Deterrence and Conflict

Deterrence: what it can (and cannot) do

The ultimate **GOAL** of deterrence is for our enemies to view **RESTRAINT** as their **best option**.

Ellen Resnek
Downingtown East High School
2018 FPRI Conference
Understanding the Many Missions of the American Military
Lesson Plan World History/Contemporary Issues High School

Essential Question: Assess the validity of the statement

Deterrence is still fundamentally about influencing an actor's decisions. It is about a solid policy foundation. It is about credible capabilities. It is about what the U.S. and our allies as a whole can bring to bear in both a military and a nonmilitary sense. Robert Kehler

Instructional Focus:

After this lesson, students will be able to:
- define the acronym NATO and other key terms related to the lesson's content
- explain NATO's purpose
- identify member countries of NATO
- discuss employed defense strategies
- students will be able to summarize a specific event of NATO efforts

Curriculum Standards

CCSS.ELA-LITERACY.RST.11-12.7
Integrate and evaluate multiple sources of information presented in diverse formats and media (e.g., quantitative data, video, multimedia) in order to address a question or solve a problem.

CCSS.ELA-LITERACY.WHST.11-12.2.B
Develop the topic thoroughly by selecting the most significant and relevant facts, extended definitions, concrete details, quotations, or other information and examples appropriate to the audience's knowledge of the topic.

Objectives:
NCSS Standard VI. Power, Authority, and Governance.

Understanding the historical development of structures of power, authority, and governance and their evolving functions in contemporary U.S. society and other parts of the world is essential for developing civic competence.

Teacher Background

This lesson plan was conceived and adapted from the lecture:

“Deterrence and Forward Presence in Europe: From Cold War to Present”
Sarah Kreps Associate Professor of Government, Cornell University March 24, 2018

The emergence of the Cold War following WWII did not allow for all U.S. troops to return home. The First Division, among other units, remained for a long time to help provide conventional deterrence and to reassure allies. The aftermath of the Cold War allowed for a reduction in the number of forces deployed, but new geopolitical realities may affect this moving forward.
The Value of Preserving NATO: Priceless

By Sarah Kreps.

In a recent press conference with the NATO Secretary General, Vice President Mike Pence sounded all the right notes for those who have been concerned about the impact of the Trump administration on transatlantic relations. He said that “the United States’ commitment to NATO is clear” and that its commitment would continue.

A reporter from the BBC called Pence out on the obvious incompatibilities between his words and those of his boss: “Who should European leaders listen to, you or President Trump? Can they be certain that what you say, the assurances you give won’t be contradicted in a tweet or a statement at a press conference tomorrow?”

Indeed, as a candidate, Donald Trump staked out a decidedly anti-transatlantic vision, saying that “NATO is costing us a fortune, and yes, we’re protecting Europe, but we’re spending a lot of money…we can’t afford to do this anymore.” He tweeted in March 2016 that NATO is “obsolete.” He has fervently defended Brexit, another indictment of the European project. He has cozied up to Russia, a country viewed with suspicion in Europe.

Pence offered a non-answer, which was not at all reassuring to a Europe that is facing enormous political uncertainty. Not only do they face an assertive Putin to the East, they face the prospects of major political change on the continent. France, Germany, and the Netherlands have major elections coming up that will have significant impacts, not just on those countries, but on Europe as a whole. Europe now hears mixed messages from the United States, an erstwhile ally and partner who has helped guarantee security on the continent since the end of World War II. Trump has cast the alliance as a costly, one-sided relationship – this assumption is misguided and dangerous.

How should the United States think about the alliance?
As former Secretary of State George Marshall recognized, Europe’s peace and prosperity have held the keys to American peace and prosperity at least since 1945.
Between 1948 and 1952, the United States committed $13 billion through the Marshall Plan—$103 billion in current dollars—to 16 countries in Europe with the explicit purpose of reconstructing post-war societies and fashioning them into advanced industrialized democracies. To put those costs in perspective, it was not until 2014 – 13 years into the Afghanistan war – that the US spent in Afghanistan what it spent on the Marshall Plan.

A skeptic could say, what were the benefits of European peace and prosperity in the wake of the Marshall Plan? Maybe this outcome would have resulted anyway since the world was tired of fighting and was unlikely to slip back into war. Any more systematic response would likely come back to counterfactuals — for example, what if the Soviets had exploited European weakness to go beyond the Iron Curtain? But these costs are invariably harder to quantify than the concreteness of what the US actually spent. As Jim Goldgeier and Elizabeth Saunders put it, good foreign policy is sometimes difficult to sell because it consists of this sort of non-barking dogs: the wars or crises that did not happen. Good foreign policy then requires investments in benefits that sometimes accrue either silently or down the road. In this sense, the vision that Pence outlines is a harder one to articulate from a purely cost-benefit perspective than the one that Trump has reached for.

One way to think about it is through the economics of trade. The United States conducts $699 billion in annual trade with the European Union. Major crises on the continent would necessarily affect the economies not just of those countries but of all trading partners as well. In 1914, for example, as war started to engulf the continent, economic crisis emerged in the US as President Wilson called for an
emergency internal revenue measure that would replace the $100 million in foregone revenue ($2.387 billion in today’s money) because of war on the continent. The knock-on effects of war in Europe were felt strongly in the United States – this occurred at a time when economic integration between the transatlantic countries was not nearly as robust as it is today.

What are the corresponding costs? In 2015, the United States had about 63,000 troops stationed in Europe, down from 343,000 in the 1950s. European allies pay about 34% of the basing costs. As Tim Kane from the Hoover Institution summarizes in his study, “regardless of public impressions of heavy US engagement, the downward trend seems beyond doubt.”

What about spending on NATO? Trump has said that the United States represents 73% of NATO spending, which is accurate based on American defense spending as a percentage of other alliance members. But this is not the same as saying that the US provides 73% of NATO costs. Rather, the US pays 22% of costs on common NATO projects, such as the NATO E-3 AWACS, a surveillance platform. A recent Congressional Research Service report showed that the United States contributes about $500 million a year, a far cry from the “billions and billions” that Trump referred to.

The transatlantic alliance has faced crises before. Nearly every president during the Cold War urged Europe to spend more on defense. France withdrew from the NATO military command in 1962. Donald Rumsfeld divided Europe into old and new in 2003 when he was trying to gin up support for a “coalition of the willing” to invade Iraq and found only “new” Europe to be willing. In short, the recent uncertainty does not necessarily put the transatlantic alliance in uncharted territory.

The way out of the current crisis does require that countries in Europe commit more to their nations’ defense. But it also requires that the United States more uniformly realize that the key to continued peace and prosperity still runs through Europe. American financial and diplomatic commitments are a small price to pay toward this end.
Theme Overview:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) represents one of the most significant defense agreements in the world. Students will complete a viewing activity to learn how NATO has provided much-needed protection.

Step 1:

Procedures:
1. Hook: Whole Class Viewing
   https://www.youtube.com/NATO

   NATO: What is it, why does it still exist, and how does it work?
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3vN4r2hg0Os&list=PL_vlwQEsZAbYa88nSFp-ea6oDcP8SmJ

2. Whole class direct instruction:
   Discuss the fundamental concepts from the short clip:

3. Class discussion of political objectives and military aims.
   • Do you think NATO is still a valid organization? Why or why not?
   • Do you think the U.S. still needs to be a part of a broader political, military, or economic organization such as NATO or the United Nations? Why or why not?
   • What purposes have these organizations served the U.S. in the past?
   • What purposes do they currently serve?
   • Should there be a new alliance system in place of the current system? Why or why not?
   • If so, what would it look like? What would be its goals? Who would belong? What methods would it use to further U.S. goals?

