The Changing Role of the US Military and Foreign Policy after the Cold War: 1991-2001

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This lesson is designed for an honors US History Course/Advanced Placement US History
Duration: Depends on schedule; approximately 2 weeks

NATIONAL HISTORY STANDARDS:
US History Standard Era 10, Contemporary United States (1968 to the Present)

Standard 1C Recent developments in US foreign and domestic policies
Evaluate the reformulation of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

COMMON CORE STANDARDS SOCIAL STUDY FRAMEWORKS:
English Language Arts Standards » History/Social Studies » Grade 11-12

CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.1
Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.

CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.2
Determine the central ideas or information of a primary or secondary source; provide an accurate summary that makes clear the relationships among the key details and ideas.

CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.3
Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.

Integration of Knowledge and Ideas:

CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.7
Integrate and evaluate multiple sources of information presented in diverse formats and media (e.g., visually, quantitatively, as well as in words) in order to address a question or solve a problem.

CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.8
Evaluate an author’s premises, claims, and evidence by corroborating or challenging them with other information.

CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.9
Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.

ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS:
Q1: What foreign affairs challenges did the United States face in the 1990s? Why did the United States decide to commit US military forces to these events? How was the military used?

Q2: Was the United States successful in its response to these events? Why or why not? What is the significance of the outcome of the event?

Q4: Do the 1990s demonstrate the US foreign policy and use of military demonstrate a new, coherent post-Cold War doctrine or does it show instead the US struggling/grappling to institute solid initiatives? What could this mean for the future?

GOAL OF LESSON PLAN:

Background:
With the end of the Cold War, the United States faced a new challenge: how to refashion a foreign policy that was solidly focused for 45 years on containing the power of communist countries and the former Soviet Union. Until finding a solid anchor after September 11th, 2001 with the War on Terror proclaimed, the United States in the 1990s ventured into a new period of foreign policy development. What would be its new focus? How would the US military be used in this period? Would its new role bring success/struggle? What would the end result of the US military engagements in the 1990s mean for the future?

Main focus:
After reviewing the use of the US military during the Cold War and predicting new foreign policy challenges and initiatives in the post-Cold War period, students will examine several events in the 1990s in which the US military was engaged—Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, various airstrikes, and their lack of response in Rwanda—evaluate common characteristics among each event and assess the end outcome of the US military use in this period. To finish, students will postulate the effects of US military uses in the 1990s in terms of challenges for the 21st century. As an extension activity, students will examine the contemporary relationship between the US and the countries/events studied and access the long-term implications of the US intervention.

DAY TO DAY OUTLINE

DAY 1: Introduce the 1990s foreign policy as a transitional period and review US foreign policy during the Cold War

A) Start off by assigning the following questions for homework and discussing these for the first part of class

1) What US foreign policy goals/strategies dominated the Cold War era? What common features did these strategies share? What thinking/philosophy connected policy goals during this period? Were these policies successful? Explain.

2) What international challenges would the US face with the end of the Cold War? What international opportunities would now be available to the US with the end of the Cold War?

Have them categorize the challenges and possibilities into political, economic, and social. You could also ask them to address #2 by having individual groups focus on specific world regions.

3) What obstacles could get in the way of the US implementing new foreign policy pathways in the post-Cold War period?

4) How might the United Nations and NATO be refocused and/or goals refocused with the fall of the Berlin Wall?

B) Pass out Reading 1 Handout (Excerpt from The Telegram article “The Promise and Failure of American Grand Strategy after the Cold War” by Jeremi Suri, March 2010)
C) Give students 20 minutes to read and assign questions to groups of students to discuss and share out.

D) Discuss answers.

E) Put the following observations from the excerpt on the board:

List A) Policy makers statements about US foreign policy potentials in the 1990s:
- Focus on rule of law
- Focus on ensuring/promoting economic and political freedoms
- Multi-lateral actions
- Policy as not having a big cost on American tax-payers
- Expansive agenda
- Zone of peace
- Cooperative approaches
- Collective security institutions

List B) Author’s summary of policy decisions made in the 1990s:
- Made by technocrats
- US engaged in strategically unimportant places
- “Small policy”
- “Misguided choices” made
- Half-complete/half-worked out policy

Ask students for homework to analyze the disconnect/discord between the two lists. Remind students that the first list is what policy makers wanted and the second, the author’s analysis of what actually happened. What could have happened? Why might pursuing an “expansive agenda” and a “zone of peace” bring about “half-completed” missions, for example? Could there be a correlation between low cost military engagements and “small policy” or engaging in “strategically unimportant places?”

