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A nation must think before it acts.
This essay is based on a presentation at the Butcher History Institute for Teachers on Understanding the Many Missions of the American Military on March 24-25, 2018, sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the First Division Museum at Cantigny, and Carthage College and supported by a grant from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. This was our 13th military history weekend at the First Division Museum. The agenda for the conference was designed to correspond to the museum’s new wing on the post-Vietnam era emphasizing these missions: Deterrence, Battle, Humanitarian/Peacekeeping, Counter-Insurgency, and Foreign Military Assistance. 38 teachers from 23 states participated in the weekend.
A quick victory in Iraq validated military professionals’ post-Vietnam War emphasis on warfighting using decisive force. Operation DESERT STORM represented the services’ successful intellectual and physical efforts to reorient from graduated escalation strategies and guerrilla warfare in the jungles of Vietnam to fighting a potential high intensity conventional war in Europe. A new operational doctrine—Air-Land Battle—leveraged the full power of the services’ sophisticated technologies employed by highly trained volunteer forces on mobile battlefields. A potent deterrent force during the Cold War, this lethal combination devastated Saddam Hussein’s military forces in Desert Storm, justifying the military’s mission-focus on conventional war.
But even before the last troops departed for the United States, events in northern Iraq signaled future changes to military missions. Spurred by Operation DESERT STORM’S results, the Kurds in northern Iraq rebelled against Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi dictator responded with a repressive campaign that pushed the Kurds into the mountains along Turkey’s southeastern border, where they suffered from lack of food, water, and shelter. Under the auspices of UN Resolution 688, the Bush administration authorized military operations to prevent a further flood of refuges into Turkey and to alleviate the suffering. The ensuing operation airdropped humanitarian supplies, deployed ground troops to secure Kurds in protected enclaves, established “No Fly” and “No-Drive Zones” to prevent further attacks by Hussein, and eventually resettled the Kurds back into Iraq. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT set precedence for a series of overseas humanitarian interventions by American military forces during the 1990s.
Humanitarian interventions dominated American military forces’ deployments during the 1990s. The ideology, legal frameworks, and political nature of these interventions shaped military doctrine, planning, training, and performance. Military mission sets shifted in emphasis from warfighting to “military operations other than war”: humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement and peacekeeping, and shows of force. In Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans, American military forces adapted to political-military confrontations framed by ambiguous objectives, restrictions on the use of force, challenges to unity of effort, and fraught with regional and global security implications.
A proliferation of intra-state conflicts characterized the immediate post-Cold War international environment. Insurgencies and violent civil wars between rival clans or competing political factions challenged unstable governments inside “failing states.” Indiscriminate violence and large-scale violations of human rights threatened spill-overs into neighboring territories. The international community strongly expressed humanitarian desires to stop the killing, especially of non-combatants, in these conflicts. Intervening in such internal struggles, however, raised vexing legal and practical problems.
Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, customary international norms and international law acknowledged the “sovereignty” of nation-states. The concept of sovereignty recognizes the state’s unchallengeable authority within its borders. International law prohibited one state’s attempt to intervene by military force in another’s internal affairs. The United Nations Charter (Article 2) enshrines the principle of sovereignty as the norm for international relations.
State sovereignty came under attack in the twentieth century as large-scale human rights atrocities during World War II led to several non-binding conventions recognizing and protecting individuals. The UN Charter’s Preamble (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), and a section of the Helsinki Final Act (1974) recognized fundamental individual rights. As the Cold War ended, international elites increasingly argued that a state’s sovereignty could be supplanted to protect against gross violations of human rights. In April 1991, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cueller noted:
We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and documents.
Subsequent Secretary Generals reinforced the morality of interventions on behalf of human rights. In his Agenda for Peace (1992), Boutras Boutras Ghali identified threats posed by failed states as requiring future UN action. His successor, Kofi Annan, emphasized UN humanitarian interventions to prevent massacres and forced population migrations.