Whole Class Viewing: Current Conflicts:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnDNOMbu0bg

2017 has seen the arrival of more than 4,000 troops in countries along NATO’s eastern flank. Split into four multinational battle groups, each consisting of approximately 1,000 soldiers, the troop deployment is known as NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence. The battle groups are stationed in the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – and also Poland and are an important part of NATO’s defense and deterrence posture in the eastern and south-eastern part of the Alliance.

Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg explain why the troop deployment is necessary.

What are today's security challenges?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dhUyJYEAIRI&index=16&list=PL_vlwQEsZAbYa88nSFp-ea6oDcP8SmJ
1. **Collective defense:** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949 and is a group of 29 countries from Europe and North America that exists to protect the people and territory of its members. The Alliance is founded on the principle of collective defense, meaning that if one NATO Ally is attacked, then all NATO Allies are attacked. For example, when terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11 2001, all NATO Allies stood with America as though they had also been attacked. Since 2014, NATO has implemented the biggest increase in its collective defense since the Cold War. For instance, we have now deployed four multinational battle groups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Their purpose is not to provoke a conflict, but to prevent one.

2. **Managing crises around the world:** Promoting stability in our neighborhood and protecting our people at home can sometimes mean taking action further afield. In the 1990s, NATO stopped further bloodshed from occurring in Bosnia and Kosovo. Since 2003, NATO has helped to ensure that Afghanistan is no longer a safe haven for international terrorist groups. NATO has also helped to prevent piracy off the Horn of Africa and, since 2016, has helped address the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe.

3. **Fighting Terrorism:** NATO plays an important role in fighting terrorism, contributing more than 13,000 NATO troops to train local forces in Afghanistan. NATO is also a full member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and our AWACS surveillance aircraft continue to support the Coalition. NATO is also training Iraqi forces to better fight ISIS, and our new Intelligence Division helps us to anticipate and respond to threats. In Naples, NATO has set up a ‘Hub for the South’ to help Allies tackle the threat of terrorism.

4. **Working with our partners:** Because threats like terrorism, piracy and cyber warfare know no borders, NATO is committed to cooperation with its global partners. That’s why we work with over 40 partner countries around the world, as well as organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union, to spread stability and security.

5. **Troops and Equipment:** Whenever NATO carries out a mission, individual Allies commit troops and equipment to be placed under a unified NATO command. These become known as “NATO forces.” The only military equipment that NATO owns is a fleet of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control) surveillance aircraft. NATO is also developing a capability for Global Hawk surveillance drones.

6. **NATO’s Command Structure:** With so many countries working together, having a clear chain of command is vital. Military and civilian personnel from all member states work together every day within NATO’s ‘Command Structure.’ This includes two top-level Strategic Commands: Allied Command Operations, based in Mons, Belgium; and Allied Command Transformation, based in Norfolk in the United States. To remain fit for purpose, the NATO Command Structure is being modernized to enable us to move forces more quickly across Europe and to keep sea lines of communication across the Atlantic free and open.
7. **NATO funding:** Every NATO country contributes to the costs of running the Alliance. By far the Allies’ biggest contribution comes in the form of taking part in NATO-led missions and operations. For example, one country might provide fighter jets, while another provides ships, equipment or troops. NATO Allies also provide direct funding to NATO to cover the costs of NATO staff and facilities, its Command Structure and its jointly-owned equipment, like its AWACS aircraft.

8. **Defense Spending:** At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO Allies pledged to invest more and better in defense – to stop the cuts, move towards spending 2% of GDP on defense by 2024, and to spend 20% of that on major equipment. We are making progress. Over the last three years, European Allies and Canada have spent almost 46 billion US dollars more on defense.

9. **The "Open Door" Policy:** The Open Door Policy is a founding principle of NATO and means that any country in the Euro-Atlantic area is free to join NATO if it is prepared to meet the standards and obligations of membership, contributes to the security of the Alliance, and shares NATO’s values of democracy, reform, and the rule of law. Since 1949, NATO’s membership has grown from 12 to 29 countries. In 2017 we welcomed Montenegro as our 29th member of the NATO Alliance.

10. **Cyber Defense:** Cyber-attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated and damaging, making cyber defense a top priority for NATO. In fact, NATO now recognizes cyberspace as an ‘operational domain’ – just as land, sea or air. NATO helps Allies to boost their cyber defenses by sharing information about threats, investing in education and training, and through exercises. NATO also has cyber defense experts that can be sent to help Allies under attack.
Step 2: Independent Reading:
Student Handout

*Deterrence: what it can (and cannot) do*

Deterrence is making a comeback. Perceived by many as a mere relic of the Cold War, the Russia-Ukraine crisis has hastened its resurrection. However, the debate over the past months as to how best to deter Russia reveals that 20 years of neglect have taken their toll. Much of what was once considered basic knowledge on deterrence appears to have evaporated. What, then, is deterrence? What can it achieve – and what can it not?

Deterrence is the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent from taking an unwelcome action. This can be achieved through the threat of retaliation (deterrence by punishment) or by denying the opponent’s war aims (deterrence by denial). This simple definition often leads to the conclusion that all it takes to deter is to put enough force on display. As long as both sides act “rationally”, i.e. according to a cost-benefit calculus, and if none of them is suicidal, their military potentials will keep each other in check.

If only it were so easy. History abounds with examples of deterrence failing despite a balance of forces, and even cases in which the weaker side attacked the stronger. In some cases, the weaker side banked on the element of surprise. The military leadership of Imperial Japan, for example, was fully aware of US military superiority. But if a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base would destroy a major part of the US Pacific Fleet while paralysing Washington politically, Japan might stand a chance of prevailing. In 1973 Syria and Egypt attacked the militarily superior Israel – not because they hoped to win, but because they wanted to re-establish the political clout they had lost after Israel had defeated them in the 1967 Six-Day-War. Israel had not seen the attack coming: why would two militarily inferior countries even think of attacking an opponent that was certain to emerge victorious? This self-assuredness led Israel to ignore the many warning signals about a pending attack. As a result, the rapidly advancing armies of Egypt and Syria were initially much more successful than expected. Military superiority had not ensured deterrence.

*HMS Andromeda and SS Canberra outside Port Stanley on 16 June 1982, in the Falklands*
Another important example for the pitfalls of deterrence is provided by the 1982 Falklands War. Argentina, which contests the United Kingdom’s authority over the islands in the South Atlantic, knew only too well about the superiority of the British armed forces. However, over the course of several decades the UK had gradually been reducing its military protection for the islands. Thus, while London kept emphasising that the Falklands were British, the military Junta in Buenos Aires became convinced that such statements were mere lip service. When the Junta faced a domestic crisis that threatened its rule, it tried to generate support by stirring patriotic feelings and occupied the islands. Deterrence had failed because the United Kingdom had ignored an important factor. Striking a tough pose while at the same time reducing the means to make good on it undermines one of deterrence’s most important ingredients: credibility. The story did not end there, however. Much to Argentina’s surprise, the British Navy sailed to the South Atlantic and re-conquered the islands. General Galtieri, the Chief of Argentina’s military Junta, later admitted that he never believed that a European country would be ready to pay such a high price for a few insignificant islands so far away. Argentina, too, had miscalculated.