DAY 2: US Military in the Cold War and Predicting US Military changes in Post-Cold war period

1) As a warm-up and link back to Day 1, ask students to discuss disconnects/discords noted from yesterday’s activity.

2) Transition to focus on the use of the US military in implementing foreign policy. Ask students to list 8-10 ways/events the US military was used in the Cold War and the doctrines created during this period. (You can do this by listing doctrine/presidents and have student groups list military engagements per each doctrine/president: Truman Doctrine/containment—Domino Theory—Massive Retaliation—Brinksmanship—Eisenhower Doctrine—Flexible Response—Nixon Doctrine—Carter—Reagan—George WH Bush)

Ask students to summarize the most common uses of the military during this period and the outcome.

3) Tell students that they are now going to read a short excerpt from an article focused on military doctrine during this time as a way to connect what they studied previously to precise military goals. Pass out Reading #2, an excerpt from The Coming Transformation of the U.S. Military? E-notes Michael Noonan Feb 4 2002. This is meant as a more detailed look at the policy of this period.

4) Have students get into groups, read, and discuss questions. Share out with the class. Connect war doctrine and changes back to the events the students listed in transition activity (e.g. Limited War with Vietnam)

5) De-Brief/Transition: Ask students to reflect on the state of foreign policy by 1991 (the end of the Cold War.)
Noonan’s article notes that Overwhelming Force in action had success in Panama and Iraq. If students have not studied these events already, briefly review these events.

6) Now for homework, ask students to answer the following questions:
   A) What changes would in all probability occur to the US military now that the Cold War was over? Why would these changes occur?
   B) What, if any, type of engagements would the US military be involved in with this post-Cold War era? Explain why.
   C) How would the US population respond to the changes made in the US military in the post-Cold War era? Think about this first: What would the US public want in terms of the US military in the post-Cold War era?

Day 3: Introduction to President Clinton, Post-Cold War Foreign Policy and Military Use

1) De-brief on homework questions.

2) Pass out Reading #3.

3) Break students into 4 groups. Tell students that each group represents people working under President Clinton’s first National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake. Have students brainstorm a list of 5-8 characteristics, according to the article read last night, that describe you in terms of your background, personal characteristics foreign policy goals, and assumptions you made contributing to your goals. Ask students if they discern any negative traits in these characteristics and if the author might be biased. Share out.

4) In the same groups, assign each group 1 of the 4 goals Lake created to inform Clinton’s post-Cold War foreign policy. Ask students to answer each of the following questions. Before they do this however, go back to the list created the end of Day 1 and have students keep the wishes of policy makers (List A) in mind when responding to the questions.

   Questions to answer:
   a) decipher what each goal means and why the goal makes sense in the Cold-War context
   b) how each goal could be implemented and whether the US military would be necessary and in what capacity
   c) decide if the implementation of the goal could and should be done as a coalition or with the UN or NATO and Why
   c) hypothesize what countries/regions might be the focus of these goals and why
   d) hypothesize the cost of implementing the goal
   e) predict problems for developing and implementing the goal

LAKE’S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS:

1. “We should strengthen the community of major market democracies—including our own—which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding.”
2. “We should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible in states of special significance and opportunity.”
3. “We must counter the aggression—and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and markets.”
4. “We need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”

5) Have each group share out and take notes on other group’s predictions.

6) Assign the following question as homework: Have students re-read List B and ask what could have gone wrong in implementing Lake’s foreign policy goals.

   For example, Suri noted that US foreign policy in the 1990s was misguided and involved strategically
Day 4: De-Brief and Assign Research Project

1. Have students share out their answers. Note commonalities of their predictions on what might have happened.

2. Transition to the group project. Depending on the number of students in the class, group size will vary. Tell students that they will be responsible for researching and assessing the role of the US military in a foreign policy engagement in the 1990s. Events are:
   - Intervention in Somalia
   - Intervention in Haiti
   - Decision not to get involved in Rwanda
   - Response to the Bosnian War
   - Response to the Kosovo War
   - Strategic bombings in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran (these can be broken up into separate events)

3. The group project centers on researching and formulating answers for the following questions:
   A) What was happening in the country that prompted international attention? (Investigate the circumstances— the who-what-where-when-why of the event)
   B) Why did the United States decide to get involved in the situation? Does the US response link back to any of Lake’s policy goals?
   C) How did the United States respond (strategy/goals/implementation of both) and what was the role of the US military in the response?
   D) Were there other international players that got involved? Who? How? Why?
   E) Was the United States/international coalition successful in its response? Explain. If there is debate on the success/failure, be able to explain briefly.
   F) How did the US public respond to the use of force?
   G) What is the end outcome/effect of US military force in the particular engagement? What legacy did it leave?

