…And Thence Romania?

By John R. Haines

I[1] have written separately of Transdniestria and the Russian proclivity to use partition and buffer zones in its near abroad as a means to secure against the threat of foreign invasion, and quoted approvingly Sarah Paine when she wrote of Russia, “Great and even middling powers on their borders were dangerous.  So they must be divided…”.[2]

Now, a provocative new commentary by Dmitry Rodionov posted on the online Russian-language news website АПН[3] asks rhetorically, “Is it time to redraw the map of Romania?”  It is a fascinating, if somewhat unsettling, exposition of, to paraphrase Stonewall Jackson, defending by “taking the aggressive.”[4]

Rodionov argues the “Transdniestrian question” will resolve in parallel with resolution of “the Ukrainian question.  He writes, “the issue will disappear by itself,” if Novorossiya separates from Ukraine, since Russia would then have a common border with Transdniestria.  He warns, however, “if the Kyiv regime is able to suppress resistance in southeast Ukraine,” then “a hostile state will arise like a wall between Russia and Transdniestria, eliminating any possibility of reunification.[5]

He identifies two divergent points of view within Russia as to the wisest course, should “the Kyiv regime” prevail and erect that “hostile wall.”  The first sees Transdniestria self-resolving regardless.  He writes, “Moldova’s accession to the EU (or even merely association status) detaches it from Transdniestria,”[6] which regards that the latter “except for Bendery Tighina, has never been part of Moldova or Romania.”[7]  He claims Moldova’s “political elite” see Transdniestria as “an anchor to prevent them from joining Europe, and would part with it without regret or even turn it back to Russia.”[8]  Some Russians, he writes, go so far as to say that it would be “preferable for Romania to unite long-claimed Bessarabia (Moldova) with Northern Bukovina and Budzhaka (Southern Bessarabia)— Ukrainian territory.”[9]

Here, Rodionov differs.  Moldova is not the threat to Russia interests, he warns; that threat comes from Romania:

“We must understand that even if pro-Russian forces come to power in Moldova and discontinue its accession to EU membership, Romania will not give up its territorial claims.  For them, the ‘return of Bessarabia’ is a pillar of Romanian nationalism, as is the reintegration of Moldova’s ‘Left Bank’.”[10]

“And now, with Ukraine severely faltering and with Bucharest’s predatory territorial ambitions in Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia, the question of ‘righting an historical injustice’ becomes especially relevant.”[11]

We return shortly to the question of “‘righting an historical injustice,” but first some context. 

Transdniestria was a vortex of 20^th century territorial ambitions— Russian, Ukrainian, and Romanian.  Ukraine annexed the so-called “Left Bank” in 1918, and in 1924 made it part of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Ukrainian SSR.  In 1940, the Soviet Union established the Moldovan SSR by taking Transdniestria, comprised of territory on the left bank of the Dniester River, from the Moldovan ASSR and combining it with territory seized from Romania under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that was formerly part of Romanian Bessarabia.

Today, Rodionov claims:

“[I]n the Romanian historical region of Moldova there is a popular movement of people who call themselves Moldovans and claim to be the rightful heirs to the Principality of Moldova, who believe that Romania is an artificial union imposed on them by the Wallachians in Bucharest and who speak of Moldova leaving Romania.”[12]

This is “all the more to the liking of pro-Russian supporters of a united Moldova, who want to secure the country against Bucharest’s claims.”[13] 

So why not, he asks, return to Russia’s proposal to solve the “Eastern Question” [14] almost three centuries ago— to establish the buffer state of Dacia,[15] the intended first step toward which was Russian “annexation of Bessarabia, and the creation of a Russian protectorate in the remainder of Moldova and Wallachia.”[16]  However, with Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War:

“the end of the Russian protectorate over Moldova and Wallachia led to their unification under an entirely different construct, one orientated to the West rather than Russia.  Even the name was chosen by the pro-Westerners— Romania.”[17] 

What ensued, Rodionov claims, was the:

“parallel formation of two political entities— Moldova (part of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union) and Romania, as two nations and even two languages.  I recall that before the unification of Moldova and Wallachia, they used Cyrillic letters, but only three years after unification Latin ones were adopted— the sole purpose for that was to bring the country closer to the West and to tear it from its Slavic roots.”[18]

An irredentist Rodionov concludes by asking (and answering) bellicosely:

Is it not better to focus our sights on reuniting historical Moldova as a Russian protectorate?  Once, the West fashioned Romania as a buffer between itself and Russia.  We also need a buffer in this very place, something Russia has thought of before.  Is it not time to redraw Romania? Once again, of course, after Ukraine is redrawn…”.[19] [Emphasis added.]

Asked in February 2014 about events in Ukraine, Romanian think tank director Adrian Corobană,[20] stated, “I do not see how Ukraine could become a precedent for Romania.”[21]  Rodionov suggests raising one’s eyes a bit:

“Looking at events in Ukraine, you can now envision the most unlikely geopolitical outcomes (after all, who a couple of months ago could imagine that Crimea would become part of Russia?).”[22]

Credit to Dmitry Rodionov, perhaps Corobană can see so now.