STILL FIRST TO FIGHT?
SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY MARINE CORPS

Frank G. Hoffman
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The headline in the New York Times on June 1, 1918, read “Marines – First to Fight.” The day before, a brigade of Marines attached to the U.S. Army’s 2nd Division had raced to the Western Front to halt a breakthrough threatening Paris. They stopped the Germans cold, and five days later, the brigade successfully counterattacked at Belleau Wood becoming the first publicly identified American unit to enter combat in World War I. Ever since that epic battle, the Corps has embraced “First to Fight,” initially as a recruiting slogan, and then as an ethos that reflects its place in the country’s security architecture. As part of that ethos, the U.S. Marine Corps has promoted an institutional mindset about a high level of readiness for crises small and large. Since 1952, the Corps has been designed and postured as an amphibious “force in readiness” poised for immediate use in an array of missions, exploiting its expeditionary tool kit and naval mobility. In response to the Pentagon’s defense strategy, the Marine Corps’ leadership plans (called Force Design 2030) to reshape its focus and force structure, and just possibly change its reputation as a “force in readiness” with broad utility.
The Marine Corps has earned its reputation in battle, but it has also excelled at anticipating demands for new capabilities to deal with the changing character of war. After the end of the Cold War, as it adapted to the age of terrorism and a generation of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marines made small steps forward. When he became Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) in 2019, General David H. Berger signaled that the time for distinctive change had arrived. In his articulating his vision of a future Marine Corps, General Berger concluded:

The rapid expansion of China’s area-denial capabilities, coupled with its pivot to the sea as the primary front in a renewed great-power competition, have fundamentally transformed the environment in which the U.S. military will operate for the foreseeable future. For the first time in a generation, sea control is no longer the unquestioned prerogative of the United States.

His plans were refreshingly frank, challenging cherished assumptions and willing to reduce personnel to gain funding for needed modernization. Subsequently, the Commandant has shown that he was willing to gore a few sacred cows and has detailed the proposed force changes developed for a 21st century Corps aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy. This plan has generated plaudits and concerns from defense analysts outside the Corps and retired Marines. Any change would be controversial, especially when you move away from combat-proven capabilities to accept tradeoffs and embrace a different future.

This report details the proposed changes, assesses the general shifts represented in the design, and evaluates some issues related to the plan. This assessment indicates that the capability and capacity changes are aligned with the National Defense Strategy and changes in the projected operating environment.

General Berger has followed up on his initial guidance with a set of decisions to reshape the Marines. Force Design 2030 is Berger’s plan for reforming the Marines by 2030. Some of the shifts are significant, including the elimination of tanks and the large reductions in truck-towed cannon. The Marines have used tanks since World War II and used them in Iraq and Afghanistan for mobile shock power, especially in urban fighting. Their shock and firepower in combat is valuable, but they—like artillery—are heavy and reduce the agility of the force. In particular, they are of limited value in the emerging realities facing us in maritime operations in the Pacific, where greater mobility and precision are needed against near-peer competitors.

The new plan also alters the aviation combat element of the Marine Air-Ground Team, cutting 108 airplanes by eliminating squadrons and aircraft totals assigned to fighter/attack squadrons. Three unmanned vehicle squadrons are added, as is a refueling squadron that will help extend the operating range of the 5th generation F-35 Lightning being procured.

Another significant change is the expansion of missile batteries to extend the range of Marine

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fires. This shift allows the Corps to support what Andrew Krepinevich has called “Archipelagic Defense” in the Pacific.\(^7\) To support such an approach, U.S. ground forces would be postured in and around the First Island Chain and apply cross-domain capabilities to deny freedom of maneuver to adversary surface forces. Marine units would deny the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) use of the seas with shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles from distributed operations in the Pacific. At the same time, other land-based air with missile defense assets—including Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and possibly railguns—would ensure that the Chinese military could not use its air power. This strategy is in line with ideas expressed years earlier by T. X. Hammes.\(^8\) The new Marine concept being tested to operationalize this mission is Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and has been subjected to several years of study and wargaming.\(^9\) This concept, and other concepts like Littoral Operations in Contested Environments (LOCE), extend the Corps’ unique naval skill sets and strengthen its integration with the Navy for maritime operations in the Pacific.\(^10\)

A brief summary of the major changes at the organizational level are displayed in Table 1 on the next page.

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# Table 1. Marine Corps Force Structure Change Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>Percentage Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Combat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Regiments/Battalions</td>
<td>8/24</td>
<td>7/21</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fire Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Batteries</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Batteries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank Companies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Elimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Armor Companies</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Vehicle Companies</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rotary Wing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Helicopter Squadrons</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Helicopter Squadrons</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strike and ISR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmmaned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Attack Squadrons</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Same total, 50 fewer aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
There are six distinctive shifts in this design. These are shifts in degree, not necessarily in kind. Each appears consistent with the emerging environment, as well as the intent and vectors of the National Defense Strategy.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{itemize}
  \item **From Manned to Unmanned.** This design reduces manned aircraft and helicopters while doubling the Marine’s unmanned air assets. They offer lower operating costs and endurance in support. In the future, ground unmanned systems will be added to generate man/machine teaming to enhance combat effectiveness and logistics.
  