4. Students can use social studies databases available at the school site for research in addition to using appropriate FPRI articles and other international relations websites/university research databases.

5. Teachers can decide what format the students should use to present their findings. Suggestions include:
   - Prezi/power point presentation
   - Mock news cast
   - Creation of a wiki/website
   - Mock debate on the statement “President Clinton’s decision to use the military in (x) event was not necessary and did only created more problems for the United States.” (group divides into affirmation and negation)
   - Mock trial: Putting Clinton on trial for the US of military in a certain event (akin to the mock debate)

6. Before beginning their research, the teacher should explain/give a brief background on the following (make sure students know these definitions):
   - Peace-keeping missions
   - Humanitarian aid and intervention, define NGO (give example)
   - UN Charter, Chapter 6 and 7 about intervention and national sovereignty
   - Peace-keeping Missions under Chapter 6
   - Peace keeping missions under Chapter 7
   - Helsinki accords in terms of human rights (as back drop for 1990s—stepping stone)
As an excellent background/review on these, teachers are advised to watch:
The Savage Wars of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo by Janine Davidson

7. The teacher should also explain that with the end of the Cold War, the US military budget and size was cut drastically. Reference Janine Davidson’s talk here. Students should know that the resources available during this period were more limited than that of the Cold War.

Days 5-9: Research/collaboration and group share out of project

During student presentations, make sure non-presenting students take notes with a teacher-created graphic organizer focusing on answer the researched questions (A-G). If groups fall short in answer a specific question (of the A-G), teacher should fill in the gaps by assigning a reading and/or reviewing material/asking student groups questions after their presentation.

Day 10: Socratic Seminar and Short Written Assessment

1) Assign the students the Socratic seminar questions (handout) the night before and have students prepare notes for an in-class discussion.

2) Teachers can set up and grade the Socratic seminar in whatever format fits their class size. One option would be to create a fishbowl and have each fishbowl take 1-3 questions and switch out. Students outside the fishbowl would be responsible for scoring student participation in addition to their answers.

3) After finishing the Socratic seminar, have students form a circle and conduct a whole class discussion on the following questions:
   A) To what extent can the 1990s be accurately titled “The Fog of Peace” era or the “Decade of Denial”?

4) Assign two of the Socratic seminar questions as a culminating written assessment.

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Reading 1
Excerpt from E-Notes:
“The Promise and Failure of American Grand Strategy after the Cold War”

http://www.fpri.org/articles/2010/03/promise-and-failure-american-grand-strategy-after-cold-war

Jeremi Suri
March 2010

Like so many things, it began and it ended in New York. In December 1988, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union flew into the city amidst great fanfare and anticipation. President Ronald Reagan, President-elect George H.W. Bush, and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev met on Governors Island, off the southern tip of Manhattan. They were to celebrate how they had, through unprecedented arms reduction agreements and credible personal commitments to cooperation, built what Reagan called “a strong foundation for the future.” Conversing casually and strolling “as friends” in Gorbachev’s words, almost no one could deny that the international system had entered a new, post-Cold War era.[1] The fall of the Berlin Wall less than a year later – and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years after that – were surely not inevitable, but they were no longer unthinkable. The New York Times echoed popular sentiments, evidenced by the enthusiastic crowds on the streets of Manhattan (soon Budapest, Prague, Beijing, and Berlin, too), when it looked forward in late 1988 to the “basic restructuring of international politics—for the rule of law, not force; for multilateralism, not unilaterallism; and for economic as well as political freedoms.”[2]

By September 2001, nearly everyone recognized that the terrain of international politics had changed fundamentally. The hopes embodied by the December 1988 superpower summit in New York, however, turned to unmistakable horror as a new group of actors left their indelible mark on the city. The two hijacked aircraft that destroyed the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and killed more than 2,500 civilians announced a new era of fear, violence, and extended conflict. A global “War on Terror”—including American-led military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as fundamental transformations in the treatment of prisoners and domestic law enforcement — was not inevitable. Yet, it became almost irresistible as Americans grappled with the damage inflicted by a gang of well-organized Islamic extremists.