President George H.W. Bush’s decision to protect the Kurds, therefore, acknowledged that human rights could serve as a motive for intervention into an offending state’s internal affairs. A foreign policy realist, Bush generally tried to assess actions in the context of American national interests, and before leaving office, he resisted intervening in on-going conflicts in Haiti and Bosnia because they had little to do with those interests. In principle, his successor Bill Clinton was more sympathetic to humanitarian interventions.
President Clinton filled his national security team with foreign policy idealists who were willing to use power to promote American values abroad. Many Clinton staff members were former Carter administration officials, who were strongly predisposed towards a human rights foreign policy agenda grounded in democratic peace theory. This theory stresses the promotion of democratic values and institutions as enduring sources of global stability, asserting that democracies do not fight other democracies. Clinton endorsed the spirit of these underlying premises in “National Security Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement” (1995) and “A National Security Strategy for a New Century” (1997). The three pillars of Clinton’s strategy—shape, prepare and respond—required a military prepared for a range of interventionist scenarios performed at minimal costs in blood and treasure.
During the late 1980s and 1990s the American military developed doctrine for interventions short of war. The Army and Air Force first articulated five doctrinal imperatives for low intensity conflicts involving counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peace operations, and peacetime contingencies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in 1993. This doctrine stressed deterrence and peacetime engagements to keep “day-to-day” tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war. MOOTW explicitly recognized the dominance of political objectives and need for more restrictive (than in war) rules of engagement. Six general principles—clear, attainable objectives; unity of effort; security; restraint; perseverance; legitimacy—conceptually guided MOOTW’s conduct. Applying force to demonstrate resolve and, when necessary, compel compliance with international law remained essential. When and how much force to apply in a given circumstance were the open questions in each intervention.
Both Clinton’s National Security Strategy and doctrine recognized that MOOTW would likely involve multinational cooperation. To build and cement multinational coalitions the administration backed UN Resolutions for interventions, which established legitimacy and defined appropriate objectives. Bridging national differences in language, culture, capabilities, and command arrangements were critical for reinforcing unity of effort during humanitarian interventions. Professional military education and training, especially situational and field exercises with potential partners, provided a basis for improved multinational cooperation. Beginning in 1993, NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and scenarios at American National Training Centers incorporated realistic humanitarian relief, search and rescue, and peacekeeping exercises that improved cooperation and integration. As post- Cold War events unfolded, American military participation in multinational humanitarian interventions accelerated.
During the 1990s, the Bush and Clinton administrations engaged in humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. While each intervention differed in the details, they shared some common themes. First, the motivation for intervening in the internal affairs of other countries involved values more than national interests. Overall both Presidents wanted to signal America’s commitment to the dignity of the individual and democratic values. Second, the United States sought to legitimize the interventions through United Nations Article VI and VII resolutions. These articles covered the basis for peacekeeping and peacemaking missions to address threats to regional and international peace. Doctrinally grounded in war-fighting doctrine, American military operations other than war leveraged highly trained, disciplined troops equipped with sophisticated weapons to stabilize chaotic environments. Each of these factors contributed to strategic and operational approaches integrating strict force protection measures to minimize risks of friendly casualties.
Before leaving office, H.W. Bush was drawn into a second humanitarian intervention in Somalia on the Horn of Africa. Throughout 1992, a drought contributed to a destructive famine and led to internecine warfare between Somalia’s clans. On 24 April 1992 United Nations Resolution 751 authorized United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) to oversee a limited peacekeeping mission to alleviate the suffering. UNOSOM’s efforts quickly proved inadequate as Somali clans raided each other’s food supplies, controlled water supplies, and looted villages. Stymying relief efforts, local warlords extorted protection payments from international relief agencies and stole food meant for the starving population. Around the clock media coverage broadcasted images of starving children with distended stomachs and covered by flies. International pressure mounted to alleviate the suffering. The United States’ national interests were not at stake, but in August, the President had had enough and ordered action.
