This whole Greenland saga has elicited all sorts of commentary. Let’s step back. The United States has had a presence on Greenland and permissive basing rules for decades. Will anything actually change with this updated agreement?

So I want to clarify that the agreement released this week, signed by the United States, Denmark, and Greenland on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, is the result of negotiations that started earlier this year after US talk of annexing Greenland triggered a diplomatic crisis. As you may recall, a multinational coalition of forces arrived in Greenland to prepare for a possible US invasion, and the level of rhetoric was pretty heated. So it’s great to have that episode behind us, and to see that negotiations have resulted in an agreement.

Before diving into a quick analysis of the text, I want to note that I’m bearish on the likelihood of significantly increased US military presence in Greenland anytime soon. I base this on the fact that the FY27 Pentagon budget request doesn’t even contain the word “Arctic”, much less “Greenland.” The Pentagon budget right now is under incredible strain from the pressure of the ongoing conflict with Iran, along with major (and majorly expensive) acquisition projects like Golden Dome, Virginia-class submarines, nuclear modernization, AI, space, etc.

Some of these projects will probably have a bearing on Greenland, so there may be some sprinkling of spending down that vector, but the very high cost of military construction in Greenland is going to be a further brake.

So, with that out of the way, what’s notable in this deal?

Well, you stole my first question: What is new about this? What is notable?

First, there’s a lot more NATO cowbell than I had expected. Perhaps this reflects the good services of NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, whose intervention earlier this year helped stem a rising crisis in US-Denmark-Greenland relations. A stronger role for NATO in the Arctic and Greenland is clearly the outcome that satisfied all parties. Greenland’s commitment to NATO membership in the event of its independence provides future assurance. To those who are focused on the fact that this agreement has no end date, I would note that the 1951 US-Denmark defense agreement doesn’t either: Its termination was linked to the termination of NATO. So I don’t see a massive practical difference there.

Second, the United States now has extremely permissive access for government vessels and aircraft to Greenland’s territory and waters. This is a much freer access than granted in the 2004 Igaliku Agreement. If US military activities in and around Greenland increase, that free access may end up an irritant in the relationship. The agreement binds the United States to exercise its presence in a manner that respects Greenlandic society and traditional ways of life “to the maximum extent possible”, and it will remain for the United States to demonstrate that. The history of military contamination of sites across Greenland already sits in the ledger books, so I imagine this is a space that Greenlanders will be watching carefully. In today’s era of available imagery, Greenlanders have access to a much more robust set of tools to monitor US military activity for environmental impacts.

Third, to the extent that expansion of Pituffik and additional US defense areas in Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig materialize as permitted in the agreement, the United States has committed itself to contract with Greenlandic entities “to the maximum extent possible.” This is not new—the United States has bound itself to this practice since 1991, and reaffirmed it in 2009. The improper awarding of the base maintenance contract to a US company in 2014 triggered a diplomatic crisis and litigation, and triggered calls in the Greenlandic parliament for self-government and a renegotiation of defense agreements with the United States. So the contracting issue also is freighted with baggage that the US government should bear in mind as it proceeds with expansion and construction.

There was some pretty notable language in the agreement on NATO. What are your thoughts about that?

Investment in Greenland is restricted to NATO allies, EU member states, and “NATO partner” states, with the latter undefined. At some time, the question of what comprises a NATO partner will have to be resolved. NATO has many partners—at times, Russia has been a NATO partner—and there are various buckets of partnership. This may be especially relevant for states including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, whose interests overlap on subjects like fisheries, polar/ice sheet science, high latitude space access/communications, and deterring China and Russia.

Any last thoughts?

Overall, this deal reflects the long and likely difficult negotiations that ultimately brought all three parties together. There are wins for all, and some tough conversations still ahead. Whether the deal is ultimately accepted by the Greenland and Danish parliaments remains to be seen, but at least we have clarity on what is at stake.

Image: Unsplash | Visit Greenland