But could Galtieri and his fellow countrymen not have guessed that a proud nation like the United Kingdom would not stand idly by as part of her overseas territory was being occupied by another power? Should one not have known that remaining passive would have spelled the end for any British government? The answer: yes, in normal times Argentina may well have pondered such scenarios. However, in a crisis humans tend to think along a different kind of logic. Indeed, many studies about human behaviour demonstrate that people who fear to lose something valuable are ready to take greater risks than those who hope to make a gain. In the context of the Falklands War, this means that for the Junta, which was under siege politically, occupying the “Malvinas” was not about a gain, but rather about avoiding losing power. This made them take risks they otherwise would not have dared to take. Rationality – a precondition for a stable deterrence system – had evaporated.

Looking at Russian domestic politics today, the lessons of 1982 are worth reconsidering: stirring nationalism in order to generate political support may lead one to military adventurism which can be self-defeating.

All these cases demonstrate that deterrence is not just about military balances, but also about interests. If the opponent’s interest in achieving a certain objective is higher than one’s own, deterrence may fail. A classic example is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. When it became clear that Washington was ready to defend its core security interests, the Soviet Union withdrew the
missiles it had started to deploy in Cuba. Another example is the Vietnam War. Although the United States was militarily far superior, it ultimately had to withdraw because the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were willing to make much greater sacrifices to achieve their goals than the US was willing to make in support of South Vietnam. This asymmetric set of interests not only makes deterrence fail, it also makes big powers lose small wars.

But what about nuclear deterrence? Should the fear of the enormous destructive power of such weapons not be enough to virtually guarantee deterrence? The answer to this question is the same as to the “conventional” examples cited above: even in the nuclear domain, deterrence depends on the interests that one seeks to protect. If a nation’s existence is at stake, the use of nuclear weapons is credible. Accordingly, deterrence between nuclear weapons states is considered to be relatively “stable”. By contrast, extending one’s national nuclear deterrence to allies is much more complicated. As British Defence Minister Denis Healey put it in the 1960s, one only needed five per cent credibility to deter the Russians, but 95 per cent to reassure the Europeans. Despite this “Healey Theorem”, however, extended nuclear deterrence has become a central pillar of international order. This is not only the case for NATO, but also for the Asia-Pacific region, where Japan, South Korea and Australia are under the US “nuclear umbrella”.

It is moot to speculate whether the United States would indeed be willing to risk nuclear escalation in order to protect an Ally. What counts is the political signal that Washington views the security of its Allies as a fundamental national security interest. However, such a message will only be convincing if the US is militarily present in those regions that is claims to defend. This ensures that in a conflict Washington will be involved from the start. Without such a presence, neither Allies nor opponents would perceive such a nuclear commitment as credible.

What conclusions can be drawn for Western security policy?

First, a renewed debate about deterrence must be cautious not to oversell that concept. The temptation to do just that is already visible. For example, some peace researchers have argued that the tactical nuclear weapons stationed in various NATO countries could be withdrawn, since they failed to deter Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. If this logic were sound, one would also have to abolish all national militaries and even NATO itself. For no army and no alliance has deterred Russia from annexing Crimea and destabilising Eastern Ukraine. A more realistic analysis of the Ukraine situation will find that this is less a case of deterrence but of geography and interests. Russia is ready to prevent Ukraine’s Western integration even with military means, while the West is not willing to risk a military escalation on behalf of a country that does not belong to NATO. Put differently, the example of Ukraine is ill-suited to prove or falsify deterrence. If anything, it demonstrates that a country that is politically and militarily weak is easy prey for a powerful neighbour.
Second, given Europe’s current security situation, NATO’s foremost task is to ensure the military protection of its geographically most exposed members. The Alliance’s new “Readiness Action Plan” (RAP) foresees increasing the readiness-level of NATO’s reaction forces, and holding increasingly complex exercises in Central and Eastern Europe. The RAP includes a “spearhead” force capable of deploying within a matter of days, the establishment of a multinational NATO command and control and reception facilities on the territories of several eastern Allies, and the updating of defence plans. Although NATO’s emphasis remains on the rapid projection of reinforcements rather than on the permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in Central and Eastern Europe, the RAP reflects the reaffirmation of a principle that for some time had been receiving short shrift: in order to communicate deterrence through credible defence one needs to match one’s rhetoric with the appropriate military posture.

Third, the nuclear dimension of deterrence will have to be re-visited as well. Although not in the public limelight, Russia is also sending nuclear signals to the West: by stepping up nuclear exercises, by having Russian bombers flying closer to allied borders, and by boasting the development of new nuclear weapons. In autumn 2014, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin even promised that Russia’s military modernisation would contain a “nuclear surprise” for the country’s potential adversaries. All this reveals that Russia’s thinking, both politically and militarily, is far more “nuclearised” than most Western observers believed. The West does not need to mirror-image Russia’s approach. However, it will have to ask itself whether the post-Cold War tendency to largely ignore nuclear deterrence and to look at nuclear weapons mainly in the context of disarmament is still in line with today’s security landscape. Given Russia’s behaviour, as well as the risk of new nuclear powers emerging in the Middle East and parts of Asia, the West will have to re-learn some lost principles of deterrence.
Fourth, deterrence must also include non-military aspects. In Ukraine, Russia has provided a textbook example of hybrid warfare: the rapid concentration of regular forces at Ukraine’s border, the employment of unmarked special forces in Crimea, support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine, an increase in the gas price and a massive propaganda campaign that sought to obscure the events on the ground. It is arguable whether this kind of warfare, which aims to create ambiguity that could make NATO’s decision-taking difficult, can be deterred merely by the threat of force. Deterring hybrid war will also require other means, such as increased resilience of cyber networks, diversification of energy supplies, and strategic communications that can rapidly correct false information spread by an opponent. Rather than punish an aggressor with military reprisals, “deterrence-by-resilience” seeks to dissuade him by demonstrating the futility of his approach.

Fifth, the United States remains the linchpin of Western deterrence. This is not just due to their tremendous military power, but also their political will to act as a guarantor of global order. Should the US lose this will – or lose its ability to convey it – others would soon test the various “red lines” drawn by Washington. Despite a debate about domestic priorities, the US remains keenly aware of this fact. At the start of the Crimea crisis, the US quickly enhanced its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe, backing up its promises of assistance with concrete military hardware.

