if not exertion. To be sure, the majority of Americans always found it easy to identify the God who watches over America with the God of their Protestant theology. But thanks to the free exercise of religion—the “lustre of our country” ensured by the First Amendment—religious minorities have been free to embrace the American Creed with equal or greater fervor.

Thus did Bishop John Carroll, founder of the American Catholic Church, “sing canticles of praise to the Lord” for granting his flock “country now become our own and taking us into her protection.” Thus did Jewish immigrant Irving Berlin liken Americans to the Children of Israel being led through the Sinai: “God Bless America, land that I love, stand beside her and guide her through the night with a light from above.” When Americans of all sects or no sect gather in civil ceremonies to praise their freedom, honor its Author, and rededicate themselves to their nation’s deals, they do not merely prove themselves a religious people, they prove the United States of America is itself a sort of religion, a civil religion, or as G. K. Chesterton put it in 1922, “a nation with the soul of a church.”

II. Faith of Our Fathers

Civil religion broadly defined is a universal phenomenon. The ancient Greeks and Romans worshiped the gods and goddesses whom they believed to be patrons of their local city-states and regional empires. To chant “Great is Diana of the Ephesians” or to burn incense to Caesar was to pay political as well spiritual obeisance. The cults of the god-kings and god-emperors of Egypt, China, Korea, and Japan were civil as well as religious. Even monotheistic Judaism displayed features of a civic cult in the eras of its monarchy and two temples. In late medieval and early modern Europe, the divine right of kings conflated civil and religious loyalties, while the city-states of the Italian Renaissance, emulating as the ancients, inspired their own patronage cults albeit this time to saints (e.g., St. Mark in Venice). But the modern concept of civil religion was born of the Protestant Reformation’s notion of civic polity as a holy covenant or social contract made by the people themselves. James Harrington, theoretician of Cromwell’s Puritan Commonwealth in mid-17th century England, and Jean- Jacques Rousseau, philosopher from the Geneva Republic in the mid-18th century, asked, what might hold a government of the people together in the absence of royal or ecclesiastical hierarchy? Their answer was civil religion, a faith and commitment all the more powerful for being voluntary (not imposed), devoted to the unity and prosperity of the commonwealth (not a king or oneself), and inspired by devotion to God or Nature (rather than corrupt human authorities). Patriotic American choirs gave voice to such religiosity when they sang in 1778,

“To the King they shall sing Hallelujah, and all the continent shall sing: down with this earthly King; no king but God.”

I was not aware of our American civil religion (ACR) until I began researching my new book, *Freedom Just Around the Corner*. Evidence of the ACR piled up until I was obliged to make it a major theme in the story of American independence and early national growth. Then, while preparing my seminar, I learned how few Americans in the 19th and 20th centuries were fully conscious of the religion they shared. Walt Whitman, the ACR’s poet laureate, certainly was, as was Whitman’s hero Abraham Lincoln, the ACR’s martyr and messiah. Later, when the United States got into the business of exporting its faith in the Spanish-American and First World Wars, a handful of scholars wrote books on “the American religion” and “the religion of the flag.” But otherwise American statesmen, artists, teachers, and preachers disseminated the creation myth, martyrology, moral code, theology, liturgy, and eschatology of American republicanism without explicitly acknowledging its status as a transcendental creed.

Indeed, not until 1967 did Berkeley sociologist Robert N. Bellah describe, in a celebrated article, what he christened “the American Civil Religion.” Curiously, what inspired him to think about the matter was the 1961 inauguration of the nation’s first Roman Catholic president, John F. Kennedy. Prior to that, intellectual scoffers could dismiss the “God talk” permeating American public life as evangelical cant aimed at Bible Belt voters. Bellah observed a young, hip, liberal, rich, Harvard-trained Catholic politician intoning “the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God” and “asking His blessing and His help” in the knowledge “that here on earth God’s work must truly be our own.” Fascinated by the nonsectarian (or polysectarian) cast of this rhetoric, Bellah recalled President Eisenhower’s observation, “Our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith—and I don’t care what it is!” Clearly there was more to this than feel-good piety or pandering to the “religious right” (or, in past eras, left). So Bellah turned to history and found he could trace the ACR back to the Founding Fathers. They had indeed preached a civil faith meant not to replace Bible-based denominations, but rather to stand above them in benign toleration so a disparate people might unite and fulfill the glorious destiny God planned for them.

But who is this God of the Founders, the God of the ACR, if not Jehovah or the Holy Trinity? He is the God with no name, but a hundred names. Franklin called him Father of Lights and Supreme Architect; Washington the Almighty Being, Invisible Hand, and Parent of the Human Race; John Adams the Patron of Order, Fountain of Justice, and Protector; Jefferson the Infinite Power; Madison the Being who Regulates the Destiny of Nations; Monroe merely Providence and the Almighty; John Quincy Adams the Ark of our Salvation and Heaven; Andrew Jackson that Power and Almighty Being Who mercifully protected our national infancy; and so on down to Lincoln who reached the tragic understanding that Northerners

and Southerners prayed—as Christians—to the same God in the Civil War, but as Americans must hear “the mystic chords of memory,” indulge “the better angels of our nature,” admit “the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether,” and strive to bind up the nation’s wounds “with malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right.”

Lincoln never could bring himself to embrace Christian faith, but was himself the Christ of the ACR. Jackson posed for electoral purposes as a Presbyterian, but was in fact a fervent Freemason who believed in a God above all theologies, the very God whose All-Seeing Eye looks down benignly on the Unfinished Pyramid of the Great Seal of the United States and our one-dollar bill. Jefferson was an Enlightened philosopher who clung romantically to a faith in reason alone. Yet they, no less than devout Protestant presidents, swore fealty to the Providence that seemed to watch over the American people.

“Seemed to watch over” is a loaded phrase. For however much historians trace the intellectual origins of the American Creed to Harrington’s republicanism, John Locke’s human rights philosophy (“life, liberty, and property”), the Scottish Enlightenment (“the pursuit of happiness,” “common sense,” and free markets), English common law, Whig ideology, and the evangelical individualism of the First Great Awakening, the fact remains that the ACR derived in large part from American colonists’ experience over 150 years. The Bible makes clear that Jews and Christians did not invent their religions; rather it was their experience of Divine intercessions in history that turned them into Jews and Christians in the first place. In like fashion, the things that happened to American colonists—material blessings beyond measure, deliverance from “Egyptian bondage” in the Old World, the liberty and self-governance sheer remoteness allowed, a sense of being guided for some higher purpose, not least the extraordinary series of “lucky” events that permitted 13 ragtag, divided colonies to win independence from earth’s greatest empire—invited Patriots to embrace an inchoate but powerful faith that they, their forbears, and their descendants were actors in a play scripted by the Author of History. Indeed, it is almost impossible to imagine the Continental Congress, comprised mostly of wealthy, well-connected men with the most to lose by rebellion, ever taking the leap of declaring independence without faith that the justice of their cause ensured divine blessing on their cause.

But divine blessing comes at a price. That was the message of Abraham, Moses, Jonah, Jeremiah, St. Paul, and the Revelation to St. John. It was also the message of the radical Deist and immediate inspiration for the Declaration of Independence, Tom Paine.

III. Prophet of Exodus

Early in 1775 the 13 colonies were ablaze with resistance to Britain’s Intolerable Acts. In the years following the great Anglo-American victory in the last French and Indian War, the

British Parliament, with the blessing of the king, violated all the spirits that had infused the English imperial mission for 200 years: anti-Catholicism, rivalry with France and Spain, agricultural and mercantile capitalism, and displacement of “savage” peoples who made little use of their lands (e.g., the Irish and Native Americans). Thus, Americans were shocked by Parliament’s Quebec Act, which tolerated the Roman church in newly won Canada, outraged by the royal Proclamation Line forbidding new frontier settlements in the name of sheltering Indians, and incredulous that the peace treaty of 1763 drove France out of North America, only to cede the west bank of the Mississippi to equally hated Spain. But most of all, the new taxes, commercial restrictions, and monopolies imposed on the colonies, whether or not they were particularly onerous, forced colonists to ask what taxes and monopolies Parliament might not impose in the future if its powers and sovereignty were once granted in principle. No wonder Patriots such as John Dickinson spied in Parliament’s acts a plot to reduce the colonists to the status of slavery.

The Stamp Act Congress of 1765 and Continental Congress in 1774 urged the colonies to unite, resist, and make themselves worthy of divine protection by boycotting English luxuries and staging days of fasting and prayer. The British were equally determined to punish colonial impudence, fearing that their whole empire might unravel if they did not. Accordingly, after the infamous Boston Tea Party, the Royal Navy blockaded the port and Redcoats patrolled its streets. Down in Philadelphia, Congress urged solidarity with Massachusetts lest all the colonies lose their liberties, while Patrick Henry preached a fiery sermon in Richmond. Everyone knows its stirring climax, “Give me liberty or give me death!” But Henry preceded that by assuring his listeners:

We shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us. The battle, sir, is not to the strong alone; it is to the vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged! Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston! The war is inevitable—and let it come! I repeat it, sir, let it come.

The war came in April 1775 on Lexington Green. Yet the colonies’ representatives shrank for over a year from severing their ties to the crown. Many New Englanders and Virginians may have been eager to train the rhetorical and genuine cannon, so recently aimed at the French crown and Catholic church, on the English crown and Anglican church. But many New Yorkers, Rhode Islanders, and South Carolinians looked to their trade, which was bound to suffer gravely in war. The Quakers of the Delaware Valley were pacifist on principle. Several colonies counted as many Loyalists (Tories) as Patriots. How was it then, in the words of John Adams, that thirteen clocks at last struck as one?

Tom Paine was a 37-year-old ne'er-do-well when he landed in Philadelphia in November 1774. The rudely educated son of a Quaker father and Anglican mother, he had failed in two marriages and numerous jobs ranging from corset-maker to collector of taxes on tobacco and liquor. His sole achievement in life was a broadside exposing corruption among excise officials, which he blamed on the low wages they received. But by chance (or Providence), the colonial agent in London, Benjamin Franklin, advised Paine to seek his fortune in America. Armed with Franklin's recommendation, Paine was invited to write articles for the *Pennsylvania Magazine* which in turn caught the eye of Dr. Benjamin Rush. He spied in this fellow a fearless polemicist in the mold of George III's nemesis, John Wilkes.

So Rush suggested that Paine pen an essay weighing the arguments for and against independence. He even suggested the title. But Paine's *Common Sense* did much more than weigh arguments. His choleric 50-page indictment of British oppression targeted the king himself, not misguided ministers or members of Parliament. It took as its text the Old Testament prophet Samuel, who rebuked the Israelites for demanding a king when they had the Lord and His prophets and judges to govern them. It invited Americans to heed Samuel's godly admonition and liberate themselves and mankind from three millennia of oppression. It reminded Americans how they were uniquely blessed with self-government in a new world. It described the stark choice faced by the colonists as one between acquiescing in their own enslavement, which amounted to rebellion against God's purpose for man, and claiming their freedom, which amounted to rebellion against the crown. Indeed, Paine accused colonists who shrank from a declaration of independence of lacking not only common sense, but virtue and manhood itself.

Published in January 1776, *Common Sense* went through so many printings that 150,000 copies were in circulation by spring, most of them read or heard by multiple people. In Washington's estimation, the "unanswerable" tract worked a magnificent change in its readers' minds. With brilliant intuition, Paine tapped both vocabularies—Enlightenment philosophy and moral evangelism—that resonated with Americans eager to know their destiny. He demanded the colonies separate from Britain before they themselves were corrupted beyond redemption. His sublime aphorisms, exhortations, and jeremiads thrilled and horrified. Paine did in print what Patrick Henry did with his voice.

Yet liberty comes at a price, which Paine was not sure Americans were willing to pay. So, no less than John Winthrop's "City Upon a Hill" sermon of 1630, Paine's *Common Sense* echoed the farewell address in Deuteronomy, in which Moses promised the children of Israel every blessing if they hearkened to the law of the Lord, but warned they would be cast out and a byword among nations if they rejected the Lord and the law. Paine foresaw a continental union of limitless potential arising in North America, yet warned that that union might prove as fragile as glass. He damned governmental authority, yet called for its relentless exercise lest

the American cause abort. He told Americans they were like Noah's family, free to begin the world over again, yet suspected they lacked the virtue that task required. He preached liberty, yet called on Patriots to repress enemies in their midst. He extolled equality, yet feared "the mind of the multitude." He foresaw unimagined prosperity, yet warned that materialism bored and corrupted. He praised Americans' rebelliousness, yet chided them for their lawlessness. He pleaded for reason, yet played on a keyboard of emotions ranging from hatred, anger, and vengeance to fear, self-love, and self-doubt. In fact, the pamphlet's demagogic style and "democratical" implications moved John Adams to write a hasty rebuttal.

But Paine, after just one year in America, understood the colonists' needs better than Adams. Paine preached a civil religion in language that appealed to Americans of whatever persuasion. Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Baptists nodded in agreement when Paine labeled vice the solvent of liberty and established churches and monarchies the symptoms of sin, not its correctives. Deists and skeptics nodded in agreement when Paine employed Biblical allusions to make secular political points. "Ye that oppose independence now, ye know not what ye do" made independence itself the Messiah and fainthearted colonists the Roman soldiers on Calvary. In sum, Christians reading *Common Sense* found in it the God of the Bible and a politics derived from religion. Deists found in the pamphlet the God of Nature and a religion derived from politics. Paine even foresaw the three ways by which the colonists might achieve nationhood: "by the legal voice of the people in Congress; by a military power; or by a mob." He hoped for a combination of all three, which is precisely what Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Massachusetts proceeded to make.

Paine's remarkable pamphlet cemented the alliance between the Awakened and the Enlightened, summoned them to a just war, and promised a kind of heaven on earth if they won. That is why some historians miss the point when they denigrate the role of religion in the American rebellion. The American cause was profoundly religious for Theists and Deists alike because both identified America's future with a Providential design, both entertained millenarian hopes, and both placed their cosmologies at the service of an overarching civil religion. Paine, like St. Paul, became "all things to all men," crafting a template for all American political rhetoric to come. He made unity the first and greatest civic virtue and did unite most Americans in hatred and fear of external oppressors and internal dissenters. Paine implied that to be lukewarm or cold toward the glorious cause was sacrilege. Paine invited—nay, commanded—colonists to become part of his ubiquitous "we," adding always the not-so-veiled threat that "we" will get all who don't. Devising a new form of government—"the noblest, purest constitution on the face of the earth"—could wait. The first task was to wrest power away from corrupt British lords. That could only be done by winning the war, which could only be done by declaring independence. Only then would Americans be forced to hang together lest they be hanged as traitors. Only then could Americans gain the French and

Spanish help needed to prevail in the war, and so enlist monarchy in a holy war against monarchy.

IV. Passover

During the months *Common Sense* swept up and down the Atlantic seaboard, two wars of nerves played themselves out. The first was in Paris, where the court of Louis XVI balked at aiding the English colonies before being assured of their commitment to independence. The second was in Philadelphia, where the Continental Congress balked at declaring independence before being assured of French aid! The French logjam broke on May 2, 1776, when Louis approved clandestine shipments of money and arms to the colonial rebels. The American logjam broke on May 15, when Congress, riding the storm stirred up by Paine, instructed the 13 colonies to suppress royal authority and organize as autonomous states.

Most colonies already had conventions or committees at work designing provisional governments. These were for the most part in the hands of radical Patriots, being chosen by bodies that prohibited voting by Tories. They justified their acts with local declarations of independence that borrowed freely from each other's language and displayed remarkable similarities. Almost all cited the king's use of foreign mercenaries (the Hessians) as the last straw, justified separation by appeal to natural law or Providence, and named as their purpose the preservation of liberties. Jefferson described preservation of liberty as "the whole object of the present controversy" and rued having to go to Philadelphia because it meant he would miss Virginia's constitutional convention.

Patriots knew the survival of their 13 new sovereignties depended on the success of a people acting "in Congress." Hence the May 15 resolution called on colonies to fashion governments that were not only "sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs" but conduced to the happiness and safety of America in general and provided "for defense of lives, liberties, and properties against the hostile invasions and cruel depredations of their enemies." Congress thereby proclaimed the existence of a new people and nation, lurched into republicanism, and echoed Paine's call for vigilance against Tories, traitors, and pacifists, as well as the king's men. Some delegates protested the haste, but down in Richmond on the same day Edmund Randolph authorized Virginia's delegation to propose that Congress declare the colonies "free and independent states" so they could make foreign alliances. The Carolinas and Georgia, menaced by British invasion, likewise instructed their delegations to pursue all measures necessary to defend America and win foreign allies.

On June 7, Richard Henry Lee moved that Congress declare independence and unite under a constitution. Such audacious steps would be worse than useless if not unanimous, but foot-draggers argued that the Middle colonies were still undecided. Proponents retorted that "the people" of the Middle colonies were in fact pro-independence, even if some of their delegates

frustrated popular will. So Congress agreed to postpone a vote until July 1, which gave both sides three weeks to bully, bribe, cajole, or persuade undecided delegates from Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York. Meanwhile, a committee chaired by John Adams was charged with preparing a text. Since the other members, notably Franklin, had more important chores to perform, they asked their cerebral 33-year-old colleague Jefferson to scribble out a first draft.

“American Scripture” is the epithet historian Pauline Maier attached to the Declaration of Independence. And rightly so, because it did become holy writ and is venerated today like a relic. But it did not begin life in apotheosis. Jefferson himself confessed that he took up the quill in his parlor on Market Street not to discover “new principles, or new arguments,” but simply to state “the common sense of the subject.” What is more, most of the original passages in Jefferson’s draft were not very good, while the good ones were not very original. The text’s lofty philosophical introduction, bill of particulars against King George, and syllogistic conclusion calling for independence were a pastiche of phrases lifted from Paine, the “little declarations” issued by colonies, and Virginia’s magnificent Declaration of Rights written by George Mason and published in Philadelphia on June 12. It was Mason who based Virginia’s government on the premise that all men are “born equally free and independent.” It was Mason who listed the rights of man as the “enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the Means of acquiring and possessing Property, and pursuing and obtaining Happiness.” It was Mason who traced those rights to “God and Nature, vested in, and consequently derived from the People.” It was Mason who called for abolition of privilege, separation of powers, an independent judiciary, a bill of rights, a free press, and “the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion.”

Jefferson did compose the elegant preamble “When in the course of human event,” tighten Mason’s list to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and conclude with the moving pledge of “our lives, fortunes, and sacred honor.” But in between those majestic heights lay a murky swamp of complaints that stick to a reader’s boots even today. One that especially troubled Congress was Jefferson’s diatribe against the British people, whom he accused of being “deaf to the voice of justice and consanguinity” despite “our former love for them” and necessitating “our everlasting Adieu!” Its romantic and false sentimentality aside, the passage shifted the focus of American ire away from the crown while gratuitously insulting the very people Congress hoped might pressure Parliament to change course.

More bizarre still, Jefferson embarrassed American merchants and planters by blaming the British crown for the slave trade. Since he cannot possibly have believed this canard, he must have been groping for some way to square the persistence of slavery with his postulate “all men are created equal.” Congress retained the latter phrase for its ring, but otherwise saw the wisdom in taking its stand on particular abuses, not universal principles. So Congress deleted a

full fourth of Jefferson's draft, tweaked the rest, and appealed to Providence at the end—all to good effect. Nevertheless, Jefferson maintained his text had been “mangled” and went into a funk that lasted all summer. But as Richard Henry Lee put it, so long as the Declaration did no harm, its wording was less important than “the Thing itself.”

Still, “the Thing itself” was far from certain during the days Jefferson worked on the draft. The New England-Virginia alliance appeared to hold firm, but South Carolinians expressed doubts about independence, while delegates from New York—a Tory stronghold—pleaded a lack of instructions. Most anxious were delegates from the Delaware Valley, where the stakes were gigantic. For if Pennsylvania's Quakers, pietist Germans, and Tories carried a “nay” on independence, chances were New Jersey, Delaware, and New York (soon to be under British occupation) would follow suit and the American edifice collapse for want of a keystone. Exactly how that was forestalled will never be known, but the story began in 1774, when Proprietary Governor John Penn forbade the Pennsylvania assembly to send delegates to the First Continental Congress. Dickinson defied Penn by calling an ad hoc convention that met in the same Carpenters' Hall as the Congress. Penn hastily summoned the regular assembly into session to restore his authority, with the result that Pennsylvania now had two legislatures speaking in the name of the people. As late as spring 1776 a majority of Penn's assemblymen opposed independence. That suggests that the May 15 call from Congress to suppress authority “under the crown” may have been, among other things, an invitation to local Patriots to disperse Penn's assembly by force. Pennsylvania's militiamen did not go that far, but in mid-June they resolved to ignore any orders issuing from the assembly. The atmosphere in steamy Philadelphia could hardly have been more electric.

War news also weighed on wafflers in Congress. Back in autumn 1775, a militia force under Richard Montgomery struck north via Lake Champlain in hopes of conquering Canada. Washington supported him with a second detachment under Benedict Arnold. But a winter campaign in Quebec was madness: the two columns lost half their men before reaching the citadel on the St. Lawrence. Still, Arnold and Montgomery threw their thousand frigid Americans into Quebec's lower town in the midst of a blizzard on New Year's Eve. A melee ensued in which Montgomery was killed, Arnold was wounded, and young Aaron Burr was heroic. But the garrison held, and when reinforcements arrived in the spring, the Redcoats pushed south to menace New England with invasion. Elsewhere, the news seemed better. In North Carolina, Patriots routed a band of Scots Loyalists at Moore's Creek in February 1776. In New England, General Howe evacuated his Redcoats from Boston by sea on March 17. In South Carolina (though Congress did not know it yet), the citizens of Charleston, led by Christopher Gadsden and William Moultrie, pummeled a British squadron from their palmetto forts. But even good news portended bad. Yes, those crazy Highlanders were cut down, but they proved how easily Tory militias might organize. Yes, Howe had left Boston,

but he was free to return in greater force at a time and place of his choosing. Yes, Charleston humiliated the Royal Navy, but what vengeance might its proud captains exact elsewhere?

Indeed, by July 1, 1776, when Congress resumed debate on Lee's motions, hundreds of sails had already been sighted at sea off Long Island. Was this the right moment to declare independence, or the worst possible? Would a clean break with King George end equivocation, energize the war effort, and secure an alliance with France? Or would it unleash civil wars in the states, steel British resolve, and condemn members of Congress to the gallows? Dickinson suspected the latter. He told of the folly of tearing down one's house in winter before a replacement was built, warned that the British lion had barely begun to roar, and imagined Indian scalping parties rampaging down Market and Wall Streets. John Adams turned no magic phrases, but made a sincere and logical case that no alternative to independence remained and freedom was worth any risk. The vote was a letdown for both. Nine colonies favored independence, Pennsylvania and South Carolina split narrowly against it, Delaware deadlocked (with one member absent), and New York abstained. What happened next is uncertain except that many comings and goings were made that thunderous summer evening. Caesar Rodney, the missing Delaware delegate, rode all night through rain and lightning to cast an exhausted, asthmatic "aye" on July 2. The South Carolinians were probably brought into line by Virginians. But what turned Pennsylvania around is a mystery. All we know is that the two dissenters, Dickinson and Robert Morris, failed to attend the caucus the following day. Had John Hancock, the wealthy president of Congress, bought them off in some fashion? Were they threatened in dark corners by Patriot goons? Or did they just shrink from taking responsibility for aborting the majority cause? Whatever the reason, Pennsylvania's delegates divided 3-2 in favor of independence instead of 4-3 against, permitting Congress to declare itself "unanimously" (New York still abstaining) the voice of the people of the United States of America on July 2, 1776.

What occurred on the Fourth of July was the anticlimactic approval of the text of the Declaration, which was generally read once on parade grounds, tavern steps, and village greens, then cheered and forgotten. Patriots had more pressing concerns. For on July 3, 1776, General Howe began to land 32,000 Redcoats and Hessians on Staten Island, just sixty miles from Philadelphia. No wonder Congress suppressed distribution of official signed copies of its treasonous Declaration until the military situation improved, at least for awhile, in January 1777.

V. The Fourth of July in America's Holy "Church Calendar"

Like all great religions, the ACR only gradually developed its creeds, canonized scriptures, inspired hymns and liturgies, blessed its martyrs, commemorated heroes, and sanctified holidays. Indeed, Jefferson's main contribution came less from his role in the Declaration than

his role as the young nation's premier politician, founder of its party system, and theologian of unity. Even after the Constitution was ratified in 1789, the content of the ACR remained a matter of hot dispute. Only in 1801, when Jefferson delivered his masterful inaugural address, did Americans acquire a creed and catechism. The first principle, as always, was unity, hence Jefferson, the first "party man," told his people "We are all Federalists, we are all Republicans." Next, he pronounced us a people "acknowledging and adoring an overruling Providence, which by all its dispensations proves that it delights in the happiness of man here and his greater happiness hereafter." Next, he told us what we revere, including

Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the State governments in all their rights...; the preservation of the General Government in its whole constitutional vigor...; a jealous care of the right of election by the people; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority...; a well-disciplined militia...; the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in public expense...; the honest payment of our debts...; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid....; freedom of religion; freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the habeas corpus and trial by juries impartially selected. [These] should be the creed of our political faith.

The Banquo's Ghost in that litany was, of course, slavery, which mocked Jefferson's equal justice but persisted thanks to Jefferson's states' rights. Americans were aware of that scandal, yet chose to ignore it in the name of their highest principle, national unity. For without unity there would be no "church" at all and surely no continental and global destiny under Providence. So Americans formed a conspiracy of silence over slavery that lasted long enough for them to annex Texas, occupy the Oregon Territory, and seize California and the Southwest in the Mexican War of 1846-48. During those decades of expansion and "Jacksonian democracy," the iconography of the ACR reflected both the flimsiness and mighty ambitions of the Union. There were no official holidays, and the only ones unofficially celebrated were the Fourth of July and Washington's Birthday (a republican version of the King's Birthday). However, New England Puritans, eschewing "popish" feasts such as Christmas and Easter, contributed four precocious examples of civil religious observance: Election Day (honoring the polity); Training Day (honoring the militia); Graduation Day (honoring education); and Thanksgiving Day (honoring the Lord's blessing on America).

The only members of an American pantheon prior to 1850 were Washington and Franklin. The Star-Spangled Banner grew popular, but another century passed before it became the national anthem. Nor was the flag, though "dyed in the blood of our forefathers," especially revered until the Mexican War. What did fire the American imagination was liberty and its fruits, peace and prosperity. The eagle and goddess of liberty were ubiquitous subjects of

illustration, the former protecting the latter. But by the 1820s and '30s, liberty increasingly surrendered her place to images of boundless frontiers, bountiful crops, bustling ports, busy canals, boisterous machinery, booming exports, and the promise of more to come for generations unborn. The ACR's balance between worship of God and Mammon tilted dangerously in the direction of Mammon.

No wonder the Constitution, a compromise contract that preserved national unity and incidentally guaranteed slavery, became the lodestone for Southerners and Northerners, Democrats and Whigs, while the Declaration of Independence was squirreled away and ignored. The actual document was almost lost several times and almost destroyed in the British sack of Washington, D.C. in 1814. It then sat for years in the archives of the State Department until, in 1841, it went on modest display in the Patent Office. At last the schism in the ACR over slavery—and the Civil War it fomented—resurrected the Declaration as the premier statement of the American Creed. At Gettysburg, Lincoln reminded the American people what had happened “Four score and seven years ago,” trumped states’ constitutional rights with “all men are created equal,” and bade Americans’ midwife “a new birth of freedom.”

Still, the document itself stayed in hiding except for a cameo appearance at the 1876 Centennial Exhibition. Needless to say, the parchment grew frayed, rotten, and faded. Only in 1921 did the Library of Congress fashion a votary for the Declaration and seek scientific methods to preserve it. Only during World War II and the Cold War was the Declaration (and Constitution) beatified. Perhaps Americans needed, then more than ever, to remember what they stood for in their mortal combat against fascists and communists. So at last the “American Scripture” came to be enshrined in a chemically and climatically controlled tabernacle ringed by a chancel rail over which endless queues of pilgrims squint. Some scoffers have drawn analogies to the embalmed Lenin and Stalin, saying that if the Spirit of 1776 still lived in Americans’ hearts, they would not make a piece of paper into an idol. But the analogy could not be falser. Communism was born of faith in an idea that communists tried to prove was still living by embalming human beings. Americanism was born of faith in human beings, who prove their faith lives by embalming and venerating their founding ideas.

Indeed, the ACR's entire “church calendar” is a cycle of feasts and commemorations of the human beings who kindled and defended the American faith. Starting in January, they include: Martin Luther King Jr. Day, Presidents’ Day, VE Day, Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day, Flag Day, VJ Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Constitution Day, Veterans Day, and last but not least Thanksgiving. Indeed, if there is a second candidate for high holy honors in the ACR, it is surely the Pilgrims’ original feast. For on Thanksgiving all Americans, whatever our creed or source, may comfortably praise whatever we choose to name God for carrying our

immigrant ancestors safely across the water, forging us into a nation dedicated to humane propositions, and blessing us (relative to the rest of the world) with unimaginable wealth.

But the highest of all holy days is still the Fourth of July. After the Civil War it gained even more prominence because Independence Day called Southerners and Northerners alike back to what unified them in the first place: their faith in themselves, in God's special providence, in their ancestors' courage and sacrifice, in the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness a unified federal republic made possible. Should the Fourth of July ever cease to be a day "set apart" for joy, pride, and community, then the text approved on that day will turn as cold as the body in Lenin's tomb. But so, too, may it perish if the Fourth of July becomes nothing but a day of self-congratulation and pride. It is a day when Americans, especially young ones, must reflect on how absurdly implausible the birth of this nation was, how its survival hung by a thread on many occasions, and how its Founders were emboldened because—be they Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Deists, or Freemasons—they believed the Author of History meant this to happen.

Notes:

Portions of Prof. McDougall's essay, "Meditations on a High Holy Day: The Fourth of July," are adapted from his *Freedom Just Around the Corner: A New American History 1585-1828* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004). That book's footnotes provide extensive documentation on the topics discussed in this essay. Otherwise, the main works consulted (and quoted from) for this essay include the following:

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Can the United States Do Grand Strategy?

By Walter McDougall

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This paper, later published in The Telegram, was delivered in October 2009 at the Consortium on Grand Strategy, a project sponsored jointly by FPRI and Temple University's Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy and chaired by Richard Immerman and William Hitchcock. The Consortium was established in 2009 as part of the Hertog Program on Grand Strategy.

In spring 2003, following the last lecture in my survey course on U.S. diplomatic history since 1776, a brilliant, inquisitive student approached me in the hall to ask a final, confidential question. She said that my course helped her appreciate, as never before, how swiftly the United States had become the mightiest nation ever, with unprecedented military, economic, and cultural influence. But how long would it last? How long did I think the United States could stay on top?

At first I was tongue-tied, because I was loath to inject a future national leader with either complacency or despair. Then an answer occurred to me. It all depends on whether the United States is as exceptional as we like to believe. If the United States follows the pattern of all previous powers, then demographic or technological trends, new foreign threats, strategic folly, overextension, domestic decadence, or sheer loss of will must hurl it into decline, perhaps within fifty years. If, however, our institutions, values, and national character really do amount to a new order for the ages, a potent mix enabling the United States to reinvent itself and force other nations to adapt to the challenges posed by us, then the republic may stay on its asymptotic trajectory. I stopped there, but as I walked to my office I recalled Arnold J. Toynbee's historical law to the effect that empires die by suicide, not murder.

As recently as a decade ago the buzzwords in our foreign policy discourse included new world order, end of history, unipolar moment, benevolent hegemony, indispensable nation, assertive multilateralism, and Washington consensus. How fast are the mighty fallen, through strategic and financial malpractice, into a reprise of the terrible 1970s when the buzzwords were imperial overstretch, exhaustion, and decline. Does another "Morning in America" await us so long as we keep faith with ourselves, or has the United States reached a climacteric and entered into a long British-style decline? In other words, is American exceptionalism the source of an energy, ingenuity, resilience, and civic virtue that propels our nation ever upward? Or is a complacent *belief* in American exceptionalism the source of a profligacy, adventurism, disregard for experience, and civic vice that portends a decline and fall? Angelo Codevilla, who says that what passes for strategy in the U.S. government is mostly wishful or sloppy thinking, made the same point in operational terms. "Because doing the right thing is important to

Americans as to no other people, American politics is like politics nowhere else.... Basing statecraft on the American people's penchant for trying to do the right thing, as did Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt, brings forth awesome energy.... But using the American people's righteousness as a propellant for private dreams, as did [Woodrow] Wilson, or as cover for tergiversation, as did George W. Bush, is ruinous." [1]

Why do I begin on such a skeptical, gloomy note? I think it is because my training was that of an old-school European historian, which gave me an outside vantage point from which to view U.S. shibboleths more objectively than do U.S. historians. I suspect my training in European history also inclines me to think about foreign policy in terms of realism, balance of power, contingency, tragedy, irony, folly, unintended consequences, and systemic interactions—all of which are foreign if not repugnant to U.S. citizens. Finally, I am a Vietnam veteran skeptical of nation- and state-building, winning hearts and minds, and making the world over in the United States' image. As FPRI's Paul Dickler recently pointed out, I asked explicitly in the 1997 book *Promised Land, Crusader State*, "can Americans be better Iraqis than Iraqis themselves, or presume to tell Chinese how to be better Chinese? If we try, we can only be poorer Americans." [2] That book was well received except at *The Weekly Standard* and other venues where neoconservatives were already calling for the forcible removal of Saddam Hussein and a muscular foreign policy in the name of "national greatness." After 9/11 they got their way while I dropped out of sight to study early American history. To be sure, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 provided me with a perfect case study to impress on students how hard it can be to discern motive in history. Thus, we were variously told but with equal conviction that Operation Iraqi Freedom was "all about" oil, Israel, the war on terror, weapons of mass destruction, the Rumsfeld Pentagon's new way of war, neoconservative ideology, the Bush family feud with Saddam, Karl Rove's re-election calendar, or democratizing the Middle East. That leads one to ask whether the Iraq invasion was doomed because too many constituencies had too many irons in the fire.

That bears on the subject at hand: can the United States do grand strategy? I assume that this does *not* mean, can the *American people* do grand strategy, because an easy answer would be, sure they can and usually very poorly. Rather I assume the title means, can the relevant agencies of the U.S. federal government plan, coordinate, and execute grand strategy with sufficient competence to secure the nation and defend its vital interests. That is a complex question that has inspired a recent spate of diagnoses of what ails U.S. strategic planning and what prescriptions are indicated. [3] I do not intend to choose among those expert assessments, much less add to them since I claim no authority on the subject of grand strategy apart from whatever U.S. diplomatic history can teach. In short, I plead *non possumus* and absolve myself of the obligation to take any controversial position. Instead, I imagine my task merely as that of a rapporteur and provocateur raising issues on which we may need to reach

some consensus before we can agree on whether the United States can do grand strategy and, if so, what that strategy ought to be at the present time.

Two recent quotations may serve to introduce those issues.

We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. From the day of our Founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and matchless value, because they bear the image of the Maker of Heaven and earth. Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government, because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our nation's security, and the calling of our time.

So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. [4]

That, needless to say, was the gist of George W. Bush's 2007 Second Inaugural Address, which a Washington insider pithily called "a crazy speech."

If it was crazy, perhaps the second quotation suggests a good reason why.

Strategic planning for American foreign policy is dead, dying, or moribund. This, at least, has been the assessment of several commentators and policy-makers in recent years. Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley observed in 2006, "For a country that continues to enjoy an unrivaled global position, it is both remarkable and disturbing that the United States has no truly effective strategy planning process for national security." At an academic conference in 2007, a former director of the State Department's policy planning staff complained that "six years after 9/11, we still don't have a grand strategy".... [And] Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass argues that the United States has "squandered" its post-cold war opportunity, concluding, "Historians will not judge the United States well for how it has used these twenty years."

That lament introduces a new Brookings Institution volume, edited by Daniel Drezner, on the forgotten art of grand strategy. [5]

Such breathtaking vitality in terms of strategic ambition combined with the certifiable death of strategic planning would suggest a certain disconnect between the muscles and brain of the

sole superpower: a disconnect which, Drezner writes, was just as evident in the prideful “ad hoc-ery” of the Clinton years as in the prideful crusade of the second Bush years. Has that disconnect always, or usually existed, or not? Most contemporary critics agree with Aaron Friedberg’s judgment that the United States “has lost the capacity to conduct serious, sustained national strategic planning,” which implies that it once had that capacity. Of course, Friedberg and most others hold that the United States had that capacity during the Cold War, beginning with George Marshall’s 1947 promotion of Policy Planning in the State Department and President Eisenhower’s 1953 promotion of strategic planning in the Pentagon. The grand strategy designed and executed over the long haul was Containment, hence the corollary that ever since 1991 the United States has been awaiting another George Kennan to tell us what new grand strategy ought to discipline and focus U. S. energies. Thus, there is a tendency in our strategic discourse, illustrated by the Brookings volume, to assume that Containment represented the norm and post-cold war drift the aberration; to assume, in short, that the United States can do grand strategy, did do grand strategy, and thus needs only to *recover* the capacity displayed by the “greatest generation” who were “present at the creation” in the heroic years of the late 1940s. [6]

A broader *tour d’horizon* of U. S. history, however, might suggest otherwise, as illustrated by another glaring juxtaposition of quotes.

“There are two men who have imparted to American foreign policy a tendency that is still being followed today; the first is Washington and the second Jefferson....” Their principles of neutrality, no permanent alliances, and no granting or soliciting special privileges from foreign nations,

... so plain and just as to be easily understood by the people, have greatly simplified the foreign policy of the United States. As the Union takes no part in the affairs of Europe, it has, properly speaking, no foreign interests to discuss, since it has, as yet, no powerful neighbors on the American continent... The foreign policy of the United States is eminently expectant; it consists more in abstaining than in acting.

It is therefore very difficult to ascertain, at present, what degree of sagacity the American democracy will display in the conduct of the foreign policy of the country; upon this point its adversaries as well as its friends must suspend their judgment. As for myself, I do not hesitate to say that it is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments.... Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar in a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. Democracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources of a state; it diffuses wealth and comfort ... [but] a democracy can only with great difficulty

regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await the consequences with patience. [7]

Democracies, especially the wild and vast American one, do not do grand strategy, or else cannot do it very well or for very long: such was the famous judgment rendered by Tocqueville 170 years ago. What then, does one make of the even more famous conclusion to his chapter on the “three races” populating the continent?

It must not, then, be imagined that the impulse of the British race in the New World can be arrested. The dismemberment of the Union and the hostilities that might ensue, the abolition of republican institutions and the tyrannical government that might succeed, may retard this impulse, but they cannot prevent the people from ultimately fulfilling their destinies.... [Free immigration, continental expanse, and spirit of enterprise will overcome all.] Thus, in the midst of the uncertain future one event at least is sure. At a period that may be said to be near, for we are speaking of the life of a nation, the Anglo-Americans alone will cover the immense space contained between the polar regions and the tropics, extending from the coasts of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific Ocean.... The time will therefore come when 150 million men will be living in North America, equal in condition, all belonging to one family, owing their origin to the same cause, and preserving the same civilization, the same language, the same religion, the same habits, the same manners, and imbued with the same opinions, propagated under the same forms. The rest is uncertain, but this is certain; and it is a fact new to the world, a fact that the imagination strives in vain to grasp.

There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans.... The conquests of the American are gained by the plowshare; those of the Russian by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe. [8]

Bottom line: in the age of Jacksonian Democracy, Manifest Destiny, and escalating Sectional Crisis, Tocqueville described a nation that was uninterested in practicing grand strategy as the rest of the civilized human race understood it—hence the Great Rule obeyed since Washington’s time—and yet was destined to know grand strategic success in terms of growth, power, and security, that no other state in the world save perhaps Russia could match. Talk

about disconnect! Can it be that the United States flourished over its first century despite, or because of, its government's lack of any self-conscious grand strategy? Or can the elements, however passive, of nineteenth-century American foreign and military policy be rightly deemed grand strategy? Or can a civil faith—faith that divine Providence, historical progress, or one's own righteousness mystically guarantees the national destiny—function as a sort of force multiplier or self-fulfilling prophecy, in which case strategies based on amoral power politics and Machiavellian cunning can amount to a suicidal tempting of fate?

According to Tocqueville's observations the U.S. government needed to do very little to realize the national destiny and the only way it could fumble it away was by gratuitous interventions or invitations that risked making North America once again a target of the European Great Powers. The unilateral neutralism of Washington's Great Rule and Jefferson's "no entangling alliances," the ideological prudence of John Quincy Adams's "not going abroad in search of monsters to destroy," the regional and republican separatism of Monroe's Doctrine, and the expansionist Manifest Destiny heralded by Jacksonians might appear to be coordinated, mutually reinforcing principles of a brilliant national strategy exploiting the United States' asymmetrical diplomatic, economic, ideological, and military advantages in that era to maximal effect. It is just that they do not look like grand strategy because nobody outside the Prussian General Staff and British Admiralty or East India Company thought in those terms in the mid-nineteenth century or (if they did) expressed their grand strategic ideas in so many words.

Hence, two big issues that scholars and strategists need to address are simply: does grand strategy have to be articulated for it to be said to exist at all; and if not, can grand strategy be said to move a nation even when that nation's fluctuating roster of mostly incompetent leaders are unsure as to why they do anything? In other words, was Auguste Comte correct when he insisted that demography is destiny, or Robert Strausz-Hupé when he insisted that you cannot argue with geography? We quote such lines to good effect, but are they operationally true in the sense of being impersonal forces that move events? One need not be a rigid determinist to grant that, especially in retrospect, there is often a logic to strategic interactions that the players sensed, if at all, by sheer instinct. Experts at poker or bridge call that "card sense." Talleyrand called it the art of statecraft to foresee the inevitable and expedite its occurrence. Bismarck called politics the art of the possible and statecraft to hear "the steps of God sounding through events, then leap up and grasp the hem of His garment." Kissinger called that people blessed whose leaders can look destiny in the eye without flinching, but also without trying to play God. What are they trying to describe? It seems as if successful grand strategy requires both acquiescence and aspiration, observation and imagination, prudence and audacity, prideful mastery of men and humble service of Providence, not to mention the meticulous groundwork, assessment of the correlation of forces, and deft timing whose strategic fruits appear, to the victimized and the envious, as contemptible luck.

To those who doubt the U.S. government can do grand strategy well (something on which “beltway bandits” and critical bloggers seem to agree) [9], the on-line STRATFOR Geopolitical Diary had a definitive answer. In anticipation of the 2009 Fourth of July it posted an essay celebrating what it confidently professed to be our overarching, automatic, and now 230 year-old grand strategy. It began (rightly) by tracing U. S. strategic ideas back to eighteenth-century Britain inasmuch as the thirteen colonies could aspire to their mother country’s geopolitical advantages as an insular, maritime, commercial power benefitting from the rivalries and balance of power prevailing among its continental Europe rivals. Another idea it failed to mention, however, was the impressive, exemplary, hard-won unity among England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. That was what freed the Crown, Parliament, Bank of England, and Board of Trade to mobilize national resources for the pursuit of power and wealth abroad. During and after 1776 the Founders of the United States had the United Kingdom (and the United Provinces of the Netherlands) very much on their minds.

STRATFOR went on to postulate the existence of “five core rules” or “geopolitical imperatives” that have allegedly “determined the behavior” of the United States. The first was to secure strategic depth by pushing inland from the Atlantic coast, crossing the Appalachians, and in the 1783 treaty of peace with Britain obtaining title to all the land east of the Mississippi. The second was to expand that strategic depth across the continent. It was accomplished through the Louisiana Purchase, its successful defense in the War of 1812, the subsequent treaties demilitarizing the U.S.-Canadian boundary, and especially in the Mexican War of 1846-48, which yielded all of Texas, California, and the land in between.

The third step, says STRATFOR, was “to gain control of the ocean approaches” which was accomplished, in the Caribbean and Pacific alike, by the dawn of the twentieth century. “Once a nation controls its approaches, the next logical step—the fourth imperative—is to reach farther and control the oceans themselves.” Of course, that strategic genius Uncle Sam achieved that by the end of World War II, securing its grip on the oceans through naval hegemony and alliances with littoral states in Europe and Asia. All that remained was the fifth imperative, which was to prevent any one power from dominating the Eurasian land mass. Needless to say, that mandated the successful Containment and Deterrence of the Soviet bloc. STRATFOR concludes: “These five strategic imperatives are not found anywhere in the Constitution of laws of the United States. But every one of the country’s 44 presidents, regardless of intention, has conformed to them, compelled by the inexorable logic of geography.... And the same geopolitical imperatives that drove these actions will shape American efforts into the future—just as they have since 1776.”[10]

How credible is that? I would certainly dispute the assertion that every single president conformed to this programmatic template. On the contrary, presidents who have given evidence of strategic vision are a decided minority. But the very notion of U. S. traditions of

foreign policy, such as I developed in *Promised Land, Crusader State*, implies continuities even, or especially, when the president and secretary of state are ignorant, distracted, or running on auto-pilot because no crisis beckons. Thus, I argued that (1) Exceptionalism, narrowly defined as the defense, not risky export, of U. S. liberty, plus (2) Unilateralism endorsed in Washington's Farewell and Jefferson's Inaugural, plus (3) the American System of States envisioned by the Monroe Doctrine, plus (4) continental Expansion imagined as an idealistic, pioneer-driven "manifest destiny," but enabled by a diplomatic and military "manifest design" begun by Washington and Benjamin Franklin during the War of Independence and climaxing in the Oregon Treaty and Mexican War under James K. Polk, comprised a mutually reinforcing body of strategic principles that guaranteed the nation's stupendous growth against any contingency except civil war (and even managed to surmount that emergency). [11]

Indeed, one useful measure of sound grand strategy could be derived from the successful example of the United States' rise to world power and the failed examples of Germany and Japan. Paul Kennedy elegantly styled the latter "middle powers" seeking to break into the ranks of the world powers seemingly destined to loom over the coming twentieth century: the Russian, British, and American empires. Kennedy underscored their importance by discarding the usual periodization with breaks at 1871, 1890, and 1914, in favor of a section beginning in 1885, when Meiji Japan and Imperial Germany began questing for overseas empire. [12] In two world wars their excellent general staffs backed by fully supportive regimes conducted military operations at the highest level and won stunning triumphs. But they brought utter ruin in the end because they wrongly assumed that sufficient operational success at the level of strategy could transform realities at the level of grand strategy. My definition of sound grand strategy, therefore, simply postulates the opposite: an equation of ends and means so sturdy that it triumphs despite serial setbacks at the level of strategy, operations, and campaigns. The classic example is Allied grand strategy during World War II. [13]

Of course, throughout the nineteenth century the United States was so blessed that except for the Civil War Americans could realize imperial ambitions on a pittance. No wonder they developed the habit which Harvey Sicherman calls "cheap hawkery." Moreover, Americans could defend what they had and grasp what they wanted without too much aforethought. To be sure, the authors of our grand traditions knew what they were doing or, just as important, refraining from doing, and why. As early as 1789 Alexander Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist* No. 8: "If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security.... This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty." Throughout the ante-bellum era only a few dozen diplomats and military

professionals, such as General Winfield Scott and naval Lieutenant Matthew Maury, needed to think in terms of grand strategy. But the miniature army on the frontier and navy in the Mediterranean and western Pacific did such excellent duty that American settlers and merchants took their new frontiers for granted. Henry James did not wonder at that insouciance because, he wrote in 1879,

That generation which grew up with the century witnessed during a period of fifty years the immense, uninterrupted material development of the young Republic ... there seems to be little room for surprise that it should have implanted a kind of superstitious faith in the grandeur of the country, its duration, its immunity from the usual troubles of earthly empires.... From this conception of the American future the sense of its having problems to solve was blissfully absent; there were no difficulties in the programme, no looming complication, no rocks ahead.” [14]

Right around that year of 1879, however, responsible people in responsible posts in the United States began to notice that the heretofore friendly strategic environment was in rapid flux. The industrial revolution was spreading through Europe and was launched in Japan. Revolutions in commerce, shipping, and communications were forging a global economic and military arena, as symbolized by bulk cargo oceanic steamships, the trans-Atlantic telegraph cable, the Transcontinental Railroad and Suez Canal of 1869, and the shift in 1876 of the global futures market for cereals from Danzig to the Chicago Board of Trade. In the decades to come Britain and her many new challengers for naval and colonial power bumped up against U. S. interests and spheres of influence. The time had come to institutionalize grand strategy.

Chief among the responsible people who did so were Commodore Stephen B. Luce, who founded the Naval War College in 1884, Captain A. T. Mahan whom Luce recruited to teach the influence of sea power on history, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy who challenged Congress in 1890 to fund a modern two-ocean navy, the magnates of steel mills and shipyards who built the United States’ first military-industrial complex, and Progressive publicists ranging from pastor Josiah Strong to politician Albert Beveridge, press mogul William Randolph Hearst, and pundit Herbert Croly. Thanks to all the above most Americans took in stride the Yankee imperialism beginning in 1898. That era’s “great equation” of federal policies to promote defense, exports, sustainable growth, conservation, assimilation of immigrants, free enterprise with measures to check its worst abuses, and both secular and Social Gospel safety nets amounted to the United States’ first articulated grand strategy, perhaps best personified by Theodore Roosevelt. [15] The only aspect of that strategy that did not serve the nation well was its humanitarian, “white man’s burden” notion to the effect that the American people possessed the calling, the means, and the wisdom to uplift foreign cultures.

What is more, that nation- or state-building component explains why I also deemed Progressive Imperialism the first in a new category of foreign policy traditions. For over the course of the twentieth century U. S. policy elites, perceiving their nation increasingly threatened by wars and revolutions in a shrinking, global arena, ceased trying to keep the outside world from shaping their nation and instead began trying to reshape the world. The next new tradition was Wilsonianism which spiritualized and universalized the local, partly strategic humanitarian crusades of Progressive Imperialism and purported to do for the world what the United States had manifestly been unable to do for Cuba or the Philippines. Being essentially utopian, Wilsonianism was a grievous temptation and failure after both world wars. The upshot was another tradition, Containment, which proved slow, costly, and sometimes morally compromising. But since it was grounded in realism and periodically renewed by serious grand strategy—for instance, during the first terms of Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan—Containment prevailed. [16] The final new tradition, which sometimes stood alone but always co-existed with the others, was what I call Global Meliorism, the idea that the United States has not just a *destiny* as an *exemplar*, but a *mission* as an *actor*, to bestow peace, prosperity, human rights, and freedom as the American people understand those terms on the entire world. From Herbert Hoover to Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush national leaders have repeatedly formulated (or at least justified) grand strategies on the basis of global meliorist ideology. Hoover said the way to fight Communism in Russia was with food, not with guns. Kennedy's and Johnson's "best and brightest" said the way to defeat Communism in the Third World was to win the hearts and minds of South Vietnamese by offering them a better social and political revolution. George W. Bush said the way to defeat terrorism in the Muslim world was to drain the swamps of despair and disaffection by democratizing the Middle East (Tony Blair, even now, spurns the expediency of a Machiavelli, Bismarck, and by implication Thatcher and Reagan, in favor of militant idealism because, he says, our cause "is just, right, and the only way the future of the world can work"). [17]

My list of nineteenth and twentieth century U.S. foreign policy traditions—given a sufficiently liberal definition of terms—would seem to support the contention that the United States has a rich and varied experience with grand strategy. Its people possessed, if perhaps somewhat intuitively, a *de facto* grand strategy that not only ensured the nation spectacular growth, but was so low-maintenance as to be almost imperceptible beyond the tiny Departments of State, War, and Navy. In the latter nineteenth century the nation designed a *de jure* grand strategy that required more vigorous mobilization of federal resources to manage an increasingly urban industrial society at home and militant imperial rivalries abroad.

What followed was an era of global turmoil that began in 1898, escalated around 1911 with the Chinese and Mexican revolutions, turned total upon U.S. entry into the world war in 1917, and has for all practical purposes never ended. The American people hoped the era of global turmoil had ended during the 1920s, again in 1945-46, and again in the 1990s. But each time

new threats and opportunities emanating from abroad compelled—or at least seemed to compel—the U.S. government to react, which meant it had to make some kind of geopolitical reading as to what the circumstances required. Hence, the historical record would seem to indicate, first, that the United States can and has embraced grand strategies (even during the eras once scorned as isolationist), second, that strategies based on realist premises have been mostly fruitful, and third, that strategies based on idealist premises have been mostly abortive. [18]

Robert Kagan, the neoconservative heavyweight, does not agree. Indeed, he is devoting years to a two-volume history of U.S. foreign relations seemingly to debunk interpretations such as my own—albeit without so much as a footnote to the scholarship he dismisses. *Dangerous Nation*, Kagan’s first volume, covers the century down to 1898 during which neutrality, unilateralism, and reticence seemed to characterize U.S. foreign policy. On the contrary, Kagan labors to argue, the American people have believed ever since their nation’s inception in their mission to liberate the whole human race, not just by example but exertion abroad. In short, George Washington was a neo-con. [19] The sometimes explicit, but always implicit message of Kagan’s books and columns is that the true and abiding U.S. grand strategy is to export democracy, free markets, and human rights in what amounts to universal regime-change. Now, there are prophecies of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth where swords are beat into plowshares and lions lie down with lambs. For a few years after the Cold War there were also Hegelian prophecies of an end to history thanks to the ideas that conquered the world. [20] But grand strategy is not usually thought of as a faith-based initiative. Or does Kagan really believe the U.S. government knows how to pacify and develop Fallujah or Kandahar? If so, he ought to inspect how little billions of dollars in urban renewal have achieved over forty years in the United States’ own inner cities. What is more, even if such Global Meliorism, with or without guns, were a viable option for terrorist sanctuaries under U.S. occupation, what strategic relevance can nation-building theory possibly have for such sources of geopolitical angst as Iran, China, and Russia?

Andrew Bacevich disagrees with my interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy traditions and grand strategies for the opposite reason than Kagan. While agreeing with us that American isolationism is a myth, Bacevich rejects both my emphasis on geopolitics and Kagan’s emphasis on ideology in favor of an economic interpretation. Indeed, his paleo-conservative critique of what he calls the new U. S. militarism and empire revives the New Left revisionism of William Appleman Williams. That “Wisconsin” or “Open Door” school was not strictly Marxist, but it did advance a mono-causal economic theory for what Williams called the tragedy of U. S. diplomacy. The real motive for U.S. foreign policy during all eras of history was not security or liberty, but the capitalist appetite for new markets, resources, and customers, at home and increasingly abroad. So the American Dream was real, but therein lay tragedy because in order to meet the growing expectations of a growing population the United

States was ineluctably drawn to imperialism that belied its liberationist rhetoric. Keenly aware of the consumerism and seductive advertising lurking behind this national tragedy, Bacevich blames the United States' grand strategic folly on the iron triangle of business, political, and military elites who alone benefit from the nation's peripatetic crusades. Indeed, the statistics he cites on U. S. debt and over-extension suggest a Ponzi scheme at the end of its tether. In sum, the United States has indeed pursued a grand strategy ever since 1776. But far from being ideological, benign, and destined to triumph, as Kagan suggests, it is material, malign, and destined to ruin. [21]

Christopher Layne, a paleo-conservative political scientist of libertarian leanings, is just as critical of U. S. imperial overstretch. But his excavation in search of the roots of our strategic overstretch and malaise discovers them, not in the post 9/11 era where crusading neocons lurked, nor in the post-Cold War era where the Lexus and Olive Tree glistened. On the contrary, Layne spies an essential continuity in U. S. grand strategy after and *before* 9/11, after and *before* the entire Cold War, even after and *before* World War II. He identifies the abiding U.S. grand strategy as one of "extra-regional hegemony" and locates its roots in the planning the Roosevelt administration initiated in 1940 and brought to maturity by 1944–45. What FDR's wartime brain trust, both civilian and military, were tasked to do and did, was to draft the blueprints for U. S. dominance over the security, economics, and ideologies of Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, well before Soviet intransigence gave them the added incentive of Containment.

Political science theories would not have predicted such behavior, given the lessons of history about the cost, risk, and ultimate futility of quests for hegemony. But the United States had the means and opportunity to bid for hegemony, and the Open Door (here Layne parallels Bacevich) provided the motive. The foreign policy and business establishments in the United States concluded from the era of the world wars that the nation's core values of liberty, peace, and ever-greater prosperity could never be truly secure until democracy and open markets prevailed everywhere. So they manipulated American politics and institutions to promote hegemony through global engagement, albeit under the guise of anti-hegemonic Deterrence, Modernization, Democratic or Liberal Regime theory. Eisenhower alone opposed the hegemonic consensus, asserts Layne, but he was isolated even within his own administration. The upshot, since the Realist theory of international relations is valid, was that U.S. hegemony invariably conjured into being opponents while obliging the imperial power to wage perpetual wars in the name of perpetual peace (if only to purchase the continued loyalty of clients), even where U.S. interests were only marginally engaged. So whereas the post-9/11 wars in the Muslim world might have driven the United States to the limits of its financial and military strength, such a denouement was inevitable for a nation pursuing a grand strategy based on the delusion that empire pays for itself. Layne concludes with a survey of the grand strategies now available to the United States—Hegemony, Selective Engagement, Offshore Balancing,

and Isolationism—and argues that the only one that would honestly fulfill the criteria of grand strategy with regard to priorities, ends, means, economy, asymmetrical advantage, and acceptable risk is Offshore Balancing. He would terminate U.S. security treaties with NATO, Japan, and South Korea, cease pestering China and Russia about their internal affairs, stand offshore of the Persian Gulf, and launch a crash R&D program to escape dependence on foreign oil. In sum, he recommends a return to the pre-1917 era of U.S. grand strategy. [22]

That so many analysts of the Realist school of international relations have soured on U.S. military assertion abroad, even in the wake of the first attack on the United States since Pearl Harbor, says plenty about how unpersuasive U.S. strategy has become. Barry Posen, Stephen Van Evera, and Stephen Walt, like Chris Layne former students of Kenneth Waltz, have all pleaded for a grand strategy based on restraint. So, too, has Colin Dueck, who characterized American strategic culture as uniquely prone to utopian ambitions and universal commitments sold to the public with lofty rhetoric and the promise of minimal cost, or “limited liability.” Thus, writes Dueck, “It was an illusion to think that a stable, secure, and democratic Iraq could arise without a significant long-term U.S. investment of both blood and treasure.... But even after 9/11, the preference for limited liability in strategic affairs continued to weigh heavily on Bush.” The Administration really believed Rumsfeld’s boast that 9/11 gave America another World War II sort of opportunity “to refashion the world.” Believing that siren’s song, President Bush proceeded to replicate the worst features of Liberal Internationalism by “pursuing a set of extremely ambitious and idealistic foreign policy goals without initially providing the full or proportionate means to achieve those goals. In this sense, it must be said, George W. Bush was very much a Wilsonian.” [23]

Dueck’s historical survey echoes Layne’s list of strategic choices. Following World War I, the United States could have opted for engagement through the League of Nations, disengagement, or limited engagement in the European balance of power (military alliance with France and Britain). After World War II, the United States had four options: disengagement, rollback of Communism, an amicable spheres-of-influence deal with Stalin, or worldwide containment. After the Cold War, the United States could have chosen disengagement, balance of power, liberal internationalism, or hegemony. In every case, Dueck argues, the United States opted for limited-liability strategies and, in the wake of Iraq, is likely to do so again. Hence, he concludes, “the choice between a strategy of primacy and a strategy of liberal internationalism, which currently seems to characterize public debate over U.S. foreign policy, is almost beside the point. Neither strategy will work if Americans are unwilling to incur the full costs and risks that are implied in either case.” [24]

If the gloom-sayers are even partially right it would seem the United States has no good grand strategic options at present. Indeed, we may have none at all given that the global financial meltdown can only reinforce our “cheap hawk” proclivities, given that the Wilsonian

moralistic conceit so dear to the nation's self-image obliges U.S. foreign policy to be (or pretend to be) a crusade to abolish grand strategy, given that our Constitution mandates frequent turnover in the executive branch, given that our checked and balanced, multi-branched system of government is either spastic or strait-jacketed by design, and given that those executive bureaucracies charged with strategic planning often seem more interested in thwarting each other than America's enemies. Just consider the sobering testimony offered by two smart, experienced veterans of strategic planning, Richard Betts and Leslie Gelb. According to Betts, no government, not least the United States, can really "do" grand strategy because nobody can accurately forecast the costs of strategic choices, or predict the outcomes of alternate choices, or determine the variables and stakes in a given competition or war, or control for the Clausewitzian friction and fog of battles both military and bureaucratic, or predict (much less counter) the reactions of adversaries, or surmount the Tocquevillian incompetence and impatience of democracies. According to Gelb, strategic planning can perversely work too well! In a large democracy like the United States, he observed during the Vietnam War, the process of bargaining among agencies and with the Congress tends to privilege what he called "Option B," the sort of incremental half-measures that meet the requirements of no coherent strategy at all. [25]

Finally, as Drezner wrote after the 2006 elections registered their verdict on President Bush's crusade, the American people found themselves back at square one waiting for a new George Kennan who, like Samuel Beckett's Godot, never shows. But if the gloom-sayers are right we are even worse off than that because even the "greatest generation" that was "present at the creation" of the Cold War architecture was not the role model we want to believe. For instance, Dueck has denounced the "cheap hawkery" that made the Truman Doctrine a risible bluff until the Korean War (itself partly a product of U. S. blunders). John Lewis Gaddis has long argued that NSC 68, the document that allegedly reversed the "cheap hawkery," was itself a deeply flawed blueprint for strategy. [26] Gaddis even regards Kennan's concept of Containment to have been myopic and idiosyncratic. Thomas Wright goes so far as to indict the whole 1940s cohort and believes the only lessons to be learned are from their mistakes. [27] To be sure, Eisenhower's 1953 strategic planning "for the long haul," expertly documented by Bowie and Immerman, enjoys a long overdue exemplary status. But however commendable Eisenhower's process, the "Strategies of Containment" are only of limited relevance because the correlation of forces, nature of the adversaries, and asymmetrical strengths and vulnerabilities were so different then than now. Just contrast Paul Nitze's analysis of Soviet intentions and capabilities in the 1950s with Andrew Krepinevich's "seven deadly scenarios" in the 2010s. [28] What is more, even though Containment ultimately brought the Cold War to a triumphant end without undermining our values, its cost in terms of lives, treasure, and economic opportunities was far more than the American people are willing or able to pledge. [29]

Not surprisingly, therefore, Drezner rejects all the strategic concepts advanced by the self-nominated candidates for Kennan's mantle, including Jeffrey Legro, Michael Mandelbaum, Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Benjamin Page and Marshall Bouton. [30] One could add to that list Francis Fukuyama and Amitai Etzioni among others. Why do all these authoritative authors fall flat? Because none says anything very original. They just reflexively damn the Bush administration's hubris and poor execution while reaffirming human rights, democracy, and an open world economy as the proper goals of American strategy. Invariably, the result is some rhetorical hybrid reminiscent of Dr. Doolittle's fanciful Pushmi-pullyu, the beast with two heads and no rump. We are told, for instance, to be visionary yet pragmatic (Legro), ethical yet realistic (Lieven and Hulsman), realistic yet Wilsonian (Fukuyama), moral yet muscular (Eztioni), focused yet ambiguous and flexible (Drezner himself). [31]

World weary as I am, having witnessed so many disappointing and disillusioning cycles of politics and foreign policy, having acquired so much vicarious experience of human folly and forgetfulness from my study of history, I nurture no hope that a great burst of grand strategic creativity lies just ahead. Oh, this or a subsequent administration may make institutional reforms, such as insisting that the National Security Strategy document address resources and means instead of just goals, or reinventing the Eisenhower NSC structure with its Planning and Operations Coordinating boards. But otherwise, I incline to the wisdom of Harvey Sicherman. Whenever I wax imaginative about the clever schemes of statesmen, past or present, Harvey assures me that I am giving them way too much credit for knowing what they are doing or being able to do it. So whatever buzz words become the shorthand for a new American strategy, I expect the most we can hope for is that our national security agencies and their consulting firms just post on their walls the business strategist Richard Rumelt's list of ten strategic blunders and meditate on them every day. [32] They are:

1. Failure to recognize or take seriously the fact that resources are scarce
2. Mistaking strategic goals for strategy
3. Failure to recognize or state the strategic problem
4. Choosing unattainable or poor strategic goals
5. Failure to define the challenge competitively
6. Making false presumptions about one's competence
7. Loss of focus due to too many stakeholders and bureaucratic processes to satisfy
8. Inaccurately determining one's areas of competitive advantage

9. Failure to realize that few people have the cognitive skills needed for strategy
10. Failure to understand the adversary.