Scholars have begun to write about the years, bracketed by these two New York moments, as an “interwar” period—a time when Americans became convinced of their “exceptional” ability to both transcend the hard choices of international politics and to pursue an expansive agenda at low domestic cost. Apparent safety and freedom encouraged indiscipline and wishful thinking. Even self-identified hardliners in the early 1990s adopted this point of view. Richard Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Lewis “Scooter” Libby described an abstract and self-reinforcing “democratic ‘zone of peace’” in the post-Cold War Defense Planning Guideline, released to the public in January 1993. They claimed that: “This zone of peace offers a framework for security not through competitive rivalries in arms, but through cooperative approaches and collective security institutions. The combination of these trends has given our nation and our alliances great depth for our strategic position.”[3]

In a context of perceived “strategic depth,” the rapid policy transformations of the late 1980s, surrounding big issues like the nature of the Soviet threat and the prospects of German unification, gave way to slow, tentative, and agonizing decision making about American interventions in strategically less significant places: Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. This was the “regional defense strategy” of Cheney, Wolfowitz, Libby, and their Democratic successors in action.[4] The 1990s did not witness a return of classic great power politics (“back to the future”), as one political scientist famously predicted.[5] Instead, the decade was dominated by small policy decisions, misguided political controversies, and half measures.[6]

Sophisticated strategic thinkers like George Kennan, Dean Acheson, and Henry Kissinger gave way to the more technocratic inclinations of James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, Anthony Lake, and even Colin Powell. The “wise men” of the Cold War had defined clear national interests, identified pressing threats (foreign and domestic), and devised policies that promised to secure interests from threats at manageable cost. Their successors did not do any of these things consistently. What were American national interests after the Cold War? What were the key threats? Which policies promised the greatest security and prosperity to the nation? None of the leading figures in the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton answered these questions coherently. None of the strategic documents they produced articulated a political-military architecture beyond vague claims about democracy, markets, stability, and American primacy.
Questions to discuss:

1) What did the *New York Times* writer mean in 1988 when it said that a new international system would emerge soon, one based on, “…basic restructuring of international politics—for the rule of law, not force; for multilateralism, not unilateralism; and for economic as well as political freedoms?”

2) Paragraph 2 shifts to a discussion on the effects of September 11th on US foreign policy and the tentative goals hinted at in 1988. What seemed to be dashed by the events of September 11, 2001, according to the author?

3) In paragraph 3, the author notes that scholars studying the 1990s characterize it as “a time when Americans became convinced of their ‘exceptional’ ability to both transcend the hard choices of international politics and to pursue an expansive agenda at low domestic cost.” What is meant by this quote? How is this statement a reflection of past mistakes? How could an “expansive agenda at low domestic cost” be pursued?

4) In paragraph 3, the author notes that major defense policy makers wanted a “zone of peace” and that “….this zone of peace offers a framework for security not through competitive rivalries in arms, but through cooperative approaches and collective security institutions. The combination of these trends has given our nation and our alliances great depth for our strategic position.” What did policy makers mean by this statement? How does this reflect a change from US military action during the Cold War?

5) The author argues in paragraph 4 that the 1990s would be dominated by “small policy decisions, misguided political controversies, and half measures” in “strategically less important places.” What does the author believe here about the use of the military in the 1990s as compared to that during the Cold War?

6) The author characterizes the Cold War policy makers as “sophisticated strategic thinkers” while the 1990s counterparts are termed “technocrats.” What does the author imply about the actions taken during each period by leaders characterized as such?
Reading 2

The American Ways of War

Except from E-Notes” The Coming Transformation of the U.S. Military?” by Michael Noonan Feb 4 2002
http://www.fpri.org/articles/2002/02/coming-transformation-us-military

The twentieth century became the “American century” because of U.S. industrial strength and entrepreneurial genius, which propelled the country to superpower status and shaped its way of war and strategic culture, for which historian Russell Weigley coined the term “the American way of war.” The leitmotif of this was the prolonged mobilization of massive American forces followed by attrition-minded warfare that would eventually wear down the enemy, taking advantage of America’s superior technology and industry. Total victory and complete defeat of the enemy was the goal. But later, in the years following World War II, the development of nuclear weapons and the Cold War with the Soviet Union made this style of warfare only partially useful.