Nothing could better illustrate the enormous significance of the US presence than a photo of an American armoured vehicle on a highway in Lithuania. Many Lithuanians sent the photo to each other on their mobile phones. The text underneath the picture said more about deterrence than a thousand textbooks: “Awesome! They could have come 70 years earlier though ...”
Step 3: Whole Class Viewing:

Stratcom Commander Outlines Strategic Deterrence in 21st Century
DoD News Aug. 4, 2017 | 7:20
Air Force Gen. John E. Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, says his command must focus on many domains, including space and cyber, to deter America’s adversaries.

https://www.defense.gov/Videos/videoid/585537/

Step 4: Group Assignment:

Have small groups of students research the role of NATO in current conflicts. Assign each group one of the following topics to research:

Use this link to begin research: https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!global-conflict-tracker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflicts with Critical Impact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WAR IN AFGHANISTAN</td>
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<td>CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA</td>
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<td>TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA</td>
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<td>TENSIONS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTH KOREA CRISIS</td>
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<td>WAR AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ</td>
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Conflict affects countries of strategic importance to the U.S. but does not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment

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<th>Conflicts with Significant Impact</th>
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<tr>
<td>ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN LEBANON</td>
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<td>INSTABILITY IN EGYPT</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONFLICT IN UKRAINE</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONFLICT BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMED KURDISH GROUPS</td>
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<td>CRIMINAL VIOLENCE IN MEXICO</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT</td>
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<td>BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA</td>
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<td>CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN</td>
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<td>WAR IN YEMEN</td>
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Conflict could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the U.S.

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<th>Conflicts with Limited Impact</th>
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<tr>
<td>NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT</td>
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<tr>
<td>DESTABILIZATION OF MALI</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIOLENCE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIOLENCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROHINGYA CRISIS IN MYANMAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH SUDAN</td>
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<td>AL-SHABAB IN SOMALIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLITICAL CRISIS IN BURUNDI</td>
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Research both secondary and primary sources. Discuss the following questions and take notes on the answers. All group members should have notes.

1. Using the table, gather and analyze statistics for your Hotspot:
2. What were the problems facing your country at the time of the crisis?
4. What was the NATO response?
During Research: In the space below, take notes about the reactions and players from different parts of the World that relate to this crisis from ANY of the websites you are using.

First World (U.S./NATO):
Leaders at the time:

Response to crisis:

Second World (Russia):
Leaders at the time:

Response to crisis:

Third World source:
Leaders at the time:

Response to crisis:

Does the event your group chose have enough background material to start? Y / N

My assignment: ____________________________________________________________’s coverage of ________ crisis.

New York Times/Los Angeles Times
Pravda
Non-Aligned Country’s newspaper (invent title)

Newspaper Organization Sheet
This sheet will help you and your group mates plan who is doing what on your newspaper stories.

Teammate(s): ____________________________________________________________

Hotspot: ________________________________________________________________

Timeline Event: _________________________________________________________

Spin (point of view assignment): _________________

Name of Newspaper: ___________________________

Assessment: There should be at least five stories in your newspaper:
Be sure to include a Story Photo

- Main story: tells the events from the timeline event they selected in a chronological order
- Eyewitness story: tells the story from the viewpoint of a fictional or real “eyewitness” who saw the events that day.
- Background story: gives information that explains why this event is so important, or what led up to the event
- Editorial: A reaction to the event from the newspaper’s point of view
- Statistical Analysis: A summary of important statistics about the nation in 1970
- Map
- Keep track of the websites or print sources you find on your own in the space below. Remember that a full citation is required for the newspaper on page two.

Newspaper Rubric

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Exceptional (4pts)</th>
<th>Great (3 pts)</th>
<th>Fair (2 pts)</th>
<th>Poor (1 pts)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential Parts</td>
<td>All parts of a newspaper are present.</td>
<td>Newspaper is complete. All parts are present.</td>
<td>Newspaper is partially complete. A few parts are missing.</td>
<td>Newspaper is incomplete. Many parts are missing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>Exceptional information.</td>
<td>Developed information provides a good description of the topic.</td>
<td>Partially developed information gives a fair description of the topic.</td>
<td>Very basic information and little detail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pictures</td>
<td>A variety of pictures and captions are present.</td>
<td>All pictures and captions are clear.</td>
<td>A few pictures and captions are present.</td>
<td>No pictures or captions are present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td>No grammatical, spelling, or punctuation errors.</td>
<td>One or Two grammatical, spelling, or punctuation errors.</td>
<td>Three or Four grammatical, spelling, or punctuation errors.</td>
<td>More than Four grammatical, spelling, or punctuation errors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design and Appearance</td>
<td>Very creative and attractive.</td>
<td>Complete design, shows creativity and organization.</td>
<td>Organized design, simple presentation, and little creativity.</td>
<td>Unorganized design.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Exceeds expectations.</td>
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<td>Graphics are not unique.</td>
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<td>Empty space.</td>
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Totals:

Score:
**Extension:** Have the students further debate the conflicts in a Socratic seminar fashion.

**Modification:** To assist LS and ELL students, teachers can create research packets that modify language and readability. Academic language can be highlighted and defined.
Citations:


Supplemental Readings attached:
On Deterrence

‘Everything in war is very simple. But the simplest thing is difficult.’
Carl Von Clausewitz

Deterrence is a relatively simple idea: one actor persuades another actor – a would-be aggressor – that an aggression would incur a cost, possibly in the form of unacceptable damage, which would far outweigh any potential gain, material or political. The involvement of at least two actors makes deterrence a complicated social interaction. It is very much about human nature, psychology and basic human emotions: fear, courage, trust, lust for power, and revenge.

Elevate all this to the level of state actors, with all the intricacies inherent in statehood and statesmanship, add the stakes of national survival, add nuclear weapons to the mix, and deterrence becomes a highly complex, volatile, intangible, but also combustible concept.

From deterrence by denial to denial of deterrence – and back
During the Cold War, NATO pursued deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment was based on the notion of ‘unactable damages’, including through massive nuclear retaliation for any Soviet attack – conventional or nuclear. Deterrence by denial was about making it physically difficult for the aggressor to achieve his objective, which NATO pursued through forward defence at its eastern border with the Soviet Union.

After the end of the Cold War, the Alliance dramatically downsized its conventional and nuclear forces.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a long period of denial of deterrence followed. The Alliance dramatically downsized its forces (conventional and nuclear) and persistently reduced defence spending. It also shifted its overall paradigm from territorial defence, including forward defence conducted by large and heavy formations, to out-of-area crisis response, underpinned by expeditionary capability based around more deployable but also smaller and lighter units.

Along the way, the Alliance’s know-how of deterrence, including planning, exercises, messaging and decision-making has not been at the centre of NATO’s attention. And for good reason: the post-Cold War security environment demanded such a change in focus. The Alliance had to focus on crisis management – from conflict prevention, to peace enforcement, peacekeeping and stabilization – first in the western Balkans and later also in Afghanistan.

Today, deterrence is back. A good indicator is to compare the number of times the word ‘deterrence’ occurs in the respective communiqués of the 1999 Washington Summit (precisely once) and the 2016 Warsaw Summit (28 times). It was one of two interrelated themes in Warsaw: first, strengthened deterrence and defence for protection of the Alliance’s citizens; second, from this position of strength, projecting stability beyond Alliance borders.

The year 2014 was a turning point due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the change of borders in Europe by force, and the rise of so-called Islamic State (or Daesh) in Syria and Iraq.

As an initial response, NATO took steps to boost its political and military responsiveness, and to increase the readiness of its forces. As part of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) measures have been taken – on land, at sea, and in the air – to reassure Allies in the eastern part of the Alliance.
Moreover, a series of longer-term measures have been launched to adapt NATO’s forces and command structure, so that the Alliance will be better able to react swiftly and decisively to sudden crises. Such adaptation includes enhancing and tripling the size of the NATO Response Force, enhancing Standing Naval Forces, developing a more ambitious exercise programme, accelerating decision-making and improving planning processes. While the RAP has been mostly implemented, it is clear that NATO continues to face a new strategic reality: an arc of uncertainty and instability around its periphery, which requires further adaptation.