I would add to this list one more:

11. *Failure to understand ourselves.*

In his famous “Silent Majority speech” President Richard Nixon assured listeners that North Vietnam could not defeat the United States, “only Americans can do that.” I suspect that were we to run our minds over the whole sweep of U.S. diplomatic and military history we could readily trace our nation’s disasters and wasteful detours in good part to our own nation’s foibles. They are legion. We are human. But chief among them is a tendency to be so dazzled by our own destiny and morality that we cannot see ourselves as others see us. So even as the American people must figure out how to frustrate our terrorist enemies and Great Power rivals in the era to come, so must we hearken to Edmund Burke. “Among precautions against ambition,” he warned, “it may not be amiss to take one precaution against our own. I must fairly say, I dread our own power and own ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded.... [W]e may say that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard of power. But every other nation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that, sooner or later, this state of things must produce a combination against us which may end in our ruin. [33]

Grand strategy, whatever other ambitions it may serve, cannot aim at the abolition or obviation of grand strategy itself. That is why U.S. strategists, while devoting all their imagination to the prevention of specific dangers, cannot be about eliminating the possibility of deadly scenarios altogether. To cite a Samuel Huntington metaphor told me by Jim Kurth, the most a wise statesman can do is imagine his ship of state on an infinite sea, with no port behind and no destination ahead, his sole responsibility being to weather the storms certain to come, and keep the ship on an even keel so long as he has the bridge.

Notes:

1. Angelo M. Codevilla, *Advice to War Presidents: A Remedial Course in Statecraft* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), p. 273.
2. Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 220.
3. See inter alia Aaron L. Friedberg, “Strengthening Strategic Planning,” *Washington Quarterly* 31:1 (2007): 47-60; Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Knopf, 2007); Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, *Regaining Strategic Competence: Strategy for the Long Haul* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009); and Codevilla, *Advice to*

War Presidents. For a standard classic defining the field in general see John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983).

4. George W. Bush, "Second Inaugural Address" (Jan. 20, 2007) accessed Sep. 29, 2009) at <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres67.html>.
5. Daniel W. Drezner, ed., *Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), pp. 3-4.
6. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Strengthening U.S. Strategic Planning, in *ibid.*, pp. 84-97.
7. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage, 1945), pp. 240-45; for other editions just see volume 1, chapter 13.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 450-52 (volume 1, chapter 18).
9. For instance, see <http://zenhuber.blogspot.com/2009/09/another-krock-of-krepinevich.html>
10. STRATFOR Geopolitical Diary, "America's Indivisible Imperatives" (July 2, 2009), accessed July 22, 2009) at http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary
11. The hardball war and diplomacy of the Polk administration that belied the benign, idealistic "Manifest Destiny" school of U.S. expansion, is summarized by McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, pp. 76-98, and described in depth by Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 2003), and David M. Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War* (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1973).
12. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 194-346.
13. Krepinevich and Watts, *Regaining Strategic Competence*, which cites in turn Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (New York: Norton, 1995), and Andrew Rogers, *Masters and Commanders: How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Alan Brooke Won the War in the West* (London: Allen Lane, 2005).
14. Henry James, *Hawthorne* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1879), pp. 142-43.
15. See the Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press publications by Robert Seager, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters* (1977), Robert G. Albion, *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947* (1980), and James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy* (1990); also Richard D. Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy 1898-1914* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1973), Richard H. Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A New View of American Imperialism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1985), and Walter A. McDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific From Magellan to MacArthur* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
16. On Eisenhower's Solarium exercise and the drafting of the New Look blueprint NSC 162/2 of Fall 1953; see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace:*

How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University, 1998).

17. Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community: Ten Years Later,” *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 4:2 (2009): pp. 5-14. Blair spoke in Chicago in April 1999 and again April 2009 when he declared “I remain adamantly in the same spot, metaphorically as well as actually, of ten years ago, that evening in this city. The statesmanship that went before regarded politics as a Bismarck or Machiavelli regarded it. It’s all a power play; a matter, not of right and wrong, but of who’s on our side, and our side defined by our interests, not our values.... I never thought such politics very sensible or practical. I think it even less so now....”
18. But wait, you may say, was not isolationism the “default mode” of the United States whenever a clear and present danger was not evident or, as in the 1930s, even when a clear and present danger should have been evident? That is what proponents of interventionist schools, be they Progressive Imperialist, Wilsonian or Global Meliorist, want us to believe. If we are not with them on some ambitious, always moral, foreign commitment, then we are selfish, stupid isolationists. But beginning with my research on the post-World War I era for my first book way back in the 1970s and culminating with my research for *Promised Land, Crusader State* in the mid-1990s, I was forced to conclude that U.S. foreign policy was never isolationist except for the years 1933-38. Indeed, the Republican administrations of the 1920s pursued a highly articulated grand strategy with sophisticated military, diplomatic, financial, and political components. It was wrecked by the Great Depression, but diplomatic historians now agree that Charles Evans Hughes, Frank Kellogg, Herbert Hoover, J. P. Morgan, etc., conceived of a strategy just as liberal and far more effective than Woodrow Wilson’s.
19. Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Knopf, 2006). On the Founders see Kagan, “Neocon Nation: Neconservatism, c. 1776,” *World Affairs* 1, no. 2 (Spring 2008).
20. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), and Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002).
21. Bacevich’s scholarly evolution seems to have been inspired by his fierce loyalty to the U.S. military which in turn bred righteous anger over the damage done by the excessive demands made on the army and marines in particular since 9/11. Compare his *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 2002), to *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced into War* (New York: Oxford University, 2005), and *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism* (New York: Metropolitan, 2008). His theory about the elites manipulating grand strategy is reminiscent not only of William

Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rev. ed. (1962), but of his contemporary, the sociologist C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University, 1956).

22. Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 2006). Geir Lundestad's critical review at www.politicalreviewnet.com/polrev/reviews/DIPH/R_145_2 faults Layne for depicting U.S. strategy over many decades as one-dimensional and invulnerable to domestic political resistance. If so, then how can his recommended alternative of offshore-balancing be a realistic alternative? He also faults Layne for underestimating the seriousness of the Soviet confrontation and European eagerness for a U. S. commitment. Lundestad himself has referred to the U.S.-led Western bloc as "empire by invitation."
23. Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, 2006); quote on p. 162.
24. Ibid., p. 171.
25. Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): pp. 5-50; Leslie H. Gelb, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979).
26. See the Gaddis commentary in Ernest R. May, ed., *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (Boston: St Martin's, 1993), p. 146. He asserts NSC 68 was not a strategy at all, or else a poor one, because it made all interests "vital" and thus made possible negotiations "only on the basis of Soviet capitulations." That in turn, transferred the power to define American interests to the Soviets themselves and made inevitable the militarization of an ideological conflict.
27. Thomas Wright, "Learning the Right Lessons from the 1940s," in Drezner, *Avoiding Trivia*, pp.125-36. The lessons are: 1. Be flexible because "consistency" can lead to over-extension and imprudence; 2. Don't neglect bilateral diplomacy for which institutions are no substitute; 3. Secure and retain domestic legitimacy without which no strategy can be sustained; 4. Prioritize problems and try to solve them rather than over-emphasize process and institutions; 5. Manage expectations and appeal to the President for support.
28. Andrew F. Krepinevich, *7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam, 2009).
29. Derek Leebaert, *The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory* (Boston: Little, Brown, 2002).
30. Daniel W. Drezner, "The Grandest Strategy of Them All," *The Washington Post* (Dec. 17, 2006); Drezner is author of *All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 2007).

31. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 2005), defines the prerequisites for a paradigm shift in world views, arguing that they must be visionary but also pragmatic insofar as they recommend concrete steps to be taken. Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), insists that the United States is the indispensable power, hence it cannot afford to starve its military of resources in favor of feeding its oil addiction and social entitlements. Lieven and Hulsman, *Ethical Realism and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Pantheon, 2006), argues a Realist case said to reflect the ethical tradition of Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr. American strategy should refocus on strengthening the home front and leading the world by example. Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven: Yale University, 2006), calls for a “realistic Wilsonianism” expressed in a “multi-multilateralism” of overlapping international institutions rather than unilateral militarism. Ikenberry and Slaughter, *Forging a World of Liberty Under Law* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Project on National Security, 2006) is billed as a “collective X article.” The authors stress international law and institutions to channel U.S. power and a “concert of democracies” to promote human rights. Etzioni, *Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University, 2007), criticizes democratization and nation-building as far too expensive, uncertain, and ineffective to warrant priority. The United States ought instead to seek legitimacy for its exertion of power through multilateral enforcement institutions such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. Page and Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want From Our Leaders But Don't Get*, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006) is an outlier insofar as it agrees with Christopher Layne that U.S. business and foreign policy elites conspire to frustrate the common sense of the American people. But far from being libertarian, these authors advocate economic nationalism in the name of “fair trade.”
32. The ten “common strategy sins” as presented by Rumelt in a CSBA seminar on Sept. 25, 2007, cited by Krepinevich and Watts, *Regaining Strategic Competence*, pp. 33-34.
33. Burke quoted by Layne, *Peace of Illusions*, p. 204. The obverse of this collective self-satisfaction is what Toynbee called ‘the mirage of immortality.’ At the height of a civilization its members “are prone to regard it, not as a night’s shelter in the wilderness, but as the Promised Land, the goal of human endeavors” and thus invite their own destruction from decadence within and/or attack from without. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 301. Is America or the West an exception? Huntington cites Matthew Melko, *The Nature of Civilizations* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969), p. 155, who asks, “First, is Western Civilization a new species, in a class by itself,

incomparably different from all other civilizations that have ever existed? Second, does its worldwide expansion threaten (or promise) to end the possibility of development of all other civilizations?” If the likely answer to either is no, then we had better guard against imagining ourselves immortal.

The Crisis of American Conservatism: Inherent Contradictions and the End of the Road

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This paper, presented at the November 15 meeting of FPRI's Study Group on America and the West and published as in E-Notes, is an abridgement of a longer paper, "A History of Inherent Contradictions: The Origin and End of American Conservatism," which was presented to the Conference on "Whither American Conservatism," organized by the University of Texas Law School and the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, September 14-15, 2012. The longer paper includes a discussion of the origins and history of American conservatism up to the 1970s, the beginning point of this abridged paper.

It has long been understood that there is something peculiar, even paradoxical, about conservatism in America. American conservatism is different from conservatism in other countries, even those countries which were the original source of many other American ideas and ideals, i.e. the countries of Europe. Indeed, the very term "American conservatism" is something of an oxymoron. For most Europeans who came to America, the whole purpose of their difficult and disruptive journey to the New World was not to conserve European institutions but to leave them behind and to create something new, often an entirely new life and even a new identity, for themselves.

In this essay, we will examine how the paradoxes of American conservatism have unfolded and revealed themselves during the period of the last three or four decades. We begin our discussion by noting the three distinct dimensions that have always defined American conservatism. The original and traditional American conservatism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries collapsed in a great debacle during the Great Depression of the 1930s, but this was followed by a creative reinvention of American conservatism during the Great Stagflation of the 1970s. This reinvented conservatism experienced its own debacle during the current Great Recession, which began in 2007 and which continues into the 2010s. We conclude with a review of the current condition of what was once a reinvented, but now seems to be YET another collapsed conservatism, in the light of the elections of 2012. The decisive defeats of the Republican party, particularly in the Presidential and Senatorial elections, have demonstrated that American conservatism will once again have to be reinvented and the Republican party will have to appeal to new constituencies or they, like the Federalists, Whigs, and traditional conservatives before them, will disappear or be eclipsed.

The Three Dimensions of American Conservatism

In recent decades, political analysts have found it useful to interpret American political movements by distinguishing between different policy dimensions or arenas. Thus, conservatives have been divided into (1) those who are most concerned about economic or fiscal issues, i.e., pro-business or “free-enterprise” conservatives; (2) those most concerned with religious or social issues, i.e., pro-church or “traditional-values” conservatives; and (3) those most concerned with national-security or defense issues, i.e., pro-military or “patriotic” conservatives.

These three arenas are not of equal weight and strength in the conservative movement, however. It is the business elite that, over the long run, has proven to be the most powerful component of the conservative coalition; it has gotten its way on more issues than either the religious or the security conservatives, and it has done so not only within the conservative coalition itself, but with actual government policies. Calvin Coolidge may have exaggerated somewhat when, in the 1920s, he said that “the business of America is business,” but it has been no exaggeration that the business of American conservatism has been business.

It was the achievement of Ronald Reagan that he was able in the late 1970s to unite these three different kinds of conservatism into one grand coalition. This was the culmination of a “fusionist strategy” that had been developing amongst American conservatives since the early 1960s. [1] For a while, especially during the 1980s, it could appear that these three kinds of conservatives were natural allies, that they had an “elective affinity” for each other, and that there was no significant contradiction between them. However, as we shall see, pro-business conservatism has always included a tendency toward the disruption and even dissolution of religious ideals and social practices. This is the famous “cultural contradictions of capitalism,” identified by social theorists as varied as Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter, and Daniel Bell. [2] And in recent decades, pro-business conservatism has also included a tendency toward the dismantling of national boundaries and even dissolution of national identities, and therefore the redefinition of national security. This is the famous “globalization” project of American multinational corporations and financial institutions. [3] It took about two decades for the fusionist strategy to put together the Reagan grand coalition, and then, about two decades after Reagan’s departure, that grand coalition largely fell apart.

The Reinvention of American Conservatism in the 1970s

Traditional American conservatism and its political vehicle, the Republican Party, largely dominated American society and politics after the Civil War down through the 1920s. However, they were unable to provide satisfactory responses to the challenges posed by the Great Depression during the 1930s and the Second World War during the 1940s. The result

was a great debacle for this kind of American conservatism in each of the three policy arenas, and this in turn resulted in a long period when American progressivism and its political vehicle, the Democratic Party, largely dominated American society and politics.

However, by the 1970s the policies of the progressives and the Democrats in each of the three arenas were also failing to meet the challenges of the time, especially those posed by the Great Stagflation. The result was another great debacle, this time for American progressivism. The way then became clear for some kind of conservatism to reappear as a serious force in American history. However, this kind of conservatism was not really a revival of the traditional American version. Rather, it was something quite different, a reinvention of American conservatism altogether, one which stretched across all three policy arenas.

The economic arena. As it happened, by the 1970s there was a body of economic ideas which claimed that it could solve the problem of inflation (and, in doing so, also the problem of unemployment). This lay in the theories of Milton Friedman and more generally of what was known as the “monetarist school.” Whereas John Maynard Keynes and his followers focused upon government spending and fiscal policy as the balance wheel of the economy, Friedman and his followers focused upon the money supply and monetary policy as that balance wheel. And whereas Keynesianism called upon government (and elected officials) to intervene directly in the economy through expenditures and taxes, Friedmanism called upon the central bank—which in the United States is the Federal Reserve System (and appointed officials who are largely independent of elected ones but actually quite dependent upon the executives of major banks)—merely to intervene indirectly in the economy through interest rates and the overall money supply. Friedmanism thus advocated a radical shift in the location of the economy’s balance wheel and therefore in the power of those who would run it.

Although Friedman and his followers were always talking about the virtues of the free market and of conservatism in economic affairs, their approach was not truly a free-market or traditional-conservative one at all. Instead, they advocated a *controlled* market in matters of money, credit and finance, while advocating a free market with respect to almost everything else. And the market in money, credit, and finance was to be controlled by an oligopoly of the major banks, implemented through the Federal Reserve System (whose name made it sound like some kind of government agency, but whose reality made it more a cartel of profit-making banks).

A truly free-market and traditional-conservative set of ideas about the money supply, and about the general economy, also existed in the late 1970s, and this was found in the theories of Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and what was called the “Austrian school.” They argued

that the economy, including its interest rates and money supply, should operate without any organized intervention at all, be it either by government agencies or by a banker's cartel. [4]

During the era of Keynesian hegemony in economic affairs, both the monetarist school and the Austrian school had been marginalized in academic economics departments and among economic-policy advisors. But the failure and incapacity of Keynesianism meant that these two marginalized alternatives now had an opportunity to supersede it. A main reason why Friedmanism became the alternative that did so, rather than the ideas of Hayek and von Mises, was that the former had a large complex of economic interests (the major banks, e.g., "Wall Street") supporting it, while the latter had no such support (the only substantial interests likely to support it were small banks and small businesses, e.g., "Main Street").

The monetarist approach was adopted by the Federal Reserve System in 1979 and implemented by its Chairman, Paul Volcker, in 1979-1982. Volcker's actions were indeed highly effective (although of course temporarily very painful) in bringing inflation to an end, and in 1983 the U.S. economy began a period of impressive growth which was largely sustained for almost two decades, until 2000. This success in solving the problem on inflation, while also providing for growing employment—i.e., for bringing an end to the Great Stagflation—gave Friedmanism an enormous boost in credibility and prestige. It now became hegemonic in academic economic departments and among economic-policy advisors, and it has held this dominant position for almost thirty years (1980s-2010s) after the Great Stagflation, just as Keynesianism had been hegemonic for about thirty years (1940s-1970s) after the Great Depression. Of course, the Friedman school has been just as insistent and effective in keeping the Austrian school marginalized (and indeed virtually unknown) as the Keynesian school had been before.

Since Friedmanism is not truly a free-market approach (despite its rhetorical claims to be so), what is its relation to American conservatism as this applies to the economic arena? It is mostly accurately seen as a kind of *pseudo-conservatism*, not as a kind of traditional conservatism. This means that when the "conservative movement" and the Reagan Revolution brought about a "revival" of American conservatism, it was actually bringing about its reinvention on the economic dimension. Consequently, this most central and weighty dimension of American conservatism would not be truly conservative at all, in any real sense of the word (e.g., in either its traditional European or its traditional American meaning).

Nevertheless, the pseudo-conservatism of Friedmanism had a very good run at managing the American economy for a very long time (almost thirty years), just like the progressivism or pseudo-liberalism of Keynesianism had had previously (also thirty years). However, as we shall see, the hegemony of the major banks within the hegemony of Friedmanism was a birth

defect and fatal flaw that would eventually work its way out and bring about the next great economic crisis, i.e., the Great Recession that began in 2007 and that continues until today.

The religious and social arena. During the long era of “the liberal consensus”—which included both progressives and moderate conservatives, both Democratic and Republican elites—Bible-believing Protestants had largely remained a component of the traditional-conservative minority within the Republican Party. However, they did not have any reliable and effective political vehicle, and they were marginalized in electoral policies and in public policy. Then, a number of developments in the 1970s brought about a rise in their potential influence.

First, after several decades of political inactivity, Bible-believing Protestants were awakened and energized by particular progressive advances with regard to moral issues. The most central of these was the issue of abortion, for which a monumental milestone was the Supreme Court decision in *Roe vs. Wade* in 1973. Just as Prohibition had been “the Great Crusade” of conservative Protestants for three generations from the 1870s to the 1920s, so Pro-Life became their great crusade for the three decades from the 1970s to the 2000s.

Second, shifts in the social bases of the two political parties and their associated ideological movements, which were produced by progressive policies and which occurred in the 1970s, brought Southern whites and ethnic Catholics into the Republican Party. As it happened, each of these groups had something important in common with the Bible-believing Protestants who were already in the party. For Southern whites, this was the Protestant part (and indeed, when Southern whites had been Democrats, many had also been among the most Bible-believing people in America). For ethnic Catholics, this was the Pro-Life part. Thus, the shifts in social bases brought about a new traditional-conservative grand alliance with respect to religious and social issues and around commonly-shared “traditional moral values.”

Of course, traditional conservatives had long been bereft of any credible national political leader (after the death of Robert Taft, Barry Goldwater had briefly been the closest approximation to one, and he was much more a social libertarian than a traditional moral conservative). By itself, religious or traditional moral conservatism was not going to produce a credible national political figure. However, the fusionist project of the conservative movement had laid the intellectual groundwork for uniting social conservatives with economic and security conservatives. And Ronald Reagan, “the Great Communicator,” certainly had the gift of being able to speak to the different arenas of traditional conservatism, in words and concepts that they not only understood, but that they loved. It was Reagan who appeared to traditional religious and social conservatives to be, at long last, their authentic political representative and effective political vehicle. And it was he who brought them into the grand alliance of conservatives that provide the electoral base for “the Reagan Revolution.”

We have observed, however, that in regard to economic policy, the Reagan era and the following years of Republican political power did not really produce traditional-conservative policies, but ones which were merely pseudo-conservative. Much the same thing can be said for the social policies of the Reagan era and later Republican rule. Reagan and some other Republican leaders were excellent in their public speeches and pronouncements with respect to traditional moral values. However, when it came to implementing these values in actual legislation and practical policies, the results—after a period lasting almost three decades—have been virtually negligible. The main benefit that traditional social conservatives have received from Republicans in the White House and in Congress have been four Supreme Court appointments—Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, and Samuel Alito. And so, in a sense, the reinvention of American conservatism in the social arena actually produced another kind of pseudo-conservatism—or at best quasi-conservatism—one which was parallel and analogous to the pseudo-conservatism in the economic arena.

Moreover, while the Republicans were in power in the White House and in Congress, they facilitated a major change in the demographic composition of the U.S. population—and therefore in the social bases of the two political parties and their ideological movements. This was the great increase in immigration—including illegal immigration—from Latin America, and especially from Mexico. Of course, this increase in immigration had originated with the Immigration Act of 1965, which can be seen as one of the progressive policies of the time, and it had steadily increased in numbers during the 1970s. However, it was during the era when reinvented conservatism was in ascendancy and the Republicans were in power that the Hispanic immigration and the ensuing Hispanic births in the United States reached massive proportions. For example, in the 1980s, Hispanics accounted for 5 percent of the U.S. population; by the late 2000s, they accounted for 15 percent, surpassing the black population in numbers.

Progressives of course had their own ideological reasons for facilitating immigration, based first upon ideals of racial equality and human rights and then upon the ideology of multiculturalism. But why did the Republican Party—with its putative social conservatism—join the Democratic Party in facilitating this massive demographic and therefore social change? The reason is that the grand alliance of reinvented conservatives were simply ordering their priorities and following the same script as the grand alliance of traditional conservatives had done in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that other era of open immigration into the United States. That is, the economic interests of business and middle-class conservatives in cheap labor trumped the communal interests of the cultural and social conservatives.

Of course in the long run, since “demography is destiny,” this new and massive demographic sector could become a new and massive voting bloc. Given the voting behavior of most previous immigrant groups and racial minorities, it seemed most probable that this Hispanic voting bloc would largely vote for the Democratic Party. However, given the hegemony of business interests in the Republican Party, it is not surprising that the short-term profit-making interests of its business constituency trumped the long-term vote-getting interests of the party itself. And so, once again, re-invented conservatism was revealed to be merely pseudo-conservatism. Indeed, given the massive changes that a new Hispanic bloc could produce in American society and politics in the future, reinvented conservatism was, at least with respect to the social arena, even a kind of anti-conservatism.

The security arena. In the 1970s, a number of policy intellectuals came together to develop a systematic critique not only of the security policies of the progressive Carter administration, but also those of the preceding moderate-conservative Nixon and Ford administrations. They called themselves “neo-conservatives.” These thinkers had already developed a systematic critique of progressive and moderate-conservative social policies, but by the late 1970s their principal focus was on the security arena. They were particularly alarmed about the resurgent Soviet and Communist threat and the new Iranian and Islamist threat. [5]

The neo-conservatives proposed a comprehensive program to revitalize U.S. security policy and to strengthen America’s leadership in the world. In particular, they advocated (1) major increases in U.S. military spending and expansion of U.S. military forces; (2) enhanced military assistance to friendly foreign governments which were threatened by Marxist or Islamist movements; (3) enhanced military assistance to insurgent movements which sought to overthrow Marxist regimes (this was the most innovative of the neo-conservative proposals; it would eventually be formulated as the Reagan Doctrine); and (4) renewed willingness to undertake full military interventions, i.e., to employ U.S. military forces to overthrow unfriendly governments and to protect friendly ones.

With the exception of (3), these proposals merely called for a revival of previous U.S. policies and practices in the security arena. Indeed, some version of them had earlier been carried out by moderate-conservative administrations (Eisenhower and Nixon) and even by progressive ones (Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson). In fact, even the traditional-conservative Republican administrations of the 1920s used such methods in dealing with countries in the Caribbean basin and Central America. However, in the era of “the Vietnam syndrome” and the unusually passive security policies of the Ford and Carter administrations, the neo-conservative proposals seemed new, fresh, and vigorous.

The neo-conservative security program was largely adopted by the Reagan administration when it came into office in 1981. As it turned out, that administration and its successor, the George H.W. Bush administration, did achieve a series of extraordinary successes in first reducing and then eliminating the Soviet threat (e.g., the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989, the collapse of East European Communist regimes in late 1989, the reunification of Germany on Western terms in 1990, and finally the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1991). Although the actual causes of the Soviet debacle are complex and disputed, the neo-conservatives naturally claimed the credit for this historic achievement of the Reagan and Bush administrations.

There was still, however, the threat from Iran and from Islamism more generally and this threat continued to grow at the very time that the Soviet threat was disappearing. And here, the record of the neo-conservatives and the Reagan and Bush administrations is marked by significant failures (e.g., the U.S. military intervention in Lebanon in 1964, the growing threat from Islamist terrorists in the 1980s and early 1990s). Even the apparent successes would later turn into major security problems (e.g., the U.S. assistance to Islamist insurgents against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, the U.S. victory over Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 1991). And as we shall see in a concluding section of this essay, the failure of the neo-conservatives would become even more manifest when they became one of the two core groups (the other being the oil industry) shaping the security policy of the George W. Bush administration with respect to Islamism and the Middle East.

What explains the difference between the success of the neo-conservative policies toward the Soviet Union and Communism and the problems with their policies toward Iran and Islamism? One obvious factor is the different regions where these policies were directed. The policies toward the Soviets and Communism were directed primarily toward Europe (e.g., the Soviet military threat toward Western Europe, the weakening Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the internal decay within the Soviet Union itself). Europe was a region where the United States had been actively and continuously engaged since the Second World War. It can be said that U.S. officials and Americans in general understand this region very well. The traditional conservatives had not wanted the United States to be so engaged in Europe, but once America was there, it (and the progressives and moderate conservatives who shaped U.S. policy there) constructed security policies which were grounded in the local realities, indeed which, overall, were “realist” policies.

The contrast with the policies toward Iran and Islamism is substantial. These policies were directed primarily toward the Middle East (e.g., first the Iranian and then the Iraqi threat in the Persian Gulf, the Islamist terrorist threat to U.S. interests in the region, and, a long-standing dilemma for U.S. policy, the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict). The traditional

conservatives had hardly ever thought about the Middle East at all, and the few heirs to their views in the 1980s-1990s were usually convinced that U.S. military involvement in the Middle East was very much not in America's national interest.

Of course, successive U.S. administrations had been actively involved in the Middle East ever since the beginning of the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine, after all, was primarily directed at supporting Greece and Turkey (part of the "Near East," as the language of foreign offices once put it). The Eisenhower Doctrine was directed against Communist alliances with Arab nationalists. And the Carter Doctrine was directed against possible Soviet military moves into states around the Persian Gulf. But each of these "doctrines" were really directed at the Soviet Union and Communism, and they took little account of the local realities of the Middle East, especially realities about Islamism; they were hardly examples of "realist" security policies, and that is why the Eisenhower and Carter Doctrines were largely still-born and soon forgotten. Overall, the record of earlier administrations in the Middle East—be they Democratic or Republican, progressive or moderate conservative—was bereft of any obvious and enduring successes. In a way, this record confirmed the traditional—conservative view that this was yet another region where the United States should not be militarily or politically involved.

When the neo-conservatives turned their own attention to the Middle East and Islamism, they also largely overlooked the relevant local realities and instead imposed concepts drawn from abstract ideologies which had been developed for other regions, especially for Europe. Thus, they spoke a great deal about "Islamofascism" and Saddam Hussein's "Stalinism" and, conversely, about the U.S. success in occupying and democratizing West Germany and Japan after the Second World War.

In what sense, then, can it be said that neo-conservatism is an authentic kind of conservatism with respect to U.S. security policies with respect to the Middle East and Islamism? It argues for extensive U.S. military involvement, and even U.S. wars, in a region where U.S. national interests are unclear and greatly disputed, and there is little conservative about this. It is more accurately described as a kind of pseudo-conservatism. And it argues for intensive U.S. political involvement to remake Middle-Eastern states and Muslim societies, and there is little conservative about this. It is more accurately described as a kind of anti-conservatism. Overall, then, neo-conservatism is not really conservatism at all.

The Great Debacle of Reinvented American Conservatism in the 2000s

And so, in the fullness of time, reinvented American conservatism brought about its own great debacle, again a debacle great enough to encompass all three policy arenas.

The economic arena. The three decades when Friedmanism and the monetarist school dominated economic theory and the Federal Reserve System dominated economic policy were largely an era of impressive economic growth and prosperity. There were occasional stock-market panics or business recessions (1987-1988, 1991-1992, 2000-2002), but overall the U.S. economy seemed to be operating so smoothly that Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke—successive chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board and archetypal exponents of the monetarist worldview—could call the era (and their own management of the economy) “the Great Moderation.”

However, near the end of this era and in the aftermath of the recession of 2000-2002, some ominous developments and unhealthy distortions appeared. The economic boom that began in 2003 was based not upon new technologies and investments in productive assets (such as the information-technology boom of 1993-2000), but upon the real-estate, especially the housing, sector. And soon, the housing boom became a speculative bubble, which burst in 2007 and then turned into a bust. Since banks had very heavily invested in over-valued real estate and complex securitized mortgages, the housing crisis soon metastasized into a full-blown financial crisis, and since credit and finance is the lifeblood (and in an era of monetarist and Federal Reserve hegemony, the balance wheel) of the economy as a whole, the financial crisis in turn soon metastasized into a full-blown economic crisis. Indeed, this crisis was in many ways—particularly with respect to high and prolonged unemployment—the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression almost eighty years before, and it was soon given its own name—the Great Recession.[6] It was the major factor causing the Republican Party to decisively lose the presidential and Congressional elections of 2008.

It was no accident that “The Great Moderation” ended with a speculative bubble in housing and complicated securities. For at the center of this era were the major profit-making banks. Throughout this period, they had relentlessly and successively lobbied government officials to reduce and remove restrictions upon banking activities which had existed ever since the New Deal and Depression-era financial legislation of the 1930s (most importantly, the Glass-Steagle Act of 1933, which limited the risk-taking activities of commercial banks). By 2000, the financial sector had succeeded in abolishing most of the New Deal legislation, and that which remained was very lightly enforced by the anti-regulation appointees of the George W. Bush administration. Then, when there were left virtually no government restrictions upon their profit-making activities, the major banks decided that they could make the most profit by investing in familiar and apparently-solid (“real” estate) assets, rather than in innovative and apparently-risky (but ultimately more productive) enterprises. This kind of decision to invest in the familiar rather than the innovative has long been characteristic behavior for very large

and established banks, and it was natural that the major American banks took this path as soon as they could. [7]

And so it was the very ideas, interests, and institutions which brought Friedmanism into power and which presided over its long era of success which then, through their excesses, caused an economic crisis that brought their era to an end. And since these ideas, interests, and institutions have caused so much economic disruption and destruction, they can truly be said to be pseudo-conservative, rather than authentically conservative.

Of course, when Friedmanism and pseudo-conservatism were confronted with the challenges of the Great Recession, they were incapable of offering any convincing and effective solutions. In this regard, they were like their predecessors, first the free-market advocates and traditional conservatives when they were confronted with the challenges of the Great Depression and then the Keynesians and progressives when they were confronted with the challenges of the Great Stagflation. But just like these previous great economic crises were eventually addressed and solved with new economic theories and policies, so too we might hope that the current crisis will be also. But just like it took about a decade of crisis before those earlier new theories and policies at last became ascendant, we will probably be waiting for our new solutions to the current crisis for quite some time. In the meantime, despite the disruption and destruction which they have wrought, the major banks and the monetarist school continue to prevail in the making of U.S. economic policy.

The religious and social arena. Since the political representatives of reinvented conservatism produced a good deal of religious and social conservative rhetoric but negligible policy results, there were not any policy failures of reinvented conservatism in the religious and social arena comparable to those in the economic arena and contributing to its contemporary great debacle. However, the choices which reinvented conservatives made with respect to immigration policy from the 1980s to the 2000s finally matured into political consequences in 2008. In that year, Hispanics overwhelmingly (about 70 percent) voted for the Democratic Party, and they provided the margin for victory for many Democratic elected officials. The prospects are that this strong Hispanic identification with the Democratic Party will continue into the future, adding another large voting bloc to the Democratic base, parallel to the one which blacks have long provided to the party. (Together, these two voting blocks of the Democratic Party will greatly outweigh the only comparable voting bloc in the Republic Party, that of white Evangelicals—or, more accurately, white Bible-believing Protestants). The recent coming into maturity of this great transformation in U.S. electoral politics has contributed a good deal to the great debacle of reinvented conservatism.

The security arena. By the late 2000s, another failure of reinvented conservatism—and particularly of neo-conservatism—was becoming manifest. This was, of course, the Iraq War, joined increasingly by a parallel failure in the Afghan War. The U.S. war in Iraq, which the George W. Bush administration had begun in 2003, was certainly an expression of neo-conservative policies such as a willingness, even eagerness, to employ U.S. military forces to overthrow unfriendly governments and to impose democracy-promotion and nation-building on foreign countries. The same had become true of the way the Bush administration conducted its war in Afghanistan, after its initially successful overthrow of the Taliban regime in late 2001.

By 2006, the Iraq War was clearly going very badly, and for this pressing problem the Bush administration and neo-conservatives deservedly got the blame. This was a major factor in causing the Republicans to lose control of Congress to the Democrats in 2006. Although the new counterinsurgency strategy of General David Petraeus and the military “surge” authorized by President Bush in 2007 seemed to turn the Iraq debacle around dramatically by 2008, the grueling and growing war in Afghanistan threatened a new debacle. The major cause of the Republican defeat in the 2008 presidential and Congressional elections was of course the onset of the Great Recession, but the Afghan War was an additional and substantial contributing factor.

American Conservatism in the Current Great Recession

The depth, scope, and length of the current global economic crisis—greater than any economic crisis since the Great Depression—has meant that economic and fiscal issues now dominate American politics. Although issues in the religious/social and security arenas are still intensely debated, most of the focus and energy of what now passes for American conservatism is devoted to the economic arena. As we have seen, this has always been the most important arena in American conservatism, and it is now even more central and determinative than before.

The economic arena. The policy response of the George W. Bush administration to the financial crisis of 2008 was completely in keeping with the economic priorities of the reinvented, pseudo, conservatism which had brought about the crisis in the first place, i.e., massive government bailouts of large financial institutions (“Wall Street”). These bailouts were so massive that they provoked opposition from long-dormant elements within the Republican Party that represented small banks and small businesses (“Main Street”), but when directed at a Republican administration, this opposition was only brief and ineffective (e.g., Congress’s initial rejection of the administration’s TARP plan).

However, the succeeding Obama Administration also pursued economic policies which privileged large financial institutions, while not doing much that actually improved the condition of other sectors of the economy (e.g., unemployed workers). Moreover, the budgets of the Obama Administration and the Democratic Congress resulted in a massive expansion of Federal deficits and debt (an expansion that had actually begun under the preceding Bush Administration and Republican Congresses). Now the small bank and small business elements in the Republican Party had Democratic targets to oppose, and their opposition could be more sustained and more effective. The result was the beginning of the Tea Party movement in the summer of 2009, which was able to achieve significant successes in the Congressional elections of 2010. [8]

The economic and fiscal thinking of the Tea Party movement had much in common with that of *traditional* American conservatism, and with theorists such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. It had much less in common with the economic and fiscal thinking of reinvented conservatism, and with theorists such as Friedman and the monetarists. Indeed, the thinking of the Tea Party movement was largely the same as that of the libertarian movement, which had long been a marginal element within the Republican Party.

Consequently, with respect to the economic arena, American conservatism is now split between two tendencies: (1) a partially-discredited reinvented conservatism, which nevertheless continues to dominate the leadership or “establishment” of the Republican Party because it corresponds to the economic interests of the party’s elites and big donors, and (2) a partially-revived traditional conservatism, which is a significant insurgent force within the Republican Party, because it corresponds to the economic interests of much of the party’s base and many of its core voters.

This split was played out in the 2012 primary elections to nominate the Republican candidate for President. From the beginning, indeed as early as 2009, the preferred candidate of the Republican leadership and elite was Mitt Romney. In the early Republican primaries (those with several candidates competing, representing the several different tendencies within the Party), Mitt Romney consistently led with respect to campaign funding and the support of most big donors, but he usually received less than 30 percent of the votes. Conversely, the Tea Party voters often preferred Ron Paul, but they recognized that he could never win the nomination; consequently, their votes were split among several different candidates other than Romney. The party leadership had early determined that their best strategy to achieve a Romney nomination was to split the anti-Romney vote among several different candidates, no one of which could achieve a majority, or perhaps even a plurality and this strategy proved successful. The insurgent or anti-Romney candidates cancelled out each other. Romney may

not have achieved majorities, but he did achieve more pluralities than anyone else, and therefore the nomination.

The Republican Party leadership also calculated that any disaffected Tea Party voters could be corralled into voting for Romney against President Obama in the general election. By that time, the Tea Party resentment against Romney would be only a memory, and what would count in the minds of Tea Party voters would be the immediate and immense threat to their interests of a second Obama administration. And, to consolidate the Tea Party vote, Romney selected Congressman Paul Ryan, a prominent and respected economic and fiscal conservative in the traditional sense, to be his vice-presidential running mate. [9]

The religious and social arena. In contrast to the even greater dominance of economic and fiscal issues within American conservatism since 2008, religious and social issues have been pushed even further to the margins. Both the Republican Party establishment and the Tea Party movement consider religious and social issues to be at best a distraction from the central arena of economic and fiscal issues, and at worst causing an actual subtraction of votes of independents from Republican candidates; consequently, both agreed to marginalize these issues in the 2012 elections. Even such a fundamental and immediate concern to religious conservatives as homosexual marriage was given very little attention in the Republican presidential primaries. The religious conservatives did have a preferred candidate, Rick Santorum (who is a Roman Catholic, not an Evangelical Protestant), and he did score a couple of primary victories, but like the other anti-Romney candidates, he was soon overwhelmed by the Romney strategy and money. And, in the end, the marginalization of Evangelical Protestants even within the Republican Party culminated in the Romney-Ryan nomination, the first major-party president/vice-president ticket in American history which did not include a Protestant.

Meanwhile, the Hispanic percentage of the electorate continued to increase, and their votes continued to go overwhelmingly to the Democratic Party. With all of its focus upon economic and fiscal issues, the Republican Party was not able to develop a coherent and effective strategy to win over Hispanic voters in the 2012 elections. [10] Indeed, many traditional conservatives were opposed to Hispanic immigration, and they found some voice in the Tea Party movement. This drove Hispanic voters even further away from the Republican Party. Some Republican leaders, alarmed by this development, hoped to attract Hispanic voters by having some prominent Hispanic elected official be Romney's running mate (e.g. Senator Marco Rubio of Florida). But the selection of Paul Ryan brought an end to even these fitful efforts to attract Hispanics.

The security arena. The security arena provides another contrast in the development of American conservatism in the 2010s. In the midst of the continuing global economic crisis, it is not surprising that security and defense issues have been less prominent than before 2008, although they have certainly remained more prominent than religious and social ones. What is perhaps surprising, however, is the continuing articulation of neo-conservative priorities and policies among most Republican leaders, including Mitt Romney. One might have thought that neo-conservatism would have been discredited by its debacle in the Iraq and Afghan wars, but in the election year of 2012, it was just as prominent among Republican candidates for president as it had been in the George W. Bush Administration, which put the United States into those wars.

The explanation for the continuing prominence of neo-conservatism in the Republican Party does not lie in the base of Republican voters. Most of these have become critical or skeptical of U.S. military interventions abroad, especially for such remote goals as nation-building and democracy-promotion. In particular, the Tea Party movement has largely avoided discussion of security and defense issues, and many of its members take positions similar to those of the anti-interventionist (and anti-defense-spending) libertarian movement. Rather, the explanation lies in the Republican elite, and particularly with some of the Republican Party's big donors. These are found in both older sources of funding, such as the defense industry, and in newer sources of funding, such as hedge funds, and they continue to support neo-conservative priorities and policies, particularly with respect to the Middle East.

In the early Republican primaries of 2012, the neo-conservatives' preferred presidential candidate was Newt Gingrich. Indeed, it was funding (in the amount of \$20 million) from just one big donor, Sheldon Adelson, a casino magnate, that accounted for there being a Gingrich campaign at all and for its few and brief successes.[11] When it became clear that Romney was going to win the nomination, the neo-conservative donors, including Sheldon Adelson, then threw their support to him. Romney reciprocated by appointing a large panel of advisors on security and defense issues, most of whom were prominent neo-conservatives, and by making a series of well-publicized speeches, which advocated just about every neo-conservative priority and policy.

There is an obvious contradiction between the fiscal conservatism of a substantial majority of the Republican Party's big donors and the security neo-conservatism of a significant minority of its big donors. Such contradictions have to be resolved, or at least negotiated, within a presidential administration when it actually has to make and implement decisions about security issues which entail large fiscal costs. Within a mere presidential campaign, however, candidates can now promise almost anything and everything to particular audiences in different arenas, even things that are contradictory, and this entails almost no political cost at

all. This is exactly what Romney did in 2012 with respect to the economic and the security arenas.

What, then, is the character of American conservatism in 2012, four years after the debacle of the reinvented version, brought about by the Great Recession and the ongoing global economic crisis and in the immediate aftermath of the Republicans' defeats in the Presidential and Senatorial elections? In this regard, we will sum up the current condition of the conservative coalition in its three component arenas.

In the economic arena, conservatism continues to be dominated and defined by the same kind of big-business, especially big-bank, priorities and policies which have been dominant for many decades. This domination has even been strengthened in recent years by the greatly increased weight in the Republican Party of big donors to its candidates for public office.^[12] But the Party also continues to articulate the rhetoric of traditional, free-market, conservatism, and this has been enough to retain its traditional small-business and independent-proprietor base among voters. Indeed, this base has even been strengthened in recent years by the energy and activism of the Tea Party movement, which on economic issues adheres to traditional-conservative values. In short, in regard to the economic arena, American conservatism is now characterized in its rhetoric by the values of traditional conservatism—supported by a steady or even strengthened mass base of voters—and in its reality by the priorities and policies of what we have called reinvented conservatism—supported by a steady or even strengthened elite source of donors.

In the religious and social arena, however, the picture is very different. This kind of conservatism is today much weaker and more marginalized than it was four years ago. First, there are now very few big donors supporting the electoral campaigns of religious and social conservatives (the only prominent exception in the 2012 elections was a billionaire investor, Foster Friese, who provided the principal financial backing for Rick Santorum). And there has also been a substantial decrease in the number of voters who put religious and social issues as their chief concern when deciding for whom to vote. Moreover, the Republican Party can always be confident that this shrinking—but still essential—part of its electoral base will continue to cast its votes, however unenthusiastically, for Republican candidates and not for Democratic ones. With a very small donor elite and a shrinking and subordinate voter base, it is not surprising that religious and social conservatives are now only a weak and subordinated component within today's American conservatism.

Finally, in the security arena, the picture is again different, a kind of mixture of the contrasting situations in the other two arenas. First, although the number of big donors who prioritize security issues is much smaller than those who prioritize economic ones, their donations are

still sufficient to essentially buy the security priorities of Republican candidates. These priorities are those of neo-conservatism, not traditional (“realist” in current terminology) conservatism; in fact, today, there are virtually no big donors who support traditional security conservatives to be candidates for public office. When we turn from the donor elite to the voter base, however, the situation is reversed. There are very few voters who actually put neo-conservative security priorities and policies (e.g., U.S. military interventions and democracy-promotion abroad) as their chief concern when deciding for whom to vote. Although there are a small number of voters who do make security issues their top concern, the large majority of these actually adhere to traditional-conservative security priorities and policies (e.g., a strong military to defend America itself). With a substantial donor elite promoting neo-conservative security positions and a small voter base adhering to traditional-conservative security positions, it is not surprising that the security arena was an important but secondary one for Republican candidates during the 2012 primary and general elections. But within this secondary area, neo-conservatism has dominated.

Prospects for the Future: Whither American Conservatism?

By itself, this review of the various components of the contemporary conservative coalition would suggest that the electoral prospects for the Republican Party in the future are rather poor. Its defeats in the 2012 elections are likely to be repeated in succeeding elections. There is a well-funded and well-mobilized base for economic and fiscal conservatism, but although this base is strong, it is narrow. Probably no more than 30 percent of the national electorate now votes the way they do because they hold conservative economic and fiscal values, and this is at a time of pronounced economic and fiscal crisis. Of course, within particular Congressional districts and particular states, this percentage will be higher, and this will enable economic and fiscal conservatives—when they can make alliances with large numbers of religious/social or security/patriotic conservatives—to win elections to the U.S. House of Representatives (and even to win a majority) or to the U.S. Senate (but where they are unlikely to with a majority). But in general the prospects for conservatives to win *presidential* elections are doubtful.

It is possible, then, that the great debacle of reinvented conservatism in the 2010s will have consequences for American conservatism and the Republican Party similar to those that followed the original great debacle of traditional conservatism in the 1930s. That is, American conservatism already will have entered into an era where it will mostly be a political minority, while some new version of American progressivism will be in political ascendancy.

Of course, some Republican politicians are well-aware of these prospects, and they cannot be expected to just passively accept the implications. Rather, we would expect that they will seek to bring about yet another reinvention of American conservatism, one which would provide a

broader and stronger base for the Republican Party than the current narrow, incoherent, and withered version. What might this new version of American conservatism look like, given the electoral realities (which are based upon political, economic, social, but also demographic realities) of the 2010s and beyond? And here, through a glass darkly, we may glimpse the increasing significance of race.

The potential role of racial identity. Racial issues, in the form of slavery and the Civil War, were obviously at the origin of the Republican Party and in its ascendancy during its first 70 years. However, the Party never was seen as the white party. On the contrary, where blacks were able to vote, they generally voted Republican. It was the Democratic Party in the South (in the once-Confederate states) that was seen, and seen accurately, as the white party. More broadly, after the Civil War, traditional American conservatism, while neglectful of the interests of black people, did not include white racial identity as an important component, even in its social or cultural dimensions.

However, the coming of the civil rights movement of the 1950s-1960s—and especially the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965—brought about a new racial reality in American partisan politics and a reversal of the racial identities of the Republican and Democratic parties. By the late 1960s, blacks were overwhelmingly voting for the Democratic Party, and whites in the South were largely voting for the Republican Party. Indeed, with their “Southern strategy,” Republican leaders made it a major objective to have Southern whites see the Republican Party as the white party. In the South, this new racial and partisan reality has only become more pronounced during the ensuing half-century.

In the rest of America, however, Republican leaders have generally tried to avoid a racial identity being attached to the Party. Rather, as we have seen, they have emphasized economic/fiscal, religious/social, and security/patriotic issues and identities. And what has been true of the Republican Party has been even more true of the reinvented conservative movement. None of the major components of reinvented conservatism has provided any acceptance or even acknowledgement of racial issues and identity as being legitimate. The only exception is in the social arena, where many social and cultural conservatives have criticized affirmative-action policies which have explicitly and directly given preferences to blacks and Hispanics.

Such policies seemed to many to be in obvious contradiction to all the language and legislation of the civil rights movement about prohibiting discrimination based upon race and about equal rights for all, and it provoked a good deal of resentment—and even delegitimization of the Federal government—among many whites. In recent years, therefore, progressives have developed an alternative way of constructing public policies in order to give substantial

assistance to blacks and Hispanics. Since a much larger proportion of these two groups is poor, in comparison with whites (and also with Asian-Americans), policies which give substantial assistance to poor people will implicitly and indirectly also give such assistance to blacks and Hispanics. There have been three major areas where such policies have been implemented in recent years: (1) housing ownership; (2) economic stimulus; and (3) medical care.

(1) Several major Federal housing programs promoted giving sub-prime and “alternative” (i.e., higher risk) mortgages to poor people, and probably a majority of such mortgages were sold to blacks and Hispanics. In a sense, then, this program put blacks and Hispanics at the center of the housing and financial crisis that began in 2007. Although these housing policies had been devised to advance progressive ideals and interests, and were therefore supported by Democratic presidential administrations and Congressional legislators, they were also supported by the Republican administration of George W. Bush and by the Republican Congresses from 1994 to 2006.

(2) The economic stimulus program which the Obama Administration and the Democratic Congress adopted in early 2009 directed most of its assistance to maintaining or increasing employment among public-service workers, state and municipal as well as Federal. In many localities, however, a large number of these workers are black and Hispanic. (They are also members of public-service unions, which regularly and overwhelmingly gave campaign contributions to Democratic candidates. In fact, public-service workers do not actually comprise the poorer parts of the black and Hispanic populations. An economic-stimulus program truly focused upon poorer blacks and Hispanics would have emphasized infrastructure projects, which would have hired large numbers of black and Hispanic construction workers).

(3) The Health Care Act which the Obama Administration and the Democratic Congress passed in 2010 greatly expanded Federal spending on the Medicaid program, in which a large number of the recipients are blacks and Hispanics. The Act provided that a good part of this expansion of Medicaid would be funded by shifting money from Medicare, in which most recipients are white. Whereas the disproportionate assistance given to blacks and Hispanics by the housing-ownership and economic-stimulus programs was largely unnoticed by whites, this aspect of the Health Care Act soon became a topic of private conversations, an underground discourse beneath the public discourse, among many older white conservatives.

There is therefore a growing consciousness among whites, especially among older ones, that Democratic programs not only benefit the poor at the expense of the middle class, but that they benefit blacks and Hispanics at the expense of whites. This consciousness is heightened

by current economic realities, because government policies to bring about redistribution of monies from a stagnant or shrinking economic pie impose obvious and painful costs upon the middle class. It is also heightened by changing demographic realities, because the black and Hispanic proportion of the American population is steadily increasing, with these two groups already accounting for a majority of births in the United States each year.

Since the conventional identities of Republican voters—be they the identities of either traditional conservatism or reinvented conservatism—now issue in a voting base that is too narrow and withered to win most presidential and senatorial elections, the Republican Party leadership has to think about how to expand that base and that probably means adding groups with new identities or ones that are redefined. In particular, the Republican establishment will try to somehow persuade many more Hispanics (73 percent of whom voted for Obama in the 2012 presidential election) to vote Republican in the future. [13] However, there are formidable sociological and political obstacles standing in the way of this establishment Hispanic project.

An obvious alternative path for the Republican Party in expanding its electoral base leads from the South to the rest of America, i.e. from the Republicans being the white party in the South to the Republicans being the white party in America as a whole. In the 2012 presidential election Romney got 60 percent of the white vote, while Obama received only 38 percent. Of course the Republican establishment knows how dangerous and destructive it would be to have an American party system defined and divided along racial lines, even if not explicitly or overtly so. However, if the Party grows more desperate to gather voters in hard times, its younger political entrepreneurs might calculate that a racial path for the Party might well be the best path to advance their own ambitions, and themselves.

These speculations lead to a prospective realignment—or rather a sharpening of the current alignment—of the American party system along the following lines: The core voting groups for the progressive coalition and the Democratic Party are (1) blacks, (2) Hispanics, and (3) workers in the public sector. Conversely, the core voting groups for the conservative coalition and the Republican Party are (1) economic and fiscal conservatives; (2) Evangelical or Bible-believing Protestants; and (3) white male workers in the private sector.[14]

The potential role of gender identity. Of course, in this alignment there remains one immense independent or swing group, and that is white women. A substantial majority of these now vote for Democratic candidates, with economic issues being primary for working-class women and social issues being primary for middle-class women. If these women continue to vote for the Democratic Party in the future, the prospects for the Republican Party to win most presidential and senatorial elections will remain bleak.

In our long review of the history of American conservatism, we have seen it appeal over the decades and in successive versions to a wide array of different groups and interests. But neither traditional conservatism or reinvented conservatism ever had much to appeal to women, if they saw their principal identity to be as women. The same is true of the weakened movement that now passes for American conservatism and of the Republican Party that is its institutional expression. It will only be if the conservatives and the Republicans can convince large numbers of American women that their principal concern must be about conserving something important to them that American conservatism will have a future.

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The New Cold War History

By John Lewis Gaddis

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John Lewis Gaddis is an expert on the Cold War and the Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University. This essay is based on a keynote address delivered by Professor Gaddis at FPRI's History Institute on "The Cold War Revisited," May 1-2, 1998, and was published in Footnotes. Designed for secondary school teachers and faculty at community colleges, the History Institutes are part of a larger program of research, publication, and education on issues concerning American identity.

The Cold War has always been the subject of intense debate—was it necessary, was it just, why did it happen, and how did it end—and has been a challenging topic for teachers. Over 40 teachers from 17 states and two foreign countries met at this History Institute to hear five experts present the best and latest thinking about the Cold War and its lessons. Now is a particularly exciting time to be taking stock of this major issue of American and world history. New evidence both from the former Soviet Union and the West is overturning received opinions. We now know more than we did ten years ago, but less than we will know in the future.

John Lewis Gaddis is Robert A. Lovett Professor of History at Yale University. His most recent book is *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford University Press, 1997).

Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend. Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read.
—Groucho Marx

I like this quotation from the other Marx because it suggests how limited our view of the Cold War, until quite recently, has actually been. In contrast to the way most history is written, Cold War historians through the end of the 1980s were working within rather than after the event they were trying to describe. We had no way of knowing the final outcome, and we could determine the motivations of only some—but by no means all—of the major actors. We were in something like the position of those puzzled poseurs Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, wondering what in the world was going on and how it was all going to come out.

We now know, to coin a phrase. Or, at least, we know a good deal more than we once did. We will never have the full story: we don't have that for any historical event, no matter how far back in the past. Historians can no more reconstruct what actually happened than maps can replicate what is really there. But we can represent the past, just as cartographers approximate

terrain. And with the end of the Cold War and at least the partial opening of documents from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China, the fit between our representations and the reality they describe has become a lot closer than it once was.

So what does it all add up to? What is the new Cold War history—that is, histories of the Cold War written after the Cold War ended—all about?

First, it is clear now that, contrary to what historians and theorists of international relations expected when the Cold War began, democratic governments behaved more realistically throughout than did their authoritarian counterparts. By realism, I mean the ability to align one's actions with one's interests. The fact that the Cold War ended as it did—with the world more democratic than it has ever been—suggests strongly that authoritarianism gave rise to illusions more often than it did effective policy.

We now know what some of these illusions were. Stalin, for example, believed to his dying day that the capitalist states would never join together to contain Soviet expansionism. Why? Because Lenin had taught that capitalists were too greedy ever to cooperate with one another: this idea left the Soviet leader ill-equipped to deal such initiatives as the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the reintegration of Germany and Japan into an American-run system of alliances. Mao Zedong, also for ideological reasons, saw the Soviet Union as an ally of the newly-established People's Republic of China; that view too, in time, he had to rethink. And Nikita Khrushchev risked the fate of his country and possibly of the entire world by placing missiles in Cuba in 1962, in the absurd hope that this could somehow ensure the spread of Castro's revolution throughout Latin America.

What these errors have in common is a romantic rather than a realist view of the world: one gets a certain idea in one's head, rather like Cervantes' Don Quixote, and in an authoritarian system no one is in a position to tell the top leader that his conclusions make no sense. Democratic leaders were often no wiser. But democratic systems did at least provide ways to challenge illusions at the top when they arose, and ultimately to remove leaders who persisted in holding onto them. Far from being progressive states, then, the Soviet Union, its Eastern European satellites and China functioned for many years as absolute monarchies, with all the possibilities for impractical illusions that such a system entails.

Second, and as a consequence, Cold War historians are giving greater weight than they once did to the role of ideas in shaping that conflict. We traditionally had viewed the Cold War as a clash of great powers—as a continuation of rivalries that had characterized international relations during the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries. We had calculated power in terms of material indices, giving the greatest emphasis to the military capabilities that existed on each side. Despite the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union were strongly ideological states, neither historians nor theorists of international relations tended to give

sufficient attention to the comparative content of these ideologies, or to the extent to which they elicited support from the people who had to live with them.