After 1949, total war in the context of the conflict with the Soviet Union meant a possible global nuclear confrontation. The many small advances made by world communism in the 1950s and early 1960s convinced strategic thinkers and eventually President Kennedy that the U.S. needed a more flexible doctrine for the use of force. This led to the Limited War school of American strategic thought (c. 1950-1984), exemplified by post-MacArthur Korea and Vietnam, which centered on more subtle applications of military force. Robert Osgood, who articulated much of the doctrine, called Limited War “an essentially diplomatic instrument … Military forces are not for fighting but for signaling.” Thomas Schelling, another limited-war theorist, noted that the use of military force should rest on tacit understanding of each other’s war aims. Due to fears of the Soviet response and escalation, decisive military outcomes were not necessary or even desirable. The underlying logic also had a scientific component. To control this more subtle application of force, the strategic decisions would be highly centralized, and made by civilians.

The U.S. military’s criticism of Vietnam, where scientific calculations about the application of limited force against an opponent who was fighting a total war backfired, led to the downfall of the doctrine. Military reformers sought to create a new doctrine that they themselves would control following a war. For these reformers, the decisive military engagement and the need to attack and destroy the enemy at his “center of gravity” needed to be reinstated in American military strategy. The political signaling of Limited War had led to needless military sacrifices in Vietnam and much toil that in the end did not contribute to the war goals. Even worse, it had ceded the initiative of action to the enemy. To the reformers, President Johnson’s reluctance to widen the Vietnam war led to a strategy that preferred military operations that were controllable over those that were decisive and successful.

The revamped U.S. military doctrine of the 1980s restored the primacy of combat engagements and decisive victory. After the failed 1980 hostage rescue attempt in Iran and the 1983 bombing of U.S. barracks in Beirut, the Pentagon heralded the official arrival of this doctrine, generally known as Overwhelming Force. Articulated by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Army General Colin Powell, this strategic doctrine (c. 1984-1993) responded to the problems of Limited War as applied in Vietnam. It centered on the tenets that the U.S. military must have clear objectives, the necessary means to achieve those goals decisively, and popular support. It restored decisive battle and operational victory as the centerpiece of any strategic campaign and highlighted the need for U.S. military forces to retain the initiative of action and keep the enemy in a reactive posture. As the underlying logic had shifted away from science and back toward the military’s operational concerns, the strategic decisions were dominated by the military (or sympathetic civilian leaders).

While the Reagan-era build-up of the military certainly provided policymakers with expanded means for applying Overwhelming Force, the underlying conditions of international politics and certain legacies of Vietnam led to reluctance to use it. On the one hand, it could be seen as a prescription for inaction. Only a few complex conflicts had the characteristics that could satisfy its conditions for American military and political success. While the military found comfort in a doctrine that would call for them to fight only when success was assured and the cause important, political leaders considered it inflexible. Heightened sensitivity to military casualties among both political and military leaders made the doctrine’s employment even more rigid. Nonetheless, the successful uses of force in Panama and the Persian Gulf were seen as proving its value.
Questions to discuss

1) How does the author characterize US military goals and strategy during World War II?

2) What changes does the author note took place in US military use and strategy transitioning to the Cold War period?

3) The author remarks that from c. 1950-1984 a new policy was created, one called Limited War. He noted that, “...Robert Osgood, who articulated much of the doctrine, called Limited War [as] an essentially diplomatic instrument ... Military forces are not for fighting but for signaling.” What could be meant by the military as a diplomatic instrument and the military conducting “signaling” versus engaging in battle?

4) Thomas Schelling, another Limited War theorist, noted that Limited War was also characterized:
   1) a lack of a need for decisive military outcomes
   2) decisions were centralized and made by civilians
   3) emphasis on scientific analysis

   What is meant by all three? Use the Vietnam War to a guide in answering these questions.

5) What changes in the use of the US military strategy were made as a result of the Vietnam War? Think of the following: What strategy changes were made and why? How would the US military be used? What were its goals now? Who was making the decisions?

6) Describe the doctrine of Overwhelming Force.