Two triggers
The decision to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture was triggered by two developments. The first was Russia’s military doctrine, the scale and pace of its military modernisation, and above all, its aggressive rhetoric, aggressive actions against neighbours, and increased military activity and provocations close to NATO’s borders.

Russia’s seamless employment of all tools and capabilities at its disposal – from hybrid activities, to conventional military threats and nuclear saber-rattling – has been especially disconcerting for Allies, since it appears to lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in Russia’s approach to conflict. The deployment of Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities that reach into NATO territory and international airspace and waters – from the High North, through the Baltic and Black Seas to the eastern Mediterranean – has added further complication, not least in terms of NATO’s freedom of movement.

*At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, Allies agreed to step up readiness to ensure that NATO can respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. © German Army Press Office*
The second development that triggered the strengthening of the Alliance posture has been the rapid degradation of the security situation in the South. Failed states and civil wars, the spread of Daesh and its attacks on the population of Allied cities, and the massive refugee flow towards Europe, taken together, have created a significant strategic challenge to the Alliance.

Deterring and defending against a non-state actor with state-like capabilities and aspirations, such as Daesh, has presented a particularly complex conceptual as well as practical challenge to the way deterrence and defence has been traditionally conceived by Allies.

Importantly, while different in nature, both challenges can significantly affect the security of all Allies, and each requires a 360-degree approach to security. Russia’s propaganda and espionage is targeted against the Alliance as a whole, and Russia pursues military activities and tests of sovereignty in the East, the South, but also in the North Atlantic. Likewise, the massive migration, as well as the propaganda, recruitment and terrorist attacks perpetrated by Daesh affect, directly or indirectly, the security of all Allies.

**The three C’s of Alliance credibility**

In light of this changed and evolving security environment, Allies agreed at Warsaw to ‘ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against potential adversaries and the full spectrum of threats that could confront the Alliance from any direction.’

As a means to prevent conflict and war, credible deterrence and defence is essential. To this end, Allies have developed a broad approach, which draws upon all of the tools at NATO’s disposal:
from civil preparedness and national forces as first line of defence, to cyber defence, missile defence, conventional forces, and nuclear deterrence as the fundamental guarantee of Alliance security.

Credibility is essential for successful deterrence. Alliance credibility can be pictured as a three-legged stool, comprising cohesion, capability and communication. Take away one leg, and the stool topples over.

**Cohesion**

With the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union gone, the Alliance’s unity and solidarity have not been truly tested over the last two decades. Russia’s resurgence, however, and the pressure of the southern challenges, have brought Allies closer together.

Beyond concern over Russia’s actions, the spread of so-called Islamic State (or Daesh) and its attacks on the population of Allied cities also served to spur efforts to strengthen NATO deterrence and defence.

As a clear signal of solidarity, all Allies have contributed to measures to reassure Allies in the eastern part of the Alliance and have also agreed a set of tailored measures to assure Turkey in the south.

The round table of the North Atlantic Council is a powerful multiplier of solidarity. Although there are perpetual intra-Allied debates and discussions on details and costs, once forged, NATO’s consensus is rock solid. Russia’s persistent effort to undermine this solidarity has actually reinforced it.

**Capability**

Robust military capability is another indispensable element of credible deterrence. Despite significant military downsizing and defence spending cuts over many years, NATO remains the most powerful military alliance in the world. No country or group of countries could seriously challenge NATO in a direct major conflict.
However, this does not mean that potential adversaries could not be tempted to exploit an apparent time-space advantage, reinforced by Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities, on the Alliance’s periphery. After all, at least one potential adversary has been actively exercising such scenarios, and tested them in real-time.

This is why NATO decided to enhance its forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, and to establish a tailored forward presence for the Black Sea region. The multinational nature of this enhanced forward presence creates a tripwire function necessary to signal to the potential adversary that any aggression against an Ally will be met by NATO military forces from across the Alliance, and from both sides of the Atlantic. This is to avoid any ambiguity or misunderstanding, and to make it clear that a potential aggressor would be engaging in a conflict not with, for example Estonia or Poland, but with NATO as a whole.

Together with the national home defence forces, the forward deployed battlegroups would also form an important element of defence in these countries. They would be quickly reinforced by the Alliance’s NATO Response Force and, if needed, the follow-on reinforcing forces.

In the case of a major conflict scenario, reinforcement enabled by high readiness, deployability and sustainability of Allies forces remains the central element of NATO’s defence strategy. From an operational perspective, this is essential to ensure timely availability of Allied forces where and when needed, rather than fixing the Alliance’s forces in one theatre.

The South represents a different kind of challenge and requires a different approach to deliver a comprehensive effect of assurance and protection of Allies, and deterrence of potential adversaries.
Here, NATO is adapting through a combination of robust intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability for strategic anticipation; an expeditionary capability to respond rapidly to any developing contingency; and enhancing the defence capacity of partners in the region to provide for their own security. Ultimately, NATO’s entire command structure and force structure – as well as Allies, individually and collectively – need to be prepared and ready to defend each other from any threat from any direction.

**Communication**

NATO’s resolve needs to be clearly and unambiguously communicated to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation by any potential adversary. A good example of such communication is the speech delivered by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference in February 2016.

He underscored that Russia’s rhetoric, posture and exercises of its nuclear forces, aimed at intimidating neighbours, is undermining trust and stability in Europe. While reminding the audience that NATO’s deterrence ‘also has a nuclear component’, he noted that for NATO, ‘the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.’ But he also emphasised that ‘no one should think that nuclear weapons can be used as part of a conventional conflict’, as ‘it would change the nature of any conflict fundamentally’. In other words, Russia would not be allowed to escalate its way out of a failing regional conventional conflict through a limited use of nuclear weapons.

Allies conveyed the same message in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué by stating that “if the fundamental security of any of its members were to be threatened however, NATO has the
capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits than an adversary could hope to achieve.”

The Communiqué as a whole should be read as a clear and comprehensive public statement on NATO’s aims and intentions, including with regard to deterrence and defence. It can be safely assumed that it is not only read by Allied audiences, but also by potential adversaries.

The challenges of continuous adaptation

The Warsaw Summit is neither the beginning nor the end of the Alliance’s adaptation. It is, however, an important waypoint towards a strengthened Alliance deterrence and defence posture. As work progresses, it will need to address a number of challenges.

The price tag: Freedom does not come free. Two per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should not appear an insurmountable target for the richest club of countries in the world. But NATO still has a long way to go: only five Allies currently meet the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of two per cent of their GDP on defence, and only ten Allies meet the NATO guideline to spend more than 20 per cent of their defence budgets on major equipment and research and development.

However, NATO may have turned the corner: collectively, Allies’ defence expenditures have increased in 2016 for the first time since 2009. In two years, a majority of Allies have halted or reversed declines in defence spending in real terms.