What we now can see, though, is that one of the Cold War super-powers—the Soviet Union—abruptly and completely collapsed, despite the fact that its military strength remained unimpaired. That suggests strongly that we who have studied the Cold War over many years neglected the non-military components of power, and especially the role of ideas. For Marxism-Leninism was itself an idea, which in turn determined how the Soviet Union and the other socialist states organized their power, their politics, their economics, and ultimately the appeals they made to their own people as well as to those beyond their borders. And as the events of 1989-91 all too clearly show, that idea had by then lost its legitimacy.

Cold War history is, therefore, the story of how the Soviet Union and its allies managed to squander their ideological appeal over many years, while the Western democracies retained and even expanded their own. In the end, what people thought counted for much more than what states could do—and that is a big change from how we've previously conceived Cold War history.

The pattern, in retrospect, was clear by the early 1960s. Capitalism had revived, and the record of command economies had shown no signs of matching it. Marxism-Leninism had suffered devastating setbacks with the suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet split, and the humiliation of the Cuban missile crisis. Germany and Japan had been successfully reintegrated into the Western defense bloc at the time, and the West was well ahead in nuclear weaponry. Why, then, didn't the Cold War end at that point?

Here there's yet a third new insight into Cold War history: it is that nuclear weapons stabilized but probably also prolonged that conflict. We've suspected for a long time that these weapons discouraged escalation of the kind that had caused pre-Cold War crises to lead to hot wars. The Cold War was full of crises, none of them escalated to all-out war, and in this sense nuclear weapons were beneficial.

In another sense, though, they may have extended the Cold War beyond the point at which it might otherwise have ended. Nuclear weapons were so awesome—and the world had apparently come so close to seeing them used during the Cuban missile crisis—that the tendency developed to measure world power almost entirely in terms of nuclear capabilities, and to neglect its other dimensions of power. It was as if in assessing the health of some great beast one looked only at its external armaments, paying no attention to the functioning of its brain, heart, and liver. Such an animal would remain formidable in appearance until the day it suddenly keeled over and died.

What nuclear weapons did, then, was to conceal the condition of an aging, formidably armed, but internally deteriorating state. With its sudden death, the Cold War was suddenly over.

That brings up a final, albeit controversial, point: can we really separate the Cold War from the Soviet Union itself? Could such a state have functioned in any other environment? It's worth recalling that the Bolshevik Revolution was itself a declaration of cold war against all other states in the international system at the time. No Soviet leader until Mikhail Gorbachev disavowed the goal of ultimately overthrowing capitalism everywhere, however distant that prospect might have come to seem. The Soviet Union was, therefore, a state uniquely configured for the Cold War—and it has become a good deal more difficult, now that that conflict has ended, to see how it could have done so without the Soviet Union itself having passed from the scene.

Cold War history is becoming at last normal history, in that we can at last write it from beyond a Rosencrantz and Guildenstern point of view. We have finally managed to get outside Groucho's dog, and it's a lot easier now to see what's been going on. Given our contentious character, historians are not about to agree, now or for decades to come, about the precise details and what they mean. We can at least accept the fact, though, that the view is exhilarating.

New Perspectives on the Genesis of the U.S.

By Trudy Kuehner

September 2004

Trudy Kuehner served as managing editor of Orbis from 2001-2007 and was the associate director of the Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education at the Foreign Policy Research Institute from 2007-2009. This report was written for FPRI's 11th History Institute for Teachers on June 5-6th, 2004, which itself was held in conjunction with the publication of Walter McDougall's critically acclaimed book Freedom Just Around the Corner: A New American History, 1585—1828. The conference brought together forty-five teachers from fifteen states for a weekend of lectures and seminars featuring leading international scholars. It was later published in Footnotes.

Colonial Origins of American Identity

Walter McDougall, co-chair of FPRI's History Institute and professor of international relations and history at the University of Pennsylvania, began by noting that devotionals to "divine right republicanism" pervade America's national hymns, texts, and oratory to such a degree that most of us do not even notice them. But in addition to fashioning a new Promised Land—the last, best hope of mankind—Americans also can suffer messianic delusions, cloaking the self-centered pursuit of happiness in self-righteous piety. We run the full gamut from charity and sacrifice to cruelty and hypocrisy precisely because we've been uniquely free to be fully human. Anglo-Irish statesman Edmund Burke understood this when he observed in 1775 that "even if the colonists were less numerous, less loving of liberty, less steeped in religion, less proud, they would still be irrepressible for the simple fact Americans are full of chicane and take whatever they want."

English drifter Thomas Paine, who arrived in Philadelphia in 1775, defined the colonists' identity for them fourteen months later, in *Common Sense*. Drawing on both radical Whig ideology and evangelical Protestant millenarianism, he wrote that anyone who wasn't a Patriot wasn't an American. His conflation of Biblical and secular principles made America a kind of religion. He repeatedly warned that "We the people" will "get" anyone who failed to embrace the cause.

Yet only a minority of colonists displayed sacrifice for the cause. The earliest colonial promoters were bold operators who hustled to attract labor and capital. As early as 1651, when Parliament passed the first Navigation Act, New England and Virginia actually forbade compliance with English law. The "unanimous" passage of the Declaration of Independence required arm-twisting, logrolling, and possibly threats and bribes. Benjamin Franklin engaged

in diplomatic duplicity, and Federalists such as Madison and Hamilton employed brilliant deceptions to convoke the Constitutional Congress.

The Declaration's framers hoped to harness private ambitions to the public good, devising checks and balances to corruption. But Americans quickly adapted themselves to a free market in goods, services, law, and spirituality. The stories of westward expansion, the admission of new states, and the development of the railroads and canals all have their free-wheeling side. But Paine's vision did come true: liberty under the law freed a people already trained to be hustlers in the positive sense of doers, dreamers, builders as well as in the sense of speculators, manipulators, profiteers and scofflaws. This, along with bountiful resources, permitted the U.S. to build the most dynamic nation in history.

Far from rejecting the spirits of English expansion, the colonies embraced them and may even have rebelled to defend these spirits of capitalism, reformation, the geopolitical idea that settlement confers ownership, and the right of eminent domain. Yes, they wanted religious and civil liberty, but as Oscar Handlin put it, "Liberty was a continent Americans found while searching for something else."

Why did the American Revolution occur? Many colonists displayed contempt for distant authority the moment they hit the New World, and yet those proto-Americans remained loyal to the crown for 156 years after landing in Jamestown in 1607 and fought with the British in many wars. It took the English victory in the Seven Years French-Indian War, which the colonists had helped achieve, to separate them. After the conquest of Canada, the king violated all four of the above spirits. Parliament imposed new taxes and legalized the Catholic Church, Britain ceded the Mississippi Basin to Spain, and George III forbade white settlement west of the Appalachians, to protect his new subjects, the Indians. These statesman-like responses looked to America like heresy.

Prof. McDougall concluded that America is a priesthood of believers in a civil religion, master builders, revolutionaries devoted to creative destruction, a jealous people whose pursuit of happiness will not be interfered with, and hustling self-reinventors. But as Rev. John Wiswall observed in 1776, "the American people are altogether too free [ever] to be content with their happiness."

Migration and Colonization

Daniel Richter of the University of Pennsylvania's McNeil Center for Early American Studies deconstructed some of the popular perceptions of the peopling of the continent through 1763 and presented ways teachers might give their students a sense of the depth of time and diversity involved.

Having arrived in America at least 10,000 and possibly as long as 35,000 years ago, it is inaccurate to depict Native Americans as simply the nation's first immigrants: "since the Ice Age" is as good as forever for these purposes. Nor were the millennia until the Europeans' arrival years of "nothing happening." The tribes dispersed and came to have as different cultures as Europeans did among themselves, with similarly shifting and reconfiguring trade, political, and religious centers.

Nor did they see the colonists as representing one homogenous "European" empire along some fixed east-west frontier. The imperial landscape was crowded, with the West Indies the center of the new world and North America a distant frontier for many colonists. Settlements like New France, New Netherlands, and New Sweden did eventually emerge along rivers to exploit trade with Native Americans. Indeed, the seeds of ethnic diversity may be represented in settlements such as Albany.

For their part, the colonists saw themselves not so much as American but as part of the larger British-Atlantic world, which grew, as the Native Americans' settlements had, along trade routes. Colonists like the Dutch or French had come not as settlers, but to man trading posts. Only in 1763, with the French-Indian war, did a more east-west border, relentlessly pushing west, emerge.

Prof. Richter also reviewed the push-pulls of the 17th-century English migration and the wider 18th-century Atlantic migration. He noted that some European cultures showed a greater affinity for moving, both within and out of their country, than others. And America was but one of many places Europeans could go to seek economic and other opportunities. English emigrants could equally elect Ireland, for instance.

Liberty and Religion in American Society

J. C. D. Clark of the University of Kansas considered how reinterpretation of the American Revolution can illuminate our understanding of U.S. culture in the present. The Revolution was about liberty, but over-familiarity with the term can lead us to miss what people meant by "liberty" in the late eighteenth century and how Americans came to conceive of liberty as a sacred cause.

The evolution of the language of rights is analogous. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the nature of "rights" was keenly debated. Over the centuries, more and more claims of "rights" came to be made until after the Second World War, the "rights of man" had metamorphosed into "human rights."

Something similar happened in the 18th century to the idea of "liberty." Previously, "liberties" were predominantly understood as specific privileges or entitlements, and "liberty" as a

summation of them. This usage changed, especially in the American colonies. The American Declaration of Independence did not assert that "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" were self-evident; what was self-evident was that "their Creator" had endowed men with these things. This made the Declaration a claim about God's actions and intentions. It went on to list a series of grievances—"liberties" that had been violated. But "liberty" was no mere summing up of these specific liberties. It was a different, more elevated, idea.

Prof. Clark located the American image of "liberty" within the positive and negative liberty categorization propounded by Isaiah Berlin: liberty can be freedom from or freedom to do something. "Liberties" echo an attachment to "freedom from"; "liberty" looks to "freedom to." In the American Revolution, "freedom from" gets collapsed into "freedom to."

David Hackett Fischer has traced four different "folkways" of the concept in America: "ordered liberty" in Puritan New England, "hegemonic liberty" in Virginia, reciprocal liberty in the Quaker Delaware region; and "natural liberty" in the backcountry, peopled by Scots and Irish. Of course, these ways changed over time, but "liberty" retains to this day in America religious connotations. Thus President Bush could explain in a 2002 interview that his values were "God-given values. These aren't U.S.-created values." The common feature of many aspects of contemporary U.S. culture has been to remake the world in its own image, an evangelical project that contrasts with understandings of "liberty" elsewhere in the world. This raises the question whether other societies have been more successful in safeguarding "freedom from," and whether the U.S.'s self-image as a defender of freedom and its frequent assertion of the "freedom to" rest on an important misinterpretation of its origins.

Struggle for Mastery in North America

Jeremy Black of the University of Exeter recalled that the struggle for mastery of America didn't end with the colonies' attaining independence. If anything, they became less protected, and it was far from clear how many times the empire would strike back. This would play a major role not just in American foreign policy, but also in its domestic history.

Britain, France, and Spain were all present in North America in the 1780s, and America was peculiarly vulnerable as a nation on the oceanic periphery—most of its population lived within 75 miles of the coast. The Continental Navy would, excepting the Civil War, not be able to project power until the late 19th century. Coastal defense was a much larger concern than defending against American Indians. And the peace settlement had left many unanswered questions that would lead ultimately to the Civil War.

How would the nation formed in 1776 deal with its fragility? Its westward expansion was far less inevitable and more syncretic than used to be emphasized. There have been few cases (America, Siberia, Australia) where it was relatively easy for a Western nation to overpower

the natives. Western colonies of the 19th-20th centuries lasted only an astonishingly short fifty years in much of the world. But colonization was not what Britain had been trying to do in America: it had only sought maritime hegemony and trade. France, too, in the 1730s-50s was seeking not settlements but trade in Quebec, Havana, and Manila. And operating and supplying a gunboat navy to protect these was very difficult.

Prof. Black also noted that the British had had no formal colonial policy. It delegated a great deal of authority to entities such as the East India Co. and the Hudson Bay Co., which were self-governed by the local elite. And the elderly George II had been more concerned with the implications of European conflicts than with events in, say, the Ohio Valley: it had no master plan to gain control there. The same can be said of France, which gained Quebec almost by chance.

After the war of independence, only these nations' preoccupations elsewhere permitted America's expansion, creating a power vacuum America could fill without even needing to fund and field a large military. But its frontiers took shape in a protean fashion, with no obvious northern or southern boundary, and the nation only became imperial late in the 19th century. Initially, a great deal of debate surrounded the issue how to mobilize strength when your nation has and wants a different state structure and ideology.

With the 20th century Cold War and America's new foreign policy of interventionism, the question is how far the existing judicial, taxation, and other state structures can support this new orientation.

The Origins of American Constitutionalism

Gordon Wood of Brown University gave the keynote speech, co-sponsored by the Brown Club of Philadelphia. He began by discussing the many ways America's constitution was unusual, if not unique, at the time—federalism, separation of powers, separation of church and state, independent judiciaries and presidents, judicial review—that are now typical. Similarly, Americans used to be thought unique in their obsession with rights, but that obsession now is shared throughout the developed world.

However, the American constitution remains unique in light of its specific origins. Unlike many European countries that existed as nations before they were states, America was a state before it was a nation. At its founding, America was imagined as something resembling England, but lacking the corruption Americans believed plagued the English constitution.

The American revolutionaries conceived of a constitution as a written document, a fundamental law circumscribing the government. The English constitution, in contrast, was an unwritten mixture of laws, customs, principles, and institutions, referring both to the way the

government was constituted and to the rights it was to protect. The American constitution was to be a document distinct from and superior to all the operations of government—"antecedent to" a government, as Thomas Paine put it; a Bible for every family to possess and cite. Its framers knew that to make sense of their envisioned system, sovereignty had to remain with the people. One may agree or disagree with the wisdom of the outcomes this has produced, but Prof. Wood emphasized that the American constitution does truly rest with the people.

Foundations, Foundationalisms, Fundamentalisms: Thinking about American History

To contextualize the ways he thinks about American history, J. G. A. Pocock of Johns Hopkins University began by explaining ancient vs. modern ideas of republics.

The creation of the American republic occurred at a hinge moment when the understanding of republics in ancient and neoclassical terms was increasingly in competition with a new, modern, commercial, and individualist understanding. In the ancient understanding, the reason for having a republic was to enhance citizens' opportunity to develop their political capacity; in the modern understanding, the function of the political was to liberate and protect personal and social endeavors. Where some scholars stress the speed and completeness with which the American republic moved from the ancient understanding towards the modern, Prof. Pocock emphasizes the extent to which ancient values survived and complicated Americans' understanding of themselves.

Ancients insisted that a republic could not survive if its magistrates and citizens became corrupt or dependent on one another, which would lead to their degeneration as moral beings. Prof. Pocock noted that all modern republics have a problem with corruption, but none equals the U.S. in the degree to which it constantly worries about it and fears that it is becoming corrupt. This stems from the ancient idea that republican virtue and corruption are both incompatible and intimately linked.

In the ancient model, citizens met in assemblies to govern themselves. As the republics grew into empires, it became harder for these assemblies to meet; and as they became civil societies, it also became less desirable: as Adam Smith remarked, people in civil society have better things to do than to be governing themselves all the time. Thus arose the idea of electing representatives to govern for them. America's modernity is seen in James Madison's writing in the Federalist Papers—distorting the history of political language—that a polity the citizens rule themselves is a democracy, but one they rule through representatives is a republic.

At least a hundred years before Madison wrote this it had been a commonplace of English political rhetoric that representatives easily become corrupt. In our own time, it is hard to believe that those we elect in any sense represent us. If we identify ourselves with them, we are

giving ourselves to them; if we don't, we are allowing them to rule us. The political class begins to look like an oligarchy of professional politicians.

With the American Revolution, Americans who had thought they were English began to think of themselves as no longer British. The English kingdom had expanded to become a complex monarchy including Ireland, Scotland, and the colonies of Caribbean. The debate about republics, ancient and modern, was part of a larger debate surrounding the ways the monarchy had expanded, what Edmund Burke termed "the present discontents." The language of this debate became the language of a civil war in the American colonies and what the Romans called a social war (between associated states) in the empire.

The Declaration of Independence is not republican—it goes no further than to declare the government of a king dissolved. One notes the use it makes of John Locke's account of how a government may be dissolved. Locke imagined the dissolution of the government of a single state, whose people then reverted to the state of nature. The stated purpose of the Declaration was to dissolve the ties that had connected one people with another—it is not terminating a civil government so much as an empire.

The Declaration had to invent concepts of "American" and "British," neither of which yet existed—the English and Scottish did not think of themselves as "British," as the Declaration treats them. But the Declaration does not declare George III deposed, solicit support from within Britain, or incite the "disaffected patriots" of England to dissolve their government. To the British people it spoke only of rejection and defiance.

In America's civil religion, the Declaration is the moment of the Covenant and the Constitution the moment of the Law. Few other nations begin their history with such a conscious act of foundation, which proclaims principles said to be applicable to the rest of mankind. While it took Abraham Lincoln to mythologize America's founding as the world's last, best hope, the American founders assuredly thought they were founders. Prof. Pocock recalled Michael Oakeshott, who saw history as an unending stream of contingency, in which one takes from time to time such actions as seem necessary and justifiable—"when in the course of human events" they appear necessary and justifiable. On an Oakeshottean reading, 1776 was a moment when Americans found it necessary to found a polity on the basis of certain enduring principles.

America's foundational culture makes it easy to fall into a cycle of self-condemnation and denial. American historiography, Prof. Pocock noted, can alternate between a liturgical mode in which the principles are celebrated and a Jeremiad mode in which the people are condemned for falling away from them. Prof. Pocock dismissed the idea of American messianism, but noted that the American universalism of the moment may arise from the

Enlightenment belief that all good things come from having a commercial civil society and a free market, regardless of whether preconditions have been met.

Whigs Vs. Democrats: Competing Visions of American Politics

Allen Guelzo of Eastern University discussed the emergence of political parties in the new Republic over the years 1750-1865. The Founders had not anticipated political parties: Thomas Jefferson declared that allegiance to a party was "the last degradation of a free and moral agent," while Alexander Hamilton vowed "to abolish factions and to unite all parties for the general welfare." Nevertheless, in less than a decade the ideological division between the two men had split American politics between the Hamiltonian (or Federalist) and the Jeffersonian (or Democratic-Republican, or simply Republican), with each blaming the other for making their own party necessary.

Hamilton's and Jefferson's conflict over economic policy touched Americans on almost every rung of the economic ladder and invited side-taking, to elect representatives who would avert the evil posed by the other side. This required expenditures of commitment that had to be rewarded with more than just electoral success. Beyond the patronage this engendered, political parties came to serve the larger purpose of establishing what Daniel Walker Howe called "political culture."

Thomas Jefferson's 1801 inaugural speech ("we are all Republicans; we are all Federalists") sought to quiet party politics, but differences over economic policy led Jefferson's own party to schismatize by 1820 into the more federalist National-Republicans and the agrarian Democratic-Republicans. By 1832, displeased with Andrew Jackson's war on the Second National Bank, National-Republicans had officially divorced to become the Whig Party, a name Henry Clay selected for its historic connotation of resistance to tyranny. The Whigs sought to differentiate themselves from Jacksonians by standing for economic opportunity, a national Christian social morality, and the preservation of the Union.

The Whigs saw a blending of public and private ethics; Jackson's Democrats (the old Democratic-Republicans) compartmentalized the public and the private, wanting laissez faire over the latter sphere. The Democrats made political virtue almost synonymous with the popular will, where Whiggism was suspicious of popular democracy. After the Panic of 1837, the Whigs had their first presidential victory in 1840, sending William Henry Harrison to the White House.

By 1856, slavery in the western states had become a dividing issue, sending deep South Whigs into the ranks of the Democrats and anti-slavery Northern Whigs into the newly-formed Republican Party. The spirit of the Whigs, however, remained in the policies of former Whig-turned-Republican Abraham Lincoln, who embodied Whig self-improvement, reason over

passion, and striving for national unity. The Civil War became the crucible in which these Whig elements hardened into national culture. Lincoln's Whiggism ebbed in the 20th century in the face of a rejuvenated Jeffersonianism. Whether this culture of hedonistic individualism and subsidy rather than aspiration will be challenged by a new national crisis is the burden the present generation will bear.

Classroom Strategies for Teaching U.S. History

Paul Dickler, AP U.S. History Teacher at Neshaminy High School and Senior Fellow of FPRI's Marvin Wachman Fund, summarized some key lessons for teachers. Students should be urged to guard against envisioning early America as just like modern America; a foreign land would be the better model. Through the early 19th century, it was more maritime than students may realize. The founding fathers are important, but it's the generations thereafter who make America what it is. He would also remind that more than ten thousand years residency is a long time, so Native Americans should be given their due. Our Whig heritage may be underappreciated, as is our idea that liberty is sacred—the corollary to the idea that religion should be free. He presented various sample teaching aids, and also led discussion on how to help high school students develop both a factual knowledge base and critical thinking skills, without putting one before the other.

PART III: NATO AND THE WEST

NATO: Correcting the Course

By Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

March 1999

The late Alexander M. Haig, Jr., was both a trustee and former President of FPRI, as well as a former Secretary of State and former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. This is the text of a speech delivered on March 18, 1999 on the occasion of NATO's impending 50th Anniversary.

Next month the leaders of the West will gather in Washington to celebrate a half-century of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Many thought NATO would never reach such an anniversary. When it was formed on April 4, 1949, the Cold War was underway, and history hung like a dark shadow over NATO's prospects. Great Britain and France were exhausted; the western half of a divided Germany was still stained by the Nazi crimes; and the U.S. had never before actually committed its forces to defend Europe. Also, the American armies had returned home to the other side of the Atlantic and were largely demobilized. Meanwhile the Red Army, recently victorious and commanded by Stalin, stood in the middle of Germany.

Thus, NATO's beginnings were not auspicious. A glittering signing ceremony in Washington and surprisingly broad Congressional support could not disguise the lack of military beef in the sandwich. What stood between Stalin and a free Europe at that point was the newly appointed NATO commander, General Eisenhower, his staff, and the United States Navy, which, as I remind my Navy friends, is not a land force. There were also a few nuclear weapons. To quote Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State, "these were not a frightening number."

In today's haze of memory, we forget that the road was so rocky at the outset. We also tend to forget that the road thereafter was never smooth. Faced by a daunting Soviet military machine, superior to NATO in important categories, the alliance was also beset by internal crises almost every year of its existence, including such divisive political issues as Germany's rearmament, General DeGaulle's opposition to frequently insensitive American influence, and Ostpolitik. There were fierce battles over strategic doctrine such as massive retaliation, graduated response, theater nuclear weapons, and the zero option. Throughout, NATO was pursued by a vast industry of critics always predicting its downfall and never out of work. I might add that they are still not out of work.

Yet somehow the alliance found its feet. Skilled leadership on both sides of the Atlantic rose to the challenge and the results are there for all to see. The United States became a European power; Germany and France were reconciled; and democracy itself was saved from totalitarian aggression. In the end NATO never had to fire a shot. The Soviet Union, contained by the

West and engulfed in the contradictions of its own system, went quietly into the night. This conclusion to the Cold War guaranteed NATO's place as the most successful alliance in history. Speaking as a soldier, I can assure you that victory without war is the sweetest kind of victory.

Given this background, we can and have already seen plenty of self-satisfied rhetoric about NATO's past and future. I do not want to add to that burden. Let me make only this personal observation. My time as Supreme Commander from 1974 to 1979 was among the most satisfying of my thirty-plus years of public service. FPRI's founder, Robert Strausz-Hupé, served as ambassador to the NATO Council for part of that period, and we achieved a couple of things that the historians will record. All members of the alliance increased defense spending by a real 3 percent despite great economic hardship. NATO also decided to deploy theater nuclear missiles despite Soviet threats and domestic protest. NATO also achieved greater readiness, created new reinforcement capabilities, and enhanced member nation coordination. Taken together this evidence of NATO's resolve shaped Gorbachev's later decision to seek accommodation with the West.

Today, even after the end of the Soviet Union, NATO remains essential to world peace. We and our allies hold the preponderance of economic and military power and this should give the champions of democracy comfort in a world still too often hostile to freedom. But I would temper self-congratulation with a warning. All is not well and all will not be well if NATO continues on its current course. Since the end of the Cold War, the Atlantic Alliance has embarked on three experiments. One is peace-keeping in the Balkans. Another is a debate over the respective roles of the U.S. and Europe in the alliance. And a third is a new security structure that includes both NATO expansion and partnership with Russia. In my view, each of these has been accompanied by serious distortions which, if not corrected, will challenge the integrity of the alliance itself.

Let me begin with peace-keeping. NATO fired its first shots after the Cold War in August 1995, when its aircraft bombed Serb positions in Bosnia. Today thousands of NATO troops still patrol a shaky truce in that torn country, and we seem ready to commit thousands more to reshape the province of Kosovo in what remains of Yugoslavia. Whatever it is, it is not peace-keeping. Simply put, NATO is trying to make peace where peace does not exist. NATO is also trying to rebuild states ripped apart by ethnic conflict. These are among the most difficult tasks imaginable, and I would be very surprised if we succeeded any time soon, if at all.

Some have said that NATO's actions in the Bosnia and Kosovo crises are a model of the alliance's new role. I hope not. Repeatedly, NATO's prestige has been risked over whether a hundred gunmen had side-arms or machine guns; whether artificial deadlines would be met by those skilled in the strategy of "cheat and retreat"; whether UN civil servants rather short of

spine would order NATO into action. And all of this was accompanied by some of the worst self-defeating rhetoric ever heard from Western leaders, who managed to combine moral indignation with political cowardice.

These are harsh words. But what else can be said of a policy that lets Humpty Dumpty fall off the wall and then tries to put him back together again? The lesson of these fiascoes is surely not to bluff late as we did in Bosnia. Nor can it be to bluff early as we have just done in Kosovo. Still less is it to put NATO forward with tough-sounding but empty demands made in Washington that look good in the headlines. Actually, these actions carry the direct, long term danger of diminishing NATO's deterrence.

Let me suggest an alternative approach. We should not automatically engage NATO in every out-of-area conflict as if the mere mention of the alliance would fix the problem. Instead, those few NATO powers who are able to project force should do so after agreeing among themselves. Hopefully the NATO alliance as a whole would support them. But the alliance per se, with its cumbersome consultation procedures, should not be the first resort. Nor should already weakening NATO transatlantic cooperation be further damaged by contentious efforts to establish acceptable new rules of engagement. But if the decision is made to engage the alliance, then NATO should say what it means and mean what it says. NATO ultimatums are not things to be switched on or off in reaction to tactical whims, even if these whims originate in Washington.

Finally, an ounce of prevention really is worth a pound of cure. In 1991, we should have recognized that U.S. warnings against the break-up of the Soviet Union would have encouraged Belgrade to use force. More timely transatlantic diplomacy might have helped. The best strategy would have been to work with our allies to keep Humpty Dumpty on the wall.

Let me turn now to the second NATO direction that should give us pause. We have always had a debate in the alliance over roles and responsibility. The actual burden of effort has often been misunderstood. Despite popular impressions here throughout much of the Cold War, the Europeans actually fielded more troops and spent a greater percentage of their assets on NATO than did the United States. Today, they have put more troops into the Balkans and spend more on Bosnia than we do.

All of this notwithstanding, there has been and will continue to be an underlying tension between the United States and some of our European allies. Some of this is attributable to arrogance. I wish officials in Washington would stop talking about the United States as the world's only superpower and indispensable nation as if this confers upon us a monopoly of wisdom that we clearly do not possess. And there are those in Europe, sometimes with French accents, who take a childish delight when we blunder or who claim for their own domestic

political purposes that America is too strong for the world's good. Would they really prefer that we be weak?

When you strip away this posturing, you will find two surviving ideas, a good one and a bad one. The good one is that the Europeans should revamp their thinking and their forces so that they become more effective. This is already taking place. The static and largely immobile European components of NATO are modernizing and becoming more mobile. There is no good reason why in joint operations NATO cannot make a division of labor that recognizes important differences. The U.S. does have a global reach that the Europeans lack and some capabilities that cannot be duplicated. Let each side contribute its strengths and let both sides compensate for the other's weaknesses.

Unhappily, the Balkan experience has cast a baleful shadow on this process. It was a mistake for the Bush Administration to tell the Europeans that Yugoslavia was their baby before Europe was ready to act, leading to a dangerous delusion on their part about the risks of premature commitment. Then came the U.N. confusion about the chain of command and U.S. refusal to commit even token ground forces to share the risks with European troops already deployed if U.S. airplanes bombed the Serbs. All of this led to a very bad idea that the Europeans should be chiefly responsible for European problems of vital interest to them while we handle the rest of the world of vital interest to us. In other words, the "European pillar" would stand alone on its own ground while the U.S. would pursue—more or less—its own other interests elsewhere.

The trouble with this approach is that it presumes a division of vital interests. Is European security less vital to us than to the Europeans because we live on this side of the ocean? If that were the case, there would never have been a NATO in the first instance. Is the security of the Persian Gulf less vital to the Europeans than to us simply because they cannot project the military power to protect it and we can? If that were the case, there would never have been European participants in Desert Storm.

The idea that the U.S. and Europe can make their way independently is a profound illusion demonstrated twice in this century. American political influence around the world depends on relations with our allies. U.S. defense plans rely upon allied participation for success. As for the Europeans, they look to the U.S. not just for security, but also to articulate the common interests that sometimes elude them. Moreover, the process of European unity is at a very delicate stage, and I am referring here to more than the debate over the Euro currency. Unified Germany is going through a change of generational leadership as it struggles to absorb the formerly communist east and readjust to new economic conditions. As we have seen recently, the debut of the new men has not exactly been reassuring.

To sum up, the only way to proceed is for both Europeans and Americans to participate in the defense of our common interests, even if the proportion of effort will vary according to the forces available and the crisis at hand. But an alliance that bifurcates its forces on the grounds that vital interests differ is an alliance headed for confusion if not dissolution.

Finally, a few words about NATO expansion and partnership with Russia. When the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland formally join the alliance, there will and should be a justified cheer for the overdue inclusion of these three long-suffering peoples. We will likely also hear that the Administration has produced a miracle in that Russia remains a democratic partner of the West despite NATO expansion. Nothing could be further from the truth. The time is long overdue for us to be very clear about expansion and even more clear about the nature of our relationship with Russia.

The Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles know exactly why they want to join NATO and it has little to do with moral rewards. For them the alliance is the only organization that has ever dealt effectively with the historic German problem and the still existent Russian problem. And from NATO's point of view, expansion makes it much more difficult for those in Moscow or elsewhere to reverse course on the results of the Cold War. So there is no doubt in my mind that NATO's move into central Europe had from the outset an important strategic rationale and we should have long ago labeled it as such.

Also we should not be complacent about the real situation in Moscow. Two presidents have hailed post-Soviet Russia as a democratic partner. I wish that this were true, but it is not yet so. Indeed Russia is not moving toward greater democracy. Today Russia is increasingly in the hands of the Communist party and is treating Russia's economic crisis primarily through the ruble printing press. As in 1991, hyperinflation is again on the horizon, threatening a second collapse of the Marxist myth. The possibility of a nationalist strongman is increasingly likely. Rearmament pump-priming could be the result, along with even more aggressive activity in the CIS. Contemporary Russian leaders are presiding over one of the greatest economic collapses of modern history. Since August 1998, the Russians have been plagued by a bad harvest, a ruble fallen in value by 66 percent, and industrial production off by 40 percent from a year earlier. Direct foreign investment has amounted to less than \$10 billion since 1991, less than 25 percent of what China attracts almost every year. And every day's headlines bring new revelations of corruption.

Despite its condition, today's Russian government is not friendly to the U.S. and has not been so for some time, probably since late 1993, when a coalition of communists and nationalists took control of the Duma. Take the issues one by one: no ratification of the START II treaty; little cooperation on preventing arms sales to countries like Iran; a steady campaign to get Saddam off the hook; an arms sale to Cyprus that might have led to a Greek-Turkish war; a

role both in the Balkans crisis and in the Middle East that can only be described as mischievous.

This is only a shorthand version of the situation, and we can debate the reasons for it. Yet, the fact remains that relations between Russia and the West have been bad for some time and are getting worse. Despite the frequent summits and the elaborate declarations following them, the “partnership” never really existed.

In some circles, the debate over “who lost Russia” has begun. Surely the U.S., and the IMF in particular, will come in for some justifiable criticism. Overall, we probably expected too much too soon and totally mistook the symptoms of kleptocracy for real reform. Yet there can be no excuse for portraying the situation as one full of promise, hope, and progress when we have known at least since 1993-94 that none of this was really happening.

Ultimately, the Russians will decide their own fate and it is useless to pretend otherwise. But at the moment of NATO’s expansion, the alliance must avoid two very serious mistakes. One is obviously to continue the pretense of partnership and to snag NATO in such tricky devices as the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which allows Moscow to make enormous mischief in the alliance. While the Russians sort things out, NATO must keep up its guard. Indeed, by doing so the alliance will signal that a new Soviet empire is no longer an option. Do not listen to those who say that the Russians are so weak that they will pose no problems in the foreseeable future and do not be fooled by the Russian collapse. Under effective leadership, the Russians could recover their strength much faster than many people think. A balanced picture is long overdue.

A second mistake would be to turn expansion into a general policy. NATO is not a collective security structure for all of Europe. A hasty enlargement would deprive the alliance of coherence and turn it into a political debating society incapable of action. At this point, NATO has enough to do with the new members, and we ought to see how that works out.

Let me conclude by summing all of this up in a few homilies. NATO has been the most successful alliance in history because it united the democracies around vital common interests, reinforced their moral values with military strength, and shared both risks and responsibilities. In doing so, NATO saved democracy from the totalitarian ideologies that plunged much of the twentieth century into war.

Over the next fifty years, to succeed in securing the peace won by so much sacrifice, NATO need not reinvent itself. Just because the fire has gone out you do not disband the fire department, especially when the Russian embers are still smoldering. But NATO should also avoid pursuing a furtive quest for fresh fires to fight. We must be leery of pitfalls of peace-keeping and nation-building; NATO is neither social worker nor sheriff. We must not delude

ourselves about our true partners and NATO expansion must be justified by strategic purpose. By camouflaging this longstanding strategic purpose we delude ourselves and mislead those who have yet to prove they share our interests. Above all, the United States and its allies must reestablish a clear sense of vital common interests.

Winston Churchill, writing in 1948, called the last volume of his memoirs, “Triumph and Tragedy.” He argued that having barely escaped with their lives in two world wars, the western democracies were already resuming the bad habits that had put them into danger. And so it might have been. But then the West acquired a new habit. It was called NATO. After fifty years, let us not take the habit for granted and wander into the old vices of irresolution, illusion, and division. Take it from this old general: a robust NATO is the finest legacy our tortured century can bequeath to the new millennium.

NATO and Kosovo: After the 'Victory,' What?

By Michael Radu

April 1999

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What is NATO doing in Yugoslavia? First, it said it was bombing the Serbs to make them give up their own territory, as called for in the Rambouillet “accords.” Instead, it made all Serbs mad, and Slobodan Milosevic stronger than ever.

Then, it was bombing the Serbs to “protect the Albanians in Kosovo”—half a million of whom have now fled the province.

NATO also bombed the Serbs to “degrade” their military apparatus, but the loss of heavy weapons made little difference to the counterinsurgency being conducted in Kosovo by lightly armed forces and paramilitary organizations. What the destruction of the relatively disciplined and professional army did degrade was the one major threat to Milosevic’s power.

Finally, we are told, NATO dropped bombs to “prevent” a spillover of the Kosovo conflict into the entire Balkan region. Instead, the influx of refugees and Serbian cross-border attacks on the KLA have increased internal pressures in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. And because bombed-out bridges now obstruct the Danube, serious economic damage awaits Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and lands beyond.

NATO Should Be Careful What It Wishes For

But suspend both logic and disbelief for a moment, and suppose that NATO somehow succeeds in breaking the Serbian will to retain Kosovo, that Milosevic is dragged in front of a war crimes tribunal (as he should be), and that Kosovo is brought under NATO occupation. Then what? NATO will have “won” for itself nothing but the obligation to oversee an intractable quagmire.

First, there is the problem of refugees. Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro cannot afford the political risks of accepting radicalized Kosovar Albanians within their borders. Western Europeans, already beset by Albanian organized crime, will hardly want to grant permanent asylum to more Albanians. At some point, therefore, many Kosovo Albanian refugees will come “back,” not to a province but to a NATO protectorate—and they will confront razed villages, decimated infrastructure, and empty pantries. NATO troops (who

else?) will have to serve as police, border patrols, and even social workers, all funded, of course, by NATO taxpayers.

If the alliance seeks to hand the various tasks over to Kosovar political leaders, it will have to find them among the KLA because, simply put, there is no one else. The extraordinary system of peaceful Albanian parallel statehood in Kosovo, established and led by Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) since 1991, would have been far more palatable, but was destroyed by the totalitarian KLA's drive to eliminate competitors for power.

But NATO should be more than reluctant to associate itself with the KLA. Notwithstanding the western alliance's promised protection of "minority" (i.e., non-Muslim, non-Albanian) rights, KLA leadership would likely be a nightmare for the 20 percent non-Albanian population—Serbs, Montenegrins, Gypsies, and others. When communist Albanians had the run of Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia within Yugoslavia (1974-89), they were not known for tolerance. The KLA also has ties to supporters of the late Enver Hoxha—Europe's closest friend to Pol Pot.

For its part, the KLA has little interest in Kosovar autonomy, but rather in a "Greater Albania" to be carved from Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Greece. Internationally recognized borders matter little to the KLA, which has no qualms about launching attacks from Albanian territory. Albania's feeble government already protests Serbian pursuit of insurgents across the international border. If the KLA has a NATO-protected base in Kosovo from which to work, its neighbors should be justifiably worried about their own frontiers, and about the imminence of "Greater Albania." The irony is that not even many Albanians share that goal, and NATO could find itself responsible for intensifying the Albanian civil war.

To be sure, the Rambouillet texts call for NATO to disarm the KLA, but that is sheer fantasy, and Western leaders must realize the impossibility of the task. Moreover, after the alliance's demonization of the Serbs and denigration of their religious and historical claims to sovereignty over Kosovo, KLA fighters will probably think themselves well within rights to retain their weapons.

An Untenable Occupation

NATO's military challenges by no means stop there, however. Serbian irregulars, incited by that same NATO dismissiveness, will surely take up the fight where the army leaves off—and they are long familiar with guerrilla tactics. In fact, since the Tito-Stalin break in the late 1940s, Serb-dominated Yugoslavian military doctrine was centered on irregular warfare—what Tito and his successors called a "protracted people's war." Casual suggestions that NATO should occupy Kosovo, let alone Serbia itself, display far more than ignorance of looming bloodshed.

Are Americans, Frenchmen, Italians, Greeks and Icelanders ready to accept the price of “victory” in Kosovo? Did anyone think through the aftermath of Serbian capitulation? It is time to go beyond cheap slogans (“Arm the KLA”) and ask the real question: what if we “win”? The answers, so far, have been devoid of any sense of consequences and realistic prospects. Americans, our European allies, Albanians, and Serbs deserve better.

Setting aside the vague and emotional responses that have dominated so much of the media to date, we are able to discern one unmistakable conclusion: long-term NATO occupation of an autonomous Kosovo is untenable. First, as already discussed, the alliance would find itself in the middle of an armed struggle between the KLA and Serbian irregulars, a position made more awkward by the inevitable perception that NATO would be protecting the Albanian side.

Second, the growing reticence among Italians, Hungarians, Czechs, and Greeks makes the resolute continuation of NATO operations highly questionable. Leftist opposition in Western Europe threatens popular support in France and Germany as well.

Third, NATO will never be able to overcome the reality of ethnic intolerance in the region. The Albanian Muslim leader in Pristina admits that ethnic coexistence between his people and the Serbs is impossible—and, reluctantly, so does Serbian Orthodox bishop Artemije of Metojia, the custodian of Serbia’s historic and religious grounds in the province.

Fourth, Serbs will never accept Albanian rule over the Metohija (“Church lands”) region, which includes the most important Serbian sites. No one in Kosovo finds credible the U.S. and NATO assurances of “protection” for the sites, because everyone understands that NATO occupation will not last indefinitely. NATO’s assumption—that protection of minorities and free access to historic and religious sites could somehow be guaranteed—confuses Kosovo with Switzerland.

Partition: Unappealing, Workable ... and Inevitable

The only way to avoid all these pitfalls, and to make sure that a NATO (or European Union or United Nations) protectorate does not become as permanent as the peace-keeping forces in Cyprus or South Korea (and far less viable), is to stop tiptoeing around the crux of the matter: the future permanent status of Kosovo. Winks to Albanian separatism, la Rambouillet, won’t do; neither will dreams of Kosovo as a Swiss canton—not for the Serbs, not for the KLA.

To what conclusion, then, does all of this lead? The only hope for resolution is the permanent partition of Kosovo along newly established ethnic lines. It is a solution that will make Belgrade and the KLA equally unhappy, but it takes into account the mutually acknowledged reality of ethnic intolerance.

Partition, moreover, can be done according to lines that should be acceptable to both sides. To do so, NATO needs to consult the Serbian Orthodox Church, which it inexplicably excluded from Rambouillet. The Church has been no supporter of Milosevic, but will never sanction the detachment from Serbia of certain areas in Kosovo. In addition, it possesses—and has used—the moral authority to galvanize broad Serbian resistance to any outside threats to those areas, whether from Albanians or NATO. The key to successful partition lies in the fact that the historic lands vital to the Serbs—Pec, the medieval monasteries of Decani, Studenica, Gracanica and Mitrovica, and the field of Kosovo Polje—have no particular meaning or importance in the KLA’s grand strategy. For the KLA, the goal is not to establish an independent Kosovo—which it realizes will not be viable in any case—but a Greater Albania.

Thus, by taking into account the cultural and strategic needs of both sides, the specifics of a viable solution emerge: a partition line starting from the Albanian border south of Decani, moving in a crescent just south of the road to Pec, Prekale to Mitrovica, and then southeast to and including Gracanica. The line is not only plausible, but also defensible by both sides. Some in Serbia will, of course, object to any seizure of their territory, but at least the Church will have no grounds to use its broad influence to mobilize sentiment against the action. The KLA gets a seed that it must learn to cultivate.

Great Powers in Context

Of course, others, including many in the West, will object that partition smacks of “ethnic cleansing,” a feeling stirred by Washington’s careless language and persistent ignorance of history—especially that of the Balkans.

It is important to remember that “ethnic cleansing” has not always been shorthand for evil. Just a few decades ago the same actions were described far more benignly as “population exchanges” and seen as a natural, indeed useful long-term solution to perennial ethnic conflicts. How much worse would Indian-Pakistani relations be without the relocation of tens of millions of people following the end of the British Raj? Closer to Kosovo, some six million Germans were thrown out of their homes in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1945, despite a history of Germans in the region dating back two thousand years. In 1922 one million Greeks were pushed out of Anatolia—where, some 2,500 years ago, their ancestors in Ephesus and Miletus developed philosophy and the cultural foundations of the modern West. At the same time, half a million Turks were thrown out of Greece, despite 500 years of settlement there. The latter two instances were not just accepted, but encouraged and ultimately codified as the Treaty of Lausanne by the Great Powers—the now more reticent France, Italy, and Britain.

The question of NATO’s moral, legal, and political consistency, by comparison, is far less easily resolved. The alliance is bombing the Serbs into accepting Albanian separatism, while keeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina to prevent Croat and Serbian irredentism. It wants to

detach Kosovo from Serbia, but has made no mention of the highly predictable, possibly violent impact in the Republika Srpska of Bosnia. Furthermore, if ethnicity is the new criterion for territorial statehood, NATO's simultaneous support of the Macedonian government and the KLA—whose expansionism will inevitably encroach on Macedonia— makes no sense.

Consistency of principles will make it impossible to isolate Kosovo from the larger problem: redrawing borders throughout the Balkans along ethnic lines. The territorial status of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as of Yugoslavia has to be on the table, because a Greater Serbia, including the Serb-populated areas of Bosnia, is just as "legitimate"—or "illegitimate"—as a Greater Albania. This is not something NATO wants to talk about, but it will be forced to. After the bombings and the establishment of a Kosovo protectorate, Serbian nationalism could easily become a violent and permanent factor for regional destabilization—just as in 1914.

This brings us to the final aspect of the Balkan problem. Although it may seem like political heresy, a return to the nineteenth-century method of dealing with the unruly Balkans is the only solution for the foreseeable future. Specifically, there should be an international conference (perhaps in Berlin, as an ironic twist) to redraw borders according to the newly defined ethnic criteria. The peoples of the Balkans would have little input, their behavior having largely disqualified them already. Rather, decisions should be made by the international powers: not the United Nations, European Union, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or even NATO as such, but individual members with divergent interests in the Balkans and at least some military, political, and economic means to pursue them. Thus, the participants should include the United States, France, Britain, Italy, Germany—and Russia. The latter suggestion has nothing to do with Moscow's pontifications about "inviolability of borders" and "sovereignty"—after all, it is Russia whose troops and machinations keep the secessionist cauldrons boiling in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan—but with common sense. Stalin could not solve the Balkan problems, and Russia cannot do so now, but it certainly can make any solution impossible.

And, in the face of a "victory" it has neither achieved nor planned for, NATO has its hands full of impossibilities.

The War and the West

By James Kurth

February 2002

This essay is an abridged version of one that appeared in the Spring 2002 issue of Orbis, which featured a special collection of essays on America's War on Terrorism.

The war that began with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has been defined in different ways for political purposes. President Bush immediately defined the war as one against “terrorists with global reach” and “the states that harbor them,” being careful not to identify the terrorists with Islam and let the war be seen as a “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West. Osama bin Laden, in contrast, repeatedly spoke of a war between “the Islamic nation” and “the Jews and the Crusaders” (or Christians). For him, the war was definitely supposed to be seen as a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West.

The war is indeed a war against terrorists and the states that harbor them as Bush stated, but all of these terrorists and states are Islamic. The war is also a war between the West and Islam as bin Laden stated, but the Western peoples and their governments do not habitually use the term “Western” to identify themselves, nor do the Islamic peoples and their governments routinely engage in terrorism. The war is actually one between Western nations and Islamic terrorists. Because it involves nations that are Western both in fact and in the minds of the Islamic terrorists, it engages the West. The way that the leading nation of the West, the U.S., wages this war will be greatly shaped by the nature of both Western civilization and Islam.

A New Kind of Warfare

The 9/11 terrorist attacks were a monstrous example of a new kind of warfare, integrating three different and older forms of political violence: terrorism, which has had a long history in both the West and the East; political suicide, which was largely developed in the East during the twentieth century; and mass destruction, which was largely developed in the West during the twentieth century.

Terrorism has existed since the beginning of human societies across all civilizations, including twentieth-century Western civilization (e.g., the Nazi killing of European civilians and the Allied “terror bombing” of German and Japanese civilians during World War II). During the Cold War, terrorism was used principally by Soviet-sponsored Marxist revolutionary movements (first in Southeast Asia, then in Latin America and the Middle East) and the Western-supported governments who sought to suppress them. The end of the Cold War and the demise of most Marxist revolutionary movements largely brought an end to this era of terrorism. By then, however, the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran had inaugurated Islamic terrorism, a new chapter (or rather renewed chapter, given the record of Muslim regimes such as the Ottoman empire right down to the end of World War I) in the history of terror.

Political suicide has been more rarely practiced. It can also be found in most civilizations going back to ancient times, but not in modern Western civilization (This is one reason suicide bombers have so shocked Western peoples). For Americans in the twentieth century, the most famous example was the Japanese kamikazes of World War II. During the Cold War, political suicide was rare, in that the U.S. and the Soviet Union each claimed to represent a version of

the Enlightenment (and thus of Western ideas). However, the Islamic revolution in Iran, whose features included the Shi'ite emphasis on martyrdom, revived political suicide. This new chapter in the history of political suicide included the 1983 truck bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut by Hezbollah (supported by Iran). But during the 1990s, the true experts in political suicide seemed to be the Tamil Liberation Tigers in Sri Lanka, a case of Hindu rather than Islamic terrorism.

Mass destruction in a single operation largely began in the West in the twentieth century, with the application of industrial technology to military weapons—first the chemical weapons of World War I, then the high-explosive bombs of World War II and the atomic nuclear weapons used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It became institutionalized in Cold War nuclear strategies. During the Cold War the U.S. and the Soviet Union also developed non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and by the end of the Cold War, many nations in the East (China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Iraq) were also developing their own WMD. A new chapter in this awful history is now being written in the East.

The War against Islamic Terrorism

The combination and integration of these three elements into the 9/11 attacks and the threat of future attacks by Islamic terrorists has created a new kind of warfare.

The U.S. has had to wage its war against Islamic terrorists on both the foreign front, beginning in Afghanistan, and the domestic front, which began with security measures directed against potential terrorist cells within the U.S. itself.

The war on the foreign front over the next years will be fought with many methods, at the center of which will be “the new American way of war,” the product of an old military tradition called “the Western way of war.” Both are characterized by systematic organization combined with individual initiative at the unit level; intense concentration of killing power achieved through the high technology of the time; and relentless continuation of the war until the enemy is annihilated. The U.S. used these methods to achieve its victory in Afghanistan, and whatever their strengths and limitations will likely use them in future battles in the war against Islamic terrorism in other countries.

The war on the domestic front is much more controversial, and its full meaning much less comprehended. This war is also likely to be extended over many years and expanded, beyond the initial (somewhat feckless) security measures. It may become even more important than the war on the foreign front, because the U.S. itself is the Islamic terrorists' most important target. Unlike twentieth century American wars, in this war the foreign front will become more peripheral as the domestic front becomes more central. Major adjustments, even a redefinition

of American society, will likely be required to provide the U.S. and Western civilization with an effective long-range defense against Islamic terrorism.

The Three Wests and Their Easts

Western civilization is the product of three great traditions and successive eras: (1) the classical culture of the ancient Greece and Rome; (2) the Christian religion, particularly Western Christianity, stretching from the ancient, through the medieval, to the modern eras; and (3) the Enlightenment worldview of the modern era.

The first two of these traditions were greatly shaped by their long and epic struggles with what came to be called “the Near East.” The great Eastern adversary of classical Greece was Persia; the earliest adversary for Rome was Carthage. In their struggles against these empires, the Greek and Roman civilizations evolved from city-states into empires. Western Christianity, too, confronted an Eastern adversary, Islam, for a thousand years, from the Arab conquest of Roman Africa in the eighth century to the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683. In its struggle against Islam, Christianity was also transformed, from being a religion for city-dwellers to one meaningful to feudal knights and crusaders. In contrast, the third great Western tradition, that of the Enlightenment, did not confront an Eastern adversary with strength comparable to its own.

Beginning with Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt, expanding with the British and French empires in the Near East during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and continuing with the American prominence in the Middle East since World War II, the leading powers of the modern West have greatly shaped the Muslim world, but until now have been much less shaped by it.

This long era of the West shaping, but not being shaped by, Islamic civilization has probably come to an end. The growth of sizable (5-10%) and unassimilated Muslim minority communities in most Western European nations has raised in a new way the perennial question of identity-be it national, European, or Western-in these nations. Until now, the response of the governing political classes has been to formulate a multicultural identity, with the deliberate intent to blur traditional definitions of identity. But this multicultural answer now seems naive. The growth of terrorist networks within Muslim minority communities has transformed a seemingly benign question of identity into a malignant threat to security.

The West of the modern and now the post-modern eras will likely be drawn into a struggle-as were the earlier, classical and Christian incarnations of the West-against an Eastern adversary. This Enlightenment version of the West may well be reshaped in a prolonged struggle with the most anti-Western and unenlightened version of Islam.

The New Islamic Adversary

The peoples of the Islamic world seem to be united in hatred toward Israel, envy and anger toward the U.S., and resentment and contempt toward Europe. These attitudes are deeply rooted and will not soon disappear. They provide the setting for the continual generation of Islamic terrorist cells and the transnational networks that support them.

The threat to the West from Islamic terrorism principally resides in these transnational networks, which differ from national states. They can operate flexibly in many locales, not responsible for any one of them, and hence without fixed interests at stake, making deterrence difficult and affording them advantages in conflicts with a national state.

However, as the case of Al Qaeda demonstrated, the transnational network still has to operate in some kind of territory. In most cases, this means it needs the support of the state which rules over that territory, even if that state is more of a gang (as was the case with the Taliban). The transnational terrorist network may not be vulnerable to a deterrence threat from the U.S., but the state that harbors it is. This is why President Bush was right to immediately link the terrorists of global reach with the states that harbor them. The U.S. military operation that destroyed the Taliban has greatly enhanced the credibility of this U.S. deterrence threat aimed at other Muslim states.

In a few cases, such as Somalia, there is no state at all. Here the local elements of the transnational terrorist network might actually constitute a gang. In this kind of situation, however, the U.S. can engage in its own flexible military expedition, a search-and-destroy operation, without seeming to violate national sovereignty (which does not exist in such a case). Indeed, had the U.S. followed through in its military operation in Somalia in 1993, Somalia itself might have provided a prototype and a model for this kind of antiterrorist operation.

In these forms, the states of the Islamic world pose a threat that the U.S. should be able to manage or contain. The Islamic world may be unified around certain political attitudes, but it is not unified around any political power. The Islamic world is divided into almost three dozen states, many of which are hostile to each other.

Indeed, the very notion of the national state is problematic when applied to the Islamic world. The idea of the national state, imported from the West in the first half of the twentieth century, has never flourished there. The most successful attempt to convert an Islamic country into a national state was that of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey in the 1920s-1930s. In later years, others including Gamel Abd al- Nasser in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Shahs in Iran, and Sukarno in Indonesia, were less successful in their attempts to create national states. By the end of the 1970s, it was clear that the national project for the Muslim world had failed,

and this recognition provided the opportunity and perhaps the necessity for the new project of political Islam, which rejected Western notions of a secular national identity. After a quarter-century, however, political Islam has not succeeded in unifying any two Muslim states or even in abolishing all vestiges of statehood (although the Taliban in Afghanistan came close).

The Multiethnic Reality of the Islamic World

The true basis for most political behavior of Muslim states is the ethnic or even tribal community. Almost all Muslim countries are really multiethnic societies, usually composed of one large ethnic group plus several smaller ones. Often, each ethnic group is concentrated in a particular region. Sometimes the largest group controls the state and uses it to dominate the others (e.g., Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan), or a smaller group may control the state and use it to dominate the others, including the largest group (e.g. Pakistan and Jordan). In extreme versions, the smaller group compensates for weakness in number by extreme brutality and repression (e.g., Iraq and Syria). In any case, the multiethnic society is held together and held down by a uniethnic state, particularly by its security apparatus. These Muslim political systems are really small multinational empires. Indeed, they are governed in ways similar to those the Ottomans used to govern their empire.

Such multiethnic society/uniethnic state contraptions are unstable. They are accidents, secessions, and partitions waiting to happen. Whenever the state is suddenly and sharply weakened (as with Iran in 1979 and Iraq in 1991), the subordinate ethnic communities try to break away from the empire. The multiethnic empire survives when a new or renewed state security apparatus is constructed, which then puts down the secession.

This multiethnic reality provides the basis for a Western strategy against Muslim states that harbor Islamic terrorists. With its precision-bombing capabilities, the U.S. can credibly threaten to destroy the state security apparatus, which would likely put the state into a long and difficult ordeal of ethnic rebellion during which the U.S. would have many opportunities to support different groups and reshape a successor state according to its own interests. This kind of strategy might be particularly applicable against states such as Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan.

The Domestic Front and the Terrorist Cells

As time moves on, the central front of the war against Islamic terrorism will be the domestic front. Here the target is the American population itself, and the threat comes from the terrorist cells who reside as “sleepers” within the U.S., living within the Muslim community, particularly among Muslims of Middle Eastern and South Asian origin. Among such Muslims, some are American citizens; many, however, have some sort of immigrant status.

The fact that the 19 hijackers were all Muslim immigrants from the Middle East (15 from Saudi Arabia), living among other Muslim immigrants from the Middle East, should raise questions about what should be a right and proper immigration policy for the new era. Why should the U.S. indiscriminately admit immigrants from countries whose populations have a demonstrated record of being hostile toward America and providing recruits and funding for the Al Qaeda terrorist network? These countries include, but are not limited to, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Egypt, and Pakistan.

Western Traditions and Muslim Immigrants

Additionally, why should Western nations indiscriminately admit immigrants whose religion and culture have a demonstrated record of being consciously and systematically hostile to the West?

Each of the three Western traditions can provide its own answer to the question about the proper role of Islamic immigrants within Western nations. The classical culture would view the Muslim culture as alien and incompatible. Muslims might be welcomed as temporary visitors engaged in a particular business, but they would not be permitted to become permanent residents, much less citizens.

The Christian religion (at least the Biblical version) would also view the Islamic religion as alien and incompatible (Jewish immigrants were accepted because they were identified with the Hebrew scripture, or “Old Testament,” the original source for Christian concepts of community and sojourners). Again, Muslims might be welcomed as temporary visitors, or sojourners, but unless they converted to Christianity, they would not be permitted to become permanent residents or citizens.

In short, if Western nations were still like Greece and Rome or Christendom, Muslims would be excluded from Europe and America and would be contained within the Middle East and the lands still further to the East. There might be transnational terrorist networks like Al Qaeda, but they would not have cells located within the West. However, the West cannot go back to being Greece and Rome or Christendom. It will have to define the role of Islamic immigrants in terms of its third and most recent tradition, the Enlightenment worldview, which can provide a very different answer to the immigration question.

The Enlightenment has been especially committed to the idea of universality. Indeed, it does not take either the classical culture or the Christian religion seriously; it holds that religious or cultural traditions provide no good reason to exclude anyone from immigrating to an enlightened society. The Enlightenment thinker has tended to assume that a Muslim who is exposed to or immigrates to an enlightened society will eventually give up the Islamic faith and become an enlightened, universal individual. The recent indiscriminate admission of

immigrants, including Muslims, into Western nations has not only been permitted by this particular tradition; it has been its fulfillment.

Of course, just as Christianity could be interpreted to allow the immigration of Muslims if they converted to the Christian faith, so the Enlightenment could be interpreted to allow the immigration of Muslims if they adopted the Enlightenment worldview. Until changes in the immigration law in 1965, the U.S. took something like this position. There was a systematic effort to bring about immigrants' assimilation into the national culture. Known as the Americanization program, its content was “the American Creed,” which was very much the expression of the Anglo-American version of the Enlightenment.

This approach to ensuring that immigrant values were compatible with Enlightenment values was abandoned after 1965. The new immigration law provided for no discrimination according to culture, and the simultaneous rise of multiculturalism rejected the very idea of Americanization. What remained was the universalist element of the Enlightenment worldview. The consequence has been a universalism of multiculturalism.

Because of its universalist imperative, the currently- reigning version of the Enlightenment worldview cannot discriminate against any particular groups within society, i.e., it cannot engage in any kind of cultural or geographical “profiling.” Any security measures it implements must be imposed universally; this has largely been the case with security checks at American airports. As these airport checks illustrate, however, security measures that are applied to everyone will be either loose, symbolic and ineffective or strict and effective but onerous, time- consuming, and ultimately inoperable. New information and computer technologies may enable the development of a surveillance and profiling system that would not be physically onerous and overtly discriminatory, but such a system could erode a central pillar of the Anglo-American Enlightenment: individual liberty and privacy.

An alternative way of dealing with the terrorist threat would be a return to an earlier form of the assimilationist or nationalist version of the Enlightenment. This would entail reestablishing a sharp distinction between those persons who are assimilated into the national culture and those who are not. This distinction would roughly correlate with that between citizens and immigrants (or “aliens,” as earlier and more blunt language put it). The assimilationist or nationalist conception can confidently distinguish between citizens and non-citizens and engage in cultural and geographical profiling. It therefore can adopt security measures focused on particular persons; these would be onerous and burdensome for only a small minority (e.g., Muslim immigrants) of the population, favoring majority rule over minority rights (to use multiculturalist language) or promoting the greatest good of the greatest number (to use utilitarian language).

Some compensation would be appropriate for the innocent members of the minority, for the additional hassles that they would experience. But since discrimination against particular ethnic minorities-Muslim as well as non-Muslim-is the policy and practice in virtually every Muslim state, Western states would be doing no more (and indeed rather less) than what the immigrants' own communities do to other minorities back in their home countries.

Security measures based upon cultural or geographical profiling would be more effective than the current general and universal ones, but they would not be completely so. Terrorist cells would try to infiltrate the circle of citizenship or assimilation. But the pool of potential terrorists and the probability of successful attacks could be substantially reduced.