7) In the final paragraph here, what problems does the author note existed with the Doctrine of Overwhelming Force? How did the legacy of the Vietnam War contribute to the problems in enacting the doctrine?
Foreign Policy Objectives

The makers of foreign policy, in the Clinton administration, were both less worldly and less provincial than their predecessors. Figures like Anthony Lake, Warren Christopher, Strobe Talbott, Sandy Berger, Madeleine Albright, and the president himself were highly educated and professorial in outlook. They had traveled widely and thought instinctively about the diversity of international experiences. Like most academics, they were uncomfortable with the exercise of concentrated power by a small group of decision makers, even Americans. They were all marked by a belief that just such a concentration of power had brought the United States to tragedy in Vietnam. Instead of power politics, as practiced by the Bush administration, Clinton and his advisors sought a more open system of international relations, where the United States led through consensus (“world opinion”), markets, and institutions. The popularity of Joseph Nye’s phrase, “soft power,” captured Clintonian hopes.[14]

Anthony Lake, Clinton’s first national security advisor, took up the challenge of authoring the administration’s foreign policy strategy. Speaking at Johns Hopkins University on September 21, 1993, Lake described how the United States would transform its grand strategy “from containment to enlargement.” “Throughout the Cold War,” Lake explained, “we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement — enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.”[15]

How would this “strategy of enlargement” work? Lake emphasized four kinds of action:

1. “We should strengthen the community of major market democracies—including our own—which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding.”
2. “We should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible in states of special significance and opportunity.”
3. “We must counter the aggression—and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and markets.”
4. “We need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”[16]

Markets and democracies were Lake’s solution to all foreign policy problems: “The expansion of market-based economics abroad helps expand our exports and create American jobs, while it also improves living conditions and fuels demands for political liberalization abroad. The addition of new democracies makes us more secure because democracies tend not to wage war on each other or sponsor terrorism.” Supporting markets and democracies, therefore, was both self-interest and the common good.[17]

Lake’s speech succeeded in framing the administration’s foreign policy. It was immediately echoed by the president and other cabinet officials. Despite the many inconsistencies in policy over the next seven years, it roughly characterized the aims of Clinton’s international activities. From Bosnia to Russia to Haiti to China to Kosovo, the president emphasized opening access to trade and preventing egregious—and obvious—examples of violence against human communities. The administration attempted to use economic incentives and promises of public respectability to encourage democratic reforms overseas. When that did not work, Clinton only very hesitantly considered the use of force. At almost all costs, he avoided the commitment of American troops on foreign territory.

Excerpts from: The Telegram article “The Promise and Failure of American Grand Strategy after the Cold War” by Jeremi Suri, March 2010

http://www.fpri.org/articles/2010/03/promise-and-failure-american-grand-strategy-after-cold-war
Socratic Seminar Questions

Compare/contrast questions and questions related to articles read

What common features among the events are discernable regarding the use of the US military in the 1990s?

What features are unique to specific events? Explain.

Did the American public respond to the events and the use of the US military similarly with each event?

Going back to Lake’s four goals, what do the events discussed by your classmates demonstrate in terms of fulfilling these aims?

“We should strengthen the community of major market democracies—including our own—which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding.”

“We should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible in states of special significance and opportunity.”

“We must counter the aggression—and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and markets.”

“We need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”

Can one event in the 1990s be labelled as the most important/significant response? If so, which event? Why?

Can one event in the 1990s be labelled as the biggest failure? If so, which event? Why?

Do you agree with Suri’s analysis that the US was “misguided, created small policy, and chose strategically unimportant places” to get involved in the 1990s?

Historical Connections/Legacy

To what extent did the Vietnam War’s legacy have an effect on this time period?

To what extent did the 1990s represent a complete shift in the use of US military from the Cold War? From previous eras?

Opinion/Open-ended questions

How do you think the media might have influenced US foreign policy in the 1990s in relation to that during the Cold War? Would there have been a change?

If you were President Clinton, what event and use of US military would you be most confident about in terms of its outcome? Explain.

If you were President Clinton and you had a time machine and could go back and edit past decisions, what two events would you change the US response to and why?

Should the United States have gotten involved in Rwanda?
If you were a US citizen, what would you say about Clinton’s use of military during this period? Does your response depend on whether or not you were a Republican or Democrat? If so, explain each point of view.

If you were a Cold War policy-maker and intimately involved in decisions regarding the deployment of troops, what would your response be to the use of military in the 1990s?

Do you think Europe (or the world’s) viewpoint of the United State (regarding its military strength) changed because of the events of the 1990s? How might it have changed? Who might take advantage of this changed status, if a country might perceive that the US lost power/gained power? Explain.

If you were serving in the US military in the 1990s during one of Clinton’s administrations, what might you say about your role in the military at this point? What complaints/concerns might you have had? What would you have been proud about? What were your accomplishments? Challenges? Would you serve again if you could go back in time and alter the past?