Foreign Policy Research Institute A Nation Must Think Before it Acts Chinese Accusations in the East and South China Seas

Chinese Accusations in the East and South China Seas

“Japan always criticizes others, so how can it explain its own actions?” charged the Chinese Ministry of Defense’s spokesman Yang Yujun. He was referring to Japan’s activation of a military radar station on Yonaguni Island earlier this week. Japan’s westernmost island, Yonaguni sits at the edge of the East China Sea, where China and Japan have an ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu Islands in China). The spokesman argued that it was hypocritical for Japan to characterize China’s deployment of military forces in the South China Sea as “militarization,” while Japan builds a radar station so close to a disputed part of the East China Sea.[1]

East and South China Seas

East and South China Seas

Of course, Chinese accusations of hypocrisy have targeted not only Japan, but also the United States. In recent years, China has taken aim at the United States over its criticism of what it considers China’s militarization of the disputes in the East and South China Seas—from declaring an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea to building artificial islands adorned with military facilities in the South China Sea. Washington has considered such actions as violations of “international norms.” As a result, it resumed freedom of navigation patrols in the western Pacific last year. But China considers Washington’s reaction as hypocritical. How, Chinese officials ask, can the United States criticize China for militarizing the South China Sea, when it uses military forces to conduct its freedom of navigation patrols near Chinese-held islets and has expanded its Asian military alliances, most notably through the Expanded Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines.

On the other hand, China sees no hypocrisy in its criticism of Japan or the United States. China considers its military actions as wholly within its sovereign rights. After all they have been conducted on what it considers to be its territory, even though many other countries may dispute that claim. In February, China took another step. It deployed YJ-62 anti-ship missiles and HQ-9 air defense missile systems on Woody Island, one of the Paracel Islands. While China may view its military buildup in the South China Sea as defensive and proper, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam (and increasingly Indonesia) likely see it differently.[2]

Surely the military significance of Japan’s radar station on Yonaguni Island pales in comparison to that of China’s anti-ship missiles on Woody Island. The radar station can only monitor nearby ships, whereas anti-ship missiles can target them. Moreover, the radar station was built on undisputed Japanese soil; China’s anti-ship missiles are deployed on an island still disputed by Vietnam.

But given the complaints that China has leveled against Japan over its new radar station, one may wonder how China would react if Japan took an equivalent step to that of China’s on Woody Island? (Were Japan to do so, it would have to deploy anti-ship missiles and air defense missile systems on the disputed Senkaku Islands.) China’s recent comments offer a clue. Beijing would likely argue that such an equivalent step by Japan is not equivalent at all, largely because of the impact it would have on China’s strategic situation. Already, China’s ministry of defense intimated that the deployment of its military forces in the South China is less provocative than Japan’s radar station on Yonaguni Island. Yang contrasted the two situations from China’s perspective: “the South China Sea is a wide and expansive place, unlike Yonaguni’s location at a narrow choke point”—one which China relies on for access into the Pacific Ocean.[3]

Certainly, if Japan were to deploy missile systems (rather than just a radar station) on Yonaguni Island or any of the other Ryukyu Islands, they would complicate China’s strategic situation. But the fact that China’s strategic situation would be complicated is not Japan’s concern. Nor would it diminish the contradiction in China’s own criticism of Japan, given that it already deployed missile systems in the South China Sea. China’s objections would sound like the pot calling the kettle black.

[1] Ben Blanchard, “China says Japan base shows its hypocrisy on South China Sea,” Reuters, Mar. 31, 2016.

[2] Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Imagery suggests China has deployed YJ-62 anti-ship missiles to Woody Island,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Mar. 23, 2016; Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China deploys HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles to Woody Island,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Feb. 17, 2016.

[3] Ben Blanchard, “China says Japan base shows its hypocrisy on South China Sea,” Reuters, Mar. 31, 2016.

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