However, just as the West cannot go back to being Greece and Rome or Christendom, perhaps in this era of globalization and multiculturalism it can no longer go back to the national identity which, until recently, was so much a feature of the modern era. If so, there is really no longer any West at all, except in the fevered imagination of its Eastern adversaries. There is only the post-West civilization, defined by its universal, transnational, and global pretensions but potentially unable to develop the effective means to defend itself against transnational terrorist networks of global reach.

Balkan Ghost

By Harvey Sicherman

March 2006

Slobodan Milosevic, former President of Yugoslavia, died on March 11, 2006, in a Dutch prison before he could have been convicted of crimes committed during the Balkan Wars of the nineties. Characteristically, he had turned an international trial into a personal political platform, taking advantage of the court to prolong it for four years and completely frustrating his enemies in the process. Equally frustrating was the manner of his death, which could be interpreted as suicide or murder, depending upon one's view of Milosevic.

Often styled a fierce Serb nationalist by his supporters or “the Butcher of the Balkans” by his enemies, Milosevic was the first of a deadly crop of post-Soviet era politicians to molt from communist into nationalist. He also proved among the most clever in exploiting the ambiguities at the end of the Cold War. Therein lies a tale not without application to our current dilemmas.

Serbia's Champion

Milosevic was born in 1941, the year the Nazis invaded Yugoslavia, and spent his childhood in wartime Serbia. His family life, though apparently conventional, carried an overture of tragedy; both parents would take their own lives. The future wrecker of Yugoslavia grew up in the state invented by Tito, a charismatic and cunning dictator who created a state that balanced four claimants, all sharply distinctive in history and religion: the Orthodox Serbs; the Catholic Slovenes and Croats; the old Ottoman-era bureaucratic class, the Bosniak Muslims; and the Albanian Muslims living in Kosovo, the historic heart of Serbian nationalism. The more economically advanced part of this polity, the Slovenes and Croats, subsidized the more numerous but less developed Serbs, with the Muslims in between and the Kosovars in a special autonomous region.

Tito maneuvered this unwieldy mass on the borderline of West and East, North and South, through a carefully calculated domestic policy and an equally shrewd intake of American, Soviet, and European favors, never quite satisfying any of them. Increasingly given to ceremony that resembled the Hapsburg Monarchy of his youth, Tito ran an authoritarian rather than a totalitarian regime. Moreover, Tito liked money. As a result, Yugoslavia could count itself among the economic success stories of the communist countries through selective and often corrupt bending of the rules to stimulate growth.

Tito died in May 1980. He left a rotating presidency based on the careful ethnic and religious mix of his heyday. By the mid-eighties, however, the economic success of earlier reforms had run aground into a recession and demands for more reform aggravated the issue of intercommunal relations—namely, who was to get what out of a suddenly declining pie. This was compounded by waning Western interest in Yugoslavia as the Cold War petered out.

At this juncture, Slobodan Milosevic was a conventional, if able, bureaucrat, with a law degree, experience in state finances, and a role in the Belgrade Communist Party organization. He, like many others, faced the critical problem of redefining his career amid a dramatic change in the very nature of the state that had educated him. No one who knew him at this time could have predicted his solution: the communist functionary became a nationalist demagogue.

On April 24, 1987, while calming a riotous crowd of Serb complainants in Kosovo Polje who had been forcibly denied entry to the Town Hall, Milosevic announced his vocation when he assured the crowd that “no one will ever beat you again.” This was a carefully contrived event; there was never anything spontaneous about Milosevic. He had decided to exploit Serbia’s distinctive national narrative, a story of repeated martyrdom beginning in defeat by the Turks on June 15, 1389 at the “Field of Blackbirds” in Kosovo.

One of Milosevic’s first victims was his long-time mentor, the leader of the Serbian Communist Party, Ivan Stambolic. Stambolic later uttered a judgment on his protégé “Slobo” much beloved by aficionados of Balkan politics: “When somebody looks at your back for 25 years, it is understandable that he gets the desire to put a knife in it at some point.” It remains only to note that Stambolic mysteriously disappeared from Belgrade in 2000. His remains were found three years later. This crime was attributed by a special Belgrade court to Milosevic’s secret police.

Once mounted on the tiger of Serbian nationalism, Milosevic could not and would not dismount. Any attempt to remake Yugoslavia entirely in Serbia’s image, of course, meant the state’s breakdown. Milosevic determined that it had to be broken down before it could be built up.

The new champion of Serbia could not have done it alone. He had a willing colleague—later opponent—in Franjo Tudjman—party boss of Croatia. Had it only been up to them, they would have divided the state more or less equally. There were inconvenient obstacles, however, such as Bosnia and international recognition. The last opportunity for internal cohesion was lost when the real political backbone of Yugoslavia, the Communist Party, imploded in 1989.

Milosevic Triumphant, the West Divided

As President of Serbia, Milosevic precipitated the breakup of Yugoslavia when he engineered the seizure of the Central Bank's reserves in spring 1991. These would provide his war chest. In reaction, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in May.

Yugoslavia's impending demise found the West distracted by the reunification of Germany and then Saddam's seizure of Kuwait. Germany and Austria, acting independently of the EU, recognized Croatian and Slovenian independence, citing historic ties. And Washington, while Yugoslavia had been an American "account" during the Cold War, offered only bromides about the importance of unity. As Secretary of State Baker would later put it, the U.S. "had no dog in this fight."

The Serbian minority in Croatia was separated from Serbia by the mixed state of Bosnia-Herzegovina: forty per cent Muslim, thirty per cent Serb and eighteen per cent Croats. After Croatia and Slovenia left, Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic sought more power for the Muslims now that they comprised a larger part of the remaining population of the Yugoslav state. Milosevic drew out negotiations with Izetbegovic to gain time. When, on March 3, 1992, Izetbegovic declared independence, Milosevic was ready.

The Serbs in Bosnia rebelled and, aided by the well-equipped and well-trained Yugoslav army under Serbian control, quickly carved out a corridor covering their own population and linking up with another Serb insurgency, this one in Croatia. The unprepared Bosnian government lost two-thirds of the country and its capital Sarajevo was cruelly besieged. The Croats, too, had lost a third of their new state.

The Croatian and Bosnian Serbs then began what came to be called "ethnic cleansing." This was the forcible removal of Muslims (and other minorities) from the corridor linking the Serbs to Serbia proper. Milosevic claimed he had no influence over such activities, although the militias doing the work were well-supplied and commanded by former Yugoslav officers who still retained their commissions.

As the violence mounted, French president Mitterand saw an opportunity for a European initiative independent of the Americans and NATO. He went to Belgrade and reminded Milosevic of France's historic alliance with Serbia in World War I that rescued the Serbs from Austrian vengeance. But he found the Serbian leader more interested in his views about what Washington would do. This chilled the conversation. Very soon Mitterand was caught up in other matters, including his own mortal illness. There would be no European initiative.

Europe unable, America unwilling, what was left? The UN, of course. French, British, and Dutch peacekeepers were dispatched to "observe" a set of cease-fires, their stern gaze reinforced by that last refuge of failed multilateralism, an arms embargo that hampered the Croats and Bosniaks but not the Serbs, who drew on former Yugoslav army stocks. These

actions told Milosevic that the big powers did not distinguish between arsonist and fireman. The cease-fires in Bosnia were soon figments as the Serbs tried to consolidate their positions.

Moments of Truth

The Balkan fighting had exposed European pretensions. Now came a moment of truth for the UN. Much had been made, even by the United States, of the idea that a “new international order” relying on a united UN Security Council could, after the end of the Cold War, fulfill the vision of 1945 in assuring world peace. It seemed to work. In the early nineties, the UN had nearly 100,000 troops deployed under its authority around the world. Its Secretary General had begun to speak of its potential for peacemaking, not only peacekeeping.

In Bosnia, however, UN forces neither made nor kept the peace. Ethnic cleansing proceeded apace. The local Serbs treated the “blue helmets” with increasing contempt. It was easy enough. UN forces in the field were subjected to the indecision of distant, incompetent bureaucrats. Soon, the UN forces began to look like hostages themselves.

In Washington, the newly elected President Clinton and his officials denounced humanitarian outrages in the Balkans. Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Europe in the spring of 1993 to stiffen the allies but refused their request for American military participation. Even before he returned, Clinton, newly read in Balkan history, decided he didn’t want to be part of it. Later that year, the Somalia disaster reinforced the Administration’s resolve to stay clear of any further peacekeeping adventures.

Then the Serbs overreached. In July 1995, they massacred Muslim civilians, often seizing them in full view of lightly armed Dutch soldiers guarding a so-called UN “safe haven” in Srebrenica. In other places, French troops were tied humiliatingly to poles.

This was too much for newly-elected President Jacques Chirac. He decided that he would have to change minds in Washington before he could change them in Belgrade. It was time, he announced, to get tough with Serbia or get out. Chirac’s insistence on action coincided with Senator Dole’s veto-proof congressional demand to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. France (and Britain) declared that such an event would precipitate a withdrawal of their forces. And most telling, Chirac then reminded Clinton that as a NATO ally he would invoke the alliance to aid their removal.

The EU had failed. The UN had failed. Would NATO—read: the United States—now also fail?

Dayton and Kosovo

Clinton was boxed and he acted at last. In August of 1995 when the Serbs violated yet another cease-fire, the UN, after U.S. prompting, finally authorized a NATO air raid on Serb forces. Simultaneously, boots began to move on the ground. These turned out to be Croatian; Tudjman had worked around the arms embargo to organize an effective force. His surprise offensive rolled the Serbs back in Croatia and away from the Dalmatian coast toward the Serb heartland in Bosnia.

Milosevic then resolved to rescue what he could. He agreed to join Tudjman and Izetbegovic at a U.S.-sponsored conference in Dayton, Ohio. There the Bosnian, Croat, and Serb leaders received the impatient ministrations of Richard Holbrooke, a formidable U.S. diplomat whose personal demons over the use of American force abroad after Vietnam had been exorcised by the Bosnian massacres.

Milosevic had grown overconfident. Money was short, the currency grossly inflated, the economy reeling. Russia and an old ally from Tito's time, China, would not support a Yugoslav army intervention to save the Serbs of Bosnia.

The resulting Dayton Agreement (December 14, 1995) followed closely the cease-fire lines established by the combatants. Bosnia's three communities (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs) were to invent a new polity under international tutelage. Peace would be enforced by international troops, including a U.S. component. Refugees were to return to their homes, reversing ethnic cleansing.

Milosevic had not been able to create a greater Serbia that included the northern swath of Bosnia extending to Croatia. Yet, he did appear to forge a partnership with the United States. The arsonist, through Dayton, transmuted into the firefighter.

Various diplomats have described Milosevic's behavior at the conference. A bulky figure fond of plum brandy, he exuded a gangster's charm. One could forget what it was all about in the warmth of his conviviality but this, too, was contrived. A moody loner who trusted only his didactic wife, Sloba was a ruthless figure remote from humanity. Power mattered; the rest was merely instrumental.

The Dayton Agreement did not deal with Kosovo, a problem judged too difficult to settle alongside Bosnia. But four years of war elsewhere had deepened Kosovar rejection of an increasingly severe Serb overlordship. When the neighboring Albanian government was abruptly felled by internal strife, weapons and fighters streamed across the border where they found a welcome reception.

Milosevic conveniently interpreted Dayton to mean a free hand for himself in Kosovo. After all, everyone agreed that the province was part of Yugoslavia, and he had been elected

president fairly in 1997. He resolved to fix the problem of disaffected Kosovars by ridding the province of them. Three-quarters of a million were driven out in 1998 by the Yugoslav Army.

This time, neither the United States nor the Europeans bothered with the UN Security Council where Russian and Chinese vetoes awaited any resolution that would authorize military action against Yugoslavia. So, in 1998, NATO went to war for the first time in its history without benefit of a UN blessing.

Clinton began by announcing that no ground forces would be needed. This time, however, there were no Croats to supply the infantry. The Albanian gangs willing to fight, like the Mujahaddin who had aided the Bosniaks, were not the sort the West wanted to liberate Kosovo. Instead, air power was assigned the job.

The bombers could not expel the dug-in Yugoslav army in Kosovo, a rugged place not amenable to such warfare. So the campaign began with the rear areas, namely, Serbia itself. Disabling the centralized electricity, transport, and communication systems was easy enough but less precise than desired because of the high altitudes flown by the bombers to avoid an anti-aircraft system far superior to Saddam's.

Nor was intelligence infallible. The campaign had been launched too quickly for thorough reconnaissance. The Chinese embassy, wrongly identified by out-of-date information, was thoroughly bombed, setting off violent demonstrations in Beijing and elsewhere; to this day, few Chinese believe it was a mistake. Destroying the Danube bridges also blocked a vital shipping channel for several states upstream.

The Serbs could not be subdued by air power alone. Only when the Russians persuaded Milosevic that NATO ground forces, activated after four months of bombing, would indeed assault Kosovo, did Milosevic relent. He could not resist like Saddam. Opposition in Belgrade had mounted apace. Milosevic hastily agreed to the occupation of Kosovo by NATO forces.

The NATO victory soured, however, when a British general refused Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark's orders to evict the Russians from Pristina Airport when they had arrived suddenly to rescue Russian prestige.

In the Dock

Kosovo, where Milosevic had begun, became his end. There was no way to disguise the truth. Eight years of warfare left Yugoslavia dismembered, impoverished, and isolated. It proved another grim chapter of Serbia's martyrdom, this time largely self-inflicted.

Milosevic, blindly confident that he could blind the Serbs again, undid himself politically by calling a snap election. He lost. The army, humiliated beyond endurance, defected from his side. Options gone, Milosevic retreated into bitter house arrest.

It was still not over. In 1992, frustrated by inaction, Milosevic's one-time acquaintance Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger launched the lawyers against him in the form of an international war crimes tribunal. NATO forces in Bosnia, especially the French, had been remarkably unwilling to risk the cease-fire by seizing Milosevic's local henchman, notably Karadic and most importantly the man who ordered the Srebrenica massacre, General Mladic. But Milosevic was secured for an international trial when the western powers forced the newly democratic Serbian government to choose between rehabilitation and the "Butcher of the Balkans."

Ailing but defiant, Milosevic put his gift for detecting irresolution and timidity to good use. He became his own counsel, berating judges and witnesses alike with apparent impunity. The purpose of such trials is multifold: justice for the victims; deterrence for the future; a way to transfer guilt from whole populations to their leaders thereby facilitating reconciliation. In this case, the international judges, inadvertently cooperating with Milosevic, soon sabotaged most of these purposes. Too many charges, too much ranting and raving, no smoking guns or paper trails. Milosevic played the victim to the hilt, marrying himself once more to Serb martyrdom. Four years and over \$60 million dollars passed this way.

As the end neared, Milosevic played his final bid to escape. His heart problems, he insisted, could only be cured by Russian specialists in their own clinics. He needed to see his family, themselves refugees in Russia from charges of corruption in Belgrade. The international court, which had allowed him a private office and unsupervised discussions with witnesses and friends (also a source of liquor and drugs), refused to let him go. For Milosevic, this was clear evidence that his enemies, unable to convict an innocent man, were poisoning him. Whether his fatal heart attack was self-induced or just a final miscalculation, Milosevic was dead at age sixty-four. He was buried in his backyard in Serbia, his family absent.

In a macabre sequence of events, Milosevic's chief accuser had committed suicide a week before his own death. And on March 12, large crowds in Belgrade marked the third anniversary of the assassination of Milosevic's opponent and successor, Zoran Djindic. The others in the drama, Tudjman and Izetbegovic, had already died.

The Balkan Ghost

It would be convenient to write off Milosevic's career as a violent deviation from the progress toward a whole and free Europe prescribed by the United States and its allies at the end of the Cold War. Yet, the Balkan Ghost continues to hover over international relations, for

Milosevic's career exposed certain unpleasant truths about the post-Cold War international system, the ways and means of military intervention, the challenge of failed states, and the working of law courts and alliances.

The first lesson is that the international order, although remarkably stable at the Great Power level, is remarkably frail beneath that threshold. Even as the Balkan crisis in 1914 exposed the bellicosity lurking beneath Europe's Great Power balance, the 1991 crisis revealed that the Great Powers had little in the way of deadly quarrels with each other. An incident at Sarajevo would not trigger a general war. That was all to the good. But, simultaneously, the Balkan conflict revealed that the post-Cold War order could still be badly disrupted. Before international action ended the carnage, 300,000 were killed, two million displaced, and a region wrecked. European and U.N. pretensions were exposed, as was U.S. reluctance to risk its own troops. Only grotesque massacres, which earlier intervention could have prevented, made later intervention politically possible. There were no profiles in courage here.

A second lesson concerns military intervention and its purpose. The dry tinder of history lay everywhere in the Balkans, but someone had to light the match. Milosevic, the chief arsonist, however, was not the target of intervention. Instead, troops were dispatched initially on a "humanitarian mission." It should be clear that there are no such things; every military intervention has political consequences. The only issue is whether the arsonist will be properly identified, and the firemen deployed to extinguish his activity. In short, these crises are not the products of nature. They are man-made. A confused objective inevitably means failure.

A third lesson carries over today. Failed states are not so easily fixed. Ten years after President Clinton declared U.S. troops would stay only a year or two, international forces—now largely European—guarantee an uneasy peace. Billions of dollars, hundreds of NGOs, and several EU High Commissioners have failed to turn Bosnia into a working state. The victimization ideology—the foreigners are always to blame—still prevails. And the Kosovars are demanding independence once more. All of this raises the ugly prospect that international forces may have to stay a lot longer—almost in the manner of the old Ottoman or Austrian Empires—before these peoples can live together peacefully, if ever. This ghost haunts proposed international action in Darfur and already afflicts the U.S.-led enterprises in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A fourth lesson teaches the old truth that justice delayed is justice denied. The war crimes court provided a full employment act for lawyers but not the expeditious punishment expected. As a result, most of the objectives of Milosevic's trial were not achieved. A similar blunder has affected the Saddam Hussein prosecution in Baghdad where an Iraqi court, even limited to a very few charges, has already been frustrated by Saddam's Milosevic-like performance—more than two full years after his capture. There, too, the Balkan ghost has cast a baleful spell. The western tendency to let lawyers meddle is a recipe for muddle.

Finally, a last lesson still unlearned. The Balkan wars did not find the Western powers quick or effective in upholding their own principles. Some of the trauma lingered. After 9/11, the Americans rudely refused NATO's offer to help in attacking Afghanistan, partly because U.S. commanders did not want to be burdened by Kosovo-like committee warfare. There and in Iraq, however, the Bush Administration's desire to avoid a Balkan-style occupation—lots of boots on the ground—badly hampered plans to secure the fruits of victory. And on the political side, the French experience with Clinton in 1995 probably made Chirac overconfident about his ability to influence George W. Bush in 2003. If the western powers are to protect their interests in the future, they will need to exorcise the Balkan ghost still haunting the halls of NATO.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall, the Power of Individuals, and the Unpredictability of History

By Ronald J. Granieri

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German unification was one of the most dramatic developments in contemporary history, as well as one of the most unexpected. After decades during which the press and public measured political wisdom according to how well leaders managed the apparently permanent realities of German and European division, leaders in 1989 had to improvise responses to the literal collapse of the most concrete of those realities in Berlin. As much as German politicians had claimed for years to be hoping for this day, none had actual plans ready. Into this potentially dangerous vacuum stepped a most unlikely improviser. Helmut Kohl was a reasonably successful party leader of enormous bulk and moderate political gifts, generally underestimated even by his political allies and known neither for creativity nor dynamism. To the surprise of all, he proved remarkably adept at managing the international and domestic complications of 1989. Within thirteen months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he rode successful reunification negotiations to a landslide victory in the first all-German democratic elections since 1932. Even if many of his decisions during those months can be (and have been) questioned, his place in history is assured.

Kohl's story provides but one of many crucial insights into how the story of German reunification displays both the limits of realism and the unpredictability of history. That unpredictability reminds us of the role that individuals can still play in the modern world, even in the face of enormous complexity. For it was the combined actions of individuals, neither beginning nor ending with Kohl, who changed the world in 1989, and all students of international affairs can profit from reexamining that dramatic story.

To appreciate just how important those individual actions could be, one has to remember the state of the world (and of most thinking about the world) in the 1980s. After decades of Cold War, the US-Soviet rivalry still shaped most global conceptions, on issues ranging from economic development to the world chess championships, not to mention the Olympics. Even

as progressives decried the focus on East-West rivalry and advocated more attention to North-South issues of economic development, conventional wisdom dictated that intelligent people assume the existence of Eastern and Western blocs for as far as the eye could see. The sense that this rivalry was permanent, and required careful management rather than bold transformations, was pervasive. Indeed, that attitude was so widespread that when commentators spoke of the End of the Cold War at all, they imagined a world in which the United States and the Soviet Union, with their associated allies, still coexisted, though at a reduced level of tension, allowing the allegedly inevitable process of convergence to make their systems look as much like each other as possible. No one imagined one side would disappear. That would have been dangerously unrealistic.

Nowhere were these assumptions more obvious than in Berlin. Although actual defenders of the “anti-Fascist protection barrier” were few outside of the upper leadership of East Germany’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the world had come to accept the presence of the Berlin Wall as the price to be paid for stability and security in Central Europe. President Ronald Reagan had declared “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” when he spoke before the Brandenburg Gate in 1987, but his words were greeted at the time as the tired echo of anachronistic sentiments. No one really expected it to happen—perhaps not even Reagan himself, who by that time was committed to negotiating arms control treaties with the Soviets based on his positive assessment of his new partner, Mikhail Gorbachev. If anything, informed observers assumed that Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika would stabilize the Soviet Union, making the situation even more permanent. That was, after all, why Reagan felt he had to ask Gorbachev to tear down the wall; no one else had the power to do it.

By 1988, the academic world, entranced by the brilliant writing and daring prognostications of Paul Kennedy’s *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, as well as by Gorbachev’s ponderous yet oddly optimistic tome *Perestroika*, was more concerned about whether the United States would collapse under the pressure of “Imperial Overstretch” than they were willing to speculate about the collapse of communism. [1] The milestones of those years reinforced that impression. The Washington Treaty (INF Treaty) that abolished intermediate range nuclear missiles capped the Great Rapprochement between Reagan and Gorbachev, celebrated at the time as the end of the Cold War. When Reagan visited the USSR in 1988, shaking hands and kissing babies in Red Square, he dismissed his own rhetoric of the “evil empire” as the “product of another time.”

By 1989, Europe was in a strange position. Strong awareness that things might be changing in places such as the Soviet Union and Poland mixed with a lack of any clear sense of where they were going. Gorbachev had become an international celebrity. His visit to Bonn in June 1989 was the high point, as he thrilled wildly cheering crowds with his rhetoric of a “common European home.” The Cold War might be ending, but communism was here to stay. Events on

the other side of the world reinforced the sense of a permanent status quo, Chinese tanks in Tiananmen Square offering proof that when push came to shove communist regimes would shove back especially hard against reform.

Ironically, the revolutions of 1989 came precisely at a time when the idea of German reunification was about as far from anyone's mind as it had ever been. Gorbachev himself said it was "not on the agenda of History." Helmut Kohl and the center-right Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) had criticized the détente oriented Ostpolitik of the previous Social Democratic governments through the 1970s. But once they returned to power in 1982, Kohl and the CDU/CSU pursued continuity in Ostpolitik, including seeking a *modus vivendi* with the German Democratic Republic. Partly this was due to the fact that Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which had changed partners to bring Kohl to power, remained foreign minister, the job he had held since 1974. It also reflected the realist foreign policy consensus, which preferred the stability provided by division to the frightening uncertainties of unity.

Officially, the West Germans continued to avoid formal legal recognition of German division, and Kohl himself was careful to maintain the rhetorical connection to reunification. At the same time, his government helped stabilize the regime in East Berlin. When currency shortages raised fears of a major collapse, the Kohl government arranged for billions of marks in bank credits. The Western representative in those negotiations was one of the Federal Republic's premier Cold Warriors, Kohl's friendly rival Franz-Josef Strauss of the CSU. Strauss claimed then and after that the goal was to undermine the East German regime by exposing its economic weakness, but his willingness to help the regime avoid catastrophe showed that the Germans had learned to live with division. In September 1987, SED Chief Erich Honecker visited West Germany and received a greeting worthy of a visiting head of state, a sure sign of normalization.

His success in receiving such respectful treatment led Honecker to his most famous pronouncement, in January 1989. Confronting the question of whether the Berlin Wall should remain standing, he declared, The Wall will be standing in 50 and even in 100 years, if the reasons for it are not yet removed."

Even as he said this, and as he resisted the new ideas coming from Moscow, however, the pressure for reform inspired by Gorbachev was encouraging changes in Poland and Hungary. When the Hungarians opened their border to Austria that summer, their reforms in turn spilled over into the GDR. East Germans hoping to evade the border restrictions chose to visit Hungary and escape to the West. Honecker's efforts to close off that escape route led hundreds of despairing East Germans to flood the West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw, demanding exit visas.

By this point the people of East Germany had emerged onto the historical stage at last. First in the small groups crossing the Hungarian border, then the larger crowds flooding the embassies, and finally in the throngs marching through the streets of Berlin and Dresden and Leipzig, their simple yet powerful declaration “We are the people!” shook the foundations of the regime.

The first reactions of Western policymakers, however, were halting. Though many made speeches endorsing human rights, most politicians were more afraid of change than willing to see an opportunity. Genscher, for example, was not sure what to do about all the East Germans crowding the Embassies in Prague and Budapest. Only after long negotiations did both sides agree to allow the occupiers to head west in sealed trains. Opposition politicians were even more ambivalent, as they had moved further and further to the Left in the 1980s. In June 1989, SPD Minister President of Lower Saxony Gerhard Schröder famously remarked: “After forty years of the Federal Republic we should not lie to a new generation in Germany about the chances of reunification. There are none.” In late July, Joschka Fischer of the Greens, future Foreign Minister, went one better, dismissing the demand for reunification as “a dangerous illusion” and called for removing the call for reunification from the preamble of West Germany’s Basic Law. Even later that fall, Fischer said “Forget about reunification; we should shut up about that for the next twenty years.”

The people of East Germany, however, decided not to shut up, but to speak out. As October, which saw anti-government protests during the official celebrations of the GDR’s Fortieth Anniversary, turned to November, the pressure from the people had become unbearable for the East German regime. Warned by Gorbachev that “history punishes those who change too late,” the SED tried to stave off its end by jettisoning Honecker and offering a new reformist face in Egon Krenz. Krenz deserves credit for rejecting the possibility of using force against the protesters (what the security forces called, with sinister subtlety, the “Chinese solution”). But Krenz could not keep up with a population whose hunger for reform grew with the eating. When the SED Politburo tried to rush out an announcement easing the visa requirements for foreign travel, the garbled press conference inspired crowds to rush to the center of Berlin and demand the Wall be opened up immediately. As the befuddled border guards acquiesced, the Wall designed to last another fifty or a hundred years had seen its last day.

Once the wall fell, reunification was still only a hazy possibility. Many East German dissidents and western intellectuals still hoped for a “Third Way” between Soviet communism and western capitalism. This reflected of course an ideological split between those on the left who had prided themselves on leaving nationalism behind and those on the right who had been rhetorically committed to the nation for so long. But the split was generational as well. When younger social democrats such as Gerhard Schröder or Oskar Lafontaine expressed worries

that the costs outweighed the benefits of national unity, the grand old man of their party, Willy Brandt, simply declared, “That which belongs together will grow together.”

Even as government agencies proved to be unprepared for the events, Kohl seized the opportunity to back up a lifetime of rhetoric with decisive action.

On November 28, 1989, he gave a speech offering a ten-point plan for German unification, beginning with easing travel restrictions, and ending with reunification within a unifying Europe. Choosing boldness over drift, Kohl’s plan attracted crucial support from Washington. His European allies, especially France, Britain, and Italy, were publicly more reserved, but President George Bush lined up behind Kohl, and helped in talks with Gorbachev.

Kohl’s plan also resonated with the people in East Germany. Uninterested in serving as subjects of another social experiment, they began to agitate for unification, or forced the issue by moving to the West themselves. Only the promise of ultimate reunification could keep the East Germans at home. “We are the people” became “We are one people.” Free elections in East Germany on March 18, 1990 showed where things were going. The CDU and its allies, Kohl’s parties, won a strong mandate. The stage was set for reunification, which Kohl and Bush negotiated with the Soviets. Careful negotiations led to the German-German Financial Treaty on May 18, which went into effect on July 1, making the Deutschmark the common currency of the two German states. On the broader international stage, negotiations on the Two Plus Four treaty, including the two German states and the four occupying powers, (a formula initially suggested by State Department official and future FPRI President Harvey Sicherman) proceeded apace. German offers of financial assistance helped sweep away remaining Soviet reservations. The conclusion of the Treaty on September 12 led to official unity on October 3, 1990.

It had all happened very fast, faster even than the protesters in the streets had expected. The hollowness of the SED regime and its utter lack of legitimacy certainly played a role. Most important was Kohl’s surprising willingness to press ahead, confident both that Washington was behind him and that Gorbachev could be convinced through a combination of political pressure and economic inducement to agree. Later on, he would be criticized for moving too fast, and for downplaying the potential costs as he predicted “blooming landscapes” in the former East. Much Western intelligence on the GDR proved incorrect; East Germany was not as prosperous and strong as their propaganda had indicated. There was also a great deal of wishful thinking about the challenges of reuniting a country after four decades of division. Consequently, Germans suffered from a long economic and social hangover that continues to bedevil German politics and society. Kohl rode the euphoria of reunification to a big victory in 1990 elections, as the SPD leadership under Oskar Lafontaine was torn by ambivalence over reunification and its costs. In 1994, Kohl was re-elected, but with a much smaller majority as

the costs of reunification became clearer. In 1998 he suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the new generation represented by Schröder and Fischer. But by then there was no going back.

Bismarck has famously been quoted as saying, “A statesman cannot create anything himself. He must wait and listen until he hears the steps of God sounding through events; then leap up and grasp the hem of his garment.” Some opportunities appear only once, and for a very brief time. German unity was such an opportunity. Kohl represented a generation that considered reunification a natural goal, but that generation was on its way out by 1989. Considering further what happened in the Soviet Union, especially the intense backlash culminating in the 1991 coup attempt, one sees that it was good that Kohl had moved so quickly, because the window of opportunity was very small. What was possible in 1990 had been unthinkable in early 1989, and would have been unthinkable again by the summer of 1991.

German unification should humble all who profess to be able to predict the course of history, and also demonstrates the limitations of a realism that attempts to reduce international and domestic politics to the sum of external structures. Structures may indeed strongly shape reality, but they alone are not enough. It takes people to give them meaning. The Cold War did not end because the superpowers said so. Or rather, what the superpowers meant by the end of the Cold War would have left the Berlin Wall standing, and a great many other walls besides. It took people with imagination to grasp the possibilities, not simply to end, but to transcend the Cold War.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism in Europe is a story full of fascinating characters. They include a man in Rome, born in Cracow with a kindly smile and an iron will; another in Moscow who risked the fate of an empire, and lost, to win a victory for humanity; two men in Washington, mocked as an “amiable dunce” and a “wimp,” who showed both skill and empathy in dealing with friends old and new; and the ponderous, slow-talking man in Bonn who grasped the opportunity to unite his divided nation.

But it is not enough to focus only on the powerful. It was the people in their broadest sense that made this history possible, often in the face of criticism from experts who clucked and told them that they needed to accept the permanence of concrete realities. They are the thousands of individuals who marched together for freedom in Leipzig, Dresden, East Berlin, and other German cities and towns, as well as thousands more in Prague, Warsaw, Vilnius, Kiev, and even Moscow. We do not know their names, but we know what they accomplished. By tearing down a hateful monument to dictatorship, they helped build a better world.

Notes:

1. Not FPRI, though. In 1987 FPRI convened a three-day conference in New York City on the question “Will the Communist Regimes Survive?” Covered extensively in the news media at the time, the conference featured 36 speakers—all dissidents or exiles from 12 communist countries. According to FPRI’s then-deputy director Alan Luxenberg, the vibrancy of the cross-national ties of the dissidents and exiles was readily apparent. “Freedom was in the air,” he said. Alas, FPRI may have been farsighted, but it was not terribly efficient at that time: the volume of conference papers was not published until 1991—after communism collapsed. See Vladimir Tismaneanu and Judith Shapiro, eds. *Debates on the Future of Communism* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

PART IV: THE EU AND THE WEST

Is Europe Dying? Notes on a Crisis of Civilizational Morale

By George Weigel

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America's "Europe problem" and Europe's "America problem" have been staple topics of transatlantic debate for the past several years. Political leaders, media commentators, and businessmen usually discuss those problems in terms of policy differences: differences over prosecuting the war on terrorism, differences over the role of the United Nations in world affairs, differences over the Kyoto Protocol on the global environment, differences over Iraq. The policy differences are real. Attempts to understand them in political, strategic, and economic terms alone will ultimately fail, however, because such explanations do not reach deeply enough into the human texture of contemporary Europe.

To put the matter directly: Europe, and especially Western Europe, is in the midst of a crisis of civilizational morale. The most dramatic manifestation of that crisis is not to be found in Europe's fondness for governmental bureaucracy or its devotion to fiscally shaky health care schemes and pension plans, in Europe's lagging economic productivity or in the appeasement mentality that some European leaders display toward Islamist terrorism. No, the most dramatic manifestation of Europe's crisis of civilizational morale is the brute fact that Europe is depopulating itself.

Europe's below-replacement-level birthrates have created situations that would have been unimaginable when the institutions of European integration were formed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. By the middle of this century, if present fertility patterns continue, 60 percent of the Italian people will have no personal experience of a brother, a sister, an aunt, an uncle, or a cousin; [1] Germany will lose the equivalent of the population of the former East Germany; and Spain's population will decline by almost one-quarter. Europe is depopulating itself at a rate unseen since the Black Death of the fourteenth century. [2] And one result of that is a Europe that is increasingly "senescent" (as British historian Niall Ferguson has put it). [3]

When an entire continent, healthier, wealthier, and more secure than ever before, fails to create the human future in the most elemental sense—by creating the next generation—something very serious is afoot. I can think of no better description for that “something” than to call it a crisis of civilizational morale. Understanding its origins is important in itself, and important for Americans because some of the acids that have eaten away at European culture over the past two centuries are at work in the United States, and indeed throughout the democratic world.

Reading “History” Through Culture

Getting at the roots of Europe’s crisis of civilizational morale requires us to think about “history” in a different way. Europeans and Americans usually think of “history” as the product of politics (the struggle for power) or economics (the production of wealth). The first way of thinking is a by-product of the French Revolution; the second is one of the exhaust fumes of Marxism. Both “history as politics” and “history as economics” take a partial truth and try, unsuccessfully, to turn it into a comprehensive truth. Understanding Europe’s current situation, and what it means for America, requires us to look at history in a different way, through cultural lenses.

Europe began the twentieth century with bright expectations of new and unprecedented scientific, cultural, and political achievements. Yet within fifty years, Europe, the undisputed center of world civilization in 1900, produced two world wars, three totalitarian systems, a Cold War that threatened global holocaust, oceans of blood, mountains of corpses, the Gulag, and Auschwitz. What happened? And, perhaps more to the point, why had what happened happened? Political and economic analyses do not offer satisfactory answers to those urgent questions. Cultural—which is to say spiritual, even theological—answers might help.

Take, for example, the proposal made by a French Jesuit, Henri de Lubac, during World War II. De Lubac argued that Europe’s torments in the 1940s were the “real world” results of defective ideas, which he summarized under the rubric “atheistic humanism”—the deliberate rejection of the God of the Bible in the name of authentic human liberation. This, de Lubac suggested, was something entirely new. Biblical man had perceived his relationship to the God of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus as a liberation: liberation from the terrors of gods who demanded extortionate sacrifice, liberation from the whims of gods who played games with human lives (remember the Iliad and the Odyssey), liberation from the vagaries of Fate. The God of the Bible was different. And because biblical man believed that he could have access to the one true God through prayer and worship, he believed that he could bend history in a human direction. Indeed, biblical man believed that he was obliged to work toward the humanization of the world. One of European civilization’s deepest and most distinctive

cultural characteristics is the conviction that life is not just one damn thing after another; Europe learned that from its faith in the God of the Bible.

The proponents of nineteenth-century European atheistic humanism turned this inside out and upside down. Human freedom, they argued, could not coexist with the God of Jews and Christians. Human greatness required rejecting the biblical God, according to such avatars of atheistic humanism as Auguste Comte, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche. And here, Father de Lubac argued, were ideas with consequences-lethal consequences, as it turned out. For when you marry modern technology to the ideas of atheistic humanism, what you get are the great mid-twentieth century tyrannies-communism, fascism, Nazism. Let loose in history, Father de Lubac concluded, those tyrannies had taught a bitter lesson: “It is not true, as is sometimes said, that man cannot organize the world without God. What is true is that, without God, he can only organize it against man.” [4] Atheistic humanism-ultramundane humanism, if you will—is inevitably inhuman humanism.

The first lethal explosion of what Henri de Lubac would later call “the drama of atheistic humanism” was World War I. For whatever else it was, the “Great War” was, ultimately, the product of a crisis of civilizational morality, a failure of moral reason in a culture that had given the world the very concept of “moral reason.” That crisis of moral reason led to the crisis of civilizational morale that is much with us, and especially with Europe, today.

This crisis has only become fully visible since the end of the Cold War. Its effects were first masked by the illusory peace between World War I and World War II; then by the rise of totalitarianism and the Great Depression; then by the Second World War itself; then by the Cold War. It was only after 1991, when the seventy-seven-year-long political-military crisis that began in 1914 had ended, that the long-term effects of Europe’s “rage of self-mutilation” (as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn called it) could come to the surface of history and be seen for what they were-and for what they are. Europe is experiencing a crisis of civilizational morale today because of what happened in Europe ninety years ago. That crisis could not be seen in its full and grave dimensions then (although the German general Helmuth von Moltke, one of the chief instigators of the slaughter, wrote in late July 1914 that the coming war would “annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come” [5]). The damage done to the fabric of European culture and civilization in the Great War could only been seen clearly when the Great War’s political effects had been cleared from the board in 1991.

The Naked European Public Square

Contemporary European culture is not bedeviled by atheistic humanism in its most raw forms; the Second World War and the Cold War settled that. Europe today is profoundly shaped, however, by a kinder, gentler cousin, what the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has

termed “exclusive humanism” [6]: a set of ideas that, in the name of democracy, human rights, tolerance, and civility, demands that all transcendent religious or spiritual reference points must be kept out of European public life—especially the life of the newly expanded European Union. This conviction led to two recent episodes that tell us a lot about Europe’s crisis of civilizational morale and where that crisis leads politically.

The first episode involved the drafting of the European Union’s new constitution—or, to be technically precise, a new European constitutional treaty. This process set off a raucous argument over whether the constitution’s preamble should acknowledge Christianity as a source of European civilization and of contemporary Europe’s commitments to human rights and democracy. The debate was sometimes silly and not infrequently bitter. Partisans of European secularism argued that mentioning Christianity as a source of European democracy would “exclude” Jews, Muslims, and those of no religious faith from the new Europe; yet these same partisans insisted on underscoring the Enlightenment as the principal source of contemporary European civilization, which would seem to “exclude” all those—including avant-garde European “postmodernists”—who think that Enlightenment rationalism got it wrong.

The debate was finally resolved in favor of exclusive humanism: a treaty of some 70,000 words (ten times longer than the U.S. Constitution!) could not find room for one word, “Christianity.” Yet while following this debate, I had the gnawing sense that the real argument was not about the past but about the future—would religiously informed moral argument have a place in the newly expanded European public square?

A disturbingly negative answer to that question came four months after the final Euro-constitution negotiation. In October 2004, Rocco Buttiglione, a distinguished Italian philosopher and minister for European affairs in the Italian government, was chosen by the incoming president of the European Commission, Portugal’s Jos, Manuel Durão Barroso, to be commissioner of justice. Professor Buttiglione, who would have been considered an adornment of any sane government since Cato the Elder, was then subjected to a nasty inquisition by the justice committee of the European Parliament. His convictions concerning the morality of homosexual acts and the nature of marriage were deemed by Euro-parliamentarians to disqualify him from holding high office on the European Commission—despite Buttiglione’s clear distinction in his testimony between what he, an intellectually sophisticated Catholic, regarded as immoral behavior and what the law regarded as criminal behavior, and despite his sworn commitment, substantiated by a lifetime of work, to uphold and defend the civil rights of all. This did not satisfy many members of the European Parliament, who evidently agreed with one of their number in his claim that Buttiglione’s moral convictions—not any actions he had undertaken, and would likely undertake, but his convictions—were “in direct contradiction of European law.”

Buttiglione described this to a British newspaper as the “new totalitarianism,” which is not, I fear, an exaggeration. That this new totalitarianism flies under the flag of “tolerance” only makes matters worse. But where does it come from?

One of the most perceptive commentators on the European constitutional debate was neither a European nor a Christian but an Orthodox Jew born in South Africa—J. H. H. Weiler, professor of international law and director of the Jean Monnet Center at New York University. Weiler argued that European “Christophobia”—a more pungent term than Taylor’s “exclusive humanism”—was the root of the refusal of so many Europeans to acknowledge what Weiler regarded as obvious: that Christian ideas and values were one of the principal sources of European civilization and of Europe’s contemporary commitment to human rights and democracy. This deliberate historical amnesia, Weiler suggested, was not only ignorant; it was constitutionally disabling. For in addition to defining the relationship between citizens and the state, and the relations among the various branches of government, constitutions are the repository, the safe-deposit box, of the ideas, values, and symbols that make a society what it is. Constitutions embody, Weiler proposed, the “ethos” and the “telos,” the cultural foundations and moral aspirations, of a political community. To cut those aspirations out of the process of “constituting” Europe was to do grave damage to the entire project. [7]

Whether that happens remains to be seen, as it is not clear that the European constitutional treaty will be ratified by E.U. member states. But what is unhappily clear at this juncture is that Europe has produced a constitution that denies the vision of three of its most prominent founding fathers—Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, and Robert Schuman, serious Christians to a man, all of them convinced that the integrated and free Europe they sought was, in no small part, a project of Christian civilization. [8] Europe’s contemporary crisis of civilizational morale thus comes into sharper focus: Europe’s statesmen—or, at the least, too many of them—are denying the very roots from which today’s “Europe” was born. Is there any example in history of a successful political project that is so contemptuous of its own cultural and spiritual foundations? If so, I am unaware of it.

Boredom and its Contents

The demographics are unmistakable: Europe is dying. The wasting disease that has beset this once greatest of civilizations is not physical, however. It is a disease in the realm of the human spirit. David Hart, another theological analyst of contemporary history, calls it the disease of “metaphysical boredom”—boredom with the mystery, passion, and adventure of life itself. Europe, in Hart’s image, is boring itself to death.

And in the process, it is allowing radicalized twenty-first century Muslims—who think of their forebears’ military defeats at Poitiers in 732, Lepanto in 1571, and Vienna in 1683 (as well as

their expulsion from Spain in 1492), as temporary reversals en route to Islam's final triumph in Europe—to imagine that the day of victory is not far off. Not because Europe will be conquered by an invading army marching under the Prophet's banners, but because Europe, having depopulated itself out of boredom and culturally disarmed itself in the process, will have handed the future over to those Islamic immigrants who will create what some scholars call "Eurabia"—the European continent as a cultural and political extension of the Arab-Islamic world. Should that happen, the irony would be unmistakable: the drama of atheistic humanism, emptying Europe of its soul, would have played itself out in the triumph of a thoroughly nonhumanistic theism. Europe's contemporary crisis of civilizational morale would reach its bitter conclusion when Notre-Dame becomes Hagia Sophia on the Seine—another great Christian church become an Islamic museum. At which point, we may be sure, the human rights proclaimed by those narrow secularists who insist that a culture's spiritual aspirations have nothing to do with its politics would be in the gravest danger.

It need not happen: there are signs of spiritual and cultural renewal in Europe, especially among young people; the Buttiglione affair raised alarms about the new intolerance that masquerades in the name of "tolerance;" the brutal murder of Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh by a middle-class Moroccan-Dutch has reminded Europeans that "roots causes" do not really explain Islamist terrorism. The question on this side of the Atlantic, though, is why should Americans care about the European future? I can think of three very good reasons.

The first involves *pietas*, an ancient Roman virtue that teaches us reverence and gratitude for those on whose shoulders we stand.

A lot of what has crossed the Atlantic in the past several centuries has been improved in the process, from the English language to the forms of constitutional democracy. Yet *pietas* demands that Americans remember where those good things came from. A United States indifferent to the fate of Europe is a United States indifferent to its roots. Americans learned about the dignity of the human person, about limited and constitutional government, about the principle of consent, and about the transcendent standards of justice to which the state is accountable in the school of freedom called "Europe." Americans should remember that, with *pietas*. We have seen what historical amnesia about civilizational roots has done to Europe. Americans ought not want that to happen in the United States.

The second reason we can and must care has to do with the threat to American security posed by Europe's demographic meltdown. Demographic vacuums do not remain unfilled—especially when the demographic vacuum in question is a continent possessed of immense economic resources. One can already see the effects of Europe's self-inflicted depopulation in the tensions experienced in France, Germany, and elsewhere by rising tides of immigration from North Africa, Turkey, and other parts of the Islamic world. Since 1970, which is not all

that long ago, some 20 million (legal) Islamic immigrants—the equivalent of three E.U. countries, Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark—have settled in Europe. And while, in the most optimistic of scenarios, these immigrants may become good European democrats, practicing civility and tolerance, there is another and far grimmer alternative, as I have suggested above. Europe’s current demographic trend-lines, coupled with the radicalization of Islam that seems to be a by-product of some Muslims’ encounter with contemporary, secularized Europe, could eventually produce a twenty-second century, or even late twenty-first century, Europe increasingly influenced by, and perhaps even dominated by, militant Islamic populations, convinced that their long-delayed triumph in the European heartland is at hand.

Is a European future dominated by an appeasement mentality toward radical Islamism in the best interests of the United States? That seems very unlikely. Neither is a Europe that is a breeding ground for Islamic radicalism; remember that the experience of life in Hamburg was decisive in the evolution of both Mohammed Atta, leader of the 9/11 “death pilots,” and of the pilot of the “fourth plane” of that grim day, the plane forced down in Shanksville, Pennsylvania—the one intended to hit the Capitol or the White House.

The third reason why the “Europe problem” is ours as well as theirs has to do with the future of the democratic project, in the United States and indeed throughout the world. The strange debate over the mere mention of Christianity’s contributions to European civilization in the proposed European constitution was especially disturbing because the amnesiacs who wanted to rewrite European history by airbrushing Christianity from the picture were doing so in service to a thin, proceduralist idea of democracy. To deny that Christianity had anything to do with the evolution of free, law-governed, and prosperous European societies is, to repeat, more than a question of falsifying the past; it is also a matter of creating a future in which moral truth has no role in governance, in the determination of public policy, in understandings of justice, and in the definition of that freedom which democracy is intended to embody.

Were these ideas to prevail in Europe, that would be bad news for Europe; but it would also be bad news for the United States, for their triumph would inevitably reinforce similar tendencies in our own high culture, and ultimately in our law. The judicial redefinition of “freedom” as sheer personal willfulness, manifest in the 2003 Supreme Court decision in *Lawrence v. Texas*, was buttressed by citations from European courts. And what would it mean for the democratic project around the world if the notion that democracy has nothing to do with moral truth is exported from western Europe to central and eastern Europe via the expanded European Union, and thence to other new democracies around the world?

So Americans should, and must, care. We sever ourselves from our civilizational roots if we ignore Europe in a fit of aggravation or pique. Our security will be further imperiled in a post-9/11 world if Europe’s demographics continue to give advantage to the dynamism of radical

Islamism in world politics. The American democratic experiment will be weakened if Europe's legal definition of freedom as willfulness reinforces similar tendencies here in the United States-and so will the democratic project in the world.

Notes:

1. Nicholas Eberstadt, "What If It's a World Population Implosion? Speculations about Global De-population," *The Global Reproductive Health Forum* (Harvard University, 1998; <http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/Organizations/healthnet/HUpapers/implosion/d...>).
2. Niall Ferguson, "Eurabia?" *New York Times Magazine*, April 4, 2004.
3. Ibid.
4. Henri de Lubac, *The Drama of Atheist Humanism* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 14.
5. David Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 224.
6. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
7. J. H. H. Weiler, *Un Europa cristiana: Un saggio esplorativo* (Milan: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 2003).
8. See Robert Wendelin Keyserlingk, *Fathers of Europe* (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1972).

Will “Europe” Survive the 21st Century? A Meditation on the 50th Anniversary of the European Community

By Walter McDougall

July 2007

Part I of II: The Other Age Born in the Year 1957

It has gone down in history as “the other world series”: a championship match even more shocking than the Milwaukee Braves’ upset victory over the New York Yankees in baseball’s 1957 Fall Classic. That shot literally “heard ’round the world” was the Soviet launch of Sputnik 1, the first artificial earth satellite. It gave birth to the Space Age, and its fiftieth anniversary this October 4 is sure to inspire worldwide attention. By contrast, another anniversary of equivalent importance was all but ignored this past March. The birth certificate of that other age born fifty years ago was the Treaty of Rome, which founded the European Economic Community, or Common Market. Its charter members included only the “original six”—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg—and they pledged only to coordinate some tariff and industrial policies and cooperate on peaceful atomic energy. Fifty years later Europe is not just a Community, but a Union. It numbers not six, but twenty-seven members. And the purview of its institutions so transcends economics that Europe today has become a veritable state of mind.

European integration fulfilled a very old dream. The Holy Roman Emperors, as putative leaders of Western (Latin) Christendom in the medieval centuries, dreamed of restoring a unity unknown since the fall of ancient Rome. So, too, needless to say, did the popes. In early modern times, monarchs such as Habsburg Emperor Charles V, French King Louis XIV, and Russian Tsar Alexander I hoped their force and persuasion might reunite a broken and warring civilization. The persistent dream of European unity even survived the onslaught of nationalism in the modern era. At the 1814 Congress of Vienna following the initial defeat of Napoleon, Austrian foreign minister Klemens von Metternich identified aristocratic cosmopolitanism with the cause. “Europe,” he said, “has always had for me the quality of a fatherland.” In 1831 the diplomatic Concert of the Great Powers declared: “Each nation has its own particular rights, but Europe also has rights, bestowed upon her by a common social order.” At a congress of radicals in 1849, Romantic author Victor Hugo prophesied: “The day will come when you, Russia, you France, you England, and you Germany, when all the nations of our continent, without forfeiting your distinctive characteristics or splendors, will bind yourselves together into a single, superior entity, and constitute a European brotherhood.” In 1860, Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini exhorted all peoples to “reinvent Europe as a federation of free republics.”

Of course Europe instead descended into the twentieth century's era of virulent nationalism and world wars. But their horrors only made the cause of unity more pressing still. In 1944 Hans von Schreebronk, a German aristocrat executed for resisting the Nazi regime, wrote in his final testament, "I instinctively know that a Union of Europe would command far more of my loyalty than any one Fatherland." Even Winston Churchill, bulldog of the British Empire, imagined in 1946: "If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance, there would be no limit to the happiness, to the prosperity and glory which its three or four hundred million people would enjoy.... We must build a kind of United States of Europe." [1]

The old dream began to take shape in the late 1940s because new circumstances, imperatives, and incentives all suggested that the nation-state was obsolete. They included the idealistic federalist movement that captivated resistance movements during World War II; the onset of the Cold War, which impelled West Europeans to unite in the face of external Soviet and internal communist threats; the obvious bankruptcy of nationalistic ambitions in the wake of the fascist catastrophe; the new predominance of Christian Democrat and Social Democrat parties favorable to integration; the war's powerful example of economic mobilization and regulation; the American insistence that recipients of Marshall Plan aid jointly plan their recovery through the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development; the Europeans' realization that they must pool their resources if they were ever to escape U.S. domination; the rationality of uniting the coal, iron, and steel producing regions spanning the Rhine; Konrad Adenauer's appreciation that West Germany could regain sovereignty only by subordinating itself to international organizations; and the desire by all other countries to institutionalize the division of Germany.

The French Fourth Republic, inspired by technocrat Jean Monnet and foreign minister Robert Schuman, began the process by inviting its neighbors to merge their metallurgical industries into a common cartel. So it was that the "original Six" founded the European Coal and Steel Community as early as 1949. But momentum flagged, in part because Britain remained aloof from the continent and Britain and France alike still imagined themselves global colonial powers. Thus, when the United States pressured its NATO allies to rearm during the Korean War, first London then Paris rejected the proposal for a European Defense Community that would have obliged Europeans to forge the common foreign and defense policy that still eludes them today.

Then came the twin crises of October 1956: the Anglo-French-Israeli assault on the Egyptian forces that seized the Suez Canal and the Hungarian revolt against communist rule. The former event reminded West Europeans, in the most humiliating way possible, of their subservience to the United States when the Eisenhower administration joined the Soviets at the United Nations to condemn the Suez operation and imply that the sun had forever set on European imperialism. The latter event reminded Europeans, in the most frightening way

possible, of their vulnerability to the Soviet Union when Khrushchev ordered Warsaw Pact tanks into Hungary to crush the rebellion. Suddenly, Belgian minister Paul Henri Spaak's call for full economic union among the "original Six" took on urgency. With French, German, and Italian concurrence, the Treaty of Rome was drafted and signed within five months. Its preamble stated that the signatories were not just acting from economic expediency, but were "determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."

A school of political science known as functionalism promptly argued that integration, once begun, must quickly lead to a United States of Europe. In the short run that appeared to be wrong. For the very humiliations in Indochina, the Suez, and the civil war in Algeria that rendered the French Fourth Republic pliant on matters of integration prepared the rise to power in 1958 of the nationalist Charles de Gaulle. He did not pull out of the European Community, as he did NATO's military command. But during his decade as president he vetoed all attempts to broaden the Common Market by accepting new members (especially the British) or deepen it by expanding the EC bureaucracy's mandate. De Gaulle spoke of a Europe of the Fatherlands, not a United States of Europe.

Still, the European idea never went into reverse. During the 1970s, a decade marred by oil shocks, stagflation, and domestic terrorism, the EC not only admitted Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, but established its first executive, the European Commission, a European Parliament, and a European Monetary System. In the 1980s, despite more talk of "Euroboredom" and "Eurosclerosis," newly democratized Greece, Spain, and Portugal became members and a vigorous campaign to deepen the EU was launched in the belief that Europe must unite to compete in a globalized marketplace. Thanks in large part to the tireless Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, EC members ratified the Single European Act of 1986. In so doing they agreed to abolish hundreds of legal barriers to the free movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, adopt standardized laws and procedures for labor, welfare, budgets, and currencies, and forge a genuine European Union by 1992.

Little did anyone know that by the time that deadline arrived a revolution would topple the Berlin Wall, dissolve the communist bloc, and partition the USSR. The resulting reunification of Germany—by posing anew the danger of an imbalance of power—and liberation of Eastern Europe—by posing the danger of Russian revanchism—made Europe's "larger and deeper" agenda more pressing than ever. In 1995 the EU admitted Sweden, Finland, and Austria. In 2002 it launched the audacious common currency, the euro, to replace the once sacred deutschemark, franc, and lira. In 2004 the EU embraced the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, and Cyprus, then Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. So the Age of Europe not only survived the death of the Cold War environment that nurtured its infancy, but flourished in its absence.

“Evolved” Europe as Model for Humanity

To appreciate how much Europeans have achieved through their fifty-year process of integration, all one need do is to look back one hundred years and contrast Europe in 2007 with Europe in 1907.

Measured in constant 1960 U.S. dollars, Europe’s per capita gross domestic product in 1907 was about \$750. It is estimated to surpass \$6,650 in 2007, an increase in per capita standard of living of 800 percent despite an almost doubling of the population. In 1907 average European life expectancy was about 45 years due to high infant mortality, disease, and poor health care. In 2007 Europe’s life expectancy is well over 70 in every country but Russia. In 1907 literacy rates among the population ranged from around 80 percent in Britain, France, and Germany to less than 40 percent in most of eastern Europe. In 2007 literacy rates range from 95 to 100 percent everywhere. In 1907 representative government, civil rights, and the rule of law were established and honored only in northern and northwestern Europe. Today they are taken for granted everywhere outside Russia and a few spots in the Balkans.

In 1907 Europe bestrode most of the world as its industrial, imperial center, with only the U.S., Europe’s offspring, posing an imminent challenge. Yet today’s statistics for higher education, equal employment, medical care, nutrition, labor productivity, per capita energy consumption, leisure time, spending on entertainment, culture, self-improvement, and a dozen more such indices prove that by comparison to 2007, Europe in 1907 was merely a “developing region.”

Most obviously, Europe in 1907 was a powder keg, a crowded continent bristling with jealous, fearful Great Powers—seven of them, counting Italy and Ottoman Turkey—all racing for armaments, divided into hostile alliances, and teetering on the brink of total war. By comparison, Europe in 2007 is a pastry shop. It sees no wars or invasions on the horizon. Its small volunteer militaries are more suited to peacekeeping than warfighting. Almost all its nations are united in a single alliance (NATO) and single market (EU). The violent international relations of the past 500 years—the Rivalries of the Great Powers—exist only in history texts. In sum, Europeans have never known peace, prosperity, and unity anything like what they enjoy today. Europe truly seems to have arrived at the “end of history” and found it a very happy ending indeed.

Genuine Pursuits of Happiness

What is more, many Americans look upon Europe’s success story with admiration and envy. Consider Jeremy Rifkin, the sociologist specializing in long-range trends, whose book *The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream* (2004) offers an arresting perspective. Rifkin digs into the roots of the American Dream and finds that the New World has in fact become the Old World! That is, we Americans are

still motivated by ideas and aspirations born 250 to 500 years ago in Europe's Enlightenment and Protestant Reformation. Colonists bearing that era's notions of liberty and equality, continual progress, and pursuit of wealth and power proceeded to invent the American Dream and imagine it a model all nations were destined to emulate. One result was the most astounding success story on earth. But another result has been that Americans remain loyal to notions of Providence, patriotism, individualism, materialism, and "Don't Tread on Me" unilateralism that Europeans have long discarded. The obvious reason for that, explains Rifkin, is that modern history has been a tale of almost continuous triumph for the U.S., but one of almost continuous trauma for Europe. Hence Europeans lost faith in traditional religions, ideologies, and even Enlightenment reason itself. They ceased to accept the liberal, industrial era's equation of better with richer, bigger, faster, stronger, and cheaper. In other words, Europeans leapfrogged Americans on the road to the future by, in effect, becoming conservative again! That is, they relinquished their millenarian or utopian belief in mankind's ability to create heaven on earth and got to work forging a humane, sustainable civilization where no wars of religion, patriotism, or ideology would disturb their personal fulfillment. Thus, whereas restless, dissatisfied, future-oriented Americans spend their whole lives pursuing happiness yet in most cases remain profoundly unhappy, Europeans are content with who they are and what they have, live for the here and now, and imagine themselves integral parts, not of a nation or civilization, but of the whole human race and even the biosphere in which they live and move and have their being.

Rifkin concludes with a rapture: "Much of the world is going dark, leaving many human beings without clear direction. The European Dream is a beacon of light in a troubled world. It beckons us to a new age of inclusivity, diversity, quality of life, deep play, sustainability, universal human rights, the rights of nature, and peace on Earth. We Americans used to say the American Dream is worth dying for. The new European Dream is worth living for."

Europe as Vanguard

Another paean to Europe written by another smitten American is Michael Mandelbaum's *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century* (2002). [2] The title echoes Francis Fukuyama's notorious claim (*The End of History and the Last Man*, 1993) that the end of the Cold War brought modern history to its "end" insofar as liberal Western values had triumphed over all its ideological competitors including monarchy, imperialism, fascism, and communism. The historical chapters trace the origins of the conquering ideas to the French Revolution, which raised the standard of popular democracy; Britain's Industrial Revolution, which raised the standard of free market capitalism; and America's Wilsonian crusade, which raised the standard of peace through international organization. But Mandelbaum provocatively asserts that those conquering ideas are best embodied today, not by any nation-state, but by the EU as a whole. Nowhere else has

a political community carried the triad to fuller realization; nowhere else have the causes of oppression, poverty, and strife been so thoroughly overcome. Americans have always imagined their nation a “city on a hill” for the world to emulate. Mandelbaum boldly imagines world government to be the true goal of humanity and believes Europe the example to emulate. The EU, he concludes, is “a foretaste of the way the world of the twenty-first century will be organized.”