Operation PROVIDE RELIEF kicked off on 15 August 1992 with American planes airlifting supplies into Somalia’s interior for distribution by relief agencies. The warring factions and their recalcitrant warlords continued to extort protection money, intimidate relief workers, and kill those who tried to stop their stealing of supplies. Opposing clans used starvation as a weapon against each other. The operation foundered without adequate security to protect relief deliveries.
Backed by UN Resolution 794, American ground troops deployed to Somalia on 8 December as a robust show of force to establish security for humanitarian relief efforts. A Unified Task Force (UNITAF) commanded by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnson deployed to Somalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE. Eventually, 18,000 U.S. troops—including Army, Marine, special operations forces—flowed into Somalia and secured the major cities. Special Forces teams moved into the countryside to coordinate with relief agencies. Troops from 23 different nations and 49 different relief agencies eventually participated in Restore Hope.
Initially, UN military forces intimidated the warlords. Better security enabled relief supplies to flow into Mogadishu, and food deliveries to famine-stricken areas in the countryside improved. Civil affairs teams assessed areas and coordinated with humanitarian groups for relief, while psychological operations teams set up radio stations to keep the population informed about relief efforts. As the worst of the humanitarian crisis subsided, the task force downsized and in May 1993, passed responsibility for relief operations to UNSOM II, a new mission established by United Nations Resolution 814.
Political stability did not proceed at the same pace as food delivery and relief efforts. The UN Resolution had called for “the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia.” Ambassador Robert Oakley, appointed as President Bush’s Special Envoy, had brokered a cease-fire between the factions during UNITAF that broke down under the new mission. “Mission creep” entered the military lexicon as pressure increased on military leaders to disarm the clans and install political leaders. General Mohammed Farrah Aideed, leader of the Somalia National Alliance, especially resisted attempts to disarm his clan. On 5 June 1993, Aideed’s men ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers, causing the Clinton administration to adopt a more aggressive military posture. A special operations force—Task Force Ranger—deployed to Somalia and concentrated on locating, capturing, and arresting Aideed and his key lieutenants. Aideed’s militia ambushed elements of Task Force Ranger during its seventh raid inside Mogadishu on 3 October. The Somalis shot down two helicopters, captured an American pilot, and kept the raiders pinned down under heavy fire. Initially, repulsed by heavy gunfire, a reaction force with armored vehicles fought its way through winding alleys and extracted the raiders early on 4 October. The Task Force killed close to 500 of Aideed’s men at the cost of 18 Americans killed and 84 wounded.
Although President Clinton sent fresh reinforcements to Somalia, American commitment to the mission was essentially over. Video clips of a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu amongst cheering crowds flashed across the globe. The American public outrage, and a Senate resolution calling for withdrawal caused Clinton later to admit, “It is not our job to rebuild Somali society.” As popular support turned against the intervention, Clinton withdrew military forces. Americans had initially supported intervention for benevolent purposes, but they were unwilling to sacrifice blood and treasure to settle a factional conflict of no real national interest.
A year later, the American military deployed to the failed Caribbean state of Haiti for a second humanitarian intervention. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (1994-95), the Clinton administration mounted a sizable invasion force to reinstall the democratically elected President Bertrand Aristide back into office and to restore stability. A military junta and their street gangs had driven Aristide from Haiti in 1991 and submerged the country into violence. Using any type of rickety boat or raft available, thousands of Haitians tried to escape to the United States. The Clinton administration returned most before they hit American shores and attempted diplomacy to resolve the situation. Clinton also ordered the military to prepare intervention options for Haiti. Pressured by months of UN sanctions, the Haitian junta agreed to Aristide’s return in October 1993. When a Haitian crowd chanting “Somalia! Somalia” prevented the landing of police trainers in Port Au Prince, Clinton ordered an invasion.