Dialogue: Allies made clear in Warsaw that deterrence has to be complemented by meaningful dialogue. NATO remains open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to
engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NATO-Russia Council. The aim is to avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability. These efforts, however, will not come at the expense of ensuring NATO’s credible deterrence and defence. Although Russia has yet to stop its aggressive rhetoric, hybrid meddling in neighboring countries and provocative military activities around NATO borders, let alone reverse its illegal annexation of Crimea, NATO remains ready for dialogue. The recent meetings of the NATO-Russia Council illustrate the importance of such a dialogue.

![Image](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-deterrence-defence-alliance/EN/index.htm)

*While progress has been made over the past couple of years, some member states still have a long way to go to meet NATO guidelines on defence spending.*

**Non-state actors:** Deterrence theory assumes the rationality of actors. Reality curtails that rationality in two major ways: first, any interaction between two rational actors often produces sub-optimal and irrational outcomes. Second, different actors adhere to different notions of rationality. A modern, democratic state actor will not be able to judge what a terrorist group, such as Daesh, deems ‘cost’, ‘benefit’ or ‘unacceptable damage’.

Deterrence, defence against and, ultimately, defeat of such actors, requires a broader approach and a concerted effort by the international community. To address the root causes of instability in the Middle East and North Africa, which has spawned groups like Daesh and its affiliates, NATO is enhancing its contribution to the broader efforts of the international community to project stability through crisis management, partnerships and capacity building programmes for the partners in the region. A series of measures have also been agreed to respond to the threat posed by Daesh and similar groups, including ensuring that this threat is appropriately monitored and assessed and that relevant plans are kept up to date.
Overall coherence: Finally, in the longer run, NATO will need to consider the overall coherence of its evolving deterrence and defence posture. This includes capabilities, exercises, and plans, across all domains – air, maritime, land and cyber, missile defence and nuclear. NATO leaders took important decisions in this regard at the summits in Wales as well as Warsaw. Implementation is now underway.

However, while NATO continues to adapt to new threats and challenges, one thing remains constant: the greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend its territory and populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. A strengthened deterrence and defence posture will ensure that it can continue to fulfil that responsibility and no one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.
ELN Issue Brief: Deterrence

NATO’s Evolving Modern Deterrence Posture: Challenges and Risks

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NATO’s Evolving Modern Deterrence Posture: Challenges and Risks

Post-Workshop Report

Łukasz Kulesa & Thomas Frear

The 2016 Warsaw Summit underlined NATO’s commitment to maintaining a deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia. But while the Alliance’s primary task of preventing conflict by deterring aggression against NATO territory is arguably being achieved successfully every day, pressing questions remain. Is the Alliance’s approach credible, sustainable and optimal? Are the risks inherent in the current NATO and Russian deterrence constructs and postures properly identified and mitigated? What practical challenges remain to be addressed?

In late March 2017, the European Leadership Network (ELN) convened a closed-door workshop in Brussels to address the main challenges to and risks in NATO’s evolving “modern deterrence” approach. This workshop brought together senior NATO officials, serving and former diplomats and military leaders, as well as selected think tank and academic experts from NATO member states.

This brief draws on the discussion’s main points in order to inform NATO and its leaders as they prepare for their Brussels meeting. While the ELN is grateful to all participants for their participation and contributions, the ELN team alone is responsible for the conclusions of this report, which do not necessarily reflect the views of participants, NATO or any of its member states.

1. What is NATO deterring?

The Alliance has made remarkable efforts since 2014 to design and implement ‘modern deterrence’. Nevertheless, NATO is still in many ways inadequately prepared for effective deterrence in the 21st Century. The challenges and asymmetries with which the Alliance must deal are very different from the Cold War, whilst the understanding of deterrence, including its ultimate purpose of preventing war, is not well understood by the publics or perhaps even the leaders of the Alliance’s member states.

In many member states, NATO’s deterrence narrative is difficult to fit into discussion of national security, as other elements appear of greater relevance and importance. Public
perceptions are focused above all on terrorism, not on the sort of existential catastrophe that NATO chiefly exists to deter. Moreover, the workshop noted difficulties within the narrative about the boundaries of what NATO is deterring.

**Modern deterrence is (de facto) mostly about Russia.** The clearest deterrence mission of the Alliance is the prevention of an attack by the Russian Federation, although not all NATO countries are comfortable with describing Russia as a potential adversary. The Russian threat fits NATO’s history and sense of purpose, namely the deterrence of a powerful state adversary and the reassurance of alliance members in its direct vicinity.

The threats of state collapse, actions by non-state actors, mass migration of people, and international terrorism are outside NATO’s original purpose and original deterrence roles. These more southern threats require new thinking that the alliance is still struggling with; it remains to be determined how far they fit within NATO’s deterrence framework. Differing sets of priorities among the NATO member states is not a new issue, but in a period of multiple threats it is proving challenging to alternate the Alliance’s attention between the Eastern and Southern flanks.

**NATO ‘deterrence insurance’ and its possible upgrades.** NATO deterrence and defence policy has been likened to basic ‘burglary and fire insurance’, i.e. protection against catastrophe. It does not cover ‘health insurance’ challenges such as protecting internal cohesion, the political processes or the strength of the economy. These remain outside NATO’s focus but could be crucial in a confrontation with an actor wishing to exploit the weakest point within the Alliance, and in every member state. Expanding NATO’s mandate might be a solution, but better cooperation and coordination with the EU plus investment in resilience at the national level appear better responses. What responsibilities fall to NATO remains somewhat unclear in this respect also.

**Focus on deterring specific actions.** Even when concerned with a state adversary, NATO faces an increasingly uncertain environment, in which state-on-state aggression has become much harder to define and deter. Effective modern deterrence is multifaceted - a fact that NATO has begun to acknowledge, as reflected, for example, in its recognition of cyber as a new domain of operation. For modern deterrence, NATO must build on this adaptive approach and address not only the threat of ‘traditional’ armed attack, but also a new mix of kinetic and non-kinetic actions.

**Ambiguity versus clarity.** Compounding the complexity around what the Alliance deters, NATO has to maintain a fine balance between ambiguity and clarity in its deterrence communication. Too much clarity would help an adversary to operate below critical thresholds, while too much ambiguity could end up undermining deterrence credibility. This perennial deterrence problem is clearest in alliance policy on cyber-attacks. Despite
NATO’s Wales Summit affirmation that cyber-attacks on the Alliance could trigger Article 5, it is unclear whether this is sufficient to deter such attacks.

**Deterrence 101.** Worryingly, the knowledge gap about deterrence extends beyond the political leadership in most member states, and remains a problem for some NATO officials and military personnel. The lack of strategic knowledge among a generation of officers that have built their careers in expeditionary warfare and counterinsurgency, added to the paucity of education in national staff colleges regarding deterrence and national security, poses a real challenge. This knowledge gap also concerns the relationship between deterrence and arms control, with one workshop participant noting that civilian and military personnel now struggle to communicate the role that arms control plays in national security. Whilst an effort to educate NATO Ambassadors on deterrence over the past two years has raised the level of understanding among this group, this is not yet an institutionalised process.

2. **How is NATO deterring?**

In the recent past, NATO has frequently discussed the optimal ‘deterrence mix’, understood as the most effective employment of elements such as conventional and nuclear forces, missile defence, cyber capabilities and so forth. Such an approach, however, is not well-suited to the contemporary environment of cross-domain threats, creating problems with the coherence and synergy of NATO’s response and feeding an organisational culture at NATO which favours the compartmentalization of issues.