Europe’s False Paradise

How realistic are such reveries? What does Europe’s pulse tell us about its health and prospects for growth? I suggest that the EU is at best incomplete and at worst a false paradise for which even its own citizens are unwilling to die.

The EU’s potential for superpower status is beyond dispute. Its 484 million people outnumber Americans by more than 50 percent. The EU today is the world’s largest internal market in terms of purchasing power and boasts the largest volume of world trade. The combined GDP of EU member states surpassed that of the United States (\$15.5 trillion to \$13 trillion) for the first time in 2003. The euro has been a magnificent success. Instead of struggling to maintain parity with the dollar, it has soared to \$1.30 or \$1.40. Yet Europe remains what the Germans call a *Handelsstaat*: a trading state bereft of significant military power or diplomatic influence. That is because NATO Europe simply refuses to spend more than a comparative pittance on its military. Of all the old Great Powers only Britain can pretend to have some capability for power projection. Thus did an American neoconservative tease our transatlantic friends with the quip that if men are from Mars and women from Venus, so are Americans from Mars and Europeans from Venus. [3] Indeed, make love, not war could be Europe’s motto.

Polls confirm Europeans’ New Age attitude toward defense. Only 24 percent think their nation-states should be responsible for security; 20 percent think NATO should be responsible for their security (take that, Uncle Sam!), and a pacifist 14 percent do not believe in having any military at all. That leaves a plurality of 42 percent who want the EU itself to take charge of defense (which is precisely what President Eisenhower hoped Europeans would do back in the 1950s). But European governments allocate less than 2 percent of their combined GDP to defense. Britain and France still deploy small nuclear deterrents plus a few aircraft carriers and bomber squadrons, but the EU itself has no strategic forces, just a handful of aircraft and armored vehicles, and virtually no capacity for long-range logistics or space-based reconnaissance, communications, command and control. The vaunted 60,000-man EU rapid reaction force may be sufficient to help patrol Bosnia or pacify a troubled ex-colony in Africa, but it is hard to imagine any other mission for which it is adequate.

To be sure, Europeans boast of what Harvard’s Prof. Joseph Nye termed soft power [4] in the belief that diplomatic, cultural, and moral suasion is more humane and effective than brute

force. But even Europe's soft power may be overrated in an era when few leaders on other continents look anymore to London, Paris, Rome, or Berlin for their standards of philosophy, law, fashion, high or popular culture. In any event, Europeans can trumpet their soft power only because of (a) the absence of any hard power threat in their neighborhood and (b) the willingness of the U.S. to combat terrorists, aggressors, and rogue regimes. Nor has the EU yet considered taking out some insurance against the chance that those conditions may change.

Economic Stasis, Energy Dependence, and Sex-Shop Socialism

Nor is the EU quite the economic powerhouse it is cracked up to be. Its social regulations emphasize the quality and equality of life over competitiveness. According to OECD statistics, the U.S. devotes just 11 percent of its GDP to redistributing wealth through social programs. EU countries devote 26 percent to that purpose. Likewise, Europeans on average work just 35 hours per week and have 3 to 4 weeks paid vacation each year. Americans are lucky if they can work 40 hours per week and get 2 weeks of paid vacation. The result is that EU productivity is about 95 percent that of the U.S., but per capita income in the EU is just 72 percent of U.S. incomes. Still, that is just fine with them. As the saying goes, "Americans live to work whereas Europeans work to live."

It is no accident that the draft European constitution guaranteed every imaginable human right except one many Americans cherish most: private property. Europeans extol their comprehensive welfare programs, universal socialized health care, free public education through university, strict environmentalism, advocacy of animal rights and children's rights, gender equality, plus programs promoting leisure, self-esteem, and (in progressive states like Denmark and the Netherlands) subsidized drugs and prostitution. Indeed, Boston University's Angelo Codevilla has jokingly labeled Europe's political economy sex-shop socialism.

How do Europeans pay for their welfare? Good question, since the same regulations that stipulate benefits retard wealth creation. Europeans have written into law such elaborate protections and benefits for labor that it is nearly impossible for corporations to lay off workers. The resulting high payroll costs discourage firms from either hiring personnel to expand or firing personnel to downsize. The result is a level of structural unemployment that would be unacceptable to Americans. To be sure, the system has brought remarkable peace to European industries since the last big labor outbursts around 1968. But sclerosis keeps EU growth modest—1.5 or 2.5 percent—even in good times.

Finally, Europe is heavily dependent on foreign energy. Some EU members, notably France, wisely invested in nuclear energy for domestic electricity. Others, such as the UK, made lucky oil strikes in the North Sea. But for the most part the EU is in thrall to oil and gas imported almost exclusively from Russia or the Middle East.

Brussels Bureaucrats and Democracy Deficits

Speaking of constraints, the EU's voluminous rules can make China seem libertarian by comparison. Back in the 1960s and 70s, functionalists such as Berkeley's Ernest Haas predicted (approvingly) just that result, because the international bureaucrats were sure to claim, rightly, that "if we are instructed to regulate A and B, then of course we must have control over C, D, and E." The Gaullist interlude notwithstanding, functionalism would seem to be vindicated. The progress of the EC, then EU, toward deeper integration has been driven, at every stage, not by the people of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, but by Brussels-based Eurocrats who insist that all countries "harmonize" their policies regarding more and more issues.

EU regulations today are so numerous no one can say how many there are except that they exceed 200,000 and some 2,500 new ones are added each year. Moreover, since legislatures of member or applicant states are obliged to incorporate them into their national codes, they become little more than rubber stamps for the Eurocrats. The powers of the European Parliament in Strasbourg are also carefully circumscribed, so it mostly signs off on whatever the EU executive council proposes. In any case, who would bother to run for a seat at Strasbourg unless they believed in the EU, or bother to vote for those who do run? In truth, voter turnout for EU elections is embarrassingly small by comparison to that for national elections.

All this adds up to a Democracy Deficit that increases the chance that someday ordinary European voters will stand up and cry "Stop!" not just to this initiative or that draft constitution, but to the whole project. They all cherish peace and prosperity, but will they still do it if it means making an Orwellian Big Brother of the Brussels bureaucracy?

A Culture of Unbelief and Culture of Death

What do Europeans believe, stand for, and fight for if necessary? We really can't say since they have not been tested, save for a few thousand professional soldiers in Bosnia and Afghanistan. If you ask Americans what they have faith in and would fight for, most reply God, Country, and Freedom. Most Europeans would not use any of those words. They have transcended religion and patriotism, and shucked off old moral taboos, to the point that it seems nothing is sacred, not even life. Cultural conservatives deplore Europeans' tolerance of suicide, euthanasia, abortion, and high rates of addiction to drugs, pornography, gambling, and mind-numbing video games. Pope John Paul II preached repeatedly against what he called a "culture of death" and attributed it to the decline of religious faith. The numbers appear to bear that out. When asked if religion is very important to them, Germans said yes just 21 percent of the time. But that made Germany a highly spiritual state, because in Britain only 16 percent, France 14 percent, and Scandinavia less than 10 percent said religion was important in their lives. The response in the U.S. was 82 percent. Similarly, 40 percent of Americans report that

they go to church or synagogue every week, while just 10 percent of Protestant Europeans say that they attend church once a month. When asked why the EU's constitutional convention rejected any reference to God or Christianity, a French diplomat reportedly sniffed, "We Europeans don't like God." [5]

The same is true of civil religion, the secular values citizens deem sacred. Almost 80 percent of Americans think it important that democratic ideals and institutions be spread more broadly around the world. Less than 40 percent of Europeans think that is important or even necessarily positive. In sum, a postmodern, post-Christian civilization has returned to the pagan values of group cohesion and collective hedonism, and elevated peace and prosperity from the status of blessings to the status of idols.

The sterling successes and worrisome weaknesses of contemporary Europe might be of no broader interest except for the fact that Europe is no island. It is trapped in a much wider world that mounts three existential challenges to the EU's would-be nirvana.

Part II of II: The European Union in a Wider World

In 2003, during the debate over the Bush administration's request for UN approval to invade Iraq, British diplomat Chris Patten was despondent. He was not working for Tony Blair, who supported Bush, but for the EU's Commission for External Relations, which was torn asunder by the war on terror. At length Patten remarked, "Some Europeans think that grumbling about America is the same thing as having a foreign policy." [6] Therein lies the essence of the American Challenge faced by Europe in the twenty-first century. The U.S. seems too strong to ignore and too headstrong to resist, but also too reckless, dangerous, and unilateralist to support. One might assume that a powerful, out-of-control America launching preemptive wars would be just the impetus Europeans need to forge a common foreign and security policy. But so far the opposite has occurred. Europe has splintered under the pressure.

It began back in the 1990s when NATO almost wrecked itself over debates about burden-sharing, expansion, "out of area or out of business," and finally the Bosnia and Kosovo debacles. But at least Bill Clinton maintained good relations with his counterparts over in Europe. He did it through charm, caution, and diplomatic deception. That is, Clinton courted favor by signing every protocol Europe favored in the knowledge none would win Senate ratification. Indeed, some agreements he never bothered to submit to Congress at all. George W. Bush, on the other hand, candidly stated his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the Rio Pact on bio-diversity, the treaty banning landmines, the International Criminal Court, and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. To Europeans it seemed that post-Cold War America was reverting to a go-it-alone, cowboy diplomacy that placed power and growth above humane global values.

Then came 9/11 and a Europe-wide outpouring of sympathy with the United States. *Le Monde* said the next day, “We are all Americans.” German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder called the Al Qaeda attack a declaration of war against civilization. Tony Blair, noting that 67 British citizens died on 9/11, promised to “stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends” and “not rest until this evil is driven from our world.” On September 12, for the only time in history, NATO invoked Article 5 of its treaty to declare 9/11 an assault on all of its 19 member states. That is why Afghanistan, whose Taliban regime harbored Osama bin Laden, was invaded by NATO and remains a NATO responsibility to this day. The entire EU declared September 14, 2001 a day of mourning.

Yet, almost from the start Europeans expressed certain misgivings. They knew how Americans, once attacked, can lurch to extremes and lash out against any and all suspected enemies, deaf to counsels of prudence and blind to war’s unintended consequences. Europeans declared their fears justified when President Bush declared an Axis of Evil including, not Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Europeans cringed to hear the new Bush Doctrine, arrogating to the U.S. the right to launch preventive attacks on anyone suspected of harboring terrorists or developing weapons of mass destruction. Europeans understandably howled when Bush announced, “You are either with us or with the terrorists.” Rage over 9/11 seemed to eclipse any subtlety, humility, or sense of proportion Americans had learned over a century as world leaders. Finally, Bush showed none of the patience and skill his father displayed during the 1991 Gulf War. Bush Sr. had built consensus among Arab states, European allies, and the UN before striking at Saddam Hussein. Bush Jr. just demanded consensus and declared he would go ahead whether he got it or not.

Britain loyally followed America, as did Spain, Italy, and the new NATO members of Eastern Europe. But France, Germany, and Belgium, not to mention Russia and China, did not. When Bush called on the UN to sanction a war on Iraq, the French and Germans protested hotly. During Schroeder’s reelection campaign in 2002, German justice minister Herta and Paul Daehring allegedly even made an analogy between Bush and Hitler. [7] Critics accused the U.S. of exploiting “rogue regimes” to behave like a “rogue Superpower.” French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine accused America of becoming a hyperpuissance, or hyper-power and law unto itself. Americans replied with their own accusations, most famously Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s comments about the tired, toothless countries of “Old Europe” led by France and Germany. Needless to say, in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, the French and Germans patted themselves on the back for staying out of the quagmire, while Tony Blair was eventually dumped by his own party.

If Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus—if their perspectives on values and world affairs are so contrary—how long can NATO survive? Prof. Andrei Markovitz of the University of Michigan goes so far as to define Anti-Americanism as Europe’s lingua franca,

conventional wisdom, and measure of belonging. That is, you just don't say nice things about the U.S. in polite European society, or else you are not a good European. In short, the EU has defined itself against a hated Other, and the Other is us.

Even in Britain defenders of the Atlantic partnership are a distinct minority. John Blundell, director of London's Institute of Economic Affairs, is among those Brits who despise the EU and fear a widening gap between the U.S. and Europe. In a 2006 speech, "Is the EU America's Friend and Foe?" he advised Americans to quit pretending to support the European project, as their presidents have ritually done, and instead try to loosen or break up the EU. [8] Of course, talk like that only magnifies Europeans' distrust of the hyper-puissance to which they are chained.

The Asian Challenge

Yet its tension with the U.S. may prove modest compared to the Asian challenge Europe will face in the twenty-first century. China, India, and still formidable Japan are already fierce competitors for economic and soft power, and could easily surpass the EU in hard power. While labor costs rise and productivity stagnates in Europe, low labor costs and soaring productivity turn Asia into the Workshop of the World. Their exports of cheap but high-quality goods have created such balance of payments surpluses that Asian coffers overflow with dollars and euros. Asians invest much of that cash in Western government bonds, which means that U.S. defense spending and European welfare spending are made possible courtesy of Asians' largesse. In short, Europe (like the U.S.) is living beyond its means and will do so even more as its population continues to age.

China, India, and the smaller Asian "tigers" have already moved into many high-tech industries pioneered in the West. In another twenty years their R&D may be so dynamic they will cease playing catch-up and instead pioneer new frontiers. What can the EU do? Pull up the drawbridge of tariff protectionism and make Europe a castle? That would only hasten its retreat into the inferiority medieval Europe suffered vis-a-vis Asia. Eurocrats are well aware of this Asian Challenge. They invoked it to justify plunging ahead with the euro. But now they must decide what to do with the EU and euro in hopes of remaining competitive.

The Islamic Challenge

The Islamic challenge begs the most fundamental question: What is Europe? Europeans themselves cannot say. EU membership criteria stress common values, not geographic, ethnic, or religious identity. Indeed, geographers say there is no such thing as Europe; it's just a convention to divide the Eurasian landmass at Russia's Ural Mountains. And what about the Muslims whose ancestors have dwelt in the Balkans for six hundred years? When "Europe" began to come into common usage a millennium ago it simply denoted Christendom. But that

is obsolete today since most Europeans are not religious at all, whereas Christianity remains the world's largest religion thanks to its strength in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Is Europe a strictly institutional reality based on EU membership, then? Or a state of mind based on those values consciously inculcated? Back in 1948 Churchill said, "We hope to see a Europe where men of every country will think of being European the way they think of belonging to their native land," and Jean Monnet cautioned, "Europe has never existed; one must genuinely create Europe." Both implicitly hearkened back to those state-builders, both royal and revolutionary, who forged modern nations through bureaucratic centralization, linguistic standardization, and mass education, and urged those same methods be used to transcend nation-states.

But do Europeans really want to transcend the nation? Their embarrassing dilemma concerning immigrants, especially Muslim ones, suggests that hypocrisy lurks at the heart of the EU project. While determining the number of Muslims in each country is difficult and one finds varying figures, as of 2001 official estimates of Muslims as a percent of the population were as follows: France 7.5; Netherlands 4.4; Germany 3.9; Britain 3.3; Spain 1.8; Denmark 1.4; Italy 1.2. Not high percentages, you may think, but Europeans think otherwise. Indeed, prior to an abashed reform made in 1990, an ethnic German refugee from, say, the Ukraine who spoke no German could get automatic citizenship, while an ethnic Turk born in Germany and fluent in its language and culture could almost never gain citizenship. Indeed, Europeans have consistently regarded immigrants as a cultural threat, a drain on welfare budgets, and a danger (one-third of all prison inmates in Germany are foreign born) long before Islamic terrorists infiltrated their cities.

But postwar Europe desperately needed workers. So huge numbers emigrated from North Africa and Turkey over the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. The oil shock and recession after 1973 slowed down immigration, but it picked up again in the 1990s. All told, Germany absorbed 24.5 million immigrants from 1950-88, France 21.9 million, and the rest of northern Europe (including the UK) some 25 million. By the end of the century, more than one in twenty "Europeans" were not European—or were they? The result is that the European "Union" now counts 87 languages and dialects.

The other trend that has made immigration an existential concern and source of panic is the concomitant plunge of fertility among native Europeans to the lowest in the world. The birthrates for Germans, Swedes, Spaniards, Greeks, French, Italians, and Russians have fallen as low as 1.4 or even 1.1 per woman, whereas the mere replacement rate is 2.1. In Germany 31.2 percent of women bear no children at all. As a result, Europe's population is expected to fall 13 percent by the year 2050 and the median age is expected to rise to an unprecedented 52 years (compared to just 35 in the U.S.). To put it another way, most Europeans will then be older than the average life expectancy of people 150 years ago.

The result will be that Caucasians (people of European stock), who numbered 31 percent of humankind in 1900, will likely plummet to just 11 percent by the year 2050, while Caucasians in Europe will number just 7.5 percent.

Such “demographic suicide” (as George Weigel termed it) is virtually unknown in biological history. To be sure, massive die-offs have occurred periodically, but they were due to famine, epidemic diseases, or warfare. Europeans today, at least west of Russia, are as well fed, healthy, and peaceful as any civilization in history. They are simply choosing not to have babies. Why? Studies done by national and EU institutions point to the decline of marriage and family values, lenient divorce and abortion laws, ubiquitous contraception, the choice by women to pursue careers, and the preference of couples for two incomes rather than children. [9] Moral critics blame the birth dearth on the selfishness of a “me first, do your own thing” generation. But morals aside, it is clear many Europeans no longer consider children a part of their pursuit of happiness and may even find them a hindrance.

All that is relevant to the “Islamic Challenge” because it means people of native European stock are shrinking in absolute terms while the Arabs, Turks, and other extra-European immigrants among them are procreating at very high rates. Moreover, Europeans are going to need immigrant workers all the more as their own population rapidly ages. That is why even Rifkin admits this seemingly idyllic European Dream is in fact placing the dreamers “between a rock and a hard place.”

So far, efforts to deal with Muslim immigration have been singularly unsuccessful because efforts to assimilate, or tolerate, or repress Muslim cultural habits have fomented protests and race riots among immigrants and nativists alike in France, England, and Germany, while neo-fascist splinter parties have arisen in France, Italy, and Austria that promise to halt or reverse immigration.

Pathetic Caucasian birthrates, Muslim immigration, the revelation after 9/11 that Western Europe was the Number One haven for terrorists outside of Afghanistan, and the Al Qaeda bombings in London and Madrid make for a crisis that is not going away for a very long time. Yet, even they do not pose the most immediate Islamic challenge. That distinction goes to the innocent, proper, and sensible application by Turkey to become a member of the EU. The Turks have been begging for years to be admitted to Europe on numerous grounds. Turkey included more or less of the Balkan peninsula for six centuries. Hundreds of thousands of Turks already live in the EU. Turkey’s economy is closely tied to Europe’s. Turkey was a charter member of NATO. Turkey is a secular, not an Islamic Republic. Still, the EU always keeps the Turks at arm’s length, citing the role the military has played in Turkish politics. But even that is somewhat disingenuous since the political role of the Turkish military has been precisely to keep Islamic parties from taking power in Istanbul. The unspoken truth is that

Europeans are just terrified of granting 60 million Muslim Turks the right to travel and live across Europe.

Charlemagne *Agonistes*

We began by contrasting Europe in 2007 with Europe in 1907. Let us conclude by invoking a grander timeline, that of European civilization itself. Once upon a time the term Europa referred only to a beautiful maiden in Greek mythology who attracted the wandering eye of Zeus, or else to a directional term referring to the Greek side of the Hellespont as opposed to the side on the peninsula Greeks called Asia Minor. The Roman Empire, encompassing parts of three continents around the Mediterranean, had no concept of Europe, and the Germanic tribes whose invasions dissolved the empire based at Rome certainly had no concept of Europe as a geographical, cultural, religious, linguistic, racial, or political entity. Nor did the Arabs, who swept out of the desert in the seventh and eighth centuries of the Common Era full of zeal for Allah and his prophet Mohammed. The Arabs overran fully half of all the provinces of Christendom, imposing their rule by sword and Quran on Mesopotamia, Syria, Lebanon, the Holy Land, Egypt, all of North Africa, and almost all of Spain. The Umayyad Caliphate even dreamed of expanding the Dar al Islam, the Land of the Faithful, across the Pyrenees and extirpating Latin Christendom altogether. But its Saracen soldiers were checked, for ever as it turned out, by the knights of a Frankish prince named Charles “the Hammer” Martel at Tours in 732.

That victory allowed the heirs of Charles the Hammer to imagine a destiny for the Franks, indeed for all the Christian tribes, greater than mere survival. Chief among them was his tall, imposing grandson, also named Charles. Exceptionally skilled at war, diplomacy, administration, and court politics, he created by sheer force of will a great empire that among his own subjects earned him the epithet Charles the Great, to wit Karl der Grosse or Charlemagne. The glory and booty he won in battle kept the lords and knights satisfied. His religious donations and support for public morality won over the clergy. His protection of commerce and administration of royal law pleased the merchants. His reign was immensely popular. Moreover, though not himself literate, Charlemagne gathered around him the most learned monks from the British Isles, Italy, France, and the Low Countries. He founded schools, patronized art, and presided over a Little Renaissance in the midst of the Dark Ages. Above all, Charlemagne was a pious man who believed himself called to unite the Christians orphaned by the collapse of the Roman Empire and spread the gospel to pagans north and west of Francia. He succeeded in all this to a remarkable degree: indeed, the empire based at his capital of Aix-la-Chapelle coincided remarkably with the boundaries of the original Common Market formed in 1957: France, the Low Countries, West Germany, and northern Italy.

What every pupil used to learn about Charlemagne is that the Pope crowned him Emperor of the West at a Christmas Day mass in the year 800. What few people know is that the year before, in 799, an anonymous court poet bestowed a still grander title. He dubbed Charlemagne “King and Father of Europe.” A continent, a civilization, had been willed into being by one man. Moreover, that self-conscious European idea survived the crackup of Charlemagne’s empire to inspire monarchs, popes, philosophers, conquerors, and at last economists and mere bureaucrats for 1,200 years. The idea had to wait until the spiraling orgy of nationalism spent itself utterly in World War II. But then, indeed in the year 1950, the good burghers of the Rhineland town Germans call Aachen and the French Aix-la-Chapelle, established a prize to be awarded annually to the person who did most to advance European unity. The town fathers named it the Charlemagne Prize after the “King and Father of Europe” who had made their city his capital.

What would Charlemagne make of Europe today? He would marvel, of course, at the wealth and technology. He would praise and bless the ubiquitous peace. He would recognize instantly the Islamic Challenge and tell Europeans it was ten times worse back in his day! Nor, having been a state builder himself, would he likely object to the intrusive EU bureaucracy. Indeed, it is fetching to think Charlemagne would discern in the EU the culmination of the great work he began over a millennium ago, and give glory to God. But three features of Europe today would doubtless grieve and trouble him greatly: military impotence; spiritual emptiness; and demographic decay. How long, the Emperor would surely ask, can a civilization expect to survive without arms, without faith, without children?

That is a question even the plodding Eurocrats will have to address before the twenty-first century gets very old.

Notes:

1. Speech in Zurich, Sept. 19, 1946.
2. Reviewed by this author in *The National Interest*, Winter 2003.
3. Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (2003).
4. Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2005).
5. Kenneth L. Woodward, “An Oxymoron: Europe Without Christianity,” *New York Times* (op-ed), June 14, 2003.
6. William I. Hitchcock, *The Struggle for Europe* (2003), p. 473.
7. “Minister denies Bush ‘Hitler’ slur,” CNN, Sept. 20, 2002.
8. Dec. 22, 2006 Heritage Foundation Lecture #983.
9. See Nicholas Eberstadt, “Population and Public Health: Four Unexpected Surprises,” *Orbis*, Fall 2004.

Turkey and the European Union: Keeping a Friendly Distance

By Michael Radu

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The alienation between Turkey and the EU has grown on both sides to the point that more and more people in Brussels and Ankara are beginning to realize that not only is Turkey's EU membership unlikely, but that it is not in the interest of either party.

The immediate problem is Cyprus, where the EU has committed every error possible, and an issue which more than any other unites all Turks. To begin with, the EU's decision to admit Greek Cyprus as a full member was made apparently without a full understanding of the implications. In April 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan for reunification—which 65 percent of Turkish Cypriot voters approved—was rejected by the Greek Cypriots by over 75 percent in a referendum. But Brussels went ahead with the admission of Greek Cyprus anyway, even though Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had risked all his political capital (and perhaps the existence of his government) to pressure the Turkish Cypriots to accept the plan. He did so even though he was fully aware that, once Cyprus was in the EU, Nicosia would be in a position to demand more and more concessions from Ankara. Meanwhile, under Greek pressure, the EU continues to punish, through blockade and isolation, the Turkish side, while threatening Ankara for not opening its ports to the Greeks. As correctly perceived in Turkey, Erdogan and the Turkish Cypriots made all the unpopular concessions and received only humiliation from Brussels.

The more long-term and profound issue is the EU's political demands on Turkey, demands that are a case study of contradiction and confusion. Turkey has complied with many of Brussels' demands—constitutional changes regarding human rights, freedom of expression, minority rights, etc. Kurds now have the right to use their own language and have a Kurdish media, again against popular sentiment and well-founded fears of Kurdish separatism. The EU continues to push, often vocally and, in the eyes of many in Turkey, irresponsibly, for the elimination of the military's political role and influence.

Why is this irresponsible on the EU's part? Because, despite government denials, Islamism, including fundamentalism, has been on the rise in Turkey ever since the present Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2003. That fact has been repeatedly brought to the public's attention by Chief of General Staff Gen. Yasar Buyukanit and Land Forces Commander Gen. Ilker Basbug. Moreover, Navy chief Admiral Yener Karahanoglu has clearly stated that "The Turkish armed forces will never make the concessions that have been asked

of it on the road to the European Union.” The military leaders have a constitutional obligation to protect secularism—something that seems to have escaped notice by its Brussels’ critics. The seldom mentioned but most powerful reason for opposition to Turkey’s membership in the EU in Europe is its Muslim identity and fear of the impact some 70 million Muslim Turks in a post-religious Europe already threatened by growing Islamism among its existing 20 million Muslim residents. While that is a legitimate fear, it is counterproductive to at the same time insist on Turkey’s weakening its most powerful and popular secularist force—the military.

In Turkey, the issue of “minority rights” is directly related to the Kurdish issue and territorial integrity. At a time when the interpretation of “minority rights,” especially in territorial terms, threatens the integrity of EU members such as Spain or Belgium, and Turkey itself is experiencing a limited revival of Kurdish Marxist/separatist terrorism, one experienced Turkish observer has observed that “to gain admission into the EU, Turkey is being asked to solve the problem of Kurdish separatism with the kind of methods that the EU countries have abandoned. Turkey cannot solve that problem and fight Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror with such methods.” By pushing for more and more “rights” for a separatist minority (including PKK terrorists) within the Kurdish minority, amounting to the very same multiculturalism that is now widely under assault within Europe, Brussels demonstrates, if not a tin ear, hypocrisy.

When Turkish prosecutors bring to trial and courts condemn separatists or supporters of Armenian claims of “genocide” by the Ottoman Empire in 1915, Brussels’ human rights arbiters are prompt in criticizing Turkey for denying “freedom of expression.” But when three Dutch-Turkish politicians were purged from their parties’ electoral lists for dissenting from the Armenian interpretation of those events, the French Parliament voted to make it a crime to do so, and Jacques Chirac, traveling to Erevan, conditioned Turkey’s membership in the EU on Ankara’s recognizing the Armenian “genocide.” Whatever one’s opinion on the events of 1915 in the now-defunct Ottoman Empire—and beyond Armenian nationalist pretensions, it is hard to see the relevance of those events for today’s Turkish Republic—such attitudes suggest a persistent double-standard which, not surprisingly, is increasingly resented in Turkey.

While the European attitude toward Turkey’s membership is full of contradictions and hidden agendas, developments inside Turkey are not boding well for the country’s integration in the EU, either. The old debate over secularism, never far from the surface, has taken on a new and increasingly open intensity. Turkish nationalism is also on the rise, lately manifested as anti-Americanism. The AKP government is more attracted to its initial Islamic roots, while the new military leadership, especially Gen. Buyukanit, who took office in August, is less diplomatic than its predecessor in publicly opposing that trend.

The combination of growing Turkish nationalism and anti-Americanism (a trend in Europe as well) means, in addition to complications for the U.S. position in Iraq, that the traditional U.S. support for Turkey's EU accession is both less enthusiastic and less effective. That is not necessarily a bad thing for Ankara: after all, is membership in the Brussels club good and necessary for Turkey's national interest? More and more Turks are answering that question in the negative. Public support for EU membership has dropped dramatically in the past year, from 70 percent to less than 50 percent.

While for many Turks the reasons may be more emotional than objective—such pushbutton issues as the Kurdish and Armenian questions, or Cyprus, create instant resentment—there are level-headed reasons to oppose membership. First, the membership issue is directly related to issues of secularism and the role of the military; second, the issue of human rights, especially Kurdish minority rights, is inseparable from terrorism. None of these are seen as being easier to cope with under the rules imposed by Brussels.

In economic terms, considering the problems facing the EU in terms of economic growth, unemployment, and budgets, the likely benefits of membership for Turkey are increasingly hard to see. Indeed, when most of the EU members are already unhappy with the cost of the newly admitted Central and East European countries and the soon to be admitted Romania and Bulgaria, which ten new members combined have a smaller but richer population than Turkey, it is hard to see how much, if anything at all, is left for that country, in terms of both good will and funding. Moreover, Turkey already enjoys, independent of its candidacy, some of the membership benefits in areas such as tariffs and investments. It has already implemented some of the key economic reforms required by Brussels, with good results. Perhaps German Chancellor Angela Merkel's opinion that Turkey should remain a "preferred partner" rather than member of the EU is beneficial for Turkey. It certainly is more honest than that of many of her colleagues, whose demands on Ankara are as great as their understanding and concessions are limited.

Euroskepticism: Pathology or Reason?

By Jeremy Black

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“I tell you, Poirot, nothing’s more difficult nowadays than the question of allies. They can change overnight.” [1]

The complaint, by the fictional Sir Roderick Horsefield to the famous detective, captures an element of the problem of alliances. They involve not simply a tussle of interests but also serious issues of comprehension because, whatever the rhetoric of shared values, there are differences. These become greatly magnified by the habit of extrapolating differences onto the background of two different states, rather than understanding them, more appropriately, in terms of the continuum of values present in most states.

Of late, American public debate has been dissatisfied with most allies. Those allies in the Middle East are presented as both adopting inappropriate policies and as being actively or passively unhelpful. Variants of this criticism have been made about Egypt, Israel, Pakistan and Turkey.

There has also been much criticism of European policies, not least at the time of the Iraq crisis. Most of this criticism has been directed at France. From a different direction, Britain has received considerable criticism. This article addresses American criticism of British Euroskepticism. This is pertinent because much of the American establishment sees European unification as an inevitable—and positive—process, and lacks an understanding of this project’s flaws from an historical perspective.

It is indeed far from easy to write on this matter for a largely American audience, because Americans tend to view Europe both as the relevant unit for analysis and as the goal of an historical process. Sometimes, it is as if we are dealing with Marxists who, allegedly knowing the future, have scant patience with the present if it does not conform to the rules of historical inevitability.

Thus, Ronald Granieri, in his interesting and clearly argued presentation in this issue, does not doubt the correct path:

It is those same Euroskeptics who have stood in the way of the political integration that would have granted Brussels the legitimacy it lacks . . . If Europeans hope to speak with one voice . . . then they need to take the necessary steps in that direction.

This statement, however, ignores the existence (and deficiencies) of the European Parliament, and fails to address the extent to which much of Europe's population appears to prefer to speak in their national forums and treat coherence at the continental level as a secondary consideration. Granieri seems to think that it is the fault of the "Anglo-Saxon Euroskeptics," a term that does not do justice to the diversity of British society. In doing so, he ignores the extent of skepticism elsewhere. The British public was not given the vote on the 2005 constitution: the Dutch and French did that. At other times, the Danes, Irish and Norwegians have all voted against aspects of the European project. To treat Euroskepticism largely, or wholly, in terms of Britain is factually inaccurate. It is also an all-too-convenient rhetorical device tapping a familiar critique of Britain as isolationist.

The idea of an inevitable agglomeration appears particularly bizarre in a Europe that is steadily fracturing with the creation of new states, most recently Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo in 2008. Spain opposed recognizing the latter, because it feared that the Basque country and/or Catalonia might follow, while an independent Scotland or a division of Belgium are both serious prospects. Scotland is governed by a party pledged to a referendum on independence, which it supports.

From the perspective of a one-voice prospectus for Europe, this perpetual splitting is troubling, if not redundant. It certainly serves notice about the strength of nationalism [2] and, thus, of the extent to which Europe as a government system will only work if able to co-operate with this nationalism, and not if it ignores it, which is the current policy, not least with the stress on an ersatz nationalism.

Americans tend to treat Euroskepticism as a cranky idiosyncrasy, rather than what in fact it is, a rational perspective focusing on history and the national interest. Indeed, the tensions between Britain's national interest and the European project, with its very different set of premises, are historically grounded. The European Union appeared to provide a permanent institutional solution to the conflicts and tensions that undermined stability in Continental Europe, but the forces that created those conflicts have passed, and the solution to them itself presents a new set of problems.

Two different views can be advanced. First, I will note the reasons for British difference and, secondly, I will discuss the European Union's deficiencies. We must recognize Britain's global power, and the degree to which this has led not only to a profound functional difference between Britain and Continental Europe, in terms, for example, of the importance of trans-oceanic trade and empire to Britain, [3] but also to a more lasting cultural and ideological

inheritance of difference. This inheritance includes a democratic character to British political culture that is not shared on most of the continent.

Discussing these points does not simply entail looking back and ignoring considerations of present functionality, but the latter are operative when they can draw on notions and practices of consent that rest on historically-grounded identity. This is a challenge to American policymakers who wish to either neglect these senses of identity or to overawe them when they seek to advance American national interests, most conspicuously in the case of Turkish entry into the European Union.

In part, there is a need to consider the complex overlays of identity and the extent to which these, indeed, constitute political culture. In Britain, for example, there has been both exceptionalism and close contacts with other European states over the centuries. This is possible because identity is neither exclusive nor a constant. [4] Reality is always more complex and fractured than those who search for a uniform zeitgeist might suggest. The same is true for France, [5] but the nature of both exceptionalism and contacts, and the resulting balance, are different between the two countries and this difference helps explain contrasts in their political cultures.

Moreover, identities develop, or are expressed most clearly, in hostility or opposition to other groups, and their real or imagined aims and attributes. Usually these groups are ones with close relations, particularly physically. Indeed, this closeness is almost necessarily the case. As a result, the reality of overlapping senses of collective self-awareness can be very contentious, as also can be the processes of adaptation in these senses. To a considerable extent, these tensions can be lessened by the collectivism of the European Union, and this is an important aspect of the claims made on its behalf. However, a more critical view can also be taken, one that notes these tensions' impact on the workings of the European Union and indeed suggests that its success is partly dependent on economic growth, and that, without this growth, the tensions will come to the fore. Whether that is a stable alliance partner for the United States is open to question.

The economic growth argument can be pursued by suggesting, either that European federalism creates a larger economic space and encourages growth, and is, therefore, benign for the world scale, or, in contrast, that this space rests on corporatism and protectionism. [6] As a result of the latter, the European Union can be presented as malign, leading both to an under-performing Europe and to difficulties in European-world relations. Given the American need for dynamic and effective trading partners, this can be viewed as particularly unfortunate, as an under-performing and protectionist Europe does not provide an adequate market for American exports nor a conducive space for American investment.

Such specific economic issues particularly interest foreign commentators, but also relate to contrasts between member states. Usually similarities and affinities are emphasized when discussing alliances, but these are not the only reasons for closeness, co-operation or union. Complementarity is also at issue. It, indeed, was the basis of the economic relationships of the British Empire, which relied on mutually-profitable differences in production. This situation helped make British adjustment to the European Union difficult, because, in place of the Empire, with its controlled exchange economy designed for mutual benefit, Britain was offered, thanks to economic similarities with her neighbors, a union of competitors rather than of partners. Britain competed as an industrial exporter and agricultural producer, particularly with France, Germany and Italy, and this affected the economic value of European convergence.

From within Europe, the critique of the European Union as restrictive economically is but part of a wider concern about illiberalism. This concern has attracted little attention from American commentators, and possibly unsurprisingly so as the nature of the post-1945 American alliance system was, understandably, to make the compromises necessary in order to anchor anti-Communist systems. This indeed was an aspect of the degree to which great-power status rests on co-operation, with the great powers often used to pursue the strategies of their allies. [7]

Yet, there is a fundamental divide between the assumptions of the European Union on the one hand and political liberalism on the other. In the Continental states, there is the concept and reality of what Helmut Schmidt, the Social Democratic (SPD) Chancellor of Germany from 1974 to 1982, termed the “political class,” a notion integral to the practice of government in the European Union.

It can also be seen in France where a small elite of graduates of the *grandes écoles*, particularly the *Ecole Polytechnique* and the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* (ENA), established in 1945, dominated government, politics and business through a system of pantouflage. Jacques Chirac was an ENA graduate, as was Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and prime ministers such as Laurent Fabius from the left and Alain Juppé from the right.

European Union institutions seem to be characterized by a disinclination to accept public scrutiny and, therefore, accountability. Thus, the European Central Bank, established in 1998, refused to publish the meeting minutes of its Governing Council or to record any votes taken at these meetings. Similarly, at the national level, the Juppé government in France (1995-1997) in trying to meet the Maastricht Treaty criteria, introduced the measures intended to cut government spending by decree, and not via the National Assembly.

This approach might conform to the idea of France or Europe speaking with one voice, the goal of the United States. However, it contrasts with the theory of British politics, with its

strong emphasis on a more democratized practice of politics. The latter in practice has more in common with U.S. politics, than with those of many Continental states. Indeed, the nature of the governmental structure created by the EU is inherently anti-political, in so far as politics is to be understood not only as a popular process, but also as one in which different views may be accepted legitimately.

Consider, for instance the European Union's history as it seeks to anchor its teleological mission. There has been a preference to look back to the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment, presenting it as a worthy precursor of its goals, and, indeed, a movement with progressive and tolerant values. The Enlightenment, however, also offers troubling parallels with the modern stage of European history, as well as an instructive contrast with the situation in eighteenth-century Britain and America. Whereas the cultural and intellectual life of the latter two was broad-based, and rested on considerable, and legally-grounded, political and religious freedom, the situation was different across most of Europe, with the conspicuous exception of the United Provinces (modern Netherlands) and Hamburg.

In contrast to Britain's situation, most of the Continental Enlightenment was top-down and only shallowly rooted in public support. This helped account for important facets of its character as self-righteous and socially condescending, as well as its emphasis on mission and not popular mandate. The populace were generally presented by Enlightenment ministers and commentators as ignorant, and their beliefs treated as the antithesis of the Enlightened. The peasantry were to be improved, in spite of themselves, and the language used to describe them was that employed to discuss children, the mentally weak, or animals. [8]

Prefiguring much of modern European political culture, the intellectuals, who sought to influence Enlightenment governments, dismissed what they disliked as superstitious. [9]_They also exaggerated the possibilities of change through education, and neglected the difficulties of turning aspirations into policies. In addition, they underrated the problems of government, the vitality of popular religiosity, and the disinclination of people to subordinate self-interest, and their own notions of a just society, to the views and self-righteousness of others.

Thus, there is a contentious historical background to the European Union. The geographical background is also unhelpful. The EU's history is Continental and inward-looking, one that offers little to Europe's Atlantic heritage, a heritage which is particularly strong in the case of Britain but has been downplayed in that of France. It is easy to forget that what made Europe, and most especially Britain, distinctive in world history was its ability to use the oceans to create the first trading systems and empires able to span the world. [10]

This is easy to forget, in part because of Europe's nature now, but also due to the way European identity is currently understood. Now, Europe's attitude towards the outside world is at once vainglorious and defeatist.

In part, this perspective focuses on the United States, and makes the EU an unsteady ally. Despite repeated talk of the EU, the Euro, and European foreign policy initiatives, as constituting a system that rivals the United States, Europeans are acutely aware that this has not happened. The Euro was explicitly intended as a rival to the dollar, with international political benefits supposed to flow from this position. Instead, in the 1990s, the Bosnian and Kosovo crises made it clear that European states and federal institutions were only able to address issues of Balkan stability by turning to the United States for support, although the U.S. government scarcely covered itself in credit in either episode. In addition, American, as well as European military power limitations were more apparent than most commentators cared to note.

Many Europeans have been clearly unhappy about American strength—military, political, economic and cultural. This dissatisfaction was exposed and accentuated in 2002-3, during the debate over policy towards Iraq. In fact, however, the roots of difference went far deeper, and were related, in particular to an ambivalence about change, as well as an uneasiness with the impression of European powerlessness in the face of American strength.

For American policymakers, there are both advantages and disadvantages in the EU's conception of European history and geography. In particular, an emphasis on European identity as central to the real interests and histories of European peoples and countries encourages a stress on links within Europe. This lends itself to the attempt to incorporate Eastern Europe into the political, economic and military structures of Western Europe, which is an American objective.

This attempt has a clear cultural correlate, as it seeks to persuade the peoples of Western Europe that their prime identity is as Europeans, and that their countries have a European character and destiny. Europe, in other words, is seen as much more than a matter of geography. To modern readers, this may seem to state the obvious, but, primarily owing to two factors, this is far from the case. First, for much of the last six hundred years, a large part of Eastern Europe was part of a very different cultural (and political) world, that of the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire. Although there were interactions [11] and although modern scholarship can search for parallels between (Christian) European governments and societies and those of the Ottoman Empire, to contemporaries the empire was not so much non-European as anti-European. It defined that which was not European—tyranny and Islam—and presented both as threats. Thus, there is a clear historical background to modern cultural rejection of a concept of Europe that includes contemporary Turkey. This is a major problem as far as American policy is concerned, not least because of the robustness of France's President Nicolas Sarkozy on this point.

Secondly, if “Europe” did not extend into the Ottoman world, it did spread across the oceans. This great expansion changed the world, but it also altered Europe. This was true both of the Europe from which trade, territorial control and colonizers came, and the rest of Europe which was affected by the expansion. By 1750, as a result both of Ottoman conquests and of the great European expansion, London, Paris, Lisbon and Madrid had more in common with colonial centers, such as Philadelphia, Québec, Rio and Havana, than they did with cities under Ottoman rule, such as Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.

It is this tradition that is questioned directly by the creation of a new European history, for, alongside the challenge to the individual states of the European Union that has attracted most attention, and caused particular controversy in Britain, has come a determination to marginalize the residue and influence of empire, so that past links are treated as anachronistic, if not undesirable.

Defining Terms

Issues of definition are complicated by the range of possible criteria. Europe can be treated geographically; although we must be more precise than to merely state that it is located between Asia and the Atlantic. But the geographic definition of Europe is open to debate. The Urals, for example, are neither a barrier nor a frontier. Indeed, in the preface to the influential French *Larousse Encyclopedia of World Geography* (1967), Pierre Deffontaines argued that the Eurasian plains from the Order to the Pacific should be treated as a single unit.

Europe can also be treated as a value system, a goal or an ideology. These contrasting ideas have been emphasized with the question of Turkish entry to the European Union. Thanks to the support of national governments, the EU has been successful in presenting itself as the means, indeed goal, of public myths of European identity. The EU had both an explicit ideological and cultural agenda, even if its politics of bartering frequently concealed this. The Tindermanns’ Report of 1975 called for a stress on common cultural traditions. Subsequently, there was much talk of supposed common characteristics and events of European culture, or what Jack Lang, the former French Minister of Culture, called “Europe’s soul,” such as toleration, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Even Erasmus and Socrates have been appropriated for the EU’s higher-education exchange programs.

Yet this cultural approach works primarily because it has limited impact as far as the people are concerned. The key element, instead, is the vitality of national traditions. Nationalism involved a stress on the vernacular and the distinctive features of national cultures in some states. However, French legislation of 1975 and 1994 banned the use of foreign words in official documents, advertising and packaging if there are French alternatives. This was an indication of the mixture of hubris, stubbornness and lack of confidence also seen at the EU scale. The advocates for regional autonomy, if not a nationalist separatism, were also

important. When control over education was transferred to the regional level, as in Belgium from the early-1960s, such ideas were institutionalized. In many respects, the separatist accounts of identity were traditional ones, based in the theories and practices of nineteenth-century nationalism. A more challenging version was mounted by assertive religious or ethnic groups, or both, most obviously Muslims, who lacked any such geographical focus to serve as the basis of separatism.

In sum, a preference for aspiration and moving forward over reality checks has characterized the EU since the 1980s. For instance, it failed to move slowly and to build from the economic fundamentals with the economic mishandling of German re-unification and with the Euro. The former is an appropriate parallel, as, in many respects, the EU rested similarly on a post-World War II idealism, and German re-unification was a key aspect in the war's end. Yet, the political sense of rebirth and the specific pressure to create a new solution, seen in these cases, was not appropriate in the 1980s and 1990s for already-functioning societies and economies.

To get the EU to work, if it can, requires the patient pursuit of changes in labor and social welfare assumptions and regulations. These changes are most appropriately handled at the national level, because it is there that political leadership is most powerful and interacts best with the population. In some states, this leadership is weak, notably in Belgium and Italy. However, it is a mistake to assume that this would be solved by adopting a European-scale politics. Far from these issues being largely a matter of political techniques and tactics, there is a serious problem of viability. A political system cannot work unless the majority of the population feels some sense of identity. In fact, due in part to the EU, this national sense of identity is now weakening in some European states, while patterns of deference encouraging consent are also eroding. European peoples indeed are becoming more ungovernable, or the ability to contain this ungovernability is receding.

Yet, at the same time, the European Union has failed to replace the nation as a focus for popular identity, and thus loyalty. If this is a measure of its failure, it is also a cause of it. Indeed, although the political context is very different, there are echoes of the failure of supranational Communism to ensure identity and support, both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

The central political challenge in any community is the eliciting of consent. This is not simply a question of defining acceptable policies, and of selecting leaders who will be judged competent. Rather it also reflects the nature of identification between people and government, which encompasses history, symbolism, and a sense of place and purpose. These, in turn, combine to produce an ideology that is stronger than the more intellectual and abstract creeds designated by that term. Despite all the talk of the nation-state's failure and redundancy, and the need for replacing it by power-sharing, supranational bodies and Euro-regions, it is the

nation-state that is most effective in eliciting and securing consent. It is no accident that Euro-federalism is endorsed most strongly in Belgium and Italy where the nation-states are young and weak in the face of regional and other divisions. It is worth noting that charges brought against recent Italian leaders such as Andreotti, Craxi and Berlusconi are suggestive of a political culture mired in self-interest and institutionalized corruption. The willingness to change the law in order to help Berlusconi avoid trial on charges of false accounting is similar to the EU's willingness to cover up serious fraud in both the Commission and the Eurostat. In contrast to Belgium and Italy, both Britain and Denmark see far less support for Euro-federalism, and France will only support initiatives on their own terms.

From the European Union's perspective, it is possible to exaggerate the Nation-state's effectiveness as a representative political unit. There is a kind of circularity: the nation-state represents national interest effectively because its very existence defines these interests. What is less clear is that the interests, thus defined and pursued by the nation-state, are the primary interests of the people of that state.

Nevertheless, given that these interests do not exist clearly, except in the most basic terms, outside the political process, the nation-state plays a crucial role in discussing, defining and validating such interests. This is a fundamental qualification of the one-voice approach.

It is far from clear that a European political community can successfully fulfill the same functions as the nation-state, certainly in terms of obtaining popular support. This owes much to the role of historical formation in giving identities and meaning to the lives of political communities. Yet, considering Continental Europe's recent history, it is not surprising that the new constitutionalism following 1945 made scant attempt to find roots or continuities. Within this context, creating the European Economic Community (EEC) as a way to recreate an acceptable solution to the German question, [12] and to root democracies at the national level, (although not democracy at the European level) appeared sensible, and its norms seemed appropriate, just as the response in Britain was understandably different.

Unlike African and Asian international bodies, all the EU members are democracies, and its institutions are thus filled, directly or indirectly, by at least ostensibly democratic processes. Yet, focusing on the difficulties of attempting to create a plausible European public myth helps to explain some of the problems faced by any effort to displace the nation-state from its position in popular loyalties. A sense of place and continuity is crucial to the hegemony of individuals and societies, and this affects the response to the currents of change that have become so insistent over the last century. In particular, the idea of a European state and/or nation lacks roots, and the impact of the very different roots of other political and ethnic groups make it unlikely that a new identity can be successfully created, or at least one that calls on similar commitment.

At this crucial level, therefore, the notion of European community is of value only if its institutional pretensions and prerogatives are restricted by the preservation of a major role for the nation-state. Telling people that, because they are Europeans, they must think and act in a certain fashion is unacceptable in a democratic society. This idea is especially problematic if it is employed to deny the validity of a people's sense of identity and the views that arise from it. A key aspect of free choice is that people should be able to choose the level at which they wish to express and make their free choice. This basic right was at stake in referenda about the Euro and the European constitution. Political goals should derive from the identities and interests of individuals freely expressed.

These interests are not fixed and, instead, are subject to the changes that is naturally a product of the use of free will. In short, democracy subverts the tendency to argue in terms of apparently immutable national interests. The latter is very much the rhetoric of partisan politics, which are inherent to democracy, but they require an understanding that others can legitimately advance differing views.

If, therefore, the exercise of free will leads to an integrationist European Union, the organization and goals of this union should be adaptable enough to support withdrawal or a major change in direction. Although Greenland, which had joined while a Danish colony, was able to leave the EU once it gained real autonomy, there is no sign that the EU, as currently conceived, possesses that flexibility. Indeed, not only its structures and processes, but also the convictions of its supporters, make the EU singularly unable to respond both to popular opinion and, also, to changing circumstances.

For ideological and functional reasons, it is easy to understand why those who see government as a response process find it easiest to conceive of this at the national level. It also best allows for the nature of change, not as a linear, unidirectional and predictable process, as conceived of by those who support the European "project," but as variable, unpredictable and experienced in a very diverse fashion. The inexorable nature of EU policies was suggested by the fate of the projected Constitution, drafted by the Convention for the Future of Europe and accepted in June 2004 by the European summit in Dublin. While the French and Dutch elections rejected these policies in referenda in 2005 (and might seem to indicate the failure of the EU's plans) still in 2007 most of the provisions of the Constitution (without the name) were agreed to at a new summit in Lisbon.

After the upsets of 2005, there was a deliberate avoidance of referenda, with promises to hold them being ignored, most prominently in Britain, while the Portuguese government was bullied into not holding a referendum. These actions evoked anger in Britain, leading columnists such as William Rees-Mogg in the Times to write about treason. It is therefore easy to appreciate why American remarks about the need for European federalism are received as,

at best, lacking in sensitivity and, at worse, crass, bullying and one-sided. Most of the arguments employed by American commentators could be used to argue the case for an “anchoring” of Mexico and Central and South America through mobility of labor and goods and revenue sharing with the United States.

The democratic deficit is a key element. Non-Americans frequently remark that the Western alliance would be stronger (and environmental pressures less urgent) if Americans changed their private and public finances and their lifestyles. Whether accurate or not, such critiques frequently fail to take note of the character of American freedom and the exigencies of American politics. While rejecting criticism of their own norms, commentators are all-too-willing to opine about those of others.

The democratic element is crucial because it can cut across what is functional and “necessary.” This can be seen, for example, in British skeptics’ responses toward the Euro. Already the world’s second largest currency, the Euro has continued to expand. At the beginning of 2008, Cyprus and Malta took the number of states using it to fifteen. Overcoming earlier fears, it now appears that the Euro can survive, and even flourish despite failing to adhere strictly to the Stability and Growth Pact’s requirements: budget deficits were not to exceed 3 percent of the nation’s annual GDP and the national debt must be limited to 60 percent of GDP. In practice, the early phases of the Euro were difficult, accompanied by much small-business-driven inflation in some countries. Moreover, the measures judged necessary to ensure Stability and Growth proved hard to swallow.

Yet contrasts with fiscal developments in the United States and Britain in 2007-2008 suggested that the Euro’s life-raft function seems to be working well (although largely due to German fiscal culture). For the British, the challenge to national sovereignty and democratic accountability was crucial, but so was the fact that by 2007 globalization meant not only oil at \$100 a barrel, but also large-scale outsourcing of jobs. The collective responsibility aspect of the Euro helped weak and feckless governments—such as that of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy—avoid the fiscal consequences of their policies. Yet, leaving aside the pragmatic point that EU policies greatly accentuated the strains of globalization by making inward investment less attractive, and by encouraging the direction of expenditure on research and development elsewhere, the question of democratic accountability at the national level remains crucial for those who believe that consent is of limited value without participation, and that freedom and liberty are central to a desirable public politics.

Changes in the world, in particular, the great importance of China at present, suggest that a stronger EU is functional and “necessary.” The Chinese do not wish to deal with the twenty-seven members of the European Union. They are willing to negotiate with Britain, France and Germany, but, for states like Slovenia to have their voice heard, it is necessary to be

represented by the EU. The movement of attention away from Russia is relevant here, because the Russian policy of divide-and-pressurize ensures that states like Poland and Sweden were seen as having a distinctive role. This is not the case from the Chinese perspective. Yet, it is unclear whether the EU has the ability to generate solutions and negotiate successfully on crucial issues, such as energy dependence on Russia and trade with China.

Another pressure for united European action is provided by environmental concerns. This is an ironic point given that the United States, which supports a united voice, is against heeding international environmental pressures, most obviously in response to the Kyoto process. European countries take the view that environmental change is a shared pressure and that it is best to handle both specific problems, such as the pollution of the Rhine, and the more general concern at the collective level. The latter relates to the situation within Europe and also to the representation of European views at the international level. For many Europeans, rightly or wrongly, these are more acute issues than those posed by terrorism, and this is a reminder of the folly of assuming that a shared voice will mean a common list of priorities. The complexity of judging issues in terms of hard and soft is also underscored. With harsh and unexpected climate episodes, such as the 2002 floods, being heavily disruptive and the 2006 heat wave in France blamed for 14,000 premature deaths, it is unsurprising that this is not seen as a soft issue. In practice, both terrorism and climate change are serious challenges, in the short, medium and long terms.

For an historian, there are many problems in writing about the present, but it is also relevant to apply the particular training of the discipline.

Source-criticism is difficult when addressing the present as well as the future, but the skepticism that good historians show, in response to the ready assertiveness of those propounding schematic interpretations, is as relevant for the present and future as for the past. Skepticism, not cynicism, is a necessary caution in making pronouncements. Too many commentators on current affairs are in practice providing a uniform account aiming at a clear conclusion. Indeed, there is a widespread determination on their part to search not for complex lessons, but for those that apparently offer obvious guidance. In short, the public treatment of history frequently takes on a demagogic form and also a quasi-religious character, with episodes providing homilies about what will happen if wrong choices are made. Thus, the emphasis is on sin rather than redemption, blaming all on fundamental error: supposedly malevolent racial, religious, social or political groups, or malign and self-indulgent human will.

In contrast, ideas about learning from the past in an incremental fashion assume not a millenarian perfectibility of mankind or ending of history, but, rather, a notion of

improvability. This approach, however, poses the danger that, in pursuit of an exemplary lesson, the past may be jettisoned if it does not contribute to, or correspond with, the lesson.

The most accurate history, one that notes the ambiguities of the past, the diversities of motives, and the complexities of causation, is not one that corresponds with political and religious strategies, utopian futures, or the public's need for clarity—heroes and villains. Such a history is one that tells us more about the past than about ourselves. It is one that repays examination, but it can leave us with the stigma of Cassandra. For the individual, as for the nation, experience must be clearly understood and built upon to ensure a better future. If we delude ourselves about the lessons of past events, we will not avoid the pitfalls of the past, nor secure its future successes.

Indeed, an intelligent skepticism in predicting the future is the most pertinent lesson from considering the past. As such, the informed study of history is a useful antidote to the familiar glib assumptions and predictions of politicians and journalists. Those who care nothing for the past will look sightlessly to the future. [13]

This can be rejected as a conservative approach, but it helps explain why, alongside the partisan Euroskepticism that is debated and decried, there is a more profound philosophical skepticism about the idea of pattern in past, present and future. Such skepticism is also critical of the false consciousness deliberately advanced or encouraged by elites to justify their role and power, a process seen, for example, today in the attempt to create pseudo-nationalism for the European Union.

Politicians need more than skepticism. They have to inspire and lead, offering visions of the future. Managerialism does not win elections. It is particularly easy to offer visions for others and far too much trans-Atlantic commentary (in both directions) takes this form.

So, it is quite likely that the pressure to act, and to be seen to act, will encourage an emphasis on the EU without which all-too-many European politicians fear they will be of even slighter consequence. The EU as force-multiplier is the goal because this allows European, national and regional voices to feel that they will be heard. In practical terms, it is difficult to see how this will work effectively given the range and diversity of views demanding attention, and that is a prime cause of skepticism about prospects. When combined with other issues, such as the remarkable demographic transformation of the continent, it seems hard to predict any clear outcome. Pessimism indeed is the root characteristic of Euroskepticism, but then the contrast seen throughout history between expectations and achievements makes most historians pessimists.

Notes:

1. Agatha Christie, *Third Girl*, first published 1966 (London: Fontana, 1968 edition), p. 103.
2. The extensive literature includes Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London, 1960); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986); E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1992); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (2nd edn, Manchester, 1993).
3. Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire* (New Haven, 2004).
4. Jeremy Black, *Convergence or Divergence? Britain and the Continent* (Basingstoke, 1994).
5. Fernand Braudel, *The Identity of France, I. History and Environment* (London, 1989).
6. Ivan T. Berend, *An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, 2006).
7. Jeremy Black, *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony. The world order since 1500* (London, 2008).
8. Harvey Chisick, *The Limits of Reform in the Enlightenment: Attitudes towards the Education of the Lower Classes in Eighteenth-Century France* (Princeton, 1981).
9. Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
10. Kenneth J. Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002).
11. Daniel Goffman, *Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 1642-1660* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998).
12. Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966* (Berghahn Books, 2003); Jeffrey Glen Giaque, *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganisation of Western Europe, 1955-1963* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
13. Jeremy Black, *The Curse of History* (London, 2008).

The Grand Illusion Continues: What the Lisbon Treaty Means for the European Union and its Global Role

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While the EU is as beset as ever by internal divisions, European elites' ambitions for strengthening integration now revolve around greater foreign policy engagement and effectiveness. This is the central paradox of the Lisbon Treaty: an arrangement supposed to legitimize further integration through foreign policy success at a time when Europe is sorely divided over domestic as well as foreign policy. What gave rise to this glaring disconnect between reality and ambitions and what is this likely to mean for the EU in the next decade?

The Origins of the Failed Constitution

The origins of the Lisbon Treaty, finally ratified by all EU member states at the end of 2009, lie in the Nice Treaty of 2001. This round of diplomatic negotiations was an acrimonious affair, especially over the recalibration of voting weights in the Council of Ministers, which determines how many states are needed to pass or block legislation. Yet the greatest failure of Nice was that it failed to streamline the functioning of EU institutions ahead of the planned 2004 "big bang" enlargement that would see the entry of 10 Central and Eastern European states. Consequently, EU elites launched a new procedure for determining institutional reform: the Convention on the Future of Europe. Meeting over the course of 2003-04, the Convention drew together national and European parliamentarians, bureaucrats and civil society representatives. Their mandate was threefold: to simplify the legal basis of the EU treaty system, enhance institutional efficiency, and democratize the decision-making process. No striking new policy idea was brought to the table.

Under the stewardship of former French President Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing—awarded this sinecure to keep him out of the 2002 French Presidential election—the Convention produced a Constitutional Treaty. This document, with certain modifications imposed by national governments, was signed by all EU member states in 2004, opening the way for twenty-five separate rounds of national ratification. A veritable doorstop, the text of the Constitutional Treaty ran to 500 pages. The reason for this prolixity was that it was not merely an enumeration of constitutional principles and institutional rules. In addition, since the

Constitutional Treaty was to replace the existing legal apparatus, it had to define and articulate the bureaucratic functioning of the gamut of EU policies, such as the mandate of the European Central Bank, the Common Agricultural Policy or the rules governing the Common Fisheries policy. This was necessary in order to place these policies above ordinary EU law; the EU system guarantees the credible commitment of its member states by ensuring that major policy objectives cannot be changed except by unanimous agreement. Hence the constitutional terminology was a complete misnomer. There was very little provision for limiting the EU-level of government, separating powers vertically and horizontally and assigning political responsibilities to specific institutional actors. The emphasis, as ever, remained on producing consensual decision-making, whereby ultimately there are no genuine “constitutional” bounds on what the EU can do providing there is consensus among the member states.