Backed by UN Resolution 940 and with the Organization of American States’ support, an invasion force spearheaded by the Army’s 82d Airborne Division and Special Forces flew toward Haiti on 19 September 1994. The planned assault was superseded just hours before the airborne drop when a diplomatic mission headed by former President Jimmy Carter convinced Haitian coup leader Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras to capitulate. Instead of a combat assault, troops from the 10th Mountain Division, Special Forces, and Marines peacefully went ashore. For the next six months, American units helped install the legitimate government, worked with local leaders to restore order, conducted patrols to protect the population, trained the Haitian military, and provided technical assistance to organize a police force. On 31 March 1995, the American-led multinational force turned over responsibilities to the United Nations Mission in Haiti. By mid-1995, the American military had gained insights into MOOTW’s challenges that aided preparations for more complex operations in the Balkans.
The break-up of Yugoslavia and its decent into civil war eventually drew the United States into two peace enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in 1995 and 1999, respectively. Fueled by nationalism and potential conflict with nearby Serbia, the provinces of Croatia and Slovenia broke free from Yugoslavia in short wars of independence in 1991. European recognition of the Bosnian Muslim-dominated state plunged Bosnia-Herzegovina into civil war in April 1992, as Bosnian Serbs revolted against the Muslim and Croat populations. For two years, the Bosnian Serbs embarked on a systematic campaign of mass intimidation, rape, and forced evictions known as “ethnic cleansing.” A United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) deployed to enforce cease fires and provide humanitarian relief. The protective force was unable to prevent Serbian atrocities at Srebrenica or a siege around Sarajevo in 1995. Both actions sparked increased international pressure for a more robust military intervention to stop the slaughter.
The United States provided limited air and naval support to buttress United Nations Protection Force operations. Two United Nations resolutions levied an arms embargo on all belligerents and imposed a no-fly zone over the country. The U.S. Navy and participating NATO navies enforced the arms embargo by challenging 31,400 ships, boarding 2,575, and diverting 643 into ports for inspections. A multinational airlift delivered over 176,000 tons of humanitarian supplies. During Operation DENY FLIGHT, combat aircraft enforced the no fly zone, shot down four Serbian jets, and bombed selected Serbian ground targets. In August 1995, American pilots flew over 2,300 sorties during a sustained air campaign that compelled the Serbs to break off the Sarajevo siege. An American infantry battalion deployed to Macedonia to deter the spread of the conflict.
The combined effects of the economic embargo and a highly successful Croatian-led offensive forced the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table at Dayton, Ohio in fall 1995. At Dayton, Serb, Croat, and Bosnians leaders agreed to a General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). The peace treaty called for a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to enforce a cease fire, separate belligerents, collect heavy weapons into cantonment sites, assist withdrawal of UN forces, and control Bosnian airspace. Over 20,000 American troops in Europe deployed to northern Bosnia as part of JOINT ENDEAVOR, the codename for the IFOR operation. An American airborne battalion from Italy parachuted on to Tuzla airfield to secure a base for multinational Task Force Eagle that would operate in the area. The 1st Armored Division moved overland from Germany and crossed pontoon bridges spanning the Sava River into Bosnia in a robust show of force.
American troops quickly implemented the GFAP’s provision to physically separate the warring factions and establish a zone of separation. Units controlled their assigned areas with vehicle checkpoints, aggressive patrols, while collecting heavy weapons into weapons storage sites. Exhausted by three years of war, the ethnic entities offered little resistance; gunfire and acts of violence directed at the peace enforcers were sporadic. As the situation stabilized, troops operated from over twenty small encampments protected by trenches, barbed wire, and towers. During daily engagements with the population, soldiers talked directly with local officials, inspected entity armed forces’ bases, or participated in local radio broadcasts. Animosity between the ethnic factions never ceased; therefore, units sometimes assisted the International Police Task Force to control violent crowds. Identifying, marking, and clearing abandoned minefields—over 750,000 mines were emplaced throughout the country—were also a high priority. In carrying out each mission, task force members were conscious of the highly political environment where small incidents could rapidly generate adverse strategic consequences. They judiciously applied the doctrinal principles of legitimacy, restraint, and impartiality.
