The not-so-unexpected victory of former president Donald Trump on November 5 has sparked renewed discussion on his foreign policy and how a second term might differ from both his first term and current President Joe Biden’s. This article examines Trump’s potential approach to the Middle East, identifying possible shifts and continuities across key issues shaping the region today. These issues include the Iran-Israel confrontation (centered on the Iranian nuclear program), Arab-Israeli reconciliation (and the future of the Palestinian question), US military presence in Syria and Iraq, and broader efforts to reshape the Middle Eastern order within the context of US-China strategic competition. These topics continue to shape the region’s politics, affecting various state and non-state actors, both regionally and globally.

As the dictum goes, “personnel is policy.” Thus, the scenarios and possibilities discussed here consider the tensions between two core factions within today’s Republican Party: an isolationist faction on the farther right of the party aligned with Trump’s “America First” vision, and a more activist faction that supports robust American power projection, though not through large-scale ground invasions as seen in Iraq or Afghanistan. These foreign policy strains are not new—they have deep roots within the Republican Party and American politics. For example, as seen with former President George W. Bush’s administration following the 9/11 attacks, domestic or international events can dramatically alter an administration’s course, even if it initially professes significant isolationist leanings.

Israel-Iran Confrontation and Iran’s Nuclear Program

The escalating conflict between Iran and Israel is currently the most pressing regional issue, with a genuine risk of evolving into an all-out, multi-party, multi-front war. Since Hamas’s October 7 attacks and the subsequent Israeli response in Gaza, the conflict has been on a path of incremental escalation, initially by Iran and, more recently, by Israel. Israel has leveraged the multi-front assaults by Iran’s “Resistance Axis” since October 7 as justification to break the taboo of launching direct attacks on Iranian soil. Much in terms of the trajectory of Iran and Israel’s confrontation depends on the threat perception, risk calculation and strategic objectives of each side. Iran has been in a mostly reactive position since the Israeli attack on Iranian consulate in Damascus in April. Israel has gained strategic initiative over Iran and is the party that would decide whether, when, how, and where to escalate based on what price it is willing to pay for the ends that it defines for itself.

While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has jubilantly hailed Trump’s return to the White House, Tehran views the prospect with deep wariness. However, much in the US-Israel-Iran relations depends on the direction of Iran’s nuclear program and whether Iran will be willing to negotiate with a Trump administration. Trump has signaled on several occasions that he does not seek regime change in Tehran and that he wants an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian officials seem to cautiously welcome this approach, aiming to avoid the possibility of war with the United States or Israel and to relieve the devastating sanctions placed on them for decades. Iranian Vice-President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif, a primary advocate of the former Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal on Iran’s side, has indicated that Tehran would enter into talks with Trump if it is treated with “respect.”

However, the question remains: What kind of deal would Iran be able to negotiate? Would it be one that focuses solely on Iran’s nuclear program, and if so, how would it differ from the JCPOA? During his previous term, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and issued a twelve-point set of conditions for talks with Iran, which included terminating the military dimension of its nuclear program, allowing rigorous and sudden inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, halting Iran’s ballistic missile program, ceasing support for regional proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, and disarming Iraqi militias and integrating them into Iraq’s security forces. It is unclear whether the Trump team would insist on these conditions this time around. However, if they did, it would place Iran in a serious dilemma. Moreover, Iran’s repeated attempts to assassinate Trump in retaliation for his 2020 order to kill Iranian Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani could influence Trump’s personal stance toward Iran, adding another layer of complexity for Tehran.

While survival is crucial for the Iranian regime, the form and basis of that survival matter. Without its network of regional militias, ballistic missile capabilities, and a nuclear program under stringent international monitoring, the Islamic Republic would undergo a transformation, appearing significantly weakened to both allies and adversaries. This level of concession could leave Iran vulnerable to external pressures and domestic unrest—the likelihood of which is heightened given the government’s oppressive stance on civil liberties, women’s rights, ethnic minorities, and overall economic mismanagement. Consequently, a deal with Washington along the liens of the 12 points might seem like an act of capitulation for Iran and could prove disastrous, without necessarily guaranteeing the regime’s survival. However, rejecting a deal exposes Iran to the serious risk of escalating Israeli and even US attacks, particularly as its air defenses are now severely compromised following recent Israeli strikes in late October. In short, the Iranian regime is caught between a rock and a hard place.