The failure of the Constitutional Treaty to find a receptive audience in France and the Netherlands needs no elaboration here. The EU’s response to the failure of referendums in both these countries was to insist that the 2004 enlargement was unworkable without institutional reform. Thus a slimmed down version of the Constitutional Treaty was hastily prepared—taking care to remove the constitutional rhetoric and the policy specifics to leave just the institutional modifications. This is the document known as the Lisbon Treaty, which modifies rather than supplants previous EU treaties. This plan B suffered an initial setback when rejected by Irish voters in 2008. However, the insidious EU pressure brought to bear on Ireland not to stand in the way of reform led the Irish government to pull out all the stops in a second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty that passed in October 2009.

The Lisbon Blueprint

The Lisbon Treaty’s strategy for reform rests essentially on presidentialization for the sake of achieving foreign policy goals that can have a domestic payoff amongst European citizens. Of course, there are other institutional modifications, especially a new arrangement for allowing national parliaments to object to and potentially even countermand EU decision-making (although the latter is unlikely as it would entail a parliament overturning a decision already accepted by its own national executive). But the real institutional innovation is the creation of the new post of President of the European Council, the inter-governmental body that sets the EU’s policy agenda. Hitherto, this role was fulfilled by each member state in a six-monthly rotation. This rotating presidency not only meant an absence of longer-term coordination but also hampered the efficient representation of EU interests abroad, as seen for instance during the Copenhagen Climate Conference where Denmark, Germany, France and Britain each tried to take the initiative.

The new EU president of the European Council, former Belgian Prime Minister Herman van Rompuy, is thus tasked with providing policy leadership and representing the EU abroad. Yet

this position (not compatible with holding national office) carries no electoral mandate; the appointment, which lasts two-and-a-half years renewable once, was made in secret talks held between member states. The second new position created by the Lisbon Treaty further demonstrates the increased emphasis on foreign policy: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Better known as the *de facto* EU Foreign Minister, this post was given to the British life peer Lady Catherine Ashton, who will also assume the role of vice-president of the European Commission, the EU's unelected executive body. These two appointments reflect, as per the consensual division of spoils, the current political calibration of EU member state governments with the centre-right gaining the more senior position.

Ashton's job will be helped by the creation of the new European External Action Service, an umbrella organization intended to coordinate national foreign ministries and diplomatic corps in support of EU policies such as enlargement, development aid, civilian and military crisis management, as well as liaising with foreign governments when the EU negotiates bilaterally. On the ground, the new Foreign Minister and her service will take responsibility for the EU delegations now present in over 130 countries and which also represent the EU in international organizations such as various UN bodies or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Both the new roles involve personalizing EU foreign policy to enhance coordination as well as visibility, home and abroad. However, national state sovereignty continues to place considerable constraints on EU foreign policy autonomy. Besides having to rely on consensus, which often results in lowest common denominator policies, the EU is hamstrung on important matters such as bilateral treaties with third countries since these are negotiated under the EU banner but still subject to twenty-seven separate national ratifications. Foreign policy above all requires Franco-British-German coordination, a task that is complicated by the former two holding permanent seats at the UN Security Council, which makes a common European position at the UN a difficult proposition. In this context, the roles of President and Foreign Minister are intended to raise the political profile of EU foreign-policy by personalizing responsibility for negotiating with the outside world and justifying these actions to national politicians and publics. Yet a survey of current domestic and foreign policy cleavages within the EU suggests that this strategy of institutional efficiency through unelected presidentialization faces certain insurmountable obstacles.

Domestic Divisions

A widely noted trend in the past decade has been “enlargement fatigue.” The political will to embrace new member states is lacking but this also—for perhaps the first time in the history of the integration process—corresponds with the absence of a major new policy initiative. Traditionally, enlargement and new policy programs have gone hand in hand. Now both have

stalled. The last major policy initiative, besides institutional reform, was the so-called Lisbon Agenda of 2000, which has singularly failed in its aim of making the EU “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment by 2010.” Most worryingly, there is no single hymn sheet for the EU’s domestic policy priorities.

In the economic and political doldrums, the United Kingdom faces a critical election by the middle of 2010. The front-running Conservative party of David Cameron, however, remains deeply torn over the relationship between Britain and the continent. The Conservative base is embittered by Cameron’s reneging on a supposedly “cast-iron pledge” to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty if elected. There are mutterings of repatriating powers from Brussels, notably over immigration and fisheries policy; whilst the prospects of joining the single currency zone, the Euro, appear slim as this would render impossible the “quantitative easing” the Bank of England is undertaking to refloat the economy.

Across the Channel, the Franco-German axis has noticeably failed to produce any new ideas for policy coordination. Although relations between Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel are more productive than the disastrous Chirac-Shroeder coupling, the former have failed to see eye-to-eye on much of importance. Most notably, the German leader has been rather reluctant to pursue what her government sees as fiscally irresponsible stimulus spending. The new Christian Democrat-Free Democratic Party coalition elected in 2009 is also far more reticent about regulating Europe’s financial markets than the French President.

With the economic downturn that followed the global financial crisis, the EU economy has witnessed some spectacular reversals of fortune: double-digit falls in GDP in Latvia and Estonia, 20 percent unemployment in Spain, the downgrading of Greece’s bond rating. In fact, under the effect of increased social spending and national governments’ stimulus measures, the EU Stability and Growth Pact that is meant to coordinate national budget deficits and overall public debt has been jettisoned. This, alongside Greece’s disastrous and downright mendacious public accounting has led to fears for the future of the Euro itself, at least as a non-reversible triumph. In this tough climate two major underlying policy issues will be particularly thorny to resolve: energy and the balance between market freedoms and social protection.

For the past thirty years, Europe’s leaders have sought to create a common energy policy. Given Russia’s recent interruptions of gas supplies, and with Germany promoting the Nordstream gas pipeline that would bypass Eastern Europe, the EU’s most easterly countries resent the failure to leverage collective EU strength against Russia’s energy preponderance. This makes it much harder to object in turn to the continued use of coal power stations and

even decrepit nuclear plants in the impoverished East, both of which the EU seeks to regulate. Moreover, the fear of shortages and ever-increasing energy prices, has led to a re-examination of the atomic option in countries such as Italy, Germany and Sweden—an area where the EU has historically taken a back seat to national interests.

The balance between an EU that fosters an open market—to prevent national sovereignty acting as a cloak for rent-seeking—and one that protects the losers of openness through regulation and redistribution is at the heart of many EU policy debates. Yet in the absence of transparent mechanisms of representation and accountability, the inter-governmental bargains struck in this area lack legitimacy. Scholars of this process point out the game of “blame avoidance” pursued by national governments who refuse to take responsibility for EU decisions they accepted and helped devise. In the complex legal fabric of the EU, it is thus the courts that increasingly have to strike the balance between the market and social protection. For instance, the 2007 Laval case saw the European Court of Justice rule that labor union blockading action that prevented Latvians working in Swedish construction, for wages lower than set by local collective bargaining, is illegal. Lawyers expect that the Court will face an increasing case load in this area, putting great political scrutiny on an institution that is filling in the gaps created by the inability of the EU system to attribute political responsibility for specific EU policies.

Foreign Policy Divisions

Despite the high hopes resting on the President and Foreign Minister, the foreign policy field has a surprising number of slow-burning issues on which the EU is chronically divided. Nowhere is the previously mentioned enlargement fatigue more obvious than in the case of Turkey’s proposed membership. With Sarkozy and Merkel both opposed to opening the doors to Turkey, this issue is off the immediate agenda. By the time it reappears, as surely it must, Turkey may have re-oriented its foreign policy objectives eastwards—a path it appears to be embarking on today. The other persistent Eastern question is Russia, which still looms as a menacing presence in much of Eastern Europe. Unimpressed not only by the EU’s handling of the gas crises but also its de facto acceptance of Russia’s occupation of the breakaway Georgian enclaves, the newest EU member states fear a future of possible “Finlandization.” This harks back to the limited foreign policy autonomy of Finland during the Cold War, a future many fear awaits candidate countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, whose desires for a formal path to membership have been unsuccessful.

Where the EU has devoted enormous resources to fixing a problem on its doorstep, namely Bosnia and Kosovo, the results are decidedly unspectacular. Both are EU protectorates, surviving on manifold illegal activities and awaiting eventual membership that will offer their citizens a legal exit option as well as new streams of public jobs and money. Neither is a

flourishing model of inter-ethnic cooperation and forgiveness. Indeed, EU member states are in fact at odds over the legal status of Kosovan independence. Although Kosovo's status is strongly supported by France, Spain—fearful of regional secession—has joined forces with Russia in asking the International Court of Justice to rule Kosovo's self-declaration of independence illegal.

Finally, the Afghan quagmire poses serious questions about the nature and resources of EU military coordination. From the outset, it appears that national participation in the NATO effort was above all an attempt to curry favor with the US administration rather than as part of a coherent EU security strategy. Controversies over deployment and rules of engagement have undermined this collective enterprise. More worryingly, Germany's path towards a "normalized" foreign policy role that includes military deployment abroad appears to have suffered a significant setback. The political fallout from the September 4 aerial strike of two tanker trucks near Kunduz, ordered by German troops but with the loss of many civilian lives, is such that the deadline for announcing Germany's exit strategy looks likely to be brought forward with alacrity. That even a solidly centre-right coalition can be undermined in this fashion suggests inherent limitations for an EU security policy that requires strong German participation.

At the same time, the United Kingdom's increasingly costly Afghan mission is proving difficult to sustain both in public opinion and hard currency. Beyond mere revulsion at the death toll and casualty levels, the British public is—similar to its American counterpart—increasingly skeptical about the contribution this deployment makes to national security interests. With the prospect of austerity budgets looming, the British government is seeking to preserve the Army's ability to keep waging this campaign by slashing air force and navy budgets at a time when defense spending already stands at a historic low of 3 percent of GDP. In a period when naval rivalries are re-surfacing in East Asia, the sacrifice of the Royal Navy bodes ill for the EU's already struggling power projection and crisis management capabilities.

Conclusions: A Self-Limiting Power?

EU member states are divided over crucial aspects of domestic and foreign policy. These countries are also increasingly divided societies. This can be seen from the continuing violence in the French *banlieues*, the hounding of African migrant workers in Southern Italy, the difficulty of merely constructing a government for Belgium, or the riots that erupted in the British town of Leicester following a radical Muslim protest against a parade of soldiers returning from Afghanistan. In this respect, the official self-congratulation that followed the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty after a fraught decade of attempted reform is highly misleading.

Although the new treaty emphasizes foreign policy, the reality is that the EU is likely to turn inwards. European electorates, who in any case do not have a say in the appointment of the EU's new foreign policy representatives, will expect problems closer to home to be prioritized. Not only are citizens more concerned than ever about integration and its impact on their lives, national elites are less and less able to sell the benefits of integration convincingly as shown by the referendum failures throughout the past decade. Thus the electoral constituency, economic resources and intellectual inspiration for an enhanced EU global role are all sorely lacking.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, therefore, the continent is wealthy but anxious. The lack of new policy ideas and the statesmen to carry them through is nowhere better reflected than in the creation of two weak new positions granted to lackluster political cadres. The biggest winner in this period is undoubtedly Germany, which has absorbed its poor Eastern lands whilst remaining a tremendous export machine cushioned by fiscal soundness. However, Germany remains a reluctant and self-limiting power, instincts that no doubt will be extended to the EU-level in the decade to come.

The Russians are Seeping In, the Americans are Pivoting Out, and the Germans are Moving Up: The Future of Europe

By Jakub Grygiel

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The objective of much of US foreign policy toward Europe of the past century was, to use Lord Ismay's phrase, to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. [1] The pithy saying sounds blunt and undiplomatic, but it is still true. It is in the interest of the US to maintain an equilibrium in Europe where no power can reign supreme, to contain Russian imperialist nostalgia, and to maintain a deep level of engagement in the region—all in order to avoid another D-Day, a forceful and costly reengagement in European politics. Liberal and post-modern rhetoric about “global architecture of partners” or about the end of the 19th century balance of power notwithstanding, the nutshell of US grand strategy toward Europe continues to be this.

While NATO was and is the military component of the strategy to achieve these goals, European integration was its political and economic element. The latter is still doing fine, and continued interest by all parties in the maintenance of military interoperability and of security assurances makes NATO an indispensable tool. It certainly has its own problems, especially those stemming from the inability and unwillingness of most of its European members to maintain an adequate level of defense expenditures. But it has a clear mission accepted by all members, responding to a continued need for security. It also makes the US a European power, maintaining a firm American foothold across the Atlantic.

But the other component of US strategy—one of open encouragement for the EU—no longer matches the goal. Washington continues to push in favor of greater EU centralization even though this no longer supports our goal of a harmonious and powerful Europe. By supporting EU's drive to an “ever closer union” at all costs, Washington mistakes the tactical process for the strategic objective. The goal is a balanced, stable and prosperous Europe; the means has been, in part, European integration. But it is becoming clear that the former is not being achieved by the latter.

A readjustment of the policy is particularly important given that the reality on the ground seems to indicate that the Russians are seeping in, the Americans are pivoting out, and the Germans are moving up.

The Russians have been buying their way back into Europe over the past years. It is to a degree a mirror image of the end of the Cold War, when the US approach was, in Robert Gates' words, to "bribe the Soviets out" using the wealth of the West. Now, the Russians are bribing themselves in, using the deep pockets of their natural resources. It is a combination of buying political access by hiring influential political names as lobbyists, of exercising a heavy hand in the energy markets, and of lining up strategic allies as EU candidates (Serbia and Montenegro).

The Americans are pivoting out, moving military resources and political attention to the Asian theater. The Atlantic is losing strategic relevance to the Pacific and the US Navy is sailing to Asia while the remnants of American armored forces have been removed this year from Europe. Moreover, Washington has little, if any, influence over internal EU dynamics, becoming a mere spectator at a time of an economic crisis and collapse of political legitimacy.

Finally, the Germans are increasingly the dominant, if reluctant, strategic actor in Europe. Whether it is austerity plans for the profligate Southern Europeans or future political arrangements of the EU, Germany is the power *sine qua non*. Political leaders of European states embark on pilgrimages to Berlin, not Bruxelles. The foundational Franco-German axis is flailing, in large measure because of the abysmal political leadership in Paris, and new realignments are forming (notably, a Polish-German rapprochement). The longevity and effectiveness of these new partnerships remains to be seen as they are not based on an equipoise of power or interests, but rather on a plea proffered by weaker countries to Germany. Countries such as Poland fear that Germany will choose to go alone, deeming the maintenance of the euro zone and of the EU as too costly. Hence, they ask for a more proactive Berlin, one that would assume fully and consciously Europe's burden. In brief, this is not a relationship of equals, but of petitioners in front of German uncertain power.

The EU is not to blame for all three. The American "pivot," in particular, is simply recognition of the growing importance of Asia, combined with the perception that Europe is a success story no longer requiring constant American supervision and protection. The Russian imperialist nostalgia is a product of indigenous forces that, despite high hopes of the 1990s, are difficult to eradicate and will continue to motivate Moscow's political leadership for years to come. The weakness of the EU is that there is a lack of a coherent posture toward Russia, in part driven by geography (Germany, France, and Italy will naturally have a different perspective toward Moscow than Riga or Warsaw) and in part by short-term desires to cash in on Russian spending (especially in the military realm).

What the EU is to blame for is the inability to deal with the changing internal balance of power. The post-war equilibrium based on a Franco-German partnership with the UK as a watchful and engaged actor is falling apart. France is running on fumes, while the UK is choosing to be less engaged suffering from a justified “Bruxelles fatigue.” And the Mediterranean countries (Spain and Italy) are in deep economic and political crisis preventing them from exercising authority and influence over European politics; they are not Greece yet, at the mercy of European bailout policies, but they are not meaningful participants in intra-European politics.

This change may be benign or simply not relevant to the future of the continent, as perhaps the most ardent fans of the EU project could argue. If the EU is truly a post-modern creation where decisions are taken by specialized experts and implemented by independent managers, then a new balance of power ought not to matter much. And indeed, if that is the case, the most appropriate policy should be to support the actor—Germany, in this case—that may be the most likely to sustain the EU.

The challenge is threefold. First, such a belief in the post-power essence of the EU is increasingly less appealing and less popular. Observers of European politics describe with some alarm a reassertion of “nationalism,” the ghost that haunts Europe and that should have disappeared under the blue EU flag. The EU is becoming associated with unemployment and lack of legitimacy, rather than with the avoidance of another world war.

Second, Germany may not want to lead the EU forward. It simply costs a lot of money that the German electorate is not willing to front any more. It is therefore not inconceivable to see Germany wanting to shed the more burdensome countries in Southern Europe, and rearrange the euro-zone as well as the EU into something quite different from its current institutional setting and from its original idea. A smaller “Northern” core, sharing the same currency, may become a reality out of fiscal necessity. Moreover, a German leadership is unlikely to result in a more coherent European strategic actor because of the reluctance of Berlin to exercise a large role on the world scene. As a keen observer of European politics notes, “this avoidance has become the key feature of the German foreign and security policy debate. German dodging has always been a nuisance in Europe. Now, with Germany as Europe’s indispensable nation—and with Europe’s erstwhile strategy champions lost in self-absorption—Germany’s evasion has become a geopolitical problem. More than that, it is a scandal. And it won’t end anytime soon. Germany, Europe’s swing state, prefers to continue its strategic slumber.” [2]

Third, other European countries may not want Germany to lead Europe. The calls for a more active German leadership are not uniform and unopposed. Indeed, the fear of a German domination of European politics and economics is quite pervasive, if less vocal. By and large, worries about a German hegemony over the continent are quickly dismissed as ahistorical,

overly alarmist, and inappropriate in a EU context. But it is too easy to discount such worries. Nobody really expects a German military resurgence, and the exercise of power occurs in a consultative fashion through economic and financial influence. Nonetheless, the worry is that in the end Berlin is imposing policies, which, albeit necessary, carry little support and legitimacy in the target countries (to wit, Greece)—and the result may be a swelling of anti-German feelings.

An American push to support German leadership in Europe is, thus, a desperate move that is highly unlikely to reap many strategic benefits. In fact, it is upsetting traditional partnerships, in particular with the UK, and has been received quite coldly in Germany itself.

More broadly and most importantly, the US should cease its public support for the continued efforts to keep the EU afloat, efforts that are predicated on greater centralization of the powers in Bruxelles. We have limited influence over the internal dynamics and, above all, we are taking sides in an intra-European debate that is far from settled. Threatening a good ally, Great Britain, that were it to leave the EU it would not be included in new trade negotiations is shortsighted and counterproductive. Such a posture allies the US not with Europe, but with one side of a vocal internal debate in Europe. It puts Washington together with Bruxelles, and alienates half of Europeans. And it deprives us of strong allies within Europe.

A partnership with Europe does not necessarily mean a partnership with the EU. On the contrary, to seek a greater relationship with the EU, to the detriment of strong ties with individual countries, weakens the US because its counterpart, the EU, is a political entity that cannot protect its own citizens, is creating deep tensions among its states, and is contributing to an upheaval of the continent's equilibrium of power.

The success of the EU is not inevitable. We should be agnostic about the future of the EU and ought to be open to alternative ways of pursuing the continued goals we have in Europe. Whether some of these ways may involve a British exit, or a geographic consolidation of the Eurozone, or even in the most extreme and unlikely scenario the splintering of the EU project, Washington ought to be prepared. As Paul Johnson observed recently, "U.S. policy ought to take note of the general air of hostility toward Brussels. Mr. Obama faces the prospect of Britain leaving the EU and of France, Germany, Italy and Spain all weakening their links. This will have little effect on American prosperity, but it is a return to realism that Washington should welcome, if quietly." [3]

A Europe that is free, strong, and whole is not necessarily based on the EU. Bilateral relations are not *passé* nor ineffective, and should take precedence over the mirage of a unified, multilateral Europe. Our goals are still there, and rightly so, but the policies need to be adjusted.

Notes:

1. Interestingly, this is a tripartite objective that is recurrent in modern European history. For instance, as Brendan Simms writes, the goal of the 1815 diplomatic settlement was “to keep the British in, the Russians out and the French down.” A century later, the British were being replaced by the Americans, while the French had been relentlessly weakened and replaced by the Germans. The Russians, remarkably, are always there. Brendan Simms, *Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 179.
2. Jan Techau, “Why Germany Won’t Be America’s New Geopolitical Partner,” <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52126&lang=en>
3. Paul Johnson, “United Europe—Bad Idea?,” *Forbes*, 24 June 2013.

Europe: What Went Wrong?

By Ronald J. Granieri

January 2015

Back in April 2012, I presented a paper at a meeting of the FPRI Study Group on America and the West with the catchy title, “Who Killed Europe?” Later published as an FPRI E-Note, that essay, written in the early stages of the Euro financial crisis, tried to disentangle the responsibility for Europe’s mounting problems. I ended with something of an evasion, concluding that, as in the denouement of Agatha Christie’s *Murder on the Orient Express*, pretty much everyone—from the allegedly profligate and irresponsible southern Europeans to the parsimonious and self-satisfied German, English, and French leaders of the EU, not to mention Europe’s supposed American ally and the international economic system generally—had a hand in the crime.

My reference to collective responsibility, however, was not intended to let everyone off the hook. Rather, by showing how many different ways European leaders, allies, and publics had damaged the European project I hoped to make a case for collective action to salvage it. It’s not just a matter of making the Greeks live within their means, or to get the Germans to loosen up about inflation.

Hoping for collective action was of course not the same as expecting it. I ended that talk with the consciously provocative assertion that “any effort to reverse the disintegration of Europe will require more than another series of technocratic fixes and high-level photo opportunities. It will require European leaders to consider where they want Europe to go, and to be honest with both themselves and their electorates about their vision. It will require them to take significant political risks. Which is why such a reversal is extremely unlikely.”

Well, more than two years have passed, and the news is only vaguely better. Although no one speaks of the breakup of the EU or even the collapse of the Euro in the same apocalyptic tones that dominated the discussion in 2012, Europe is still far from healthy. A tentative recovery has faded, and the Continent’s economies are facing a triple dip recession. Even the strong German economy is sputtering, while especially battered states such as Spain and Greece continue to face astronomical levels of unemployment, especially among the young, which threaten the future of their societies. Greek politicians and the public, chafing under the burdens of ECB-imposed austerity, have rebelled, forcing an early election in late January that has not only inspired discussion of substantial changes in Greek policy but also resurrected an unwelcome discussion of the “Grexit” from the common currency.

Meanwhile, last May's European Parliament elections saw a rise in voting for protest and anti-EU parties. In Britain, Nigel Farage's UK Independence Party showcased its ability to siphon votes away from David Cameron's Tories. In France, Marine Le Pen's xenophobic Front National scored more votes than any other party. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland continued its growth, which has since led to success in state elections. Most disturbing was the result in Hungary, where Viktor Orban's Fidesz party, along with an even more disturbing far right Jobbik, signaled the increasing distance of frustrated Hungarian voters from the liberal political and economic models of the West.

Even if the anti-European parties themselves cannot agree on their concerns or their plans for improvement, the vote suggests a free-floating malaise in Europe, a lack of enthusiasm for the EU in general that does not necessarily lead to any specific policies, but is certainly not healthy.

Europe's economic problems would be bad enough on their own, but they pale in comparison to the pressing problems of violence from without and within. Russian intervention in Ukraine helped to turn a political revolt into a civil war, and threatens to cause an even greater regional conflagration. Meanwhile, the horrific attack by Islamic extremists on the staff of the French satirical weekly *Charlie Hebdo* both reminded Europeans of the ways that international conflict can reach into their greatest cities and rekindled still-tendentious debates about immigration, national identity, and religious pluralism. In both cases, the response of the European political class has been uneven. Although Europe has joined with the United States in imposing economic sanctions on Russia, the cacophony of voices in the various European capitals has raised serious questions about the long-term willingness and ability of European institutions to maintain a firm policy. Similarly, although European political leaders assert their commitment to freedom of expression and pluralism, the failure of those same leaders to make a clear and affirmative case for Europe has left the initiative with the nativists and nationalists, whose fear and loathing for their Muslim fellow citizens is matched only by their contempt for Brussels and all it represents for the European project.

European leaders continue to meet, and committees continue to discuss plans for this or that technical solution, while national leaders continue to rail against Brussels to serve local purposes. It's business as usual. To quote General George Marshall from a different context, "the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate."

Even as I make that last comment, however, I am aware of the potential objections. Certain of my colleagues in the European studies business complain that American news media and politicians, out of either ignorance or malevolence, only report the bad news out of Europe. Things are actually great, they assure me, as long as you measure by the proper yardsticks. Life is still good in Europe, they say—the cafes are still open, the welfare state is still stable,

and the educational system is still brilliant. Bookshelves groan with volumes praising everything from the elegance of French women to the superiority of French parenting. Europeans are still much more cultured, with better clothes, longer vacations, and better food than anyone on this side of the Atlantic.

The high politics of Europe may be dysfunctional, this argument runs, but that is not nearly the most important thing. That the EU or even the smaller subset of its larger states has not been able to act decisively in current diplomatic and military crises is not a sign of weakness, but of European cultural superiority over muscle-bound Americans with their fixation on hard power. For these fans of Europe, the organizational and material failures of the European Union, and even the complexities of geopolitics are irrelevant; Europe is just fine as it is.

Whenever I hear such arguments, I can only think of former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's response to Donald Rumsfeld's case for the Iraq War in March 2003: "Sorry, but I'm not convinced."

That Europe remains a nice place to live if you are a well-paid member of the educated elite I have no doubt. That European governments provide greater stability and public services than the United States I will also allow. Indeed, beneath the surface of politics, European institutions continue to operate, and plans for intensified European-American trade in the ambitious Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) also continue. But the failure of European institutions to build and maintain a political consensus in favor of their existence, continuing to rely instead on tired sufferance and acquiescence rather than enthusiasm for their continued existence, should give no one comfort. That would be true even if Europe had not compounded its internal weakness by proving itself incapable of acting with consistent and unified determination in favor of the values it claims to prize.

Indeed, even the supposed advantages of TTIP have been obscured by the utter failure of any of the governments to make a public case for it. Europeans may be full of self-confidence, but the European project continues to suffer from an identity crisis with no foreseeable end. I think that is a terrible historical tragedy. European integration is a great adventure, a potential triumph for humanity that no one cares about, a story that few tell and none embrace.

My grim predictions may actually cheer some people on this side of the Atlantic as well as over there. Euroskeptics, especially in the Anglosphere, are so hostile to the current organization of Europe that they act as though it doesn't matter if the EU fails. Indeed, some of them cheer on the failure, to prove that their continuous objections were true. Be they Nigel Farage or Marine Le Pen or Patrick Buchanan, they welcome the failure of Europe with the same enthusiasm they applaud Russian aggression in Crimea. The connection between the two is not accidental.

Others, less cynical and sinister, continue to imagine that the long-awaited collapse of Europe will open the door for a new celebration of national sovereignty. Thoughtful people speculate about some kind of renewed Anglo-American trade area, allowing their political distaste for European social democracy to undermine their belief in western civilization.

It is a spectacle that should shock and depress people of good will, because it did not have to be this way. Just as there is a tendency in some quarters to believe that Europe can withdraw from geopolitics and enjoy its high standard of living in peace, there is a tendency in some quarters to assume that Europe is stagnant and unimportant, not worth the effort to understand, and the United States should pivot in another direction, whatever that is supposed to mean. But Europe remains connected to the world whether its likes it or not, and Europe's responsibility to play an active role in the world extends beyond merely protecting the flow of imports and the safety of vacation spots. Europe also remains the United States' largest trading partner, with annual business activity in excess of \$4 trillion. It is also a geographical entity vital for any projection of American power. As the United States pivots to and from the Middle East, Africa, or Asia, it still relies on Cold War bases across Europe.

These were the reasons for the resurgence of the European ideal in the 1950s. There was a time when the idea of European integration both fired the imaginations of the young and figured importantly in the realistic foreign policy scenarios of the powerful. Especially since the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, European leaders and those who wanted to see Europe learn and recover from the catastrophes of the preceding century hoped that a prosperous and united Europe could play a major world role—as a model for post-modern governance and transnational cooperation, a source of support for democratic development around the world, and an example of successful multicultural social democracy.

On 19 September 1946, one European statesman, surveying the material and moral wreckage of two world wars, told an audience in Zurich:

[There] is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted, would as if by a miracle transform the whole scene, and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and as happy as Switzerland is today.

What is this sovereign remedy? It is to re-create the European Family, or as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living.

The process is simple. All that is needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong, and gain as their reward, blessing instead of cursing.

That statesman, of course, was Winston Churchill. The same man whose contemporary acolytes treat the very idea of European solidarity with contempt and distaste. Five years later, in a speech in London, NATO Supreme commander Dwight Eisenhower, no starry-eyed idealist he, told members of the English-Speaking Union, “Europe cannot attain the towering material stature possible to its people’s skills and spirit so long as it is divided by patchwork territorial fences... But with unity achieved, Europe could build adequate security and, at the same time, continue the march of human betterment that has characterized Western Civilization.” It is much harder to find anyone willing to speak in these terms today.

What went wrong?

This is a consciously big question, and my goal tonight is to provoke conversation, so I will beg your indulgence as I offer three interrelated developments that have contributed to Europe’s current malaise:

First, there has been a failure of political imagination and leadership. The successes of the European project in the first postwar decades depended on the relationship between a public eager for new ideas and leaders who were willing to express their idealistic support for the project. I have mentioned Churchill but even more important were leaders such as Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Robert Schuman, who combined idealism with political skill. Even General Charles de Gaulle, who was unafraid to criticize aspects of the European institutions, spoke eloquently to the French and world publics that economic integration was not enough, and about the need for Europe to organize and cooperate. One seeks in vain for such leaders today. Encouraged to focus on their domestic concerns, they have discovered that there is no ready-made constituency for Europe, and thus have decided that it is not worth the effort to try to build it. It is a chicken-and-egg problem: the public is apathetic at best, hostile at worst. It is possible that vigorous and imaginative leadership would encourage them to reconsider the project, but no leader is going to risk a backlash from an apathetic/hostile public by hectoring them on a subject which does not appeal to them, so there is no leadership, which guarantees that the apathy and hostility will grow, encouraged by those who seek short-term advantage in fanning those flames.

The best lack all conviction, while the worst

Are full of passionate intensity.

This failure of imagination feeds the second larger problem, which I would call the loss of geopolitical urgency in Europe. Statesmen such as de Gaulle and Adenauer argued that European cooperation was necessary because only a strong and unified Europe could speak with one voice in the world and defend European interests. Decades of peace, and the peaceful end of the Cold War have encouraged too many Europeans that old conceptions of international politics no longer matter. By the 21st century, that expresses itself in a jumble of attitudes that imagined that Europe's lack of a clear political center or a unified geopolitical identity were strengths rather than weaknesses, signs that the Europeans eschewed hard power and preferred soft power, whatever those terms are supposed to mean. In their rush to overcome the nation-state, too many Europeans believed that they should abandon the concept of the state as a geopolitical actor altogether. One can see that beginning of this transition already in the 1960s, when hopes for tighter political and military integration among the Six were cast aside in favor of broadening membership in the EC, believing that improved economic cooperation would be a good in itself, while the Europeans believed that someone else would maintain their security. Indeed, the superpowers, busily attempting to reach an accommodation in and around Europe, each in their own way encouraged the Europeans to focus on economic issues and to avoid concerted political action, to avoid the emergence of a coherent and confident rival. Furthermore, the recognition that building such a unified Europe would require significant political and material effort sapped the willingness of the next generation of leaders to bother to risk it, returning us to the first point.

Which leads to the third major problem, which I call Europe's technocratic temptation. This has always been part of the European project, going back to one of Europe's founding fathers, Jean Monnet, an economic planner who believed that practical measures, beneath the political, would build Europe while no one was looking. Recognizing that there may be quiet but practical benefits to economic and trade cooperation, European leaders have constructed institutions that operate behind the scenes.

There have been successes to be sure—Europeans today enjoy the benefits of a vast area in which people, goods, and capital can move freely, in which increasingly uniform regulations allow for ease of educational and work exchanges and familiarity of products.

Ironically, though, this technocratic development of Europe has fed the first two-philosophical/structural problems. Europeans may enjoy the benefits of this technocratic Europe, but they feel no affection for it. Indeed, the sense that Europe is governed not by elected representatives but by faceless regulators and bureaucrats is one of the most common arguments used by Europe's detractors. The crowning achievement of this technocratic impulse, the Euro, tells us all we need to know. A common currency has eased trade, encouraged tourism and investment, and given much of Europe a practical proof of unity. Yet it also can be portrayed as a tool of central bankers, an element of undemocratic dominance,

insulated against popular control. Europe's critics have mobilized all of those arguments through the past years of crisis. Without an integrated Europe with legitimate federal institutions, the Euro was a fair-weather union whose legitimacy has been called into question as soon as times got bad.

For Europe to pull together in the face of this crisis of legitimacy will require both creative leadership and a sense of political urgency. Yet right now we see neither. Instead, Europeans and their friends appear to be doubling down on everything that has gone wrong. As we speak, the EU and the USA are continuing negotiation on TTIP, a perfect example of the technocratic impulse. Even as leaders in those countries speak among themselves about how important TTIP can be to strengthening the Atlantic Community, no one has been willing to make a vigorous case with the public. Instead, negotiations held in secret have only come to light in dribs and drabs, usually by writers who are hostile to the project, which they portray as an elite conspiracy by the economically powerful to undermine national sovereignty. They can portray it that way because that's what it is. If the leadership has neither the courage nor the creativity to make its case, someone else will.

Europe seeks in vain for a leader. Its most powerful states are wracked by their own problems.

Britain is a disaster. Always ambivalent about Europe, the British are again toying with talking about leaving, and the political class has been unable or unwilling to make anything like a case for Europe. The same leadership that told the Scots things would be "better together" acts as though cutting themselves off from Europe would be a good idea. David Cameron can't decide whether he wants to be craven or irresponsible on the subject of Europe, so has decided to be both, alienating even the one political ally that he needs most, Angela Merkel. Earlier this year, he invited Merkel to speak at Westminster and advocate for the European idea. Reforms are possible, Merkel said then, but only if all partners work together, which led to her central pitch. "We need a strong United Kingdom with a strong voice inside the EU," she said. "If we have that we will be able to make the necessary changes for the benefit of all." Now, thanks to continued Cameronian pandering to the Tory Right, the Prime Minister has pushed the Chancellor to the brink of abandoning the idea of Britain as part of Europe. One can only threaten such an action for so long before someone takes you up on it, after all.

France is worse, tied up in its own problems, made that much more complicated by the repercussions of the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre. Germany under Merkel is facing its own internal problems, including not only the threat of the AfD but the rise of the PEGIDA protest movement, which combines hatred of the European Union with its opposition to further immigration and its fear mongering about the "Islamization of the West." This is even before you get further to other European states where the combination of weakness and interest

shapes their reactions to issues from the Euro's future to the possibility of maintaining sanctions on Russia.

One of the greatest temptations for any so-called expert commentator is to claim to stand between two terrible alternatives and offer the wise middle course. I cannot completely avoid that temptation myself, and beg your indulgence. But when I look today at the arguments made by both critics and fans of Europe, I despair. One hears the skeptics more, of course, especially in this country, and especially among those who consider themselves to be practical realists. They dismiss Europe as a chimera and praise the nation-state, even as individual European nation-states obviously cannot stand up to the continental challenges of China, Russia, India, and even the United States—none of which are nation-states on the classical European model. We do not have any leaders of the practical stature of the great Bavarian conservative statesman Franz Josef Strauss, who rejected “the idea that any European state—no matter its name, no matter how glorious its history, no matter how impressive its traditions—will be recognized in Moscow as an equal partner. One cannot ignore the laws of mathematics.”

But even Europe's fans depress me. Europhilia is the love that dare not speak its name in politics, but those who want to praise Europe mistake its weakness for strength, its irresponsibility for wisdom. Europe has much to offer the world, but only if it is engaged enough to care and strong enough to take political risks. An irrelevant, self-satisfied, and insular Europe is no help to anyone. Europe is in danger of becoming nothing but a tourist attraction, much like its great Cathedrals: empty monuments to the faith and wisdom and creativity of generations past, echoing with the footsteps of those who neither understand nor care about what they see, gathering dust as memories fade, their meaning receding from the minds of the living with every passing day.

That is how things are. Europhiles who deny this are not doing themselves or Europe any favors. But Skeptics who celebrate it are contributing to digging their own grave. We can all do better; we need to do better. Europeans need to seize the opportunity to display the creativity and bravery of earlier generations, and Americans should encourage their allies to do that.

I want to make a special plea to those so-called conservatives in the United States who dismiss the European project and want to write the Continent off. We spent four decades during the Cold War claiming that the Atlantic community was bound together by shared history and shared values. I for one happen to think that was all true. If it was true then, it is still true now. Recognizing that historical fact has profound significance for how we act today. Of course the United States can and should have connections to other parts of the world, and indeed should promote greater understanding between and among all of the people of the globe. But

honestly, if the United States and Europe simply throw up their hands and imagine that it is impossible to understand or be understood by the other, despite how much we have in common, how much we share, how exactly do we hope to develop constructive relationships with other, much more different cultures and societies?

If we, Europeans and Americans, fail to nurture our common ties, fail to recognize that what binds us is so much greater than what divides us, fail to do the hard work to understand and communicate with each other, then we will have betrayed a sacred cultural trust, the ideals of the West. What's more, we will have sacrificed an inheritance of generations for a mess of diluted pottage made up of self-satisfied capitalism and exclusivist nationalism that will not nourish or sustain us. The hour is late, but there is time, if only those of us who believe in the West are willing to do the hard work of repairing the damage and building a new future for Europe.

PART V: BORDERS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE WEST

Germany in the Spring

By Adam Garfinkle

April 2003

This article was published in E-Notes.

Thanks to an invitation from the American Academy in Berlin, I'm in Germany—with the air warming, the flowers blooming, and the antiwar marches humming right along like so many hives of busy bees. Yet, despite all the evidence of palpable nature around, I do feel sometimes as though I am in a slightly surreal world. Herewith five slices of recent experience as exemplars.

Marching Along

This past Sunday's *Der Tagesspiegel* *Morgenpost* carried a photo of the previous day's large antiwar rally in downtown Berlin, and above it the headline reads "82 percent of Berliners oppose the war." All the newspapers here focus intently on antiwar rallies, speeches, supporting op-eds and the like, not just in Germany, but all over the world. The print and electronic coverage of the war itself is highly professional and without any obvious bias, but the war narrative of the ruling Red-Green coalition government is everywhere to be seen and heard. That narrative is clearly in consonance with majority opinion, and helps mightily to shape and reinforce that opinion. Angela Merkel, the leader of the opposition CDU who supports the U.S., is more than just busy; she's downright thoughtful most of the time. She connects the strategic dots pretty well. The papers here don't ignore her entirely, but they seem sometimes to be trying.

If you talk to people at the antiwar rallies, it is clear that most are engaged in a votive rather than a political act. (Sometimes these acts are not exactly voluntary; teachers in colleges and high schools bring their classes with them to rallies, but everyone pretty much seems happy to be released from studying and teaching.) The sense of a religious offering is in the air; the mood is intense but calm and celebratory. Everything is extraordinarily orderly. It reminded me of a old story by Efraim Kishon, one of Israel's greatest humorists, about a trip he and his wife took to Zurich, where everything was so insanely clean that it seemed a cardinal sin to try to throw away a paper ice cream wrapper, for even the waste bins were forbiddingly spotless. I swear that antiwar rallies in Berlin end with the streets being cleaner than when they began.

Of course, this shouldn't come as such a surprise. This is a country where no pedestrian dares cross an intersection against the light, even at 3 o'clock in the morning, and where dogs are

allowed into restaurants and bars with their owners because they're better behaved than most people in other countries (They really are, too).

So one hears at antiwar rallies, and in op-ed columns, and in cross-talk in bakeries, busses and bars, that war is bad because it kills people. Period and full stop most of the time. In their never-ending search for the appearance, at least, of holding the moral high ground, most Germans reason in simple moral categoricals about war. This is very handy, for it makes the fact that most people know little about the Middle East, Iraq, or the nature of weapons of mass destruction fairly irrelevant.

In short, average Germans are a lot like average Americans in this respect, only more so. But while Americans can look at the uses of American power over the last century and be more or less comfortable with the outcome, Germans cannot. They know that war is bad because Germans started and lost two of them in the 20th century, with no little amount of breakage in the process. Thanks to two popular recent books, they also tend equate all bombing with what the U.S. and British air forces did to Dresden on February 13, 1945. A church down the street from here bears a sign out front reading, "*Krieg ist immer der falsche weg.*" This pretty much sums up the majority attitude, as does the large sign on the local theater in Potsdam, which reads "*Kein Krieg. Nirgends.*" Anyone who doesn't share it risks being thought of as atavistic and even vulgar.

This attitude toward the use of force persists despite some recent and significant changes here. Perhaps surprisingly, the Green Party has moved a long way from outright pacifism—more than the SPD—some of this movement the result of the Kosovo War and its aftermath. Some Germans, at least, now credit the concept of a "just war." Most Germans know that there are now German military forces in Afghanistan, that the German navy has patrolled off the coast of Somalia, and of course that there are German units in the Balkans. Most are not embarrassed or upset by this, but most Germans conceive of the use of force as police work, not war-fighting. For the apparent majority, of all political persuasions, the "just war" concept remains unacceptable in polite conversation. This is what has led Peter Schneider, one of Germany's leading writer/intellectuals, to pronounce his country "peace-drunk." Those who accept the concept of a just war are considered, he says, worse than murderers and rapists in chic circles.

When Peter Schneider and Daniel Cohn-Bendit—the former Danny the Red of 1968 Paris, and now a member of the German Greens—accept the concept a just war, you know things are changing. But if you sample street opinion during this war, you can see how difficult and slow that change is. If you suggest to the typical demonstrator—anyone of the 82 percent at random—that Iraq is a dangerous country, has been proven so by its track record, and will only get more dangerous if it isn't stopped, the standard reply is that Iraq isn't a threat because

Hans Blix said so. They don't believe that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction more than has already been identified or destroyed, because Mr. Blix would have found them. So why, then, are America and Britain going to war? They answer without a hint of hesitation: oil; it's all about oil, greed and imperialism.

What about America's determination to bring democracy to the Middle East? They laugh. Those who accept its sincerity are aghast at America's infantile idealism. Most will tell you that Europeans had grand and beautiful ambitions for the world, for which they saw themselves as leaders and builders above the rest—and look what happened. Expressions of American idealism tend to evoke a “been there, done that” sort of response. Something to think about, because there may well be something to it.

Most people, however, don't believe that such talk about democracy is sincere in the slightest, anymore than they believed a word of what Secretary of State Colin Powell told the UN Security Council about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. Taking their cue from mass circulation magazines like *Der Spiegel*, they all know that George W. Bush is a stupid cowboy who got elected president through corruption and stealth.

Much of the mass-circulation press in Germany, though not all, has long been in the hands of the 68er generation, and it has not been charitable, to put it mildly, to all things American. The most popular cameo here, on t-shirts, handbags and heaven knows what else, is Che Guevara. His picture adorns the cover of the latest issue of the biggest gossip magazine in the country—the German version of *People*. This helps to explain the size and popularity of current antiwar sentiment, which is partly anti-Bush but also partly anti-American in motivation. As is true in the United States, the antiwar rallies and activities in Germany resemble a large gaseous planet in structure. Most of the visible circumference is made up of light, orbiting elements, but the solid organizing core is much harder. The role that ANSWER (a.k.a. the Workers World Party) has played in the United States is played here by the Communist Party, the residua of former West and East German factions, which has taken the lead in organizing the demonstrations. With the Red-Green coalition government against the war, nothing much here “pushes back,” so to speak, against this organizing. Within both the antiwar core and the government, there is also a good deal of mostly sub rosa anti-Americanism that has nothing to do with the Bush Administration or the post-9/11 world. These elements in Germany have been anti-American for decades, fearing that American Cold War policy might have to be validated at Germany's expense, and they are using the present context as a vehicle to advance that view in a new forum (that the American war on terrorism might harm Germany's security)—with very considerable success, it must be said.

The President's overt, old-timey religiosity makes most Germans feel particularly creepy, and this also helps to explain the tone of German feeling. Many Germans identify standard issue

religion as having been an accomplice in the crimes of European colonialism, militarism, racism, and disaster—not without at least some justification, it should be noted. German churches today, Protestant and Catholic both, are epicenters of pacifism, but polls tell us that only about 15 percent of Germans attend church services more than once or twice a year. In smaller towns, that number seems low—at least according to my own first-hand experience. Still, George Bush’s kind of Christianity strikes the majority of Germans as something akin to a freak-show act from a previous century. His acknowledgement at a news conference that he prays daily, and that he appreciates deeply the prayers of others offered on behalf of himself and his family, stuns most viewers here into baffled silence. They cannot imagine any continental European head of state saying such things in public because, in fact, none of them do.

To the Generation Gap

But these are the attitudes of a mere 82 percent of Berliners, or maybe only 72 percent, adjusting for journalistic inflation. Not every German thinks like this, including, it seems, increasing numbers of younger Germans. I attended a competition among young journalists—mostly in their mid- to late-20s— vying for working fellowships in the United States. Most of the several dozen competitors had been to the United States and wanted very much to go back. I shared a podium with a distinguished German civil servant, an elder middle-ranking diplomat, who was most judicious in his comments. He was skeptical of the then not-yet-begun war on prudential grounds, but critical of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s diplomacy, which had isolated Germany from America and within Europe. I expressed my support for the war on prudential grounds but criticized the Bush Administration’s new expressions of “liberation theology” and other signs of hubris and impending overreach.

The young journalists were electrified by these two presentations. They were not used to hearing analytical as opposed to moral opposition to war expressed in German by a German with gray hair. And they were not used to hearing support for the war expressed in prudential rather than idealist terms from an American with a beard. Their reactions were divided, however. One fellow began his response by saying that, “As a German, I see war as only a very last resort...” When he finished I asked him whether he had really thought through his “last resort” thesis. “Are you aware,” I asked, “of Winston Churchill’s efforts before September 1, 1939 to rally the world to stop Hitler before it was too late, before a war broke out at a time and place of Hitler’s choosing that would be maximally long and destructive to all concerned? As a German, you aren’t happy in retrospect that Churchill failed, are you—or happy that antiwar isolationists in America kept the United States out of the war against the Nazis effectively for another two and half years? So why do you argue now that war should only be a last resort?”

Before he could attempt an answer, one of his female colleagues spoke up to praise my elder German colleague, and said: “Why can’t our leaders think realistically about matters of war and peace as you have just done? If our leaders spoke realistically, it would enable the people think realistically as well.” Later, at the luncheon table, this young woman answered her own question for me: “The 68ers,” she said, “who run this country’s politics and media, collect as much German war guilt as they can, and they deny arguments saying that British, French, and American appeasement made the war longer and worse. They deny that America achieved German reunification against British, French and Russian opposition, that American power had anything to do with a positive outcome for Germany. They do this because their guilt is the seedbed for their pacifism and escapism, without which they wouldn’t know what to think, without which they would have to engage the real world with its real dilemmas.” I froze in mid-chew. A shock of insight from an attractive 24-year old woman can do that.

She and those who think like her will have to swim upstream here—that’s for sure. In the Berlin Wall Museum, right next to Checkpoint Charlie, for example, success in the Cold War is directly equated to personal bravery, people power, and non-violent resistance. Positively depicted, in addition to all of the brave Germans who escaped from East Berlin, are Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the anti-nuclear demonstrations in Germany in the 1980s. So are the uprisings in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Prague in 1968, Romania in 1989, and Russia in 1991. NATO is never mentioned.

On the 18th Floor

Die Welt’s executive offices are at the top of the Axel-Springer Verlag building in Berlin, built just adjacent to where the Berlin Wall once stood. Some of these men may be, technically speaking, members of the 68er generation, but they do not act or think like that generation.

The editorial leadership of the paper hosted me at a private lunch, and the conversation was most edifying. There clearly are people in Germany who can get to the second paragraph, and well beyond, of an analytical treatment of the war and related security issues. They may have prudential misgivings about American policy, but they know that the collapse of the U.S. position in Southwest Asia before Saddam’s petty imperialism would harm Europe far more than the United States. They know that Chancellor Schroeder’s “unilateral and pre-emptive” electoral diplomacy last August—their words, not mine—opened the way for Jacques Chirac to hijack German interests and prerogatives. They know that it is American strength in the world that allows Europe’s experiment in peaceful, federal unification to go on without risk, and that it is American economic strength—the engine of global economic expansion—that allows the EU’s protectionism and stultifying managerial conservatism at home to persist.

They are concerned about Atlantic relations, and about recent polls showing that only 11 percent of Germans consider the United States to be Germany's closest friend (down from 50 percent in 1995), while France ranks at 30 percent.

So why don't you say all this in your editorials, I asked? I learned that sometimes they do, and so does *Die Zeit* and some other papers. These positions are supported by many German diplomatic and military professionals, and by many businessmen with international experience. But the majority of Germans, I was led to understand, don't read such things. They are not interested in politics—except sometimes the insular politics of EU federalism. International politics are about power, armies, nationalism, corporate interests and war, and these are all things Germans have been anathematized to in school and later in life.

Germany was also enfolded in both an inner and an outer multilateralism—the EU and NATO—and its sense of independent policy formulation was minimized by more than 50 years of being thus enfolded. Those relatively few Germans who can think strategically, and are not embarrassed to do so, do it well; the majority, however, don't wish to think this way and are disinclined to listen to those who do. The political environment today, during the war, reflects both currents. Serious people do air their views, but with the ambient level of political attention raised and colored by the war, and with the sitting government catering to the populist know-nothingism of the day, they are, by and large, failing. I have heard, too, from some elder Greens that the political-psychological dynamic set in motion by this war has set back the maturation of German views that had begun with the Kosovo crisis.

Isn't it odd, I said, that at just the moment when Germany is of necessity emerging from the outer enfolding of the Cold War era, it has a government least capable of engaging in independent strategic thought. "Odd, perhaps," they replied, but better "sad." A senior editor of *Die Welt* took me over to the great plate glass windows facing east and west and said to me that, a dozen years ago, one could look out of these windows and see two different worlds. To the east was in a kind of shabby black-and-white, to the west a scene in technicolor. Little by little, the differences disappeared, and now the view to the east from the 18th floor doesn't look much different from the view to the west. Inside people's heads, however, things have been slower to change. Here is a case, he explained, where what you see is not necessarily what you get—at least not yet.

I thanked him for lunch, and for more than that.

With the Minister

A minister of the current government, a member of the Green Party, came to Wannsee, to the American Academy, for a private session with an American "group of seven." To make a long and somewhat strange episode a bit shorter, this minister made Dennis Kucinich and Howard

Dean seem like Machiavellian realists by comparison. The minister insisted that Iraq was no threat to its neighbors or to the United States—because Hans Blix said so. He insisted further that Iraq was not special among its neighbors, that there were a lot of undemocratic states in the area, so why pick on Iraq, and why pick on it now?

This was much too much for the Americans assembled. Iraq not special? Did the minister not remember the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and its attack on Iran before that? Could the minister think of any other local state with such a record? Did the minister not recall the 16, now 17, unrequited UN Security Council resolutions, chapter 7 resolutions at that, that Iraq was in violation of, and could the minister name any other country in a similar circumstance? Did the minister forget somehow that, according to Ambassadors Rolf Ekeus and Richard Butler—not just according to the U.S. government—Iraq had manufactured enough nerve agent, anthrax and other toxins to kill literally every man, woman and child on the planet? That it had actually used WMD to murder thousands of its own citizens? Could the minister name any other country in such a category? Had the minister forgotten that when inspectors last worked in Iraq, in 1998, missing growth media and chemical weapons precursors were listed, literally by the ton, that have never been accounted for? Did the minister think that in the four years since 1998 Iraq has come to have less such prohibited materials, and, if so, what would be the logic for such a conclusion?

These questions made nary a dent. The minister simply said that war should always be a last resort and that the inspections were working. Did the minister think that “progress” in the inspection process, asked another participant, was owed to anything other than the threat of force—but then again, how could there be “progress” if, as he claimed, if there was probably no WMD there to be found in the first place?

Whereupon another American, who happens to be against the war on prudential grounds, argued that had the U.S. Navy sunk one Serbian ship off the coast of Dubrovnik in 1992, a quarter of a million civilians would probably still be alive. Is surgery the “last resort” in the face of cancer known to be growing? How could Germans, who know that Hitler could have been stopped earlier, who saw with their own eyes the way the Euromissile debate played out in the 1980s, who watched the way the Cold War was won and Germany reunified, conclude that strength, including the threat and “other-than-last-resort” use of force, was not an asset in a serious diplomacy?

But it was Mikhail Gorbachev, as all the Greens and SPD supporters know, who ended the Cold War. That’s why Germany has since made him an honorary citizen.

This remark, even more than several others, temporarily removed most of the oxygen from the room. It had by then become clear that the minister was living in a world other than one we recognized. It may be true, as some critics say, that the Bush Administration inner circle lives

in its own closed world of logic in which Al-Qaeda and the Ba'ath Party are imagined somehow virtual subsidiaries of one another. But such a circle has nothing on the world of SPD-Green coalition, where senior members of government cannot seem to reason their way out of a mini-mart.

Ahmed and Me

This past Friday morning, I agreed to do a “conversation interview” for *Die Welt*. I was to talk with Ahmed Berwari, the German representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Journalists from *Die Welt* were to ask questions, guide the conversation, and take down the results. We met at a chic restaurant just a few yards from Checkpoint Charlie and the Wall Museum, an Italian spot called Sale y Tabacci. The journalists knew that Mr. Berwari was an Iraqi national, and that in previous weeks he had been quoted widely as having opposed a war. The journalists invited along a photographer, who had with him little flags, one American and one Iraqi. It was fairly clear that they expected some sort of debate, with me as an American supporting a war and Ahmed as an Iraqi opposing it.

What a surprise they were in for.

Mr. Berwari was frank about the recent evolution of his views about war. Both major Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq had opposed a war because it threatened what was, for the Kurds, about the best situation they had ever known. Saddam's forces, or the Turks, would be in a position to smash Kurdish autonomy in a war. But since the Americans had made it clear that they intended to destroy the Iraqi regime, restrain the Turks, and protect the Kurds with a northern front, the Kurds were now in nervous but still enthusiastic support of the effort.

“Why?” asked the journalists, seemingly genuinely disappointed and puzzled. Ahmed did not know what to say. So I asked them: “Have you ever heard of what happened at Halabja?” Vaguely, they had; somehow, however, they could not put the pieces together to explain why the Kurds would be happy to see Saddam dispatched to the other world.

One journalist asked me if the war was legal. I said it was as far I understood the doctrine of self-help in international relations. The preamble to the UN Charter contains the relevant language; I suggested they review it. Then there are, I reminded them, the 17 Security Council resolutions holding Iraq in contempt of world opinion, most of which, being chapter 7 resolutions, justified the use of force. But German experts, I was told, hold that without Security Council authorization for the use of force, all such uses are not legal. I was also told that never before, since 1945, had force been used to depose a government without UN Security Council authorization. Recalling what happened in Panama, Grenada, Kosovo—and not to speak of how many African governments have been made and broken by France and

French troops—I found this a pretty astonishing claim. Pretty soon, too, I was told that Iraq was not a threat to anyone, since Hans Blix said so—and isn't this really all about oil?

Ahmed then suddenly got quite animated about the matter of what is and is not lawful in the eyes of the United Nations. Tens of thousands of Kurds were murdered by Saddam and his henchmen, and no one brought the matter before the UN Security Council. Does that, he asked them, with some heat in his otherwise calm voice, make it alright? Hundreds of resolutions brought against Israel in the General Assembly for its supposedly terrible treatment of Arabs, but not one resolution brought calling attention to far worse Arab treatment of non-Arab minorities in Iraq, Sudan, Algeria and elsewhere.

Ahmed then pointed out in some detail how about half of the efforts of the Iraqi regime in the war were directed against its own people. Hospitals had been used in Nasiriya and Najaf to hide tanks, ammunition, chemical weapons suits and, more ominously, nerve-gas atrophine antidote injectors. One journalist asked me how I knew that Iraq possessed any chemical and biological weapons when Hans Blix said he could not find any. I asked in return: Why do you think the Iraqi regime would send chemical weapons suits and antidote injectors to the south of the country if they didn't have such weapons, and maybe even intend to use them again? I got no answer.

As if oblivious to most of what went on, the tag-along photographer at session's end suggested that I hold the U.S. flag and Ahmed the Iraqi flag in a joint photo. Ahmed took one look at the Iraqi flag and make it crystal clear that he had no intention of identifying with it. At that point, if the Mad Hatter himself had emerged to pour tea, neither Ahmed nor I would have been terribly surprised. When the interview was published on Sunday, March 30, it nevertheless had large letters reading "Irak" under Ahmed's photo and "USA" under mine. Go figure.

If Germans feel any sense of *Schadenfreude* over America's early difficulties in the war, they aren't saying so in public. The popular magazine *Focus* calls the war a "debacle" on the cover of its current issue, but doesn't gloat about it. It is galling, however, to know that many do express such sentiments in private—galling because someone's being superficially right for unserious or plain wrong reasons is far harder to take than their being right or wrong for any set of sensible reasons. Chancellor Schroeder's use of last summer's floods and the threat of war in his re-election campaign amounted to help from two of the four horsemen of the apocalypse, and it turned out that two of four was enough for the purpose at hand. But for Schroeder to make still more political capital out of Anglo-American difficulties is just plain unfair, especially in light of his otherwise plunging popularity since his re-election. The Chancellor is therefore in some ways the guy who got it all wrong, and prospered anyway.

Will he continue to prosper? It's hard to say. Opposition contenders seem to be taking turns trying to undermine Angela Merkel. On the other hand, the SPD party in Hamburg, where it is very strong, and has been for decades, is making trouble for Schroeder. The key, perhaps, is the declining economy—but the opposition CDU/CSU doesn't yet seem to have found any better solutions to the problem. The coalition is very unlikely to fall and the next election is years away. Chancellor Schroeder will be around for a while, it seems. Whether George W. Bush will, too, is less clear.

Legacy of Ostpolitik: Germany's Russia Policy and Energy Security

By Felix K. Chang

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Germany seems to be suddenly in a policy pickle. Almost a half century of German engagement with Russia that was supposed to have tamed Moscow's historical impulses appears to have come to naught in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014. But that engagement has left Germany (and many other Central European countries) more dependent on Russia for much of their energy supplies.

Of course, even without the Ukrainian crisis, Germany's approach to energy security, riven with paradoxes, has often confounded outsiders. Germany is a country that is abundant in coal, but feels ashamed to mine it; a country that is deficient in sun, but has pinned a large part of its future on solar power; and a country that has well-run nuclear power plants, but has decided to shutter them (importing nuclear power from France instead). Rather than pursue an energy security policy that ensures the continuous availability of energy at affordable prices, it is almost as if German leaders have chosen one that does the opposite.

Much of this has been the product of Germany's *Energiewende* (energy transition) policy. First talked about in the 1980s and put into practice in the following decades, it envisions Germany gradually doing away with its conventional forms of power generation in favor of renewable energy sources, like wind and solar power. Most Germans hoped that, in time, *Energiewende* would produce an abundance of renewable energy and a greatly diminished for fossil-fuel or nuclear power. In theory, that would not only reconcile the paradoxes in its current energy situation, but also help create a more verdant society. [1]

But the absence of large-scale electricity storage technology or a suitably designed transmission network has meant that the power generated from renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, remains intermittent. That volatility makes electrical grids difficult to manage. The amount of electricity put on a grid must precisely match the amount that is consumed;

otherwise variations in voltage could cause rolling blackouts. And so, even as renewable energy sources have become a bigger part of the country's energy mix, Germany has been unable to wean itself from coal and natural gas. Indeed, it has become even more reliant on them to even out the amount of electricity on its grid. [2]

Meanwhile, to pay for the subsidies that have underwritten the growth in renewable power generation, German households have had to accept electricity costs that have grown to be 48 percent higher than the average in Europe in 2013 (That is on top of a 40 percent increase in European electricity costs over the last decade). Already some energy intensive industries, like steel and machinery, have shown signs of disinvesting in Germany and locating elsewhere. To prevent that from happening, Germany has exempted some companies from having to pay the subsidy, putting an even greater burden on households. At such high rates, some have begun to wonder whether *Energiewende* might hollow out Germany's industrial base before it reaches its goal. [3]

That was the unenviable position that Germany was in when the Ukrainian crisis began. Until recently, environmental concerns have driven Germany's energy security outlook, much like those in other European countries. Most Germans considered the impact that international security would have on reliable energy supplies as a second-tier concern, whether they admitted it or not. And so, even as Germany curbed its own conventional energy production (principally brown coal), it willingly accepted Russia as a major new natural gas supplier. Berlin appeared untroubled by the possibility that Russia could turn its natural gas supply relationship into political leverage. That seemed to suddenly change with the Ukrainian crisis, when Russia made clear the power that its energy supplies held over Europe's still-recovering economies. German policymakers surely took note. Perhaps for the first time in a long time, Berlin had to reconsider the assumptions that underlay its energy security, not to mention its approach to Russia.