  \item **From Quantity to Quality.** Some services focus on technology, and some U.S. armed services focus on their overall size. The Marines value their human capital and invest extensively in selection and initial recruit training. General Berger intends to stress quality and rejuvenate the Corps’ infantry training and educational systems to reinforce it.\textsuperscript{12} In the design, the Marines trade off some personnel to better balance the manpower/modernization costs. The emphasis is on quality in their Marines while also freeing up limited investment capital.
  
  \item **Greater Precision and Range.** The plan adds more capacity and greater range and precision to Marine forms of firepower and a potential family of munitions for different missions and targets. The ground-launched missile systems will increase range significantly from 40km to 70km or more. U.S. forces need to ensure that they are neither outgunned nor outranged by adversaries.\textsuperscript{13}
  
  \item **Combined Arms to Cross-Domain.** The Marines excel at traditional combined arms, but the capability mix, particularly the advanced avionics of the F-35 and the new missile batteries, allows the Marines to extend and integrate their targeting and strike assets. This enhances cross-domain applications, including from land-based forces against naval surface targets, which is of particular value in the vast Pacific.
  
  \item **From General Purpose to Strategically Shaped.** A shift from a “ready for anything” full-spectrum utility to a more focused and strategically relevant posture against more capable competitors is explicit in the new design. The proposed design is more agile and resilient against defined priority challengers.
  
  \item **From Expensive to Cost Effective.** The manpower reductions and the cuts in jets and helicopters in the plan provide more balance in capabilities, and they free up capital to invest in critical modernization needs. It also strategically prepares for anticipated leaner budgets. The Marines have accurately anticipated not just their warfighting needs, but the nation’s priorities and capacity to modernize.
\end{itemize}

\section*{Assessment}

As noted earlier, the proposed shifts in the unique Marine set of capabilities are derived from the National Defense Strategy and do reflect the priorities and desired investments that the Pentagon’s planning documents calls for. A strategy should document choices and make priorities clear, and its implementation should strive to align means to ends. The Pentagon did that in its strategy and framed explicit priorities, as well as the risks for lower priorities. Especially at this time of crisis and limited resources, discipline

\textsuperscript{11} The author served on the National Defense Strategy Task Force during the formulation of the strategy from March 2017 to January 2018.


in execution should become critical for U.S. military leadership as we attempt to maximize national security. Force Design 2030 details clear tradeoffs and investments in line with those thrusts. While the force design holds up well against the shifts suggested by that strategy and today’s dynamic security environment, two areas warrant comment.

♦ **Joint Force Design.** Joint interoperability at the strategic level is important. One cannot objectively evaluate the Marine force design in the absence of a holistic understanding of the other services, so an understanding of how the Joint Force is designed would be helpful. In the past, the services resisted the idea of Joint Force “interdependence.” With best-case defense budgets in the future declining or at a plateau, an integrated joint force design is more important than ever, making it imperative to ensure that there are no gaps and far less redundancy in the overall armed force. How the Marine changes impact the U.S. Army’s armor force needs to be understood. Even more important will be clarity on how the Navy supports the Marines when deployed in expeditionary operations. Navy support in terms of theater-level mobility, intelligence and surveillance, and logistics may be more salient than ever. No doubt the Commandant realizes this and engaged with the Chief of Naval Operations to generate an integrated naval design.

♦ **Strategic and Operational Risk.** The cardinal virtue in defense planning, the late Colin Gray often stressed, is prudence. \(^\text{14}\) This includes a reasonable appreciation for uncertainty, the consequences of choices, and the need for adaptability. There is some risk involved in shaping the force for the Pacific. Forces that can achieve multiple missions should be considered at a premium over single purpose forces. Force designs that cover multiple strategic futures are preferable to a design oriented on one threat although such specialization is needed for key capabilities. As Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis said when he rolled out the defense strategy, the United States “cannot adopt a single preclusive form of warfare. Rather we must be able to fight across the spectrum of conflict. This means that the size and the composition of our force matters.” \(^\text{15}\) It matters since the Joint Force has to cover a wide range of missions and terrain; they have to be rugged and reliable, instead of exquisite and expensive.

In his initial guidance, the Commandant signaled that while he conceived of the Marine Corps as the nation’s force-in-readiness, it was not designed to operate across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO): “But rather, a force that ensures the prevention of major conflict and deters the escalation of conflict within the ROMO.” \(^\text{16}\) That is a redefinition of the Corps’ mission as articulated by Marines since the end of the Cold War. General Berger’s intent was to create a Corps “optimized for naval expeditionary warfare in contested spaces, purpose-built to facilitate sea denial and assured access in support of the fleets.” \(^\text{17}\) He explicitly noted that this “single purpose-built future force” could be used in many other missions around the globe, but the force would not incorporate investments for those contingencies. \(^\text{18}\) The new force structure reflects that guidance.