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR lasted a year, replaced in succession by JOINT GUARD and JOINT FORGE, new phases of the mission. Dubbed as stabilization forces (SFOR), units from across the Army rotated into Bosnia. The ethnic factions remained divided, with resentments just under the surface of civil life. Resettlement of displaced persons into their original homes, for example, proved to be a particularly complex and tough mission. Presuming they could produce the required legal proof of ownership, returning a family to their house occupied by another ethnic group’s family often proved contentious. Nevertheless, the factions’ passions subsided over time and reduced the need for SFOR. Only 1000 American troops remained when Task Force Eagle disbanded in late November 2004. 
While heavily involved in Bosnia, the American military engaged directly in a second peace enforcement mission involving a NATO intervention in Serbia’s internal affairs. Conflict engulfed the Serbian province of Kosovo, bordering Albania, in 1998. The province held special historical importance in Serbia’s national identity. Serbs had dominated the province until the 1990s when Albanian Kosovars accounted for 90% of the population. The Muslim Kosovars agitated for independence or unification with Albania, causing Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to crack down with repressive measures, including forced population displacements. The agitators formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a clandestine guerrilla movement, to strike at government officials and police. The KLA were skilled at propaganda and exploited mass media to publicize their plight, especially highlighting Serb brutality. Serbian forces’ massacre of 45 civilians at Racak on 15 January 1999 caused NATO to issue an ultimatum to Milosevic’s government to end the fighting.
Milosevic rejected the international community’s demands at the Rambouillet Peace Conference in February 1999. NATO unanimously resolved to use air strikes to force Serbian compliance with agreed terms. Operation ALLIED FORCE, the NATO air campaign conducted from 23 March – 10 June, launched cruise missile strikes from ships in the Adriatic and carried out 38,000 air sorties, sixty percent flown by American pilots. Precision-guided bombs initially struck at strategic command and control facilities, ammunition depots, air defense sites, and dual-use facilities such as bridges, power plants, refineries, and telecommunications infrastructure. 
While bombs smashed into their infrastructure, the Serbian Army terrorized the Kosovars. General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, tersely persuaded NATO to dedicate some air attacks against Serb ground forces and to prepare for a ground offensive, an option previously rejected by the Allies. Air strikes against ground troops proved problematic as Serbs used camouflage to conceal troop positions, deployed decoys, and exploited the Kosovars as human shields. The air strikes’ effectiveness gradually improved as the KLA worked as spotters for the Allies. NATO readied ground forces and deployed them to Macedonia for a possible invasion. An American brigade task force—Task Force Hawk—with attack helicopters, rocket artillery, and mechanized infantry deployed to Albania. Applying additional psychological pressure on Milosevic’s troops, a ground offensive proved unnecessary. After 79 days of bombing, Milosevic agreed to NATO’s terms on 10 June 1999, including withdrawal of loyal forces, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force into Kosovo, and return of refugees. Two days later, the previously staged multinational ground force raced into Kosovo and assumed peace enforcement duties.
American units in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) occupied a sector in southeastern Kosovo and steadily enforced the peace. Their experience paralleled that in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Units patrolled, manned checkpoints, conducted vehicle searches for illegal weapons, carried out liaison with allies, supported humanitarian relief efforts, and engaged local officials. Because local governments proved incapable of law enforcement and delivery of services, military police and civil affairs detachments engaged in “nation-building” to improve security and stability. The Kosovar Albanians welcomed the Americans as liberators, but sometimes exploited their friendly relations to seek revenge against the Serbs. As peacekeepers American troops applied the principles of legitimacy and impartiality to such situations and quickly found themselves protecting the Serbs. Like Bosnia, the situation stabilized, troop strengths dropped, and the ethnic factions remained separated rather than reconciled.