A Brief History of Ostpolitik

But was this really so sudden for Germany? Not really. Since the late 1960s, Germany (then West Germany) had begun to take incremental foreign policy steps in its relationship with Russia (then the Soviet Union) that led to its natural gas reliance on Russia. At the time, West Germany's Social Democratic Party (SDP) had just come to power. Chancellor Willy Brandt and his center-left adherents believed that the best path to European security lay in building bridges to, rather than strengthening bulwarks against, the Soviet Union. Brandt hoped he could establish trust with the East, as his Christian Democratic Union predecessor, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, had done with the West.

Brandt's approach became known as *Neue Ostpolitik* (new eastern policy). He argued that Germany could bring about *Wandel durch Annäherung* (change through rapprochement). His

efforts culminated in a number of accords between West Germany and the Soviet Union in 1970. Among the first was one in which the two countries agreed to exchange West German wide-diameter steel pipe for future deliveries of Soviet oil and natural gas. At the time it was the biggest trade deal ever concluded between the communist and non-communist blocs. Later that year, the two countries signed an historic agreement to renounce the use of force. Brandt assured his Western allies that Ostpolitik would neither weaken West Germany's commitment to NATO nor make West Germany dependent on the Soviet Union.

However, Cold War realities eventually intruded on West Germany's embrace of Ostpolitik. In 1981, the Soviet Union pressured Poland's communist government to crack down on Solidarity, a Polish trade union which had been agitating for social change. That prompted the United States to impose economic sanctions on the Soviet Union. But Brandt's SPD successor, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, opposed such a confrontational approach to the Soviet Union. Instead, Schmidt, in line with Ostpolitik, pushed ahead with West Germany's pipeline deal with the Soviet Union to bring natural gas from Siberia to Europe, antagonizing the United States. Doing so Schmidt demonstrated how Ostpolitik could divide West Germany from one of its closest allies.


West Germany's next chancellor, the Christian Democratic Union's Helmut Kohl, managed to mend much of the rift between West Germany and the United States. Kohl's firm support for NATO and American missile deployments in Western Europe helped immensely. But Kohl did not undo the economic ties that West Germany had established with the Soviet Union. Like most West Germans, he was concerned about the fate of those in East Germany and thought it wise to maintain a dialogue with Moscow. Then, after the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ostpolitik seemed like a good rubric under which to knit Russia into a broader Europe. The policy also neatly facilitated the greater penetration of German companies into Russia. Many argued that such economic integration would reduce the chance of future conflict, since both sides stood to lose if that was to occur.

That mindset reached its peak during the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder. A Social Democrat and disciple of Brandt, Schröder reenergized Ostpolitik through his policy of *Wandel durch Handel* (change through trade) with Russia (and China). He came to believe that Russia (and its president, Vladimir Putin) had fundamentally changed. Thus, during his time as chancellor, Schröder pushed for stronger ties with Russia. He met with Putin at least 37 times and, in 2004, called him a "flawless democrat." [4] Schröder also pushed for the construction of Nord Stream, a major natural gas pipeline project that is majority-owned by Russia's Gazprom and would directly connect Russia to Germany. More fearful of natural gas supply disruptions due to differences between Russia and Ukraine (through which its natural

gas must pass) than its relations with Russia souring, Berlin approved Nord Stream. The project's twin pipelines were laid down in 2011 and 2012. [5]

The end of Schröder's tenure in office did not end Germany's close relationship with Russia. Chancellor Angela Merkel and her current foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, once Schröder's chief of staff, have kept the lines of communication open to Moscow. Throughout the Ukrainian crisis, Merkel probably had more direct contact with Putin than any other Western leader. She apparently did so because of her belief that constant dialogue can avoid the sorts of miscommunication that could lead to open conflict. She also did so in order to avoid jeopardizing the major business interests that German companies had built in Russia. But equally as important as both those factors, is that most Germans would rather see their country as a mediator in the crisis between Russia and the West rather than a partisan in it. German politicians who opined that the West had shown insufficient sensitivity towards Russian interests in the years before the crisis reflected that sentiment. In this way, Ostpolitik has continued to resonate in Germany. [6]

As a consequence, over the course of nearly a half century and under various flavors of Ostpolitik, whether *Wandel durch Annäherung* or *Wandel durch Handel*, Germany's reliance on Russian natural gas has been allowed to grow. In 2012, Russia supplied about 37 percent of Germany's total natural gas demand. That share will rise this year after Nord Stream begins to operate closer to full capacity. [7] Berlin's decision to abandon nuclear power by 2022—in the aftermath of Japan's Fukushima Dai-Ichi meltdown in 2011—will force Germany to further rely on natural gas (and coal) to not only smooth out the ebb and flow of electricity from renewable energy sources, but also provide baseload power for its grid. That will further exacerbate Germany's vulnerability to energy supply shocks. And since energy prices are usually set on the margin, even a slight decline in energy supplies could push up already-high German electricity prices. And so, as Berlin determines how it will deal with Russia's resurgence, it must keep its energy security in mind.



Perhaps unsurprisingly, Russia always viewed Ostpolitik somewhat differently than Germany. To be sure there were varied opinions about it within the Soviet Union. One group wanted nothing to do with the West, fearful of its corrupting influences. Another group was open to Ostpolitik, but for reasons that were far from homogeneous. A few may have been genuinely interested in better relations. More wanted to take advantage of the economic benefits that would derive from energy exports to West Germany. Still others sought to use it to promote German “neutralism,” loosening West Germany’s ties with the NATO alliance. Apparently, *wandel* (change) could work in both directions.[8]

After the Cold War, many of Russia’s pillars of strength faded. The country itself was thrown into economic and political turmoil for most of the 1990s. Russia’s ability to influence events abroad came to be centered on its oil and natural gas exports. Due to pipelines built during the Soviet era, Russia has continued to dominate energy distribution in much of Central and Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, Moscow has sought to protect and build on that capability. In 2011, Russia solidified its hold on Belarus, not through military force, but rather through the acquisition of its natural gas pipeline network. [9]

Another example has been Russia’s efforts to promote its South Stream pipeline project as an alternative to a European-backed one, called Nabucco, which had envisioned bringing non-Russian natural gas to Central Europe through the Balkans. Many Europeans hoped that Nabucco would increase price competition and ease their energy reliance on Russia. But a series of setbacks halted Nabucco. In 2013, one of its principal backers, a major German utility company, pulled out and then the consortium that was to provide it with natural gas rejected Nabucco as its preferred link to Europe. Finally, Moscow seemed to have won over Hungary, a key Nabucco transit country, to the South Stream camp in early 2014. It did so by granting Hungary aid for its ailing steel industry and state credit for the construction of two new nuclear power blocs at its Paks nuclear power plant. Although there are still hopes for the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, which plans to ship natural gas across Greece and into Italy, that route would leave countries like Bulgaria and Romania dependent on Russian energy. [10]

Germany’s Energy Options

In the short term, Germany has few good options. Almost half a century of choices created the situation that Germany finds itself. It is unrealistic to think that they could be quickly reversed. Some Germans sympathetic to Schröder’s view argue that nothing needs to be reversed and that, if only given more time and understanding, Russia can change. But the rest of Germany is not so sure any more. In fact, more Germans hold a dim view of Russia than do Americans, according to the German Marshall Fund survey late last year. [11] But to improve the state of its energy security, Germany must either create new domestic energy sources or find them elsewhere.

Of course, the fastest way to create new domestic energy sources is not to discard those already in existence. In short, Germany could slow or stop its process of rapid decommissioning of its nuclear power plants. Rather than phase out nuclear power, it could replace its last-generation plants with next-generation ones that produce less radioactive waste and have additional safeguards against meltdown. But that is unlikely, given the strength of anti-nuclear sentiment in Germany.

Another course would be for Germany to accelerate its *Energiewende*. Theoretically, the faster it can make the transition to renewable energy the better. Unfortunately, simply boosting Germany's intermittent renewable energy sources would also increase the volatility of electricity on the country's grid. That in turn would exacerbate the difficulties (and costs) in balancing the grid's electricity supply and demand. To do that today, Germany has had to import and burn more coal, raising the country's carbon dioxide emissions to their highest levels since 1990. Ironically, Germany's attempt to be friendlier to the environment has led to it to pollute more. [12]

Since large-scale electricity storage technology is still unavailable, Germany could speed up its plans to build 4,000 km of new transmission lines to shift electricity from parts of the country where renewable energy is produced to those parts where shortages will exist after its nuclear power plants are closed. So far, only 300 km of transmission lines have been built. By one count, 15 out of 24 grid-expansion projects are up to seven years behind schedule. The reasons why vary: difficulty in securing the appropriate financing; a lack of coordination between German states; and the paradoxical opposition from German citizens who “(demand) an end to nuclear power but (object) to the new transmission grid being built in their backyard.” [13]

A fourth course for Germany would be to use hydraulic fracturing technology (commonly known as fracking) to produce natural gas from the shale formations that lie under its northern states. Early in 2013, it seemed as though Germany would seriously consider fracking as a method to fuel gas-fired power plants. But a year later, domestic concerns about the technology's possible environmental impact had essentially shelved that solution. [14]

As for sourcing Germany's natural gas from elsewhere, that is easier said than done. Given the major financial investment that German companies have made into Nord Stream and the fact that it just came online, it would be difficult for Berlin to suddenly back away from it. With the Nabucco pipeline project stymied for the moment, Germany could turn to Norway's offshore natural gas fields. However, those fields are too small to satisfy all of Germany's natural gas demand. Ultimately, Germany would have to make new billion-euro investments to building liquefied natural gas terminals to import natural gas from more distant sources. Even if left unused, such terminals would provide Germany with the flexibility to do

so, if the need ever arose. Though extremely expensive, they would give Berlin more bargaining room with its existing natural gas suppliers, like Russia.

For the time being, Germany's plan is to press forward with its *Energiewende*. Indeed, there is little else Berlin can do, given that German law prevents it from retroactively reneging on its current subsidy scheme. And, as some have calculated, changing the scheme now would do little to alter its economic costs. But Germany could change the goal of its subsidy program from creating more renewable energy to deploying new electricity storage technologies, like flywheels or gas to power (whatever their current level of development) or speeding the construction of its new transmission network (even if that means overriding the parochial interests of German states). Such measures would make *Energiewende* more practical, but could not free Germany from its rising reliance on Russian natural gas. [15]

Conclusion

Germany needs reliable and cost-effective energy to support its world-class industrial economy. *Energiewende* has demonstrated that renewable energy sources can satisfy a substantial share of Germany's electricity demand. But they cannot satisfy all of it, nor can they ensure the stability of the country's electrical grid without support from coal and gas-fired power plants. That ultimately means figuring out how to deal with Russia.

Perhaps it is time for Berlin to reconsider the flavor of *Ostpolitik* that it should pursue. For all of Germany's engagement with Russia over the last 44 years, the basic motivations of Russian foreign policy are fundamentally *unverändert* (unchanged). Similar security concerns continue to inform Russia's strategic behavior. What changed in the intervening years was only Russia's ability to act on its impulses.

As such, Russia is likely to continue to loom large in German foreign policy thinking, as it has been since the nineteenth century. After all, Germany has always been a country sandwiched in the heart of Europe, with great powers to its east and west. To think that Germany could completely distance itself from its massive eastern neighbor is unrealistic. However, perhaps a new incarnation of *Ostpolitik* is warranted, one that is pursued under the banner of *Wandel durch Stärke* (change through strength). That would be something that Russia (and Russian leaders) would understand and take more seriously when pursuing its agenda in Europe. *Stärke* would require that Germany get more practical about not only its energy security, but also its national security.

Notes:

1. "German Lessons," *Economist*, Apr. 3, 2008.
2. Some German environmentalists argue that more renewable energy sources would not undermine grid reliability. With enough wind and solar power generation spread

across Germany, there would be enough wind or sun somewhere to provide a consistent flow of electricity to the grid. As evidence, they point to the fact that Germany's grid has not yet failed. "How to lose half a trillion euros," *Economist*, Oct. 12, 2013.

3. Exempting companies from paying the subsidy has drawn the attention of the European Union's competition commissioner, who has begun investigating whether the whole subsidy and exemption scheme violates European law. Henning Gloystein and Vera Eckert, "Analysis: German households pay for lower industrial power prices," *Reuters*, May 21, 2013; Bjørn Lomborg, "Germany's energy policy is expensive, harmful and short-sighted," *Financial Times*, Mar. 16, 2014.
4. "Ex-Chancellor Schröder defends Putin in Helsinki," *Helsingin Sanomat*, May 8, 2007, <http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Ex-Chancellor+Schr%C3%B6der+defends+Put...> [4] J. Himmelreich, "Wieder nüchtern warden," *Tagesspiegel*, Jan. 15, 2006.
5. After Schröder left office, he became chairman of Nord Stream's shareholders' committee. Later he joined the board of directors for TNK-BP, a joint venture between Russian and European energy companies. During the Ukrainian crisis, he argued that Russia's actions in Crimea were no different from NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Schröder has continued his friendship with Putin, even spending his seventieth birthday with him. Andrea Thomas, "German Ex-Chancellor Schröder Celebrates Birthday With Russia's Putin," *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 29, 2014; Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid, "The Roots of Germany's Russia Policy," *Survival* 51:2 (April-May 2009), pp. 105-122; "Germany's Russia policy," *Economist*, Mar. 22, 2014; Gerhard Schröder, "Change through Integration," *Spiegel Online*, May 22, 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/former-german-chancellor-advoc...> [5].
6. Matthew Karnitschnig, "Corporate Germany Opposes Sanctions," *Wall Street Journal*, May 2, 2014, pp. A1, A6; Matthew Karnitschnig, "Germany's Angela Merkel Treads Softly With Russia's Putin On Ukraine," *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 7, 2014; Alison Smale, "Ukraine Crisis Limits Merkel's Rapport With Putin," *New York Times*, Mar. 12, 2014.
7. Nord Stream consists of two pipelines, with a total annual capacity of 55 cubic meters. Pipeline continuation problems limited Nord Stream's flow to half its capacity until 2014. "Russia, EU Agree to Let German Pipeline Run at Full Capacity," *RIA Novosti*, Jan. 29, 2014, <http://en.ria.ru/world/20140129/186999579/Russia-EU-Agree-to-Let-German-...> [6].
8. Michael J. Sodaro, "Soviet Foreign Policy and the Two German States," *National Council for Soviet and East European Research Working Paper*, Oct. 1988, pp. 58-66.
9. Alan Cullison, "Russia Tightens Its Grip in Belarus," *Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 26, 2011.

10. Selina Williams and Vanessa Mock, “Gazprom Pushes Ahead With New Pipeline, Despite Ukraine Standoff,” *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 8, 2014; “Power out(r)age,” *Economist*, Feb. 10, 2014; Vladimir Socor, “Russian Energy Projects and Hungarian Politics,” *Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Feb. 10, 2014; Art Patnaude and Jan Hromadko, “European Pipeline Loses Bid to Ship Gas,” *Wall Street Journal*, Jun. 26, 2013.
11. Steve Szabo, “Germany Faces Tough Choices on Russia,” GMF Blog, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Dec. 11, 2013, <http://blog.gmfus.org/2013/12/11/germany-faces-tough-choices-on-russia> [7].
12. Stefan Wagstyl, “German coal use at highest level since 1990,” *Financial Times*, Jan. 7, 2014.
13. “Tilting at windmills,” *Economist*, Jun. 15, 2013.
14. Vera Eckert, “Unleash German shale to halt gas output decline, industry pleads,” Reuters, Feb. 6, 2014; William Boston, “Germany Debates Fracking as Energy Costs Rise,” *Wall Street Journal*, Mar. 1, 2013.
15. Chris Nelder, “Turn Up the Juice: New Flywheel Raises Hopes for Energy Storage Breakthrough,”
16. *Scientific American*, Apr. 10, 2013, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-flywheel-design> [8].

The Legacy of the Scottish Referendum

By Jeremy Black

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This article was originally published in E-Notes following the Scottish independence referendum, in which roughly 55% voted no to leaving the UK.

The Scottish referendum on 18 September 2014 was of crucial significance for Scotland, the United Kingdom, and, indeed, the world. The last comes first because, however lesser a power than in the past, the UK is still a major strategic force, not least as an important military power and a state willing and able to use that power. Indeed, the most striking aspect of the referendum was the undisguised wish on the part of anti-Western states for the breakup of the UK. Putin's Russia saw an opportunity for a major weakening of NATO—both in military terms and with reference to broader political cohesion. The naval and air bases in Scotland are of importance not just to the UK but also to NATO, notably the USA. They provide a crucial opportunity for the forward deployment of power into and beyond the North-East Atlantic, a deployment aimed against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and directed against Russia thereafter. Moreover, this military capability provides a crucial backup for NATO's northern flank, specifically Norway. It would also have been difficult to see Britain continuing as a nuclear power had the submarine base on Holy Loch been dismantled as the Scottish National Party (SNP) intended.

The impact of NATO coherence would have been highly significant, and not least at a time of concern about how best to respond to Russian expansionism and aggression. An SNP victory would have been regarded, both in Russia and in NATO, as a success for neutralism or, at the very least, a vote against any meaningful resistance to Russia. Such a vote would have encouraged neutralism elsewhere, a neutralism that would have weakened NATO and, thus, helped lead America towards neutralism.

There is also a wish on the part of China for the collapse of the UK. Following on from China's interest in Iceland has come a sense of opportunity in an independent Scotland. This was linked to the greater geopolitical significance of the Arctic, and, therefore, the approaches to the Arctic, as the ice melted. Partly due to this Chinese interest, there was great concern on the part of other powers wary of China. Indeed, I followed part of the last stage of the campaign in Japan, where government, strategic and military commentators were all greatly concerned about the breakup of the UK and its impact across the world.

At the level of the European Union (EU), the campaign underlined the risk of the disintegration of other nation states, notably Spain and Italy. The prospect for Catalan

independence has receded, as, even more, has separatism within Scotland. With this, the idea of the EU as a state of the regions has become less plausible, although that will not prevent support for that concept at the level of the EU.

The size of the Yes vote was in part a product of disillusionment with existing nation states. Such a product was not simply a matter of (relative) economic failure, recession and austerity, although all played a role. There was also the failure of the existing system, a failure that spoke to broader currents. Existing national narratives of achievement, however flawed and partial, could not capture the experience and commitment of many who were scarcely political radicals.

In the case of Scotland, there was also a reconceptualization of nationalism. From the perspective of the SNP, Scotland had been regionalized from the 1940s as Great Britain and the United Kingdom ceased to be imperial and multinational and, instead, became an English-dominated Little Britain. In the event, the referendum indicated that this reconceptualization was limited. While 1.6 million voted for independence, the Yes campaign failed to pass 45 percent of the voting figure. The high turnout—84 percent and up to 91 percent in some areas—was unprecedented, since 1951, for a UK election at this scale. This result and turnout suggested a clear verdict, and one that is unlikely to be reviewed again for a generation.

At the same time, the campaign said a lot that was disappointing about the state of Scottish and UK politics. The SNP response to failure, as seen not least in the concession speech the morning after the vote by Alex Salmond, the Scottish First Minister, was a “we wuz robbed” approach. Salmond’s campaign argument that the election was one of hope versus fear was repeatedly reiterated. Salmond argued that the Yes campaign was a “mass movement of people,” one thwarted by a scare and fear of enormous proportions. The latter reflected the classic response by populist politicians when confronted by an unwilling electorate: the idea of false consciousness. In the case of the SNP, this was blamed not on the electors but on the “Westminster establishment,” the “bankers’, big business’, and the usual list of culprits.”

This was an approach that failed to give enough credit to the Scottish electorate which had a great opportunity for listening to arguments during a long debate. The mechanics of the election reflected this. The ‘Yes’ campaign enjoyed a significant August surge, one that led to much speculation about the independence cause breaking through. In the event, this speculation almost certainly continually underestimated the persistent strength of the ‘No’ side. “The silent have spoken” declared Alistair Darling, the “Better Together” leader, the morning after the vote. Darling presented the vote as one for “unity over division” and “positive change over needless separation,” one that reaffirmed “our place within the Union.” All of these points were well-founded, but there was also a tendency to underplay the political risks involved in the entire episode. Had the ‘Yes’ campaign won, then many commentators

would have seen the result as a product of poor decisions by both Blair and Cameron. In the first case, the establishment of a Scottish Parliament in 1999 was a key product of Blair's determination to "repackage" national identity with sound bites such as "New Britain" and "A Young Country." Longstanding constitutional, political, and governmental practices were altered. The Scottish Parliament gained tax-varying powers and a capacity for a substantial legislative programme on domestic affairs. Considerable differences between Scotland and England swiftly opened up, notably as a result of the different cost structures put in place under legislation, notably the 2001 Graduate Endowment and Student Support Act and the 2001 Regulation of Care Act. In large part, there was a matter of political calculation by Blair, with the determination to use a Scottish Parliament in order to prevent an independence that would have denied Labour in Westminster the support of Scottish MPs. It was typical of Blair that self- and partisan-interest were sold with rhetoric.

That set up a problematic situation that Cameron sought to thwart by lancing the drive for independence by holding a referendum, which was the policy of the SNP government elected in Edinburgh in 2011. At the time, this seemed an adroit move to Unionists, but the risks were seriously underplayed. This was the case not only with Scotland, but also with the process of constitutional change that the vote has set in play. The promise, by Cameron and other national party leaders, that a vote for staying together would lead to the devolution of more power to Scotland, a possibly unnecessary promise, left the constitution unclear and threw the "English Question" into particular prominence, namely the issue of how far England, and indeed Wales and Northern Ireland, should have rights comparable to those of Scotland. This issue creates problems of further instability; at the same time that the possibility of constitutional renewal also opens up new opportunities. Cameron called for "a balanced settlement."

The roles of Blair and Cameron are also instructive. They indicate the significance of individuals and particular conjunctures and contingencies. The latter extended to particular results, with 'Yes' majorities in a few important cities and areas, notably the largest city, Glasgow, as well as Dundee, with 'No' majorities in many more, notably Edinburgh, Aberdeen and key areas such as Fife. As a result, Cameron was able to declare that 'our country of four nations' had been kept together.

The role of individuals underlines the extent to which counterfactuals are also significant. That is not the approach taken by many historians. They tend to prefer great causes, causes they generally champion, but it is necessary to understand the role of specificities and particularities. For example, the asymmetrical nature of the "four nations" is crucial, with England having eighty-six per cent of the UK population. Thus, a separate English Parliament, of "English votes for English laws" as Cameron declared on 19 September, would be disproportionately significant in the UK. It might well be the case that a Labour-dominated

UK government found itself opposed by a Conservative-dominated English Parliament. This scarcely offers an easy outcome. Cameron faces much anger from Conservative backbench MPs, and this is focusing on more rights for England. Pressure from the populism of UKIP is particularly significant. UKIP has been able to take up the case of England. This raises serious problems for the UK.

Thus, the idea that the referendum vote in Scotland has solved UK political problems, notably its asymmetric Union, is misfounded. There is much uncertainty ahead, even though it is less to the fore than it was when voting started on 18 September.

Vladimir Putin: An Aspirant Metternich?

By Mitchell Orenstein

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As Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his military into Ukraine in 2014, people were quick to compare him to Adolph Hitler, whose annexation of Austria and invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland set off World War II. Hillary Clinton commented in March 2014 that if Putin's justification for taking Crimea to protect ethnic Russians sounded familiar, it was because, "it's what Hitler did back in the '30s. . . . Germans by ancestry were in places like Czechoslovakia and Romania and other places, [and] Hitler kept saying they're not being treated right. I must go and protect my people." Since that time Ukrainian Euromaidan supporters have published dramatic images of Putin as "Putler," mashups that have trended wildly on social media and become a staple of public protests.

Yet, Putin's approach to world affairs is more similar to that of another Austrian, Prince Klemens von Metternich. Like Metternich, the dominant force in post-Napoleonic era diplomacy, Putin is a conservative imperialist who seeks to create a balance or "concert" between the great powers in Europe, while suppressing liberal democratic politics and the aspirations of small nations. By comparing Putin's worldview with that of Metternich, one can gain more insight into Putin's approach to world affairs than can be understood from much contemporary debate. Putin has indeed returned to 19th century diplomacy in 21st century Europe, so it makes sense to brush up on the major figures of that time and how their strategies played out. No one was more influential in shaping European diplomacy in the 19th century than the great man of Austria, Prince Klemens von Metternich.

Putin's career, like Metternich's, was defined by the trauma of democratic revolution. Metternich, the scion of a noble diplomatic family, had just begun university in Strasbourg, France when the French revolution broke out in 1789. In 1790, he was unable to return to university and forced to transfer. Metternich sympathized greatly with the sufferings of the nobility in France. Like the great British conservative Edmund Burke, Metternich saw the revolution as a calamity. He sought throughout his career to restore the grandeur of monarchical Europe over the challenges posed to it by radical democracy, liberal nationalism, and constitutional government.

Similarly, Putin's worldview was shaped by his early career as KGB officer in Dresden, East Germany, where he experienced the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disruption caused by democratic revolutions in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. While Putin rose to power in the Yeltsin years, he came to believe in the restoration of the former empire and to oppose the disruption caused by democracy. Putin has called the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in history and he regards democracy in Russia as an existential threat. He supports conservative authoritarian governments of the smaller states, including Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and refuses to abide by the rule of law. He seeks to restore the grandeur of Russia.

In Metternich's time, the democratic turmoil of the French revolution, with its attacks on the church and nobility, were followed by the Napoleonic invasions, which sought to expand French domination of Europe under the guise of spreading democracy. As Austrian ambassador to France, Metternich tried to persuade Napoleon to leave off invading Austria, and when unsuccessful, helped to organize the triple and then quadruple alliance that ultimately stopped Napoleon and forced him into exile. One of Metternich's key allies was Tsar Alexander I of Russia, along with Prussia and the United Kingdom.

Putin tends to see the expansion of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as Napoleonic in their ambitions. Democracy is not peaceful, in this view, but wildly messianic and territorially expansionist. This time, it is not the multi-national armies of Napoleon threatening to cross the Berezin River, but the multi-national European Union and NATO—backed by the US—that promise to convert Russia and its allies to democracy at the barrel of a gun. This explains why Russia's defense strategy emphasizes threats emanating from the West.

Metternich's greatest achievement, after helping to defeat Napoleon, was to create and manage a balance of power system in Europe for more than 30 years. In 1806, he was appointed Austrian Foreign Minister (he formally assumed the office only in 1809) and in 1821 Chancellor. He dominated Austrian statecraft for a generation. He organized the Congress of Vienna that established a post-Napoleonic order in Europe that lasted from 1815 to 1848. The Congress of Europe, as it became known, rested on a series of accords between the monarchical rulers of Europe's great empires and states, mainly Russia, Prussia, Austria, the United Kingdom, and France.

Managing Europe's complex affairs through frequent meetings, the Congress managed to ensure relative peace by restraining the empires' territorial ambitions and combining to tamp down democratic and national aspirations, such as the rise of Greek nationalism, agitation for an independent Poland, or Italian self-rule. Some have lauded the Congress of Europe for protecting the peace in Europe for more than 30 years. Others have criticized it for stifling

growing demands for democracy and national autonomy that erupted across Europe throughout this period, culminating in the liberal revolutions of 1848, when Metternich, the architect of the Congress system, was forced to resign.

Vladimir Putin is only an aspirant Metternich, in this sense. While he shares Metternich's view of the need for a balance of power system in Europe, and in November unveiled a monument to Alexander I, the Russian Tsar who worked with Metternich to form the Congress of Europe, Putin has been unable to impose a similar system himself. Although, it must be said that this has not stopped him from trying. It was notable that throughout the Ukraine crisis, Putin disparaged the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people and opposed direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. He sought instead to resolve the conflict through great power talks with Germany, France, the UK, and the US. This, he believes, is how peace can and should be achieved. The rest of Europe, which respects national self-determination, finds Putin's thinking archaic. Yet, since 2008, Russia has explicitly advocated for a "new security architecture" in Europe based on a version of Metternich's balance of power system.

Russian proposals for a balance of power security architecture in Europe arose suddenly in 2008. In June 2008, then President Dmitry Medvedev made a set of proposals for a new European security architecture that surprised and confused the West. Medvedev advocated doing away with NATO (and all other security alliances) and replacing them with a principled legal agreement to resolve all conflicts peacefully while respecting each country's security interests. These proposals were met with confusion in the West, which failed to understand how such an arrangement would actually work, viewed the lack of an institutional structure as bewildering, and opposed the "spheres of influence" thinking that seemed to lay behind it. Medvedev's proposals were rejected out of hand. They never got a serious hearing. However, they have resurfaced periodically as a concept in Russian track two diplomacy, most recently in *Foreign Affairs* where two independent Russian security experts mooted many of the same ideas in an article on what it would take to resolve the Ukraine crisis peacefully. The authors proposed a "grand bargain" in which NATO would be dissolved, replaced by a grand alliance with Russia and other Northern hemisphere powers.

Putin wants a new balance of power system in Europe for two reasons: first because he feels Russia is fundamentally excluded from the current security architecture of Europe, built on NATO and the EU, and second, because he believes Russia could play a major role in a new system, just as Metternich used the Congress of Europe to enhance Austria's power.

Putin rightly feels that Russia is excluded from the current European security system based on NATO and the EU. His hatred of NATO is well-known. He believes that NATO is an anti-Russian organization that has outlived its purpose. His hostility to the European Union is less

well understood. For most in the West, the European Union is seen as the other lynchpin of peace and security in Europe. The EU has become the dominant political organization in Europe by forcing its members to resolve conflicts peacefully among themselves, to govern themselves democratically, and to respect the opinions of all member states, large or small.

Yet, while most European leaders have come to see the EU as indispensable, from Putin's point of view, the European Union is deeply flawed because it excludes Russia. Russia, under Putin, can never become as democratic as necessary to become a full member of the European Union—or of NATO. It will always, therefore, have second-class status. Russia's perspective will never be fully respected on a continent governed by the EU. Therefore, the EU must go.

This explains why Putin seeks to undermine European unity at every turn and seeks to use Russia's relations with middle and weaker powers such as Italy, Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey against European Union policy. It explains why Putin supports anti-democratic and anti-EU politicians such as Hungary's Victor Orban in Hungary or France's Marine LePen, as well as funding a wide variety of anti-EU far-right parties. He wishes to weaken the EU, make it unable to fulfill its mission of peace and democracy, and ultimately replace it with a balance of power system.

Putin aspires to reshape Europe, as Metternich did after the Napoleonic wars, into a balance of power system in which Russia is not only included, but a central player that helps to construct the rules of the game. When Putin proposes a "new security architecture," he is actually recommending himself as the Metternich of a new Europe. His ideal is a Congress Europe in which great powers meet to resolve security issues on the continent while respecting and containing one another's spheres of influence. Putin is happiest when dealing directly with those whom he regards as the real leaders of Europe, the heads of the other great powers on the continent, Europe's big three. If we look at Putin as an aspirant Metternich, a lot of his seemingly hard to understand foreign policy behavior comes into clear view.

Putin's audacity has proven difficult for Western leaders to understand, but here it also makes sense to point to a few similarities between Putin's character and that of Metternich. Putin, like Metternich, considers himself a genius of international affairs and tends to regard most other leaders with contempt. They simply do not meet his standards of greatness. Putin's arrogance has been expressed, most recently, by his showing up late to important international meetings, such as his recent meeting in Milan with Angela Merkel or his early departure from the G20 summit in Brisbane. Famously conceited, Metternich once stated, "I cannot help telling myself twenty times a day, 'O Lord! How right I am and how wrong they are.'" One can imagine President Putin having similar sentiments. His body language in conversations with US President Barack Obama indicate a person who cannot bear that he is less powerful than a man he regards as possessing much lower abilities.

While the idea of a new balance of power Europe seems bizarre to many world leaders, who cannot understand why Putin supports 19th statecraft for a 21st century Europe, he does have some European politicians on his side. Marine LePen's Front Nationale, for instance, has long proposed replacing the Euro-Atlantic security system in Europe with a continental alliance between France, Germany, and Russia. This may be why she has been singled out as the European leader Putin most seeks to cultivate. He has treated Marine LePen's visits to Moscow with the pomp and circumstance of a state visit. And a Russian bank has agreed to finance LePen's Presidential election campaign to a tune of 40 million Euros. While many apologists have suggested that the bank was acting independently, no Russian bank gets involved in high politics without the support of the Kremlin. Indeed, the intermediary who helped set up the loan is a parliamentarian from Putin's party. Opinion polls show LePen is likely to enter the second round of voting in a run-off with one other candidate for President of France.

Marine LePen's idea of a grand alliance between Russia, France, and Germany is akin to the idea propounded by other European far-right groups of a "Europe of nations" to replace the detested European Union. The far right hates the liberal Brussels bureaucracy, which it portrays as elitist and distant from the average national voter. They recommend replacing Brussels with a much looser alliance of nation states guided by their own national priorities. The basic idea is similar to Metternich's Congress of Europe. The previous German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder also showed signs of agreeing to a balance of power Europe in which Germany would play a large role through a coalition with Russia. His dealings with Russia's Gazprom gave the impression that Germany could be bought off and drawn into a special relationship with Russia, ignoring its smaller neighbors. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has also fed Putin's belief that a balance of power Europe led by great leaders was within his reach.

There are a number of problems, however, with this vision of a "Europe of nations." In contrast with the European Union, it is far less institutionalized and therefore far more prone to failure. No mechanisms are prescribed for formal working out of policy issues, beyond discussions between great leaders. What if leaders are less than great? What if they differ from one another? Conflict can result, as it did during Metternich's time. Second, and perhaps more fundamental, every country's nationalism in Europe is another country's potential repression. This basic principle can be seen most vividly in Ukraine, where it is fine to talk of a "Europe of nations," but when it comes down to it, one must decide between Ukraine's national aspirations and Russia's. European countries are forced to take sides and the outcome looks a lot like the start of World War I. The idea of a "Europe of nations" is fundamentally unstable. At worst, it marks a direct path to war. At best, it enables the larger, more militarized nations to dominate the small. That is hardly the Europe that most Western leaders want.

Certainly not German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the now acknowledged leader of the European Union, who has cast her and Germany's lot with the EU. Germany under Merkel has not fallen for Putin's attempts to detach it from Europe and encourage it to behave as a great power, dividing and conquering the smaller countries in between. Merkel, like most other European leaders, feel deeply that Europe has already found the right model for dealing with common crises on the continent of Europe. It is called the European Union. And, despite the EU's slow response to the global financial crisis, there are plenty of reasons to think that the EU managed to resolve this crisis, like others, with a high degree of success. Europe has reached its nadir and is on the upswing, while Russia with its dependence on the historically high oil prices of the past post-Iraq decade, is on the way down.

Putin faces fundamental problems in his attempt to create a 19th century balance of power in a 21st century Europe. A study of Metternich's fall from grace shows why.

Ultimately, Metternich's lifelong crusade against democratic liberalism and national self-determination in Europe came to naught. He was deposed during the 1848 revolutions in Europe that celebrated the national and constitutional aspirations of numerous states in Europe, such as Hungary, Poland, and a unified Germany—aspirations that had been suppressed under the Europe of empires. Some historians have questioned whether Metternich might have done more to accommodate these national and liberal aspirations within the Austrian empire and thereby prevent the debacle of the First World War. Yet, Metternich remained throughout his life a vigorous proponent of a conservative, imperial Europe dominated by a few great states: Austria, Prussia, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France. He saw the times changing, but was unable to change with the times.

President Putin may prove to be equally anachronistic. The political and economic system he has built in Russia cannot provide an adequate basis for the future of Europe. Russia's extraordinary oil wealth during the 2000s, a product of the Iraq war and other unusual circumstances, have masked the effects of his corrupt and kleptocratic system of rule. It is hard to see Putin's rise as a sign of anything but an unintended consequence of the failed pursuit of the war on terror and a global financial crisis that temporarily weakened the West.

The forces of democratic liberalism, national self-determination, and international cooperation remain strong. Neither Putin nor any other world leader has been able to propose an international system that would work better than the liberal internationalism of the West. Metternich's glorious Congress of Europe is nothing but an anachronism. It was a second-best solution at the time, a way of preventing war in a chaotic Europe at the expense of liberty. It has been surpassed by a European Union that provides peace, liberty, and common prosperity and that few leaders or most people will willingly abandon. Russia cannot be a core member, but its best hope is to undertake the difficult work of economic modernization

and the steps towards political liberty that will enable Russia to integrate with the most successful European state system the continent has ever known. Just as France had to give up its Napoleonic territorial ambitions to join the Congress of Europe, Russia will have to give up its grander ambitions to join the European club.

A Tale of Two Exceptionalisms: The Future of the UK and its EU Membership after the Election

By Andrew Glencross

May 2015

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David Cameron's unexpected triumph in the 2015 UK General Election means that Britons will be asked to vote on whether to remain in the EU. On the surface, this referendum appears to be just another manifestation of Britain's prolonged equivocations over European integration. First there was the decision in the 1950s to remain aloof, only joining the then European Economic Community in 1973, a decision shortly followed by renegotiation as well as a referendum on membership in 1975. Subsequently, there have been periodic tumults over obtaining concessions, including a budget rebate and opt-outs from both the single currency and the borderless Schengen area. Look more closely at the source of the current dispute, however, and a different picture emerges. Demands for renegotiating British membership prior to voting on the issue, combined with expectations of a "generous exit" if such wrangling fails, all imply that Britain is big enough to do better by going it alone. In this sense, the struggle against the EU is not about indecision it is about loathing constraints on self-government, a narrative directly echoed in the demand for Scottish independence—an issue that is now intertwined with the EU question.

The Relevance of the 1975 Referendum

The 1975 precedent of asking the people to vote on Britain's relationship with Europe is useful to illustrate the continuity in this sentiment of a frustrated desire for managing one's own affairs. At the time though, European partners largely misunderstood the source of British dissatisfaction. A French satirical magazine ridiculed the British position, presenting the then-Prime Minister Harold Wilson as an inept lover who left his mistress, Europe, uncertain of whether he was coming or going. More seriously, negotiators such as Gaston Thorn, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, worried that a future British government would simply change its mind once again and ask the people to vote anew. What such readings of the situation overlooked was the importance of the sovereignty question and its instrumentalization in British euroskepticism.

Peter Shore, who at the time was Secretary of State for Trade, articulated this kind of complaint most pellucidly when in 1974 he told a crowd in New Zealand that he hoped Britain "can face the future without any necessity of joining a particular trade bloc." This is not the

hesitation of Hamlet—unsure as to how to proceed decisively—but the rage of Caliban upon seeing his own reflection. What is troubling about European integration from this perspective is the implication that post-imperial Britain is incapable of governing its own affairs. Today, buoyed by economic success in the past four decades, Conservative Party politicians imagine the EU to be a ball and chain for prosperity. London Mayor Boris Johnson (who also won a seat in the House of Commons at this election) speaks of potential withdrawal as a removal of red tape, “turbo-charged by new trading agreements with major partners such as China, Brazil, Russia, Australia and India.” This envy for unilateralism extends to couching EU reform as the process of asking for new exceptions to accommodate UK interests, including a unilateral veto for the British parliament that is anathema to consensus-based EU law-making.

Railing against the structural constraints of EU membership is thus an elite, mainstream position—unlike in other Western European countries, where it is associated purely with populist parties. Indeed, the Conservative Party’s euroskepticism is inherently connected to a portrayal of the EU that misrepresents the strictures imposed by the terms of membership. Significantly, when it comes to product market regulation, OECD figures reveal that the UK already has less red tape than the US and the least in the EU apart from the Netherlands. A similar tale applies to labor regulation, albeit with more rights for temporary workers than are present in the US and Canada. Moreover, the financial benefits of leaving the UK are equally wrapped in mythologizing as both Norway and Switzerland pay into the EU’s coffers in return for accessing the European single market. The costs involved are much lower than those for the UK as an EU member state because these non-members do not participate in the expensive Common Agricultural Policy. As acknowledged by even the most thought-through plan for UK withdrawal, savings in this area would be offset by having to funnel taxpayer money to support farmers and rural communities.

Decision-makers in other EU countries no longer misunderstand the British position as the product of indecision. This is because they acknowledge how far the UK, notably by promoting enlargement, has shaped the development of the contemporary EU. In fact, the previous coalition government itself recognized this fact, albeit in a backhanded fashion. From 2012-14, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office conducted an exhaustive review of 32 policy areas affected by European integration so as to audit the EU’s overall impact on UK interests. The failure of this Review of the Balance of Competences exercise to vindicate the concerns of euroskeptics led to the reports being buried—they were never mentioned by the Conservatives during the General Election campaign.

British Exceptionalism Meets Scottish Exceptionalism

The exceptionalist British attitude towards Europe, best expressed in the words of Winston Churchill as meaning “we are in Europe, but not of it,” naturally gives rise to a utilitarian

argument regarding integration. For instance, James Callaghan, who as Foreign Secretary oversaw the renegotiation of Britain's terms of membership in 1974-75, understood the EEC as a "business arrangement." Yet the utilitarian dimensions explains only part of the current UK government's attitude towards the EU as demonstrated—ironically enough—by the Scottish National Party's (SNP) position on the fate of the country itself.

Both the closely-fought 2014 independence referendum in Scotland and the SNP's capture of 56 out of 59 Scottish constituencies in the General election clearly reveal that British politics is home to another potent exceptionalist claim. Even pro-Union parties now back the further devolution of powers to Holyrood in order to satisfy demands for a form of autonomy unique in the UK. During the 2014 independence campaign, the unionist camp emphasized the pragmatic, cost/benefit reasons for remaining a constituent part of the UK: currency stability, a larger tax base to absorb shocks such as banking crises or global recession, and foreign policy clout. These arguments narrowly won the day (the result was 55% in favour of remaining in the British Union), but Cameron had expected a much more comfortable victory.

Unionists are confronted with the same ideological challenge facing British europhiles: a semi-mythologized longing for self-government couched in an exceptionalist identity. SNP ideologues swat aside arguments about the merits of the Westminster state by labelling them "Project Fear." Despite existing devolution—more is promised—that grants Scotland's parliament autonomy over a swathe of policy areas, the British political establishment is derided as unreformable and prejudicial to true Scottish interests. Equally important, the SNP considers the very notion of union to be an offensive claim that Scotland is too puerile to govern its own affairs. Nevertheless, the cry for independence is wrapped up with Scottish membership of the EU so as to retain the benefits of a single market and gain a seat at the table of EU diplomacy. The utilitarian benefits of the EU system, according to this logic, do not hold true for the defective British state, even though new members of the EU are obliged to adhere to the ever more tightly bound-rules governing the euro.

Hence the dynamic of the past five years is the development of two overlapping and ultimately irreconcilable constitutional demands. Since the UK's status in the EU determines Scotland's, SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon, has called for a veto on an English-majority vote to withdraw. In the absence of a veto, there is a realistic prospect of further constitutional crisis: if the UK votes to leave the EU without majority Scottish support, it will produce inevitable calls for a second referendum on Scottish independence based on the choice between membership of the UK *or* of the EU.

Battleground 2016: Home and Abroad

The double-helix of Scottish and British exceptionalism may finally unravel in 2016. This is the year for holding new elections to the Scottish Parliament, which in 2011 gave the SNP a

majority that was accepted by Westminster as the platform for holding an independence referendum. It also now seems that Cameron's idea is to hold the In/Out referendum on the EU that same year. Since polls consistently show that voters would prefer Britain to remain in a reformed EU, the onus is on the UK government to find concessions that can be packaged as particularly beneficial to Britain—the same tactic pursued prior to the 1975 referendum.

The problem in satisfying this demand is that EU leaders are loathe to open the Pandora's box of treaty change, much less to do so for the sole advantage of Britain. Angela Merkel, the maker and breaker of EU deals, has previous experience in outmanoeuvring Cameron. She side-stepped the UK's veto of the Fiscal Compact in 2012 by steering this treaty through as an intergovernmental arrangement outside the EU legal order. This reluctance to concede ground to the UK will make it very difficult for the government to spin a story about obtaining a better deal, thereby playing into the hands of Euroskeptics who claim the EU is “unreformable” and heading towards federal union. By giving the SNP the ability to campaign for independence as the only guarantee of continued EU membership such euroskepticism can only fuel divisions between mutually exclusive claims of Scottish and British exceptionalism.

As perplexing as these rival identity claims are to the casual outside observer, that is nothing as compared with the parochialism of this whole debate over the UK's future when viewed from major Western capitals. Already in 2014 President Obama counselled the UK to remain “strong, robust, and united.” Now Washington has to contend with a key NATO ally that might not just split apart but also turn its back on the economic bloc with which it is negotiating the world's biggest free trade deal, TTIP. This transatlantic drift is compounded by a continental drift within Europe itself. For while decision-makers in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris are still scrambling to save the euro-zone and contrive a cohesive front against Russia, British priorities clearly lie elsewhere.

Of course, the siren call of self-government is strong amongst the various populist parties of Europe such as France's Front National or Greece's Syriza. Yet their success is fundamentally linked to problems that those countries have in adapting to an interdependent economic order that makes a mockery of claims to retain sovereignty over key macro-economic policy levers. It is very odd then that the UK, which is far more prosperous than when it first wrestled with European integration fifty years ago, should be governed by the same anxieties. Neither the dissolution of the UK nor Brexit is inevitable, but if they do occur it will be because of misplaced belief in the nostrum of self-government.

PART VI: FUTURE PROSPECTS, PESSIMISM, AND THE STUDY OF THE WEST

Pope John Paul II and the Dynamics of History

By George Weigel

May 2000

This essay was adapted from the Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs delivered on February 22, 2000, and was later published in Watch on the West. FPRI thanks John M. Templeton, Jr., for sponsoring the lecture.

We are here this afternoon to discuss the international impact of a man who is neither a politician, a diplomat, nor an international relations theorist, but rather a pastor, an evangelist, and a witness to basic human rights. Yet it is also appropriate that we explore “the Pope’s divisions” under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, for this institution has always understood that ideas have consequences in history, for good and for ill.

Pope John Paul II has had a considerable impact on contemporary history. Yet one may well wonder whether those who think about international relations, professionally or as an avocation, have begun to come to grips intellectually with the meaning of John Paul’s international accomplishment—or what that accomplishment suggests about the contours of world politics in the 21st century.

So my plan here is to sketch, briefly, the Pope’s accomplishment as I have come to understand it as his biographer, using three examples; then I shall indicate, again briefly, some lessons from this accomplishment for the future; and finally, I shall suggest where the new intellectual terrain lies for those interested in ethics and international relations.

I.

To understand John Paul II’s concept of the dynamics of international relations, indeed, the dynamics of history itself, requires us to go back to the small Polish town of Wadowice, c. 1928. There, a young Polish boy named Karol Wojtyla learned the great lesson of modern Polish history: that it was through its culture—its language, its literature, its religion—that Poland the nation survived when Poland the state was erased for 123 years from the map of Europe. History viewed from the Vistula River basin looks different; it has a tangible spiritual dimension. Looking at history from that distinctive angle-of-vision teaches the observant that overwhelming material force can be resisted successfully through the resources of the human spirit—through culture—and that culture is the most dynamic, enduring factor in human affairs, at least over the long haul.

Karol Wojtyla, whom the world would later know as Pope John Paul II, applied this lesson of the priority of culture in history in resistance to the two great totalitarian powers that sought to subjugate Poland between 1939 and 1989.

He applied it to a variety of resistance activities against the draconian Nazi Occupation of Poland from 1939 until 1945. If the Nazi strategy to erase these Polish-Slavic *untermenschen* from the European New Order began with an attempt to decapitate Polish society by liquidating its cultural leadership, then one effective means of resistance was to keep Polish culture alive—and this Wojtyla tried to do, at the daily risk of his life, by his participation in a host of cultural resistance groups: the underground Jagiellonian University, clandestine literary, theatrical, and religious activities, a pioneering movement of civil renewal called UNIA.

As a priest and bishop in Krakow, he applied a similar "culture-first" strategy to resistance against the communist effort to rewrite Poland's history and redefine Poland's culture. Wojtyla had no direct "political" involvement between 1948 and 1978; he could have cared less about the internal politics of the Polish communist party. But his efforts to nurture an informed, intelligent Catholic laity were examples of what a later generation would call "building civil society"—and thus laying the groundwork for an active resistance movement with political traction.

Pope John Paul II has applied this strategy of culturally driven change on a global stage since his election on October 16, 1978.

John Paul's role in the collapse of European communism is now generally recognized, but it does not seem well understood. He was not, *pace* Tad Szulc, a wily diplomat skillfully negotiating a transition beyond one-party rule in Poland. He was not, *pace* Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, a co-conspirator with Ronald Reagan in a "holy alliance" to effect communism's demise. He was not, *pace* the late Jonathan Kwitny, a Gandhi in a white cassock, running a non-violent resistance movement in Poland through a clandestine messenger service from the Vatican. Rather, John Paul shaped the politics of east central Europe in the 1980s as a pastor, evangelist, and witness to basic human rights.

Primary-source evidence for this is found in the texts of the Pope's epic June 1979 pilgrimage to his homeland, nine days on which the history of the 20th century pivoted. In those forty-some sermons, addresses, lectures, and impromptu remarks, the Pope told his fellow-countrymen, in so many words: "You are not who they say you are. Let me remind you who you are." By restoring to the Polish people their authentic history and culture, John Paul created a revolution of conscience that, fourteen months later, produced the nonviolent Solidarity resistance movement, a unique hybrid of workers and intellectuals—a "forest planed by aroused consciences," as the Pope's friend, the philosopher Jozef Tischner once put

it. And by restoring to his people a form of freedom and a fearlessness that communism could not reach, John Paul II set in motion the human dynamics that eventually led, over a decade, to what we know as the Revolution of 1989.

June 1979 was not only a moment of catharsis for a people long frustrated by their inability to express the truth about themselves publicly. It was also a moment in which convictions were crystallized, to the point where the mute acquiescence that, as Vaclav Havel wrote, made continuing communist rule possible was shattered. Moreover, it was not simply that, as French historian Alain Besancon nicely put it, “people regained the private ownership of their tongues” during the Solidarity revolution. It was what those tongues said—their new willingness to defy what Havel called the communist “culture of the lie”—that made the crucial difference.

To be sure, there were other factors in creating the Revolution of 1989: the policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher; Mikhail Gorbachev; the Helsinki Final Act and its effects throughout Europe. But if we ask why communism collapsed when it did—in 1989 rather than 1999 or 2009 or 2019—and how it did, then sufficient account has to be taken of June 1979. This is a point stressed by local witnesses: when I first began to research this question in 1990, Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks, religious and secular alike, were unanimous in their testimony about the crucial impact of June 1979. That, they insisted, was when “1989” started.

(Parenthetically, it’s worth noting that the West largely missed this. Thus the *New York Times* editorial of June 5, 1979: “As much as the visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland must reinvigorate and reinspire the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, it does not threaten the political order of the nation or of Eastern Europe.” But two other Slavic readers of the signs of the times were not at all confused: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Yuri Andropov both knew that the rise of John Paul II and the deployment of his “culture- first” strategy of social change was a profound threat to the Soviet order.)

John Paul applied a similar strategy to a quite different situation when he went to Chile in 1987. Fourteen years of the Pinochet government, following the crisis of the Allende regime, had created deep divisions in Chilean society. There were raw wounds in the body politic because of human rights abuses and the recalcitrance of the Left; there was, in a phrase, no “civil society,” and that lack made a democratic transition impossible.

Therefore, John Paul, in collaboration with the Chilean bishops, decided that the public purpose of his 1987 pilgrimage to Chile would be to help reconstitute civil society through a reclamation of Chile’s Christian culture. The great theme for the visit would be that “Chile’s vocation is for understanding, not confrontation.” The papal pilgrimage would, as one of its organizers put it to me, “take back the streets,” which had been places of fear under Allende and Pinochet, and transform them, once again, into places of community. And people would

be deliberately mixed together at the venues for the papal Masses: Chileans would be compelled, under the eye of their common religious "father," to look at each other, once again, as persons rather than ideological objects. And it seems no accident that, some eighteen months after the papal visit had accelerated the process of reconstructing Chilean civil society, a national plebiscite voted to move beyond military rule and restore democracy.

Finally, the Pope deployed a similar strategy in Cuba in January 1998. He did not mention the current Cuban regime, once, in five days. Rather, he re-read Cuban history through the lens of a Christianity that had formed a distinctively Cuban people from native peoples, Spaniards, and black African slaves, and he re-read the Cuban national liberation struggle of the 19th century through the prism of its Christian inspiration. Here, as in Poland in 1979, the Pope was restoring to a people its authentic history and culture. In doing so, he was also calling for a reinsertion of Cuba into history and into the hemisphere, asking the Cuban people to stop thinking of yourselves as victims (the theme of Fidel Castro's welcoming address), and start thinking of themselves as the protagonists of their own destiny.

II.

Several lessons can be drawn from this analysis. First, the experience of John Paul II suggests that "civil society" is not simply institutional: a free press, free trade unions, free business organizations, free associations, etc. "Civil society" has an essential moral core.

Secondly, John Paul's strategy reminds us that "power" cannot be measured solely in terms of aggregates of military or economic capability. The "power of the powerless" is a real form of power.

In the third place, the Pope's impact demonstrates that non-state actors count in contemporary world politics, and sometimes in decisive ways. John Paul II did not shape the history of our times as the sovereign of the Vatican City micro-state, but as the Bishop of Rome and the universal pastor of the Catholic Church.

III.

Still, the present pontificate has left some gaps in our understanding that urgently need filling in the years just ahead. It is curious that this son of a soldier, who has expressed his respect for the military vocation on many occasions, has not developed the Church's just war doctrine. This was most evident during Gulf War, but beyond such relatively conventional conflicts, there are new issues today at the intersection of ethics and world politics—the problem of outlaw states, the morality of preemption in the face of weapons of mass destruction, the locus of "legitimate authority" in the international community—that the Pope has simply not addressed, and others must.

The same can be said for “humanitarian intervention,” which the Pope identified as a “moral duty” at the FAO in 1992. But this “duty” was not defined. On whom does it fall, and why? By what means is it to be discharged? What about the claims of sovereignty? These are large questions that demand the most careful reflection.

IV.

John Paul II has been the most politically consequential pope in centuries. But his impact did not come through the normal modalities of politics. He had no army. His success did not, in the main, come through the normal instruments of diplomacy. In terms of the history of ideas, his “culture-first” reading of history is a sharp challenge to the regnant notions that politics runs history, or economics runs history. Does the fact of the Pope’s success suggest that we are moving into a period in which nation-states are of less consequence in “world affairs”? Or were the accomplishments I’ve outlined here idiosyncratic, the result of a singular personality meeting a unique set of circumstances with singular prescience and effect? There is much to chew on here, for students of international affairs, in the years immediately ahead. But that we have been living, in this pontificate, through the days of a giant seems clear enough.

You Can't Argue with Geography

By Walter McDougall

September 2000

This essay, published in FootNotes, is excerpted from a larger paper commissioned by the Thomas B. Fordham Foundation as part of the History-Geography Project for publication in the Middle States Yearbook 2001.

I suppose I am an old-fashioned teacher. My subject—diplomatic history and international relations—could not be further removed from the avant-garde of post-modern cultural studies. My methodology is traditional, centering on the critical interpretation of documentary evidence and the logic of cause and effect in the belief that facts exist and falsehood, if not perfect truth, is discoverable. My lectures and books are in narrative form, because in political history sequence is critical to understanding why decision-makers acted or reacted as they did. And my assignments require students to demonstrate knowledge of at least the most important names, dates, and events because concepts and theories are empty unless one knows what factual evidence inspired them and what phenomena they are advanced to explain.

Old-fashioned, demanding, some would say boring—and yet, my courses in diplomatic history draw hundreds of students. Evidently, the collegiate consumers of history, not to mention the book-buying public, find more value and enjoyment in rigorous studies of the origins of wars and peace than in speculative studies of, for instance, the “gendering” of gravestones in 17th century France. The downside of having large classes, however, is that the only students I get to know personally are those who come to my office hours and voluntary discussion sections. So it was that I was taken aback when one anonymous face from my 19th century European diplomacy lectures visited my office accompanied by a big and decidedly businesslike black labrador dog. I was about to make a joke, or a protest, when I looked up and realized the young man was blind.

He felt for a chair and asked for my help: he had received a B+ on the midterm, but was used to getting straight A's. His problem, he said, was with maps. He could understand the ideological or commercial motivations for the foreign policies of liberal Britain, Napoleonic France, the multi-national Hapsburg Empire, or reactionary tsarist Russia. But he had trouble visualizing the strategic, balance-of-power relationships among the various states. Suddenly I felt both wholly inadequate and ashamed of feeling inadequate given the courage he boldly displayed. If a student unable to read by himself could aspire to study history, it was incumbent upon me to assist him. So I pulled out a map of Europe, took the boy's finger in my hand, and traced for him the coastlines of the continent and the location and boundaries of the various states. I showed him where the mountains and rivers were located, and tried to convey

their strategic significance. I described how large the countries were—hoping that he had some notion of distance—and told him how swiftly (or slowly) pre-industrial sailing ships and armies could move so that he might imagine how railroads and steamships exploded the old equation between space and time. Never letting go of his finger lest he become disoriented, I repeated the lessons until he stopped me. His memory was extraordinary, and he soon displayed a better feel for the geopolitics of Europe than many, perhaps most, of my students blessed with sight. He would return periodically, however, for more information, such as the locations of the provinces of Italy and Germany that united into national states between 1859 and 1871, and I recall having an especially difficult time when the European colonialism of the 1880s ushered in the era of world politics. But he finished with an A in the course.

The blind student had to learn his geography in order to understand history. My own love affair with history began with a fascination for geography. As a youngster in the 1950s I enjoyed sports and games, but was transfixed by atlases, globes, stories of the explorers, my parents' *National Geographic* magazines, and travel and nature programs on television. I traced my own maps and prided myself on knowing all the countries and capital cities, highest mountains and longest rivers. By high school this thirst for information about the world turned into a thirst for history, including the origins of civilizations, the rise and fall of empires, the “lost worlds” of South America or Africa, the flora, fauna, and human cultures that characterized different climatic zones, the patterns of politics and military strategy. If someone had asked me then to distinguish between geography and history as distinct academic fields I could not have done it. And I cannot do it today, anymore than a blind person can explain European diplomacy without a mental image of the map. But I was not the whiz at geography I imagined, as I found out in graduate school at the University of Chicago. The professor asked our seminar on Central Europe why after 1918 the new nation of Czechoslovakia was uncomfortably dependent on Germany. Disgusted by the silence that ensued he gave us a clue: “Where does the only major river of landlocked Czechoslovakia reach the sea?” After a few flustered movements I replied, “But, the Vistula runs through Poland.”

The professor fixed a cold stare on me and hissed, “Look at a map!” The answer, of course, was the Elbe River, which runs from the Czech heartland to the great German port of Hamburg.

Why Geography Matters

I learned then that one can never know enough geography—or, to put it another way, one must learn more geography whenever one endeavors to learn more history. That is why it is so disheartening that most Americans emerge from their schooling as functional illiterates in geography despite the fact that 90 percent of U.S. adults consider some geographical

knowledge a prerequisite to being a well-rounded person. The poll, conducted on behalf of the National Geographic Society, showed that only one-third of Americans could name a single country in NATO and that half could not name any members of the rival Warsaw Pact. The average adult could identify only four European countries from their outlines on a map, and less than six of the fifty United States. One in four could not find the Pacific Ocean. What is more, the group that performed the worst in the survey were those aged between 18 and 24, a finding that would not surprise those of us who teach history in universities. For it appears that many American students were not even given a chance to learn much geography in their elementary and high school years. Why is that? Is it because educators have just been unaware of the importance of geography to many branches of knowledge, not least history? Is it because they once knew, but have forgotten? Is it because geography seems to involve rote learning of “boring” facts rather than development of the “thinking” faculties? Is it because the influential political-correctness and multiculturalist movements are suspicious of a subject that emphasizes distinctions among regions, invites unflattering comparisons and hierarchy among nations and cultures, and has been used in the past as an intellectual tool of empire? Is it because geography just seems passé in an era when communications technology, commerce, and ideas “transcend boundaries” and make the earth a “global village”? Or is it because geographers themselves have failed to define and promote their subject?