Yet, reforming the Marines solely around one scenario, instead of multiple futures and challenges, reduces versatility to a degree. A study on Alternative Marine Corps force designs several years ago that I produced with a colleague concluded:

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18 See, Berger, “Notes on Designing the Marine Corps of the Future.”
The future will be highly complex, and a premium should be placed on versatile forces, not narrow, specialized or single-purpose assets. The Corps must find a new balance between maintaining the enduring traditional logic of its role as soldiers of the sea and meeting the challenges of a new security environment. It cannot just become a smaller version of its pre-Iraq force design.  

This has led some, including myself, to publicly express concerns that the force design stressed one mission in one theater. The critics accurately point to the versatility of the Marines in scenarios over the last 15 years, such as in the Iraq theater. Other analysts and Marine veterans expressed this same concern, “A Marine Corps that is custom-designed for distributed operations on islands in the Western Pacific will be poorly designed and poorly trained for the land campaigns it is most likely to fight.” However, a detailed look at the published report on the design reveals a robust force with sufficient flexibility over multiple tasks. With its tailorable Air-Ground team, along with the additional precision strike assets, the 21st century Marine Corps retains utility across numerous contingencies, including conflicts like eastern Ukraine and the likely proxy wars of great power competition. These are far more likely in eras of great power competition, especially a contest between nuclear armed competitors. Yet, Force Design 2030 reduces risk in the Pacific theater, and accepts some readiness tradeoffs in potential secondary tasks or unknown crises. That is a risk in all force development efforts.

Strategy and force planning are about choices with different risk tradeoffs with constrained resources. The new Marine force is more

23 As one scholar has presciently noted, “Proxy wars are not merely relics of Cold War superpower competition. Indeed they are likely to be an increasingly used facet in the rivalry between today’s existing and rising superpowers.” Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare (London: Polity, 2013), p. 111. Pages 40-46 Published online: 28 Apr 201
strategically shaped, and it prudently reduces risk in what U.S. strategy defines as the primary challenge of our times. It has not eliminated the Corps’ ability to respond to many scenarios as an overview of threats shows. Force 2030 is not a hammer with only one purpose, retaining the ability to defeat an array of rivals. In fact, the Corps’ agility, lethality, and resilience are enhanced in key ways, and targeted to meet strategic requirements rather than general utility. Yet, the Marine “Leatherman tool” task organization remains, with new attachments.

Every Marine will have different ideas about how to tweak this plan. There could be more of a hedge, perhaps more unmanned systems, or adjust the missile/artillery mix in order to retain some artillery. These can be sustained in the Marine Reserve as a hedge against uncertainty. We can almost certainly expect communications and logistics difficulties as the creative operational concepts are put to the trial, and future adversaries will exploit them. The Marine Warfighting Laboratory is no doubt aware of this and are studying a range of potential solutions. More details on counter-Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) capabilities are needed. The possibility of intensive urban operations needs to be considered. That said, the reformed Marine infantry units, with man/machine teaming, and long-loitering armed UAS support should remain capable of urban fighting.

Thus, these are near-term, strategy-driven changes based upon clear strategic priorities, as well as known adversary capabilities and changes in the character of modern warfare. The next generation of Marines is embracing a number of innovative concepts worthy of consideration. They begin the path towards more transformative changes tied to advances in technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics,

additive manufacturing, and hypervelocity missiles. These should continue to be explored via experimentation over the next few years. Their battlespace potential will emerge over time, and will be part of the continuous process of rigorous force development and change that the Marine Corps has demonstrated for generations with helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles, tilt-rotor planes, etc.

**Ready for the Next Fight**

Ultimately, this is *not* a radical shift of force capabilities or capacity. Nor is it risk free. But it is a response to strategic direction that recognizes stronger competition from adversaries who have gone to school on our methods and invested to thwart our power projection approach. In so many ways, the force design represents a measured step forward in response to the strategic direction established in the *National Defense Strategy* and to emerging challenges in the strategic environment. The proposals take the Marines two long strides forward into the 21st century. General Berger has crafted a positive vision for how the Corps should posture itself for this century—to move beyond the old missions and outdated tactics from the last one. Clearly, in such a dynamic age, we need more than just a shrunken version of the Corps’ pre-Iraq 2001 force structure. Given the intensive efforts that major states have made in developing robust anti-access capabilities against the predictable pattern of deploying U.S. forces, the Marine plan is actually overdue.

Rather than radical, the shifts in the 2030 plan are quite deliberately measured. The Marines are not just the “First to Fight,” but often also the “First to Adapt,” and Force Design 2030 reinforces that history.

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