On November 13, 2024, the Foreign Policy Research Institute will present Jared Isaacman with the 18th Annual Benjamin Franklin Award for Public Service. Isaacman served as commander of Inspiration4, the first private human spaceflight in which none of the people aboard were from a government agency, for SpaceX in 2021. In 2024, he commanded the Polaris Dawn mission, which set new records and marked important milestones for what private firms can achieve with crewed spaceflight.

How do questions about space exploration and commercial development fit within a “foreign policy” paradigm? We’ve gone back through recent Orbis offerings, and also asked an Orbis contributor—Joan Johnson-Freese, who among other things is one of the country’s leading space experts, and also chaired the National Security Affairs department of the US Naval War College—to give us some perspective.

Joan Johnson-Freese notes:

Space is a unique physical and legal domain.  Perhaps consequently, there is disagreement among the major space powers, and sometimes even within the major space powers, regarding whether it is a global commons like the maritime realm, or something else. Those countries with high vested interests in using space and protecting their space assets – like the US, Japan, Russia, India and China – tend to consider that space is not a global commons, as if it were rights of sovereignty and self-defense would become muddled.  That said, the Obama Administration did reference space as a global commons in the 2010 National Security Strategy. Alternative to a global commons, space is sometimes referred to as a “common pool resource” and, within security communities, an “operational domain.”  The US has even called space a war fighting domain.  The overriding consideration for most space security issues is the dual-use nature of the vast majority of space technology; specifically whether it is offensive or defensive.

Space as a domain hosts a vast number of information technology assets necessary for modern living as we know it. Those assets include GPS, which as a timing asset facilitates information that allows individuals to, for example, use their credit cards at gasoline pumps. As a navigation tool, commercial airlines can fly closer together more safely, and hence more efficiently, and fire engines can find your house in an emergency.  Weather satellites track storms. Huge amounts of data can be transferred around the globe through communication satellites.

The addition of commercial companies to the once exclusively-government-owned space has been both a boon and a complication to the growth of space activity,  On the positive side, commercial space transportation has brought cost-per-pound-to-orbit down substantially, and offered options for spaceflight previously unavailable.  On the “complications” side, commercial space operates under different parameters and with different goals than government, security-focused space activities. The US space security community, for example, is hyper focused on competition between nations vis-a-vis potential space warfare, whereas the commercial, private sector focuses on competition much like competition on any other domain – e.g. cost, profit, market, etc..

“Rules” about what is and is not legally “permissible” in space exist, but will likely go out the window with the first whiff of conflict in space. Hopefully though, countries will remember that much like in a nuclear conflict, there is no winner in a space war, only losers.

Back in 2020, Mariel Borowitz, Lawrence Rubin and Brian Stewart called our attention to the national security implications of emerging satellite technologies, especially satellite rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) and on-orbit servicing (OOS) capabilities. With more than 2500 satellites in active operation, we depend on them for enabling communications and navigation to keep the global economy operating–and in the military/security sphere, satellites are critical for monitoring and observation. RPO and OOS spacecraft can be used for benign purposes–for repair, refueling, etc.–but the same technologies are also what is required to wield anti-satellite weaponry. Moreover, these capabilities are well within the capacity of private/commercial firms to develop, meaning both state and non-state actors can potentially, in the future, have the ability to threaten satellite networks. As they conclude:

The rapid advancement of emerging space technologies, such as RPO and OOS, promises to bring a transformative effect to both peaceful space operations and the future of warfare. These capabilities offer a broad array of options, from reconnaissance to repair to destruction. Which of these functions will be employed on any given day will be difficult to determine.

Kaili Ayers examines possible deterrence scenarios that could avoid some of the negative and catastrophic outcomes Mariel Borowitz, Lawrence Rubin and Brian Stewart lay out. But she also warns:

The proliferation of inferential ASAT capabilities presents new challenges to the space governance regime by introducing uncertainty into the deterrence calculus through methods such as salami tactics and grey-zone warfare. As this scenario demonstrates, deterrence strategies within the context of such tactics are difficult to achieve as signals may be easily misconstrued.

Finally, Brandon Weichert advocates for a policy of “space dominance”, reminding us:

Modern society depends on satellites in space, and the United States relies on satellites more than any other country. It is from space that much of America’s military advantage is assured. Without the satellites that link our forces together, America’s modern military would cease to function and would risk being overwhelmed. However, US space architecture is more vulnerable to attack than ever. The longer America’s satellites remain undefended, the more likely those systems will be vulnerable to hostile attack.

The US position of global leadership on Earth rests, in part, on its ability to maintain a dominant position in space.

Image: NASA