Introduction

The risk of a war over Taiwan is higher today than at any time in the past half-century. Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping has declared that Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland is an “inevitable requirement” for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and “should not be passed down generation after generation.” Yet peaceful means of reunification have all but disappeared because most Taiwanese are more determined than ever to maintain their de facto independence. This stance threatens China’s territorial integrity, as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Xi’s legitimacy as top leader.

In response, China is brandishing its military option. Over the past three years, it has conducted the largest and most provocative show of force in the Taiwan Strait in a generation. Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more than fifty combat aircraft, menace Taiwan almost daily and often simulate attacks on Taiwanese, Japanese, or US targets. Meanwhile, China has been amassing ships, aircraft, and missiles as part of the largest military buildup by any country in decades. Its military budget increased tenfold from 1990 to 2020. From 2020 to 2023, it doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal. China now militarily outspends every other country in Asia combined. It wields the world’s largest ballistic missile inventory and navy by number of ships. Moreover, Beijing has become increasingly belligerent in its relations with neighbors from Japan to India.

The United States has tried to deter Chinese aggression by declaring its support for Taiwan. But it is no longer clear that the US military could immediately respond to a Chinese assault on the island. Historically, the United States has relied on its manufacturing prowess to outproduce adversaries after a war starts. But now that China is the world’s leading manufacturing nation by output, it is possible that both sides could sustain a protracted conventional war—and might be tempted to break the stalemate by using nuclear weapons against military targets.

These dangerous trends make deterrence and defense cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Taiwan extremely important. Toward that end, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) convened a US-Japan-Taiwan Track 2 dialogue in November 2023 to discuss deterrence and defense cooperation.

Findings Summary

The dialogue yielded several key points of broad agreement.

1. Military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is likely to evolve into a protracted war. Both the United States and China have the resources and motivations to continue fighting and escalate the conflict even after enduring heavy losses, making it a high-stakes clash for regional dominance.
2. Deterring the use of nuclear weapons requires preventing a conventional war from breaking out in the first place. Both sides could be tempted to use nuclear weapons to turn the tide of battle or break a grinding war of attrition.
3. The US, Japan, and Taiwan must redouble efforts to modernize and prepare their respective militaries for potential war in the 2020s. The current funding levels and military plans do not match the speed and severity of the Chinese threat.
4. Internationalizing the conflict over Taiwan is an essential component of deterrence. The United States must develop diplomatic and economic strategies that emphasize economic, political, and human costs of war for countries around the world.
5. There is not enough domestic support in the United States, Taiwan, or Japan for trilateral defense cooperation. New and improved public awareness campaigns should communicate the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait and the need to mobilize resources for deterrence.

Reassurance is essential for deterrence. Beijing must believe that the United States is maintaining its Taiwan policy, and that peaceful reunification remains possible.

Methodology

FPRI convened a US-Japan-Taiwan Track 2 dialogue in Washington, DC, on November 13-14, 2023. Participants included retired military leaders, former government officials, and non-government subject-matter experts from the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. The dialogue was comprised of five 75-minute sessions on the following topics: (1) deterrence signaling; (2) domestic politics; (3) defense cooperation; (4) war termination; and (5) policy recommendations. Every session began with a brief presentation by a participant from each country, then shifted to a moderated open discussion involving all participants. These conversations operated under the Chatham House Rule.

Key Findings

• A war over Taiwan will likely become protracted because the United States and China have the resources and incentives to fight multiple battles in the world’s most strategically vital region. Deterring or winning such a conflict will require substantial forces deployed ahead of time in theater and the capacity to regroup and reload indefinitely.
• Both China and the United States could be tempted to use nuclear weapons against military targets to turn the tide of battle. The best way to avoid nuclear escalation is to prevent a conventional war from breaking out in the first place. Failing that, the United States will need to deter Chinese nuclear use by credibly threatening to retaliate in kind and by establishing crisis communication mechanisms with Beijing.
• The pace of US, Taiwanese, and Japanese defense modernization does not match the speed and severity of the Chinese military threat.
• Military preparations should be bolstered by a diplomatic and economic strategy that internationalize the Taiwan conflict.
• Political will for robust trilateral defense cooperation is lacking.
• Deterrence must be coupled with credible reassurance.

Read the recommendations in the full report.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.