Whatever the answer (it is probably “all of the above”), the Rediscovering Geography Committee, appointed by the Board on Earth Sciences and Resources of the National Research Council in 1997, lamented not only the “astonishing degree of ignorance in the United States about the rest of the world,” but that most people think of geography as a matter of memorizing place names. The committee rebutted, “A central tenet of geography is that location matters for understanding a wide variety of processes and phenomena. Indeed, geography’s focus on location provides a cross-cutting way of looking at processes and phenomena that other disciplines tend to treat in isolation. Geographers focus on ‘real-world’ relationships and dependencies....”

That would seem to be such a commonsense proposition that no one would challenge it. It is, in fact, the first fundamental reason why geography is indispensable to a sound school curriculum. We are all geographers, after all, from the moment we learn to navigate the playpen or find the bathroom and refrigerator, to the years we explore the neighborhood on our bicycles and take a family vacation, to the careers we pursue as adults. The general, admiral, or statesman is a geographer, but so too is the common soldier or sailor, the corporate executive deciding where to build a plant and which markets to target, but so too the salesperson, not to mention the farmer, fisherman, miner, oil worker, pilot, engineer, truck or taxi driver, real estate agent, manufacturer, consumer or, for that matter, golfer.

One Jimmy Sneed, a legendary caddie at the Pinehurst resort in North Carolina, was unschooled, but he knew his golf course and golfers so well that he invariably chose the right club to use for each shot ... until, after World War II, Pinehurst began to provide yardage markers on the fairways, whereupon “Sneed’s circuits blew.” Numbers meant nothing to him, and his feel for club selection deserted him. The Polynesians who crossed thousands of miles of open ocean to populate the Pacific Islands, and the Native Americans who navigated the trackless Great Plains in search of game likewise had no need of maps and instruments. But that only meant that they were natural, intuitive geographers all the more keenly alive to the sun and stars, winds and currents, landscapes and weather about them. So whether we steer our way through the world by feel and folklore or maps and instruments, geography is the context in which “we live and move and have our being” (to paraphrase the apostle Paul). You cannot argue with geography, as Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé liked to say, and geography in turn “does not argue, it simply is,” as Hans Weigert put it. Geography concerns the way things are, not the way we imagine or wish them to be, and thus it is as fundamental to a child’s maturation as arithmetic, which teaches that $2 + 2$ are 4, not 3 or 22.

Second, geography is fundamental to the process of true education in that it serves as a springboard to virtually every other subject in the sciences and humanities. Children, as a British government study observed, are like the mongoose in the Rudyard Kipling tale: “The motto of the mongoose family is ‘run and find out’ and Rikki-Tikki-Tavi was a true mongoose.” Children’s minds are much the same. They “will enjoy merely discovering what is just ‘round the corner’ or finding out from pictures, and most will need no encouragement to explore the banks of the river or visit a farm or even to investigate the well-known streets of their own town.... So, too, when faced with glimpses of Everest, the Victoria Falls, the lonely deserts of Arabia, Tibet and Antarctica, they often find food for their sense of wonder and feeling for beauty.”

What happens next, usually in secondary school, is that the student who was originally enthralled just by the sheer variety of the world and its people, begins to ask, not only “what?” and “where?” but “why?” and “how?” Why are deserts or rain forests here and not there? Why do Asians eat rice and Mexicans tortillas, instead of bread? Why did the Europeans discover routes to China instead of the Chinese discovering routes to Europe? Why did democracy emerge in Greece and not Egypt? How did the colonial powers manage to conquer the world, and how did today’s two hundred odd countries emerge? What is a “country,” for that matter, and why are some big, rich, populous, and mighty, while others are small, poor, or weak? Asking such questions inspired by geography opens up a universe of intellectual inquiry, because to answer them the student must turn to geology, oceanography, meteorology, and astronomy, anthropology, economics, comparative religion, sociology, and history. Geography is the window on the world of the mind as well as the senses, and can be dispensed with no more than reading, writing, and arithmetic. To educate, after all, means to “lead out”

(*educō*, in Latin), and no subject leads the student out of the narrow, familiar, and “taken for granted” better than geography. That is the second reason why it is indispensable in a sound curriculum.

Yet a third reason why geography is fundamental to true education is that students without geographic knowledge are helpless when confronted by adult issues, whether in school or outside of it. Geography is vital to the examination of economic competition, poverty, environmental degradation, ethnic conflict, health care, global warming, literature and culture, and, needless to say, international relations. But the universality of geography’s relevance has perversely contributed to its demise as a subject in its own right. As Malcolm Douglass observes, “The strange fact of the matter is that the role of geography in the school curriculum is at once anomalous and ubiquitous. Geography lacks a clear identity.... Nonetheless, by its very nature, geography is integral to all human inquiry. It is difficult, or even impossible, to separate what is geographic from what is not. In this sense, then, geography is everywhere in the school curriculum. The major problem, both for geographers and geographic educators, and for all curriculum planners and teachers, is to find ways to acknowledge and act on this reality.”

The ways have always existed. They need only to be rediscovered.

Three Programs to Push

Assuming a given state or school board is persuaded of the need to reintroduce geography into the K-12 curriculum, what principles should guide its planning?

First, teachers, textbook authors, and curriculum designers must restore an “old-fashioned” emphasis on basic topography, place names, and map reading. For whatever your ideological preferences, the grammar of geography is conventional and grounded in reality. The Earth, as Galileo insisted under his breath, does revolve around the sun and rotate on its axis, and that was not just his “point of view.” The motions of the Earth and heat of the sun are what create climate, vulcanism, erosion, and all the features of lands and waters. On some points we may argue, for instance whether Europe ought to have been considered a continent separate from Asia, or whether the term Middle East is a Eurocentric conceit. But the geographical and cultural distinctions that first inspired people to invent those terms were real and are also worth understanding. Likewise, the Mississippi River exists. Its name, like all names, is a social convention, but the river is real, and no student can claim to “know” American history without understanding the river’s importance.

How much factual knowledge is “enough”? One useful exercise which teachers, textbook authors, and curriculum designers might try is to recall the history surveys they took in college, or study some syllabi from current surveys, and ask themselves what geographical

knowledge is needed in order to master that material? Conversely, they might ask themselves what knowledge they would wish to assume their students possessed if they were teaching the course. Thus, in my Modern History survey I do not expect students to know anything about the political map of Central Europe during the Renaissance, but I am crippled if they do not even know that Venice is an Italian port city, that the Alps divide Italy from the rest of Europe, that Germany lies north of the Alps, that the Austrians speak German, that the Turks were Muslim and militant, that all Europeans were still Catholic, and that Rome was the historic seat of the papacy. If I must “go back to square one” to lay out such basics, then the best students will be bored and the poor will be paying Ivy League tuition for high school instruction. It is all very well to say that education should teach youngsters to think rather than memorize. But unless their “memory banks” are filled with facts and categories in which to deposit new facts, then their “RAM” will have no “data to process.”

Second, history and geography should be kept as close as possible to each other, perhaps even merged, because so much of history is best approached through geography, and so much geography is taught best through an historical approach. The former point is obvious: the human stage is the world, and the plot of the play is the activity of human beings in relation to their environment and each other. The latter point may be less obvious. What I mean can best be expressed by a comparison to courses in physics and astronomy that begin with the knowledge and theories prevalent in the ancient world and then march forward in time, teaching students their science in the same progression as Europeans (and others) learned it. Thus, one studies Galileo’s experiments to learn the laws of mechanics, Kepler, Tycho, and Newton to learn orbital mechanics and the laws of gravitation, the experiments of Faraday, Ampere, Ohm, and Marconi to learn the formulas of electricity, and so forth through atomic physics. Geography ought to be taught the same way, however much that may seem to “privilege” Europeans who explored and mapped the world with their galleons and brigs and geodetic satellites. For in learning the progress of geographic knowledge from Ptolemy to the present the students will not just be memorizing names and concepts but witnessing an adventure story without parallel. They will discover America, penetrate the interior of Australia and Africa, and race to the South Pole along with the historical figures, and the geographical knowledge they acquire will be linked to causes and effects rather than stand alone as trivia.

Third, history and geography teachers ought to convey to students how the realities of space and time have indeed changed over the millennia, centuries, and sometimes mere decades as a function of human technology, which is the nexus between the mankind and its environment. From the first irrigation systems to the Space Age the evolution of civilizations and their relationship to nature has been a function of tools. The history of technology might even be called the “third dimension” that rounds out our picture of the past. Geography, the first dimension, describes terrestrial space. History, the second, describes change over time.

Technology, the third, describes how human conceptions of space and time have evolved. But just as algebra students cannot handle solid geometry until they have mastered plane geometry, so history students are not ready to question human conventions of space and time until they know the “lay of the land” and know how to “tell time” historically.

One Dream to Realize

I have the pleasure of lunching one day a week with Harvey Sicherman, the president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and catching up on world affairs. As an experienced expert and former speechwriter for three secretaries of state, he is a ready source of inside information and insights that only later, or never, appear in the newspapers. Above all, Sicherman is a master of the geographical factors in war and diplomacy, and he amazed me several years ago by predicting exactly, and weeks before time, the internal boundaries that would define the settlement in Bosnia. “I’ve done the map,” he announced, and proceeded to trace it out on a napkin. Since then I make it a habit when we are discussing the latest crisis to ask if he’s “done the map.”

My dream is that every teacher and student of history and geography, at the end of every block of instruction, can say proudly and knowledgeably, “I’ve done the map.” Because that means they know who they are, where they are, and how to get where they want to go. That means they have had true education.

The West at the Dawn of the 21st Century:

Triumph Without Self-Belief

By Alan Charles Kors

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The willingness to contain Communism, to fight its expansion overtly and covertly, to sacrifice wealth and often lives against its heinous efforts of extension was, with the struggle against Nazism over a much briefer period, the great gift of American taxpayers and the American people to planet Earth. As England under Churchill was in 1940, the United States from 1945 to 1989 was the West, drawing from its values to stand against what was simultaneously its mutant offspring and its antithesis. In the twentieth century, the West met and survived its greatest trial.

On the whole, however, Western intellectuals do not revel in these triumphs. Where is the celebration, and, just as importantly, where is the accounting? The absence of celebration, of teaching the lessons learned, and of demands for accountability is perhaps easily understood on the Left. Convinced that the West above all has been the agent of creating artificial relationships of dominance, subservience, the commodification of human life, and ecocide, Left intellectuals have little interest in objective analysis of the manifest data about societies of voluntary exchange. Nor do they have interest in coming to terms with the slowly and newly released data about the conditions of life and death under the Bolsheviks and their heirs, or in the confirmation and disconfirmation of various theories in the outcome of the Cold War (let alone, given their contemporary concerns, in analysis of ecological or gender politics under Communist or, indeed, third-world regimes). Less obvious, but equally striking, in some ways, has been the absence of celebration on so much of the intellectual Right, because it is not at all certain something worth calling Western civilization did, in fact, survive the twentieth century.

The view that Western civilization has ended has had various incarnations, with the most sensitive souls of many epochs imagining themselves to be the last bearers of the Western torch. One needs perspective in such things: the question, in many ways, was more compelling when Athens fell; when Christian Rome was sacked by barbarians; when the Norsemen

ravaged settled Europe; when feudal warlords reigned unchecked; when, at the end of the first millennium, all signs indicated a divine disfavor that seemed to presage the end of the world; when the Black Death left soul and society without mooring. Indeed, imagine the question posed to Catholic and Protestant apologists of the sixteenth century, viewing each other's religions as the Antichrist and seeing Western Christendom rent first in two and then into a multitude of competing sects. How fragile, if not spent, the West seemed during the religious civil wars, or, indeed, during the devastation of the Thirty Years War. There were lamentations in profusion during the Terror, the decades of Revolutionary and then Napoleonic Wars, and again, with gravitas, there were the inward and outward sermons on the West uttered on the slaughterfields of World War I, or at Auschwitz, or in the Gulag.

The West is resilient beyond all seeming possibility, and something gives it that resiliency. The West has survived its barbarians without and—more dreadful yet—its own barbaric offspring within. If it could outlast Attila the Hun and the armed ideologies of the Third Reich or Stalin's Russia, it surely can outlast Jacques Derrida, Stanley Fish, and Michel Foucault. At each moment of seeming dissolution, there were diverse profound voices who analyzed compellingly the depths to which we had fallen; the almost infinite remove we were from any light; the loss of something that we never could recover, and yet the West survived. There was something about its mind, its spirit. Greece fell, but its philosophers conquered the minds of those who conquered its soil, and its natural conceptual categories still organize our understanding of reality and knowledge. Rome fell, but its language became the lingua franca, and, thus, the natural definitional universe of Christendom; its history became the great drama by which to understand the glory and the baseness of political life. The barbarian tribes believed that they had conquered Rome, but Rome, in greater part, had conquered them, and their descendants called their realm the Holy Roman Empire, and these terms were not, until much later, empty words. When the Norsemen came, learning fled to monasteries, and that learning, and, indeed, those monasteries, eventually conquered the Norse, whose Norman descendants, in Britain, founded universities that live to this day. It is the last thing that any frightened monk taking desperate shelter in the eighth century ever could have imagined.

The Thirty Years War seemed to sensitive and moral observers the end of civilization, but its battles are mostly forgotten, and what is it that remains of that seventeenth century? Bacon. Galileo. Descartes. Hobbes. Pascal. Bayle. Boyle. Fenelon. Harvey. Huyghens. Newton. Locke. Louis XIV is a tourist attraction at Versailles; his wars changed precious little. The conceptual revolution of the West, however, changed a great deal in that same seventeenth century. It arose from the very dynamics of the West's models of learning—disputation, accounting for appearances, refining inductive and deductive logic—now linked to expanded education and to printing. What happened in the minds of the graduates of Europe's Christian universities changed the human relationship to nature, to knowledge, to the rights of inquiry and conscience, and to political and economic life. The Christian West kept the traditions of Greek

mind alive, and, thus, from its own debates, it overthrew the presumptive authority of the past in matters of natural knowledge and its application. The West believed that we were not cast fatally adrift in this world, but that we could learn new things and that we could alter the sorry scheme of experience closer to the heart's desire for knowledge, order, and well-being. It was not Faust who dreamed of occult knowledge that would make him a demigod, but Bacon, who commanded that knowledge proceed from humility and charity, who became the prophet of the great scientific revolution of the West. Louis XIV is a statue; Bacon is a living force wherever the West touches minds.

It is odd that conservatives question whether Western civilization has survived the twentieth century, at the very time that so many academics on the cultural Left define that civilization as a singular hegemony that stands astride the globe. What, after all, is the “multiculturalism” so ardently but desperately proclaimed in higher education but the belief that there is a hegemonic Western civilization that, unchallenged, frames all issues and that provides almost all modes of understanding? For the so-called multiculturalists, the question is not whether what they see without complexity as Western civilization will survive into the twenty-first century, but whether anything other than Western civilization will so survive. What, after all, do they mean by the hegemony of the West? It is not physical colonialism and imperialism that concern them anymore. No, they see as far more ominous what they term the cultural colonialism and imperialism of the West, a triumphant colonialism of the mind by a civilization that believes in universal categories that transcend its own civilization. The West believes its values to be accessible to all human souls. The West believes its science to be a method by which all human beings, everywhere, can rise above ignorance, superstition, helplessness, and prejudice. The West believes that there are rights and obligations that belong to humanity qua humanity, beyond the power of governments and political wills. Conservatives despair about the disappearance of that West; the cultural Left despairs about its transcendent success.

There are profound ironies about the multiculturalists, so many of which testify precisely to the dynamism and inescapable appeal of precisely that Western civilization to whose dismemberment they are in theory committed. Theoretically, they are all moral relativists, but in fact, they sound, most of the time, like Biblical prophets, calling power to categorical moral duty; or, most commonly, like traditional Western social critics who in this case have not thought out either their facts or their logic terribly well. The postmodern canon, despite its proclaimed alienation from Western thought and values, derives not from any non-Western culture, but from the internal debates of the West and the products of its educational vitality: from Marcuse, Gramsci, Marx, Hegel, and Rousseau—from, in short, the debates that the West always has had with itself. When the issue is involuntary female circumcision, for example, post-modernists seek asylum in America for the victims of such customary rites, citing our notions of legal equality and of universal human dignity, not their alleged

commitments to the relativity of all human values and cultures. They seek tenure at universities with medieval traditions of what the West called “philosophical liberty.” In the first and in the final analysis, so-called multiculturalists are simply Western radicals, in the Western radical tradition, with the most imperial, dogmatic, and absolutist aspirations of all.

The current barbarians within also remind us that the West is, again and again, the author of its own worse follies and abuses, compared to most of which the postmodernists pale into virtual insignificance. We are the authors of our own religious wars and persecutions, our own enthusiastical superstitions, our own conquests of lands and peoples over which and whom we had no rights, our own ultimate nightmares of National or Leninist Socialism, which drowned our world in blood unimaginable in any century but the twentieth, and which truly threatened to bring this civilization to an awful end. We have had the will, however, to learn from depravity and from reality, and to bear ultimate witness to the higher sides of our being. What civilization ever has engaged in more searing analysis and soul-searching of its own sins? Having defeated the National Socialists and the Communists within, the bearers of the best of this civilization have reason for a moment of optimistic pride. What often denies us both optimism and pride, however, is the very stringency of our self-judgment untempered by historical realism. It is a dangerous intellectual error to imagine that goodness, wisdom, order, justice, peace, freedom, legal equality, mutual forbearance, and kindness are the default state of things in human affairs, and that it is malice, folly, disorder, war, coercion, legal inequality, murderous intolerance, and cruelty that stand in need of historical explanation. The West, in theory, always has understood that man has a lower side to which he is drawn, that man is a wolf to man, and that we are governed more by prejudice and passion than by the rational capacity of our minds.

If that is so, however, then we err grievously in our assumptions of what it is that requires particular explanation in the world. We understand the defaults; what should astonish us is the ability to change them. Rousseau and the postmodernists have it all backward in this domain. It is not aversion to difference, for example, that requires historical explanation, for aversion to difference is the human condition; rather, it is the West’s partial but breathtaking ability to overcome tribalism and exclusion that demands explanation. Anti-Semitism is not surprising; the opening of Christian America to Jews is what should amaze. It is not the abuse of power that requires explanation—that is the human condition—but the Western rule of law. Similarly, coerced religious conformity should not leave us groping for understanding, but the forging of religious toleration. It is not slavery that requires explanation because slavery is one of the most universal of all human institutions; it is the values and agency by which the West identified slavery as an evil and finally abolished it. Finally, it is not relative pockets of poverty in the West that should occasion our wonder, for we termed almost infinitely worse absolute levels of poverty as simply “the human condition”; rather, what is

extraordinary are the values, institutions, knowledge, risk, ethics, and liberties that created such prosperity that we even notice such poverty at all, yet alone believe it is eradicable.

We are surprised, in a failure of intellectual analysis, by all of the wrong things, and as a tragic result we lose our wonder at the accomplishments and aspirations of our civilization. Depravity never should startle us; rather, the identification and naming of depravity should amaze us, and the attempt, frequently successful, to contain it should fill us with awe. Indeed, that attempt has been so successful in the West, relative to the human condition, that the other world fantasized by the multiculturalists seeks entrance, again and again, at our doors, and the multiculturalists are not riding leaky boats to the otherness of the Third World. Most obviously, the multiculturalists' ostensible rejection of the West's philosophical realism, their vaunted "social constructionism," does not stay with them past their medical doctor's door.

In the final analysis, it is that last trait, the West's commitment to a logically ordered philosophical realism, that undergirds its ways of thinking, valuing, and, indeed, worshiping. Such philosophical realism was defended by Augustine, Aquinas, and almost all fathers and doctors of the Church. While various extreme epistemological and ontological skepticisms and various radical irrationalisms have flourished, sometimes with brilliance and profundity in our history, Western civilization always has had at its core a belief that there is a reality independent of our wishes for and ideas of it; that natural knowledge of that reality is possible, and, indeed, indispensable to human dignity, and that such knowledge must be acquired through a discipline of the will and mind; and that central to that discipline is a compact with reason. The West has willed, in theory at least, to reduce the chaos of the world to natural coherence by the powers of the mind.

Indeed, the belief that truth is independent of particular time and place is precisely what has led the West to borrow so much from other cultures, such that, ironically, whole schools of tendentious thought decry Western "thefts," as if the recognition of compelling example and argument in others were a weakness, not a strength. The West recognized and adopted Eastern systems of number superior to that of the Romans; it took the Aristotle of its high Middle Ages from the Islamic scholars who had preserved and interpreted it in manners superior to the schools of the West; it took music, art, forms of expression, and new foods from around the earth that, in large part out of restless curiosity about realities beyond its own, it had explored. The West always has renewed and revitalized itself by means of recognizing superior ways to its own. It did so, however, with a commitment to being a rational culture.

The Greek principle of self-contradiction as the touchstone of error, and thus, its avoidance as a touchstone of truth, is the formal expression of a commitment to reason that the Christian West always understood to separate us from beasts and madmen. To live with self-contradiction was not merely to fail an introduction to philosophy, it was to be less than

human. Induction from experience always had a logic, and the exploration of that logic was one of the great and ultimately triumphant pursuits of the Western mind. To live with error was to deny oneself the fruits of that human light. Again, the core philosophical assumption of Western civilization is that there is a reality that exists independently of our will and wish, and that this reality can be known by human inquiry and reason. There were many radical ruptures in the history of certain disciplines in the West; there were no radical ruptures with the Western compact with reality and reason. It is that compact that led to a civilization of self-scrutiny and honest borrowings; to a civilization in which self-criticism gave rise to a critical scholarship that could question and either strengthen or repair the West's received beliefs themselves; to a civilization in which the mind could appeal to the rational against the irrational with ultimate success; to a way of understanding that led to the sciences that have changed both the entire human relationship to nature and our sense of human possibilities, always tempered by our knowledge of human nature.

The fruits of that civilization have been an unprecedented ability to modify the remediable causes of human suffering, to give great agency to utility and charity alike; to give to each individual a degree of choice and freedom unparalleled in all of human history; to offer a means of overcoming the station in life to which one was born by the effort of one's labor, mind, and will. A failure to understand and to teach that accomplishment would be its very betrayal.

To the extent that Western civilization survives, then, the hope of the world survives to eradicate unnecessary suffering; to speak a language of human dignity, responsibility, and rights linked to a common reality; to minimize the depredations of the irrational, the unexamined, the merely prejudicial in our lives; to understand, with the possibility of both interest and charity applying that knowledge for good to the world in which we find ourselves.

The contest on which the triumph of the West depends, then, ultimately, is between the realists and the antirealists. The failure to assess the stakes of the struggle between the West and its moral Communist adversary always came from either a pathological self-hatred of one's own world or from a gross undervaluation of what the West truly represented in the history of mankind. The West has altered the human relationship to nature from one of fatalistic helplessness to one of hopeful mastery. It has made possible a human life in which biological atavism might be replaced by cultural value, the rule of law, individuation, and growing tolerance. It also created an intellectual class irrationally devoted to that adversarial stance. Its view of the West, in the past generation at least, had become a neo-Gramscian and, thus, neo-Marxist one, in which the West was seen as an unparalleled source of the arbitrary assignment of restrictive and life-stultifying roles. The enemies of the West represented a fictive make-believe that supposedly cast grave doubt upon the West's claim of enhancing freedom and dignity and opportunity.

With the triumph of the West in reality and with the celebration of Marxism and the Third World shown more and more to have been truly delusional, the adversarial intellectual class appears to be retreating increasingly into ideologies and philosophies that deny the very concept of “reality” itself. One sees this in the growing strength in the humanities and soft social sciences of critical theories that view all representations of the world as text and fiction. When the world of fact can be twisted to support this or that side of delusion (as in astrology or parapsychology), pathology tries to appropriate what it can of the empirical. When the world of fact manifestly vitiates the very foundations of pathological delusion, then it is the very claim of facticity or reality per se that must be denied. This is what we now may expect: the world having spoken, the intellectual class, the Left academic wing of it above all, may appropriate a little post-Communist chaos to show how merely relative a moral good the defeat of Stalin’s heirs has been, but it will assail the notion of reality itself. In Orwell’s 1984, it was the mark of realistic, totalitarian power to make its students say that all truth was political, “a social construction,” as intellectuals would say now, and not objective; that, in the specific case, $2+2=5$. By 2004, making students in the humanities and soft social sciences say the equivalent of $2+2=5$ will be the goal of adversarial culture. They will urge that all logical and, one should add, all inferential, inductive truths from experience are arbitrary, mere social constructions.

The ramifications of that effort will dominate the central debates of the Humanities in the generation to come. Until there is a celebration and moral accounting of the historical reality of “the triumph of the West,” that “triumph” will be ephemeral indeed. Academic culture has replaced the simplistic model that all culture was functional, a model that indeed could not account for massive discontents or revolutionary change, let alone for moral categories, by the yet more astonishing and absurd model that virtually all culture is dysfunctional. Whole disciplines now teach that propositions are to be judged by their therapeutic value rather than by their inductive link to evidence, that, in the final analysis, feeling good about saying something determines the truth-value of what is said.

Understanding human weakness, however, the West always has believed that it is precisely when we want to believe something self-gratifying that we must erect barriers of experiment, rigor, and analysis against our self-indulgence and our tendency to self-serving error. The human ability to learn from experience and nature, so slighted in current humanistic theory, is not merely an object of cultural transmission, let alone of social control, but an evolutionary triumph of the species, indeed, a triumph on which our future ultimately depends. There is nothing more desperate than helplessness, and there is no more inveterate cause of helplessness than the inability to affect and mitigate the traumas of our lives. If the role of both acquired knowledge and the transmission and emendation of the means of acquiring knowledge is a “Western” concern, then it is a Western concern upon which human fate depends.

In the current academic climate of indoctrination, tendentiousness, and fantasy, the independence of critical intellect and the willingness to learn open-mindedly from experience of a reality independent of the human will are the greatest hopes of our civilization. Has Western civilization survived? That is to ask, has a human relationship to the world based upon the assumption of a knowable reality, reason, and a transcendent value to human dignity and responsibility survived? Has a will to know oneself and the world objectively survived? Has a recognition of human depravity and the need to limit the power of men over men survived? I do not think that free men and women will abandon that hard-won shelter from chaos, ignorance, parochial tribalism, irrationalism, and, ultimately, helplessness.

Has Western civilization survived, its principle of reality justified and intact? Yes indeed, though it requires constant defense. The demand for perfection is antinomian, illogical, and empirically absurd. The triumph of the West is flawed but real. Recall how everything depends on realism in our understanding, and rejoin the intellectual struggle.

Islam and the West: A Historical Perspective

By Jeremy Black

May 2003

This essay is based on a presentation to FPRI's 2003 History Institute for Teachers on "The American Encounter with Islam," May 3-4, 2003, later published in Watch on the West.

The use of historical evidence to provide rapid support for policy advice is all too easy in a crisis. At the same time, it is valuable to offer a historical resonance to current problems. This has certainly been the case over the last two years. A flood of works has appeared on the history of terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, and relations between Islam and the West. Some of the work has been of high quality but much has been superficial. This is understandable. Commercial opportunity plays a major role. There are also serious analytical problems.

Centrality of the Conflict with the West? Not So.

One of the most important relates to the need to distinguish between long-term perceptions of Islamic power and more short-term (but still pressing) developments. In particular, there has been a tendency to exaggerate the centrality of conflict, still more relations, with the Western world in Islamic history. This is at the expense of three different tendencies, first, the need for Islam to confront other societies, secondly the importance of divisions within the Islamic world itself, and, thirdly, the variety of links between Islam and the West. The last point can be related, more generally, to modern revisionism on the multiple nature of Western imperialism, a theme I have probed in my *Europe and the World 1650-1830* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

To turn to the first point, throughout its history, Islam has interacted not only with Christendom but also with other cultural areas. Our own concerns on the relationship between Christendom and Islam appear to be underlined by the map with its depiction of an Islamic world stretching into the Balkans and the Western Mediterranean. However, if the conventional map—an equal-area cartogram—is replaced by an equal-population cartogram (see my *Maps and Politics*, Chicago University Press, 1997), then a very different perception of Islam emerges. It becomes a religion not primarily of the Arab world but of South Asia: Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Iran. In some respects there is a parallel with Christendom, which is now more prominent in the Americas and (increasingly) Africa than in Europe.

This geographical reconceptualization is linked to a focus on different challenges than those from Christianity. In particular, the clash between Islam and Hinduism proved a major aspect

of political tension in South Asia and this became more pronounced after the end of British imperial rule. Thus, Kashmir is a major faultline for many Muslims, while there is considerable concern about increasing Hindu militancy in India and the difficulties the Congress Party faces in maintaining a secular approach. In Central Asia, the challenge came as much from Chinese as from Russian expansion. Furthermore, like the Christians, for example in Amazonia, Islam competes with tribal beliefs, particularly in Indonesia. The importance of the eastern world of Islam is such that areas of conflict with the “West,” at least in the shape of Christendom, include the Philippines and Timor.

To turn back to Islamic history is to be reminded of the persistence of conflict with non-Christian peoples and, indeed, its prominence for much of Islamic history. It is, for example, all too easy to present the medieval period in terms of the Christian Crusades, a theme that has recently been pushed back into prominence, and to suggest, as some Islamic polemicists have done, that modern Western pressures sit in this tradition. However, aside from the fact that the Crusades were also directed against “heathens” (in Eastern Europe), heretical Christians (such as Albigensians, Hussites) and opponents of the Papacy, when Saddam Hussein wished to emphasize the idea of a terrible foreign threat to Baghdad he referred not to earlier Christian attacks on Islam (nor to the British who seized the city in both World Wars), but to the Mongols. When Baghdad fell in 1258, to a Mongol army under Hulegu, reputedly hundreds of thousands were slaughtered. The Mongols indeed were far more important to the history of the thirteenth-century Islamic world than conflict with Crusaders in that period. Persia and Anatolia had already been overrun by the Mongols and in 1260 Hulegu captured Damascus. Thereafter, however, the Mongols were to be stopped in the Near East by the Islamic Egyptian-based Mamluks (see my *War. An Illustrated World History*, Sutton Publishing, 2003).

What Model of War?

The sweeping initial successes of the Mongols demonstrated another point that is important to bear in mind when considering military relations between Christendom and the West, namely the danger of assuming that a Western model of warfare in the shape of Western forces, and later infantry focused on volley firepower, was dominant. In many respects, this is an anachronistic reading back of more modern conflict. South Asia provides a good example of this. The emphasis, in Western works, is on how Europeans sailed round Africa, arrived in Indian waters at the start of the sixteenth century, and then used infantry firepower to subjugate opponents (both Muslim and non-Muslim), with the British victory under Robert Clive over the Nawab of Bengal at Plassey in 1757 taking pride of place.

The arrival of, first, the Portuguese, and then other Europeans, in the Indian Ocean and linked waters, especially the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, did, indeed, greatly expand the extent of

contact between Christendom and Islam, but the extent of the challenge should not be exaggerated. The Islamic world was able to mount a robust response: the Portuguese were repelled from the Red Sea and Aden in the early sixteenth century and driven from Muscat (1650) and Mombassa (1698) by the Omani Arabs. In India itself, assaults from across Afghanistan were for long more important than European moves to military history and political developments, particularly the Mughal conquest of the Sultanate of Delhi in the 1520s, the Persian invasion in the 1730s, at the expense of the Mughal empire, and that of the Afghans in the 1750s, culminating in the victory over the (Hindu) Marathas at Panipat in 1761 (see my *War and the World. Military Power and the Fate of Continents 1450-2000*, Yale University Press, 1998).

This battle looked back to a long series of conflicts between cavalry armies that had a crucial impact on the Islamic world, for example the campaigns of Timur the Lame, which included the capture of Delhi (1398), Damascus (1401) and Baghdad (1401), and the defeat of the Ottoman Turks at Ankara (1402). This was a politics of force: Timur was brutal towards those who resisted, most vividly by erecting pyramids from the skulls of the slaughtered: possibly 70,000 when a rising at Isfahan was suppressed in 1388. Again, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the crucial fault-lines in the Islamic world divided the Ottomans from the Safavids of Persia and the latter from the Mughals of India. Their struggles were more important than those with Christendom. Thus, the Safavids were more concerned about Ottomans, Mughals, and Uzbeks (and finally succumbed in 1722 to Afghan attack), than the Portuguese, who were driven from Hormuz in 1622. Even along the traditional frontier with Christendom, there was little sign of Islamic failure until the loss of Hungary to the Austrian Habsburgs in the 1680s and 1690s. Thus, the Portuguese challenge in Morocco was crushed at Alcazarquivir in 1578, and European pressure there did not subsequently become serious again until the French advanced in 1844 from their new base in Algeria.

For the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it is possible to point to Christian advances, especially by the Russians in the Balkans and Central Asia, but it is necessary not to pre-date these. If the French conquered Algeria from 1830, the Spaniards had failed at Algiers in 1775 and 1784. If the British conquered Egypt in 1882, they had failed there in 1807 and, in the meanwhile, Egypt had been a dynamic power, expanding into Arabia (where the Wahhabis were defeated), the Near East, Sudan and the Horn of Africa: Egyptian forces took Equatoria (southern Sudan) in 1871, Darfur (western Sudan) in 1874, and Harrar (later British Somaliland), also in 1874. These dates are a reminder of the brevity of the period of Western dominance and the relatively recent period in which it began: Sudan was only conquered by the British in the late 1890s, with the crucial battle being fought at Omdurman in 1898. The continued importance of Ottoman-Persian rivalry into the nineteenth century also requires attention.

Which Mattered More: Tensions with the West or Within Islam?

Thus, the political, as much as the religious tensions within the Islamic world can be discussed as much more historically significant to Muslims themselves than the relatively recent Western ascendancy. And even this has its exceptions. If the war over the last half-century in which the most Muslims died, the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, was waged between Muslim powers, the situation has generally been also thus during Islamic history. Furthermore, there have frequently been alliances across confessional divides. Suleyman the Magnificent co-operated with the French against the Habsburgs in the 1530s. When the Portuguese were driven from Hormuz, Abbas I benefited from English co-operation. As imperialists, both the British, in India and Nigeria, and the Russians, in Central Asia, co-operated with some Muslim rulers and interests at the same time as they fought others.

This is part of a more general process by which links between Muslim and Western polities—particularly political and economic—co-existed with rivalry. There is no reason why this should cease, although the nature of Islamic societies, with rapidly-growing, youthful populations, centered on volatile urban communities, poses particular problems. Past experience suggests the need for political engagement as much as military strength. A good example of an authoritarian Islamic state that moved from political rivalry to co-operation is provided by Turkey, which refused to accept a peace settlement after World War One that included Greek rule over the Aegean coast and European troops in Constantinople. Under Kemal Ataturk, the Turks were able to impose their will after defeating the Greeks in 1922 and facing down the British the same year. This was the background to a long-term improvement in relations with the Western world, which also helped to contain continued Greek-Turkish animosity.

A robust and pro-active approach to terrorism is necessary, but destroying bin Laden will only profit us so much if other radical, anti-Western Islamic organizations arise and flourish. To understand the challenge, it is necessary to offer informed judgment of the Islamic worlds, and to avoid simplistic claims of immutable cultural clashes. The history and the reality are far more complex, and let it be said far more hopeful.

Teaching the Classics: What Americans Can Learn from Herodotus

By Paul A. Rahe

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There is one obvious reason why Americans ought to find it useful to read and study Herodotus. He described a world that is in certain crucial regards like our own. Athens and Sparta were, of course, tiny communities. Herodotus tells us that at the time of the Persian Wars there were 30,000 adult, male Athenian citizens and 8,000 adult, male Spartan citizens. The difference in scale between these polities and our own is obvious and significant. But there is this that is similar. Athens and Sparta were republics. Matters of state were open to public debate; most major decisions were reached by voting; the citizens of both polities enjoyed the rule of law—and theirs were citizen armies.

These similarities are by no means accidental. The modern nation-state owes a great deal to the ancient example. In the medieval period, antiquity never entirely lost its purchase. Cicero's *De officiis* survived through the Dark Ages within the Christian West and was at all times widely read. In some measure, Roman law survived as well, and certain of its elements were imported into canon law, the only universal law in the Christian West. From canon law these made their way into the various common law systems regnant locally within that otherwise exceedingly diverse world. One principle, derived from Roman law, deserves special attention.

Roman liberty was arguably derivative from ancient Greek liberty: the republicanism that emerged in Rome ca. 509 BCE, the species of self-government that was instituted there, was an Etruscan variation on practices developed earlier in Crete, at Sparta, and elsewhere in the Hellenic world. Naturally enough, the Romans carried over into private life the practices of public life, and, in keeping with this trend, Roman corporate law, as applied to the management of waterways, was built on the following principle: *Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari debeat*—"that which touches all should be dealt with by all." This principle, borrowed by the Roman Catholic Church to make sense of the practice of electing abbots, bishops, and popes, provided an underpinning for the practice of self-government within guilds and cities and inspired the establishment of representative institutions within kingdoms. In part as a consequence of its propagation by the church, political liberty was no stranger in

late medieval Europe, and this distinguished the Christian West from the Christian East and from the Muslim world as well.

Massed Infantry

The republicanism that first emerged in ancient Greece and spread to Etruria and Rome was built on certain military practices. Liberty was coeval with the preeminence of massed infantry. At some point between 700 and 650 BCE, someone in Greece invented a new kind of shield, which was commonly called a *hoplon*. This shield was designed to yoke together a line of men, and those who bore it were sometimes called *zeugitai*, “men yoked like oxen.” It provided limited protection to the bearer, but contributed greatly to the protection of the man to his right; and, because horses will not plunge into a wall of shields, a phalanx of *hoplon*-bearers could face down cavalry. In effect, this military revolution meant that a sizable army of smallholders, wealthy enough to provide themselves with a spear, a sword, and the *hoplon*, could easily defeat an aristocratic force on horseback. This revolution, which rendered the old military aristocracy redundant, eventuated in its overthrow and the establishment of populist tyrannies in many Greek cities. In time, as tyrants or their offspring abused the power that they had seized, it gave rise to government by the army assembly.

Infantry's Renaissance

The great revival of classical learning in the West that followed the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 coincided with a rediscovery within western Christendom of the capacity of disciplined infantry to defeat cavalry. In the second half of the fifteenth century, on two different occasions, the impoverished pikemen of the Swiss cantons defeated the mounted knights fielded by Charles the Bold of Burgundy, and from this time onward Swiss mercenaries were much in demand. The French hired them; so did the Spaniards; they were employed by the various cities and principalities of Italy; and to this day they guard the Vatican. Where they were not hired, their formations were imitated, and war underwent the revolution detailed in Machiavelli's *Art of War*. In the aftermath, Roman military tactics were studied all over Europe in detail, Roman drill was adopted, and Europe was set on the path that led to the French Revolution and to national armies drawn from among peasants not unlike the farmers who had served as soldiers in ancient Greece and Rome. The feudal levy declined in significance; dynastic loyalties slowly withered away; and national loyalties grew. The logic of developments pointed towards populism and ultimately towards self-government; the old institutions originally inspired by the Roman principle “that which touches all should be dealt with by all” came to enjoy a new life; and works such as *The Histories* of Herodotus became astonishingly popular. To understand the world then emergent, educated men and women turned back to classical antiquity.

In Defense of Liberty

What happened in the span stretching from 1469 to 1789 and beyond was obviously a lot messier than can be indicated here. There were tyrants along the way: Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Adolf Hitler are as important to this story as were Pheidon of Argos, Cypselus of Corinth, Thrasybulus of Miletus, and Peisistratus of Athens to developments in the Greece described by Herodotus. But the unfolding logic pointed beyond populist tyrannies, and by the 17th and 18th centuries, many in Europe, as well as in the English colonies in North America, found that in reading Herodotus they were reading about men rather like themselves.

In 18th and 19th-century Britain and in 20th-century America, this seemed especially true. When the British fought Louis XIV in the War of the League of Augsburg and in the War of the Spanish Succession, when they battled Napoleon in the later years of the French Revolution, when the Americans took on Kaiser Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler in World War I and World War II, and when they squared off against Joseph Stalin and his successors in the Cold War, they tended to find Herodotus' epic tale of the struggle of the Hellenes against Xerxes, the Great King of Persia, inspiring and instructive. When they read Herodotus, they were struck by his representation of the Greek resistance against the Persians as a struggle of liberty against despotism. It was easy for scholars and journalists to reclothe the Persians, the Athenians, and the Spartans in modern garb, and much of the secondary literature in the field reflects a certain propensity for distortion.

On the Eve of Thermopylae

But, if truth be told, there were good grounds for the comparisons, and they are still pertinent. Ancient Greek history is a near ideal template for the analysis of American military history. Consider Herodotus. Not long before of the battle of Thermopylae, he tells us, Xerxes, the Great King of Persia, paused at Doriscus in Thrace to review his forces; and in this context, Herodotus, who modeled his *Histories* to a considerable degree on Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, provides us with a description of Xerxes' army intended as an analogue to the famous *Catalogue of Ships* in Homer's *Iliad*. After conducting this grand review, Xerxes summoned to his side an exiled Spartan king named Demaratus, and to the latter he posed a question—whether the Greeks would stand their ground against his great army and fleet. When Demaratus answered that Spartans would fight for liberty even if all the other Greeks supported the Persians, Xerxes expressed astonishment, given the disparity in numbers and in political institutions. “If,” he said,

they were commanded by one, as our men are, for fear of him and reaching beyond the courage that is natural to them, they might go forward, though few against many, under compulsion of the lash. But being suffered to be free, they would do neither of

these things. I myself believe that even if they were equal in numbers, the Greeks would find it hard to fight against Persians alone. The quality you speak of resides in us and in no others, and, even with us, in few, not many. There are those of my Persian bodyguard who would each fight three Greeks at once.

To this Demaratus had a ready response. As an exile, he had no reason to love the Spartans, but he owed the truth to his Persian benefactor. If need be, he testified, he would be happy to take on a member of Xerxes' bodyguard. Then, he observed:

So it is with the Spartans: Fighting singly, they are as good as any, but fighting together they are the best soldiers in the world. They are free—yes—but not entirely free; for they have a master, and that master is *Nomos* (custom or law), which they fear much more than your subjects fear you. Whatever this master commands, they do; and his command never varies: it is never to retreat in battle, however great the odds, but always to stand firm, and to conquer or die.

Demaratus added, “if, my lord, you think that what I have said is nonsense—very well; I am willing henceforth to hold my tongue. This time I spoke because you forced me to speak. In any case, I pray that all may turn out as you desire.”

But, of course, it did not all turn out as Xerxes desired. In the narrows at Thermopylae, not long thereafter, Leonidas and his royal bodyguard of 300 held off the entire Persian army for three days, succumbing only when a local Greek betrayed to the Persians a path over the mountain, and Xerxes sent a contingent of his own bodyguard, the Ten Thousand Immortals, around behind the Spartans in the narrows. Moreover, not long thereafter, the Greek fleet defeated the much larger Persian fleet at Salamis; and a year later the army of the Hellenes defeated the remnants of Xerxes' army at Plataea. We are not in a position to confirm the truth of Herodotus' tale concerning the admonition issued by Demaratus, and it is perfectly conceivable that he made it up. But if it is not true, it should be, for it is certainly apt.

Nomos and Phusis

On Herodotus, more can be said. The work that he called his *Historiai*—his *Inquiries* or *Histories*—consists of nine books. The last five tell the story of the Persian Wars, specifying their immediate origin and describing the conduct of war by both the Persians and the Greeks. These books tell a stirring tale; they form the first extended prose narrative ever composed and establish the character of the genre. Herodotus' battle descriptions are, in fact, the model on which all subsequent battle descriptions are based. But it is also the case that the last five books should be read in light of the first four, which are quite different in character.

Herodotus begins his *Histories* with a statement of his aim, which is to record “what man has brought into being” and the “great and wonderful deeds, manifested by both Greeks and barbarians,” and also to explain “the reason why” the Greeks and the barbarians “fought one another.” He will, he says, mark out the man who “began unjust acts against the Greeks,” and he soon turns his attention first to Croesus, the ruler of Lydia who first conquered the Greek cities on the Asia Minor coast, and then to his forebears: above all else, to Gyges, the first in his family to achieve rule.

Herodotus uses the story of Gyges to clarify the nature of his own endeavor. Gyges was the bodyguard of the Lydian king Candaules, who thought his wife to be the most beautiful of women. To prove this to Gyges, he asked his bodyguard to secret himself in her room and observe her when she undressed. Gyges demurred, calling the suggestion “sick” and “unlawful.” “Many are the fine things discovered by men of old, and among them is this one: *that each should look solely upon that which is his own*,” he said. Candaules nonetheless insisted, and Gyges finally acquiesced. But the queen caught on and offered Gyges two alternatives: he could kill her husband, taking his wife and his kingship and ruling the Lydians, or die. One can guess which option he took.

The importance of the story is this. Over the course of the first four books of his *Inquiries*, Herodotus will ask his readers to do that which his Gyges singles out as unlawful. He will ask them *to look on that which is not their own*. He will describe in detail the history of the Lydians, the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Scythians, the Medes, and the Persians, and he will outline their *nomoi*—their customs, their laws, and their ways. Moreover, in a memorable passage in the third book, he will tell a story about Darius, the father of Xerxes, who, when Great King, called together some of the Greeks who were in attendance on him and asked them what it would take to get them to eat their dead fathers. They said that they would not do it for all the money in the world. After this Darius summoned those of the Indians who are called Callatians, who *do* eat their parents, and in the presence of the Greeks (who understood the conversation through an interpreter), asked them what price would make them burn their dead fathers with fire. They shouted aloud “Don’t mention such horrors!”

“These are matters of *nomos*,” Herodotus concludes, “and I think [the poet] Pindar is right when he says, ‘*Nomos* is king of all.’”

“Everyone, without exception,” claims Herodotus, “believes his own native *nomoi*, and the religion he was brought up in, to be the best.” Everywhere it is contrary to *nomos* to look with favor on that which is not one’s own. Everywhere it is a matter of *nomos* that one observe one’s own *nomoi* and those alone. This is arguably the only universal *nomos*, and it is this *nomos* that Herodotus invites his readers to breach. He invites them to do what Gyges had done: he invites them to transgress—not, to be sure, with their eyes, but with the eye of the

mind, and he does so for a reason. He explores the *nomoi* of the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Scythians, the Medes, and the Persians for the purpose of ascertaining which of these is superior, and in the process he invites his readers, who are, of course, Greek, to reflect critically on the *nomoi* that are their own. Before taking his readers through his narrative of the origins and outcome of the Persian Wars, he asks them to think about the different, diverse peoples in the world, and he invites them to judge.

In this sense, Herodotus' book is a highly theoretical work—a work of cultural as well as political and military history, and, in fact, a work of philosophy as well—for if there is a standard by which the *nomoi* of the various peoples can be judged, it has to be what the Greeks called *physis*. It has to be nature—and Herodotus invites those of us who read him today to engage in the same sort of cultural critique. He asks us, as he asked his fellow Greeks, to do something even more transgressive than what Gyges did and to attempt to ascertain what man as man is like when stripped of all that is conventional. Above all, he asks us to consider which conventions, which *nomoi* are the best; whether man really is by nature a political animal; and whether political liberty and the rule of law are not, in fact, the distinguishing marks of those human beings who most deserve admiration and emulation on our part.

Liberty and Human Excellence

Herodotus' questions are still worth asking. They are, in particular, questions that Americans must pose to themselves. Is our heritage of political liberty and the rule of law a treasure worth fighting for? Does this heritage produce today, as Herodotus claims it arguably did in antiquity, a people brave and resolute in their defense? Do the words that Demaratus used in describing the ancient Spartans describe modern Americans as well? When Francis Scott Key, in *The Star-Spangled Banner*, spoke of America as “the land of the free and the home of the brave,” he was borrowing language that had been used to describe classical Sparta. If the comparison is no longer apt, Herodotus would tell us that it is unlikely we will remain for long a people free.

More Faith, Less Fear:

Islam, Islamism, and the Future of the West

By Ronald J. Granieri

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These are difficult times for anyone who wants to believe in a free and pluralist society. The brutal ethnic and religious cleansing perpetrated by ISIS in Iraq, combined with the stories of young men from Western countries traveling to Syria to join the jihad in the Middle East, have sown fear and suspicion about Islam. Such fears have been further stoked by a disturbing rise in anti-Semitic demonstrations and violence in Europe, fed in part by reactions to the ongoing conflict in Gaza. For many observers, the two developments go together, an indication of a permanent and fundamental clash of cultures in which Muslims both abroad and at home threaten the peace and security of the liberal West.

Elsewhere in the world one sees even more reason to despair, from the civil war in Ukraine to the even more depressing spectacle of collapsing race relations in Ferguson, MO. Wherever one looks, one can find evidence of society breaking down, of simmering conflicts just about to boil over, and irreconcilable differences between social, religious, and ethnic groups. It's not surprising that this dire situation leads many people to throw up their hands, and to preach a kind of bunker mentality in response.

This atmosphere of dread has given new life to an Internet phenomenon. In recent weeks, many friends of FPRI have received and forwarded the text of a speech that Dutch politician Geert Wilders gave in New York back in 2008. In it, Wilders warned of the rising tide of Muslim immigration, painting a lurid and frightening picture of an inexorable force that was already on its way to destroying Europe, and which would leave the United States as the "last man standing" in the face of an existential threat. [1] Wilders is a spellbinding speaker, and a gifted demagogue. He does a very good job describing the problem, and attacking the complacency of European elites. He urges resistance to this threat, citing Churchill's unbending resistance against appeasement, "We cannot strike a deal with mullahs and imams," he concludes. "Future generations would never forgive us. We cannot squander our liberties. We simply do not have the right to do so."

But even as he presents an image of resolute resistance, there is something missing from this address, and from the arguments behind it. As is often the case with a politician who wants to stir the emotions of his listeners (and who has a very distinct, radical agenda), his comments

are a mixture of the true, the wildly overstated, and the false. He is also much better at describing the dangers than he is at offering any actual solutions. The problem therefore is not that Wilders is completely wrong, but rather that he's not as right as he thinks he is, and the things that he gets wrong are potentially very dangerous indeed for the political future of the West.

It is certainly true that there currently is a growing population of Muslim immigrants in Europe. It is also certainly true that a lot of this population—like pretty much every immigrant population in the history of mankind—is currently quite insular and concentrated in self-reinforcing linguistic, cultural, and religious ghettos. The combination of self-isolation and the failure of institutions to encourage more interaction between immigrants and the native born have created a vast and threatening gulf between them. One recent article even notes that there are more Muslim British citizens fighting for ISIS than there are Muslims in the British Armed Forces. [2] This current reality feeds the sense that Muslim immigrants simply cannot or will not be integrated into the larger society. Such concerns about Muslim men also encourage larger worries about the capacity of Western democracies to absorb new immigrants. They of course extend to the United States as well, where some political leaders warn that despite the history of immigration in the United States, these new immigrants are somehow less assimilable than those who came before.

That there are problems with the current situation is clear. The question is, how is it different from other immigrant experiences, and how threatening is it for the future of America and the West. Wilders takes some basic facts but then extrapolates them to excessive effect. He makes three problematic assumptions that need to be challenged:

First and most obviously is his characterization of Islam, which he claims is not a religion but a “political ideology,” which he compares to Nazism and Communism. “Therefore, there is no such a thing as moderate Islam,” he declares. “Sure, there are a lot of moderate Muslims. But a moderate Islam is non-existent.” This simplistic assumption is flat out wrong. The vast majority of Muslims in Europe, just as the vast majority of Muslims in the world, are not intolerant Islamist radicals. Most of them are hard-working people with families who are simply trying to make their way in the world. That Wilders feels it necessary to characterize a religious community that has existed for 1500 years and that includes hundreds of millions of peaceful people who have never threatened anybody (Indonesia, for example, is the world's largest Muslim country, and currently threatens no one) as a relentless enemy of humanity, and that he wants to dismiss it as merely an ideology is the most stereotypical form of cultural arrogance and short-sightedness. Wilders even gets the basic definition of Islam wrong. He correctly identifies it as “submission” but the context he makes it seem as though that submission is of a political form, when actually what Islam is about his submission to God and God's laws. I know of no monotheistic religion that does not basically expect the same thing

of its believers. It's also false to assume that there is no disagreement among Muslims about the practice of the faith, considering that most of ISIS's victims are fellow Muslims who do not happen to measure up to ISIS's particularly stringent dogma.

There are more and less tolerant Muslims, to be sure, and I am not going to deny that some pretty awful people use their religion to justify oppressing their own people (especially women) and threatening non-believers. Even here, however, analysts suggest that many jihadis are themselves motivated less by their faith than by other social and political issues. [3] Indeed, the rise of ISIS is in large part the product of a systematic campaign by some elements within Islam to propagate a particular vision of the faith rather than some natural development. [4] Ultimately, it helps nobody to dismiss a sincerely held series of beliefs as an ideology. It is not only bigoted, it is pointless in the extreme to claim that Islam is somehow unworthy of consideration as a body of religious faith—both because Muslims are not going to simply evaporate and because they do not have to disappear for there to be peace. This is not squishy political correctness talking, but pragmatic and respectful historical and cultural sensibility—a sensibility shared by every respectable religious leader in the non-Muslim world, I might add, such as the Vatican Secretary of state, Pietro Cardinal Parolin, who recently declared that the recent upsurge in violence in Iraq “is definitely not a clash between Islam and Christianity.” [5]

Wilders' second problem is his assumption that some alleged Muslim tide is going to flood the West forever, leading inexorably to Muslim majorities. This sort of demographic alarmism assumes a constant expansion of the Muslim population, and has of course been popular ever since Thomas Malthus in the 18th century (wildly incorrectly) predicted that within 100 years there would be no food left England because the population would reach a couple of million people. Malthus was wrong because he assumed that human beings would continue along simple mathematical paths, and that there would be no other limiting or mitigating factors. They don't and they won't. There is no inevitability that Muslim families will continue to grow along the same path they appear to be growing now. A corollary point here is to plead for a sense of proportion. According to the most recent projections, the Muslim population of Europe may reach ten percent in some countries by the middle of the century, and usually much less than that.

Both of these points lead me to my third point. Wilders wants to assume that the Muslim population in the West will never change and will always conform to his most negative description of it, thus the tide is unstoppable. Those assumptions ignore the most powerful defense mechanism the West has in its arsenal, and that is the power of an open, individualistic society to challenge closed systems and to encourage social and cultural transformation. Wilders assumes for his own purposes that these Muslim immigrants would come to the West, will live in the West, and expand in the West, and will somehow influence the West without

themselves ever being influenced by what they encounter. What he is assuming is something that has never happened in the history of mankind. Immigrant populations once settled into new territory always change. Indeed, the social transformation of Muslim populations among Indian, Pakistani, and Arab immigrants of the second and third generations in the US and Europe reveal this very clearly. If we want to talk about inevitable processes, this is one of the few for which we actually have ample historical evidence. Think also of the fates of insular and devout religious communities in the past. Ties to the motherland break down, and traditional religious practices fade and change. We know this in our own family histories, and can discuss whether that is always good or bad. But I'm sure all of us know how different we are from our immigrant grandparents, and how different our children and grandchildren are or will be from us.

This all leads to my main argument. When Wilders talks about Islam as a dangerous ideology that is somehow going to swamp the free West, he compares it to communism and National Socialism. Leaving aside how wrong Wilders is to label Islam an ideology, it is worth noting that Western Civilization managed to defeat both of those other previous threats, not only through being aggressive, but in large part just by being free. Western Civilization's encouragement for individuals to pursue their greatest individual development has done more to change the world than any of these other ideologies. Wilders claims to love the West, yet seems to believe that the West is so weak that it will have no impact on the Muslims, even after it has had so much impact on so many other peoples for so long. It is proof of the narrowness of his mind that he fails to see how free societies' greatest strength comes from maintaining their freedom. That is why he is so good at describing the problem yet so bad at offering constructive solutions. He doesn't actually have much to say on the subject of solutions, preferring to offer not-so-veiled references to banning certain practices and generally clamping down on Islam, spiced with indications of permanent war against real and imagined Islamic enemies at home and abroad. None of that, to my mind, plays to the strengths of Western Civilization.

Stirring up fear makes people believe that they will only be safe if the threatening Other is forcefully excluded. But fear will not save us. We need less fear and more faith. We need faith that a free and confident West that values the individual, a West that is strong enough to enforce its existing laws, need fear no idea or ideology. Groups of people will believe different things, but freedom has shown it has great power to encourage dialogue and break down barriers.

This is not a call for passivity. Maintaining faith in the West and its values is hard work. It requires a commitment to the institutions that preserve and protect the community, especially schools that both teach important material and model the values of citizenship. As Afzal Amin, Tory MP who was chairman of the Armed Forces Muslim Association has admitted,

the failure of those institutions to do more to reach young Muslim men shares some responsibility for their alienation. Improving those institutions has to be part of any effort to shore up free societies [6] Western societies have to be confident enough in the importance of their laws, values, and traditions to teach young people to value and defend them.

That said, *contra* Wilders, Western society can only thrive if its members live the tolerance that we demand from others. That means facing and overcoming suspicions and grievances that divide people from each other, whether they are in the deserts of Iraq or the suburbs of St. Louis. The rule of law is more than a reliance on police power. It also means embracing the kind of civility and mutual respect that allows fellow citizens to live together in peace.

Wilders and others will respond to these comments by pointing out that too many young immigrant men have turned violently against the West. They are certainly correct that people such as the Tsarnaev brothers who bombed the Boston Marathon, or Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, who brutally murdered Lee Rigby on a London street, reflect failures of integration. It is a sad truth that no matter how many opportunities they may be offered some will turn on the society that nurtured them. But as bad as the Tsarnaevs are, they did not kill as many Americans as Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols, who were native-born (one of them even a veteran!), and they also lag behind other home-grown terrorists such as Adam Lanza, James Nichols, and Dylan Klebold. No amount of civilizational confidence can protect us perfectly, but too much focus on imagined external enemies weakens us by imagining that the only enemies are some easily identifiable Other, and blind us to other, more endemic social problems.

The West is strongest when it is unafraid. Wilders and his supporters think that they will make the West greater by encouraging people to fear. Fear, however, breeds weakness and enervation. A brave society welcomes challenges, and does not fear them. It expresses its values without feeling the need to repress others. The most important values of the West—its commitment to free individuals, to freedom of conscience, and to the preservation of the rule of law—appear as weakness to totalitarians, and require a degree of patient bravery in the West's defenders that can sometimes be difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, the future of the West depends on maintaining our faith in freedom. Peddlers of fear are among the worst enemies of Western Civilization. We need to resist their message and embrace a vision of hope and inclusion, of faith in freedom, even in the face of a frightening and conflicted world.

Notes:

1. For a link to the speech, see <http://www.snopes.com/politics/soapbox/wilders.asp>. The full-length speech is at <http://europenews.dk/en/node/14505>.

2. Kim Hjelmggaard and John Bacon, "More British Muslims fight for Islamic State than Britain." *USA Today*, 21 August 2014.
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/21/islamic-state-americans-british/14384045/>. Accessed 21 August 2014.
3. See Zach Beauchamp, "The Nine Biggest Myths about ISIS," *Vox*, 22 August 2014, <http://www.vox.com/cards/isis-myths-iraq/crazy-irrational> and Mehdi Hassan, "This Is What Wannabe Jihadists Order on Amazon Before Leaving for Syria," *The New Republic*, 22 August 2014. <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119182/jihadists-buy-islam-dummies-amazon> Accessed 23 August 2014.
4. Ed Husain, "Saudis Must Stop Exporting Extremism," *New York Times*, 22 August 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/opinion/isis-atrocities-started-with-saudi-support-for-salafi-hate.html?src=me&module=Ribbon&version=origin®ion=Header&action=click&contentCollection=Most%20Emailed&pgtype=article>. Accessed 23 August 2014.
5. <http://vaticaninsider.lastampa.it/en/the-vatican/detail/articolo/iraq-iraq-irak-35945/>
6. Jane Merrick, "Exclusive: We share blame for creating 'jihad generation', says Muslim strategist," *The Independent*, 24 August 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/exclusive-we-share-blame-for-creating-jihad-generation-says-muslim-strategist-9687896.html>. Accessed 24 August 2014

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