During the 1990s, the United States military adeptly adapted to the post-Cold War’s changing strategic circumstances. Organized and trained for high intensity conventional war, the military performed a series of military operations other war that required restraint rather than power, diplomacy rather than fighting. In fact, the measures of success were lack of violence and no casualties. Consistent with the underlying premises of national strategy, units engaged in nation-building activities to help restore order and improve life in war-torn areas. Importantly, these deployments provided a generation of small unit leaders an opportunity to exercise small unit leadership in dispersed environments, assume enormous responsibilities, and hone their judgment in a multi-ethnic environment. The expertise gleaned in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans would be applied with profit on the battle grounds of Afghanistan and Iraq in the following decade.
 On the post-Vietnam “renaissance” in military professionalism, see, James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995).
 A point well-made by Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 3-5, 86-87. For a thorough analysis of Provide Comfort, see, Gordon Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991 (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 2004).
 For survey of issues, see, J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
 Cited in Mandelbaum, Mission Failure, p. 81.
 United Nations Secretary General, An Agenda for Peace, 17 June 1992, internet, https://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm, accessed 18 March 2018; Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” The Economist, 16 September 1999, internet, https://www.economist.com/node/324795 accessed 18 March 2018.
 For a good listing of various works associated with this theory, see, Oxford Bibliographies (Political Science), “Democratic Peace,” internet, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0014.xml, accessed 4 March 2018.
The doctrine defined low intensity conflict as “a political-military confrontations between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition of states . . . frequently involving protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies.” Headquarters, Departments of Army and Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Publication 3-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: HQDA and HQAF, 1990).
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (Washington, D.C.: DoD, 1995).
 Richard Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2002), pp. 6-8. United Nations Resolutions referenced in this article may be found at https://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/.
 For perspectives on Somali, see, Ibid; Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999); and Robert F. Baumann, Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington, My Clan Against the World: U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992-1994 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2004).
 The junta had agreed to the deployment of 200 American and 25 Canadian troops to train the police in preparation for Aristide’s return. When the USS Harlan County attempted to off load the troops, a crowd of enraged Haitians jeered and blocked their landing. Mandlebaum, Mission Failure, pp. 91-92.
 The military had initially prepared two invasion options: one for forcible entry and destruction of the Haitian security forces and one for a more permissible entry of peacekeeping forces. See Richard Stewart, ed., American Military History, volume 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), pp. 433-436; Walter Kretchick et. al., Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1998).
 The Muslim Bosnians represented 44 percent of the population; the Orthodox Serbs 33 percent; and the Catholic Croatians 17 percent.
 Stewart, ed., American Military History, volume 2, pp. 441-445; and R. Cody Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovia: The U.S. Army’s Role in Peace Enforcement Operations, 1995-2004, CMH Pub. 70-97-1 (Washington, D.C.: Army Center for Military History, 2005).
 Serbian Prince Lazar had fought and died in the Battle of Kosovo Polje (Plain of Blackbirds) against the Ottoman Turks on 28 June 1389. For Serbs, even though defeated, the battle symbolized martyrdom on behalf of Serbian national identity. See, Balkan Military History, internet https://www.balkanhistory.com/kosovo_1389.htm, accessed 18 March 2018.
 NATO, “NATO’s Role in Kosovo: Operation Allied Force, 23 March-10 June 1999” internet, https://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm, accessed 18 March 2018; and U.S. Air Force Historical Support Division, “1999-Operation Allied Force,” internet, https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458957/operation-allied-force/, accessed 18 March 2018.
 For perspectives on strategy and war-making in NATO, see, Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001); and Ivo Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000).
 For boots on the ground perspectives in Kosovo, see, Dana Priest, The Mission Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), pp. 247-384.
 For more in-depth analysis of the American military’s evolving doctrine and role in operations other war and nation-building, see, Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010); and James Dobbins et. al., America’s Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Afghanistan, MR 1753 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003). David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001) provides insights into the foreign policy and strategic challenges of these interventions.