An alternative approach would accept that the conception of deterrence remains fluid, as it adapts to address new strategic issues and changing adversaries. It would require thinking less in terms of components and more in terms of influencing potential adversaries across continuous spectrums of deterrence measures.

**Conventional** aspects of deterrence are the most improved element on the spectrum. The forward deployment plans decided at the Wales and Warsaw Summits remain significant, as they address the threat of a sudden land attack aimed at creating a *fait accompli*. Yet, even here, major problems remain. NATO must address significant challenges in resuscitating the military science of reinforcement, follow-on forces and infrastructure, both physical and organisational, which has atrophied since the end of the Cold War. And in order to deter, this aspect of NATO’s modern deterrence must be well-resourced and exercised.

**Nuclear** aspects of deterrence have remained the most unchanged part of NATO’s deterrence spectrum, with only slight adaptation of both doctrine and practice. Managing the linkage between conventional and nuclear components remains controversial, but cannot be left undefined. The Alliance may not be the subject of nuclear attack, but is likely to operate under the “nuclear shadow” in any confrontation or crisis with a nuclear-armed opponent.
Counter-hybrid and cyber. NATO responses to so-called 'hybrid' methods or cyber-attacks are the most underdeveloped components of the alliance’s posture. NATO has a ‘hybrid’ strategy but this has yet to be well-integrated. Whilst the Warsaw Summit included provisions on improving national resilience against hybrid attack, this depends primarily on mostly nascent work by national governments and institutions such as the EU.

There is uncertainty within the Alliance on cyber issues. The development of offensive cyber capabilities is likely to be an important element of modern deterrence. But this has yet to be effectively incorporated into NATO’s thinking. One suggestion from the workshop was to view this capability in a similar way to the strategic nuclear forces of the US, UK, and France: not as a shared Alliance capability but as a national asset that can be used in an Alliance framework. Beyond cyber, NATO usage of special forces should be viewed as a key linkage between hybrid and conventional warfare.

Understanding the adversary. In order to use a spectrum of deterrence measures effectively, a deep understanding of an adversary’s thinking is crucial. For example, Russian methods must be accepted as unique and profoundly different from how NATO thinks. The Russian way of war does not seek to mirror the West. Modern Russian strategy is also markedly different from its Soviet predecessor, focusing increasingly on stand-off capability rather than a model based on the occupation of territory. The alliance is continually debating Russia, but it is unclear whether NATO is making a sustained, institutionalised effort to read Russia better.

Communicating deterrence. Deterrence happens in the mind of the adversary. Yet, communicating deterrence and assessing its effectiveness does not so far seem to be a concern of NATO’s or indeed of its member states. The alliance does not know and does not seek to measure the deterrent effect of its behaviours. Nor does it have much grip over the “body language” conveyed by, for example, NATO and member state military exercises, and accompanying rhetoric.

Making a difference. It is difficult to fully assess the success of any deterrence policy. How does one prove a negative – the absence of unwanted action? How can NATO be sure that the particular posture presently adopted is in fact deterring an adversary’s actions better than the previous posture? Workshop participants acknowledged the difficulties but also the importance, extensively addressed during the Cold War, of measuring deterrent effect.
3. NATO-Russia: Avoiding Uncontrolled Escalation

The workshop considered some of the stabilising - and potentially destabilising - elements within NATO’s modern deterrence construct.

**Escalation is not a dirty word.** In discussion of the notional ‘new Cold War’, escalation is often presented as an ultimate failure of crisis management, to be avoided at all costs. However, escalation and counter-escalation need to be re-claimed as tools of crisis management and deterrence to be used by the Alliance. Theories of escalation need to be revisited in search of elements that may have relevance today. NATO’s behaviour during a crisis should be regularly tested through realistic table-top exercises, to identify political and military moves up and down the escalation ladder. The Alliance should not be self-deterred from taking necessary steps to increase its own security by outside criticism or ill-grounded concerns about provoking Russia.

But there is also reason to be cautious about applying the notion of escalation control. NATO needs to take into account the risk of a miscalculated response by the opponent and over-reaction, especially at present, when deterrence signalling may not be correctly read against the background noise of posturing, ‘maskirovka’ and propaganda.

**Restraint is not weakness.** NATO’s approach so far (including a light forward presence, the option of rapid reinforcement and a high degree of transparency) can be seen an appropriate compromise between the need to strengthen deterrence and defence and the wish to avoid threatening Russia with a build-up of offensive capabilities. Russia has no objective grounds for seeing the forces which are being currently forward deployed as a move aimed as escalating tensions. There seems to be space to add further elements, such as air defence, while remaining in line with the general tenets of NATO’s modern deterrence and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Periodic, transparent exercising of major reinforcement along the Eastern flank should be introduced as a standard part of NATO deterrence.

However, if the Alliance were to decide to go further, for example by introducing additional substantial combat forces to the border areas or adding significant offensive strike capabilities, that would be a major departure from the current model of restraint. Such a move would be strategically justifiable only as response to Russian moves dramatically changing the balance of forces in Europe or any of its sub-regions.

**Key role of transparency and predictability.** While NATO needs to maintain some secrecy about its defence arrangements and some ambiguity about how it would respond to an actual challenge, transparency and predictability are major assets in the Alliance’s deterrence posture. They help signal NATO’s resolve while reducing the risk of accidents, misperceptions or misunderstanding. Transparency is the best way to counter accusations
of irresponsibility and provide credible information, not least to NATO publics. NATO should seek reciprocity on transparency from Russia, but should not make reciprocity a pre-condition for providing more information about its own plans and actions.

**Disciplined dialogue with potential adversaries is also a deterrence tool.** NATO should use flexibly the existing and available channels of communication, including the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the Pavel-Gerasimov channel. Some more ambitious ideas, including working-level meetings below NRC Ambassadors’ level, or the return of Russian officers to SHAPE, still appear to be politically premature.

### 4. Broader challenges to effective deterrence

The workshop at earlier stages had identified the problems of lack of basic understanding of deterrence; lack of clarity about the objects, scope and complexity of modern deterrence; the underdeveloped nature of NATO thinking about and implementation of modern deterrence; and the weaknesses in understanding Russia and other potential adversaries, communicating deterrence coherently and effectively, and measuring effect.

Participants touched on a number of further challenges to NATO’s effectiveness in delivering its modern deterrence, many of them inter-linked.

**The unity challenge.** Deterrence credibility in the eyes of potential opponents cannot be divorced from the quality of leadership and perceptions about the Alliance’s political cohesion or lack thereof. In the two decades following the end of the Cold War, NATO has seen itself not just as an alliance of countries bound by common interests, but as a group connected by deeper bonds of common values of democracy, rule of law and a common, value-based approach to international politics. Fundamental disagreements about the relevance of these values or a sense that some major NATO members, for example the US and Turkey, may prefer purely transactional or selective engagement with other NATO partners, will be noted by opponents as evidence that the Alliance may be easier to divide during a crisis. Differing threat perceptions among allies, for example in the East and South, could also present challenges to alliance unity.

**The image challenge.** NATO has worked on adding some deterrence ‘muscle’ to the picture of an organisation focused primarily on peace building and regional stability, which was created in the process of out-of-area engagements in the Balkans and Afghanistan. At the same time, NATO stresses that it is not returning to the days of Cold War confrontation. As a result, the alliance talks more about deterrence, but projects a somehow unclear image of an organization still unsure about the return to deterrence and defence as its primary task. Various war gaming reports, in which “red” forces quickly overpower the Baltic States, have also fed an image of a weak Alliance, and were not credibly refuted.
It was argued that Russia’s image, on the other hand, is of a state which is conducting a strategic destabilisation campaign on a Euro-Atlantic-wide scale, with an objective of undermining NATO. The perception is that Moscow’s conventional and missile capabilities give them leverage over their neighbours and in neighbouring regions, whilst Russia’s nuclear posture has led to an advantage overall. NATO deterrence should address these perceptions, not just Russia’s actual capabilities.

The signalling challenge. The alliance needs not only to aspire to coherent deterrence signalling but must work proactively to achieve it. Doing so is complicated by differences between allies over relations with Russia. All subscribe to the basics of NATO’s approach to Russia, but individual states and even officials may diverge on the exact relationship between deterrence signals and efforts to engage Russia. This complicates and potentially slows formulating and signalling the alliance’s red lines, including on issues such as ‘little green men’, cyber-attacks, or the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The capabilities challenge. While NATO has been able to assemble the ‘trip wire’ and the ‘detonator’ (forward presence and the spearhead force), these are not yet connected to the fully assembled deterrent ‘device’: a substantial set of forces with sufficient demonstrated capabilities, characteristics and command arrangements to be able to defend NATO territory against a major, sustained attack. Without these elements, NATO’s modern deterrence is not fully credible and its sustainability as a deterrence construct is challenged. Yet these elements are vastly more expensive, complex and politically challenging than light forward presence.

Some of the most pressing capability gaps and issues include:

- Logistical management of reinforcement, including freedom of movement throughout NATO territory, availability of strategic transport and infrastructure in the transit and host countries, and pre-positioning along the flanks;

- Meeting the new national capabilities development targets set after the Warsaw summit - with the need to involve ministries of finance and economy in the process;

- Urgent adaptation of the NATO Command Structure, which remains ill-suited for preparation and managing of major defence operations and for maintaining permanent situational awareness in the areas important for the defence of the Alliance (the adaptation process has started and should be finished by 2018).
5. Risks in the NATO deterrence construct

Workshop participants considered that there were a number of risks which suggested that the present deterrence relationship with Russia might be very unstable. These risks centred on five main themes.

**The risk of accidents.** NATO’s modern deterrence is about making its defences credible without resorting to a major build-up of forces to counter the existing and future capabilities of Russia or other potential opponents. This nevertheless requires NATO to adjust its force posture, including through forward-deployment of some troops, weaponry, aviation and maritime assets to the vicinity of Russia and conducting more frequent exercises. That creates friction with Russia. Several workshop participants noted the danger of accidents or incidents that could lead inadvertently to a clash between the two sides. The lack of mutual understanding, absence of dialogue and inadequacy of existing INCSEA and Dangerous Military Activities agreements between Russia and NATO Allies are therefore significant risks.

**Instabilities at low levels of crisis.** NATO fears that, even at low levels of crisis, Russia would use its demonstrated ability to concentrate forces at speed and would target the seams of NATO decision making to slow alliance responses. This puts considerable pressure on alliance decisions very early in a crisis to mobilise forces and to reinforce, given the long lead times involved.

Participants noted that what would be intended by NATO as firm deterrence signalling through early decisions to reinforce or mobilise at low levels of crisis might not be well understood in the Kremlin or Russian General Staff. Russians might conclude that they should rapidly escalate in response to what they might see as a gathering NATO threat. There is thus the apparently high risk of significant instability in the deterrence relationship in the early stages of a crisis.

**Nuclear disjunctures.** Participants observed that traditional linear concepts of gradual escalation (including from conventional to nuclear) and the escalation ladder may be ill-suited to describe Russia’s approach to a potential conflict in Europe, in which a threat of nuclear use might be issued at an early stage.

At the same time, the difficulty NATO currently has in describing how its nuclear capabilities would be brought to bear in a crisis. For example, where forward forces had been overwhelmed but reinforcement was not underway, might lead to miscalculation on Russia’s part about how determined the nuclear component of NATO’s modern deterrence posture actually was.
Russia’s and NATO’s very differing approaches to the nuclear dimension of the deterrence relationship pointed to potentially significant risks of instability and misjudgement in more developed stages of crisis. There also seems to be the absence of reflection on both sides about the well thought-through de-escalation pathways.

**Asymmetric escalation.** Faced by a rapid escalation of crisis or concentration of forces by a potential adversary such as Russia, a rational NATO response might be to ‘escalate horizontally’. The threat would not be confronted head on militarily, or at least not immediately. Rather, the Alliance would seek de-escalation and resolution of the crisis through pressure in other spheres. These might be geographical (for example along Russia’s borders) or functional (for example, in the economic or cyber domains).

NATO’s modern deterrence concept does not appear yet to include much thinking about whether or how to conduct horizontal escalation nor much analysis of its potential consequences, including unintended ones. And although the Alliance has a crisis management framework and exercises it, it is unclear how far modern deterrence has been integrated with Alliance development of crisis management techniques. Thus NATO could find itself pitched into a crisis unprepared and be forced to improvise to a greater extent than necessary with consequent higher risks.

**Technological drivers of instability.** Military technologies in the Euro-Atlantic area are developing rapidly and have not been subject to systematic arms control discussion, let alone negotiation, for a decade. Russia’s anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities are giving the Alliance significant pause for thought, including for the further design of modern deterrence. NATO’s emerging missile defence capability is considered by Russia, however misguidedly, as a threat or potential threat to its own deterrence. Both the United States and Russia probably judge the other’s highly accurate long-range conventional missile strike capabilities to be destabilising. Offensive cyber capabilities are evolving fast on all sides.

As always, technology development is challenging the stability of deterrence constructs, with risks that the Alliance has yet to assess.

6. **Conclusions**

The concept of modern deterrence at NATO was developed and adopted in early 2016 in reaction to a series of alarming new contingencies arising in the East and South. The Alliance has been successful and innovative in the process of adaptation to new threats. The mobilization of NATO structures and member states, as documented in the annual reports of the Secretary General, has been unprecedented.
Nevertheless, NATO’s modern deterrence is not yet fully formed either in conception or in implementation. It faces challenges, diverse risks and apparent serious instabilities that deserve to be more squarely addressed.

It is in NATO’s interest to move from the present highly unstable relations with Russia (with the possibility of unwanted and uncontrolled escalation from a minor incident to a major conflict) towards a **stable and sustainable mutual deterrence relationship**, in which there will be less incentive for either side to engage in risky behaviour and less risk of vicious spirals of confrontation. That requires the Alliance to shape its deterrence posture, plans and actions in ways that stabilise the relationship rather than prolonging the action-reaction cycle currently governing the adversarial military dynamic between Russia and NATO.

Without analysing the weak points and challenges (internal and external), there is a danger NATO’s deterrence policy will turn into a Potemkin village: painted in bright colours and looking impressive at first glance but lacking substance behind the façade.
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