Trump’s policy toward Tehran will also depend on the figures he appoints to key national security and foreign policy roles in institutions like the State Department—especially the person handling the Iran portfolio—the Defense Department, and the National Security Council. Should individuals with strong anti-Islamic Republic views assume these positions, it would be reasonable to expect an aggressive stance from the administration toward Iran. Currently, Florida Senator Marco Rubio is reported to be Trump’s choice to lead the State Department and former State Department Iran envoy Brian Hook is reported to be overseeing the department’s transition. Fox News host Pete Hegseth is Trump’s nominee for Defense Secretary nominee and Congressman Mike Waltz is the nominee for National Security Advisor, while Congresswoman Elise Stefanik is the nominee for US’s UN ambassador role. All these figures are known for tough stances on Iran and strong support for US allies such as Israel. Additionally, Mike Evans, a prominent Evangelical leader and Trump advisor, told Israel’s i24News that president-elect Trump encouraged Israel to target Iran’s energy infrastructure during Biden’s remaining lame-duck period. With Hamas significantly weakened and Hezbollah decapitated, Netanyahu may feel emboldened to launch a comprehensive strike on Iran before or shortly after January 20 to diminish Tehran’s threat to Israel.

Overall, while the Trump administration is likely to avoid a direct regime-change policy, it will probably pursue a maximum pressure campaign by imposing new sanctions on key Iranian industries and officials, rigorously enforcing existing sanctions on Iranian oil sales (which have doubled under Biden compared to Trump’s first term), adopting a “maximum support” approach if domestic unrest occurred in Iran, and potentially backing Israeli strikes on Tehran. The intent would be either to pressure Tehran into a new deal or to punish it severely for refusing one and for its regional behavior. Of Iran’s multi-layered deterrence strategies, only developing a nuclear weapon might shield it against future attacks and possible collapse, given the reduced effectiveness of its Resistance Axis and ballistic missile arsenal. This would certainly depend on Tehran’s threat perception. But with uranium enriched to 60 percent, Iran appears to be now capable of producing weapons-grade, 90-percent-enriched uranium within one to two weeks, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken indicated in July. Despite internal pressure for such a move, whether Tehran will present the world with a nuclear weapon fait accompli—and the timing of such a decision—will be closely monitored by actors in the region and beyond. Taking actual steps toward building a bomb would certainly invite a devastating Israeli (and US) response. And if Tehran manages to secretly build such a bomb, it will prompt even greater sanctions from Washington and its Western, and possibly regional, allies.

Abraham Accords 2.0

The Abraham Accords, establishing diplomatic ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan were undoubtedly the most prominent foreign policy achievement and legacy of the first Trump administration. Following years of unsuccessful efforts by the Biden administration, a second Trump administration would likely prioritize securing a similar agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This would be seen as the culmination of the Abraham Accords, regardless of whether it retains the same title.

However, there are significant obstacles to such a deal. Ongoing Israeli military operations and its reluctance thus far to agree on a new governing formula for Palestinian areas in Gaza or Palestinian statehood could hinder the likelihood of an Israeli-Saudi agreement. Without meaningful recognition for Palestinians and without a role for the Gulf states and Egypt, in supporting a future for Gaza and other Palestinian territories, the prospects of an expanded Abraham Accords or an Israeli-Saudi deal would face substantial challenges.

Israel appears to favor a compartmentalized approach, distinguishing its relations with the Gulf and Saudi Arabia from the Palestinian question. Saudi Arabia, however, seems to prefer a comprehensive approach, with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan recently reiterating the need for a recognized Palestinian state as a precondition for any deal with Israel. Given Saudi Arabia’s leadership role in the Arab and Islamic worlds and its guardianship of Islam’s two holiest sites, the kingdom cannot afford to appear as abandoning the Palestinian cause. As demonstrated by the October 7 attack by Hamas, the Palestinian issue and militant groups remain potent forces that could disrupt any Arab-Israeli deal that overlooks them.

Overall, warmer relations and a higher degree of trust between the Republicans and Israel suggest that a deal is more likely under a Trump administration if approached strategically. Trump’s personal style of diplomacy and strong connections with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) may aid in this process. If Jared Kushner returns to a central role in Trump’s Middle East policy, the chances of a comprehensive Saudi-Israeli agreement may increase, given his close relationship with MBS and family ties to Trump. Should an Israeli-Saudi deal prove unachievable—mainly due to Israeli inflexibility on the Palestinian issue—a bilateral Saudi-US security agreement might be the most viable alternative, either in Biden’s final weeks or under a future Trump administration. 

US Military Deployments in Syria and Iraq

Another key issue for the incoming Trump administration in the Middle East will be the ongoing presence of US troops in Syria and Iraq. These forces have faced numerous attacks by pro-Iran militias, and their strategic purpose is frequently questioned in Washington. Given Trump’s emphasis on ending “endless wars” abroad, he may be tempted to bring these troops home. However, such a decision is easier said than done, as their deployment remains crucial to regional stability and US interests.

Syria

Syria has become a central arena for entangled regional and global rivalries over the past decade. The country is currently divided into three primary zones, each backed by a major regional or global power. The western part of Syria is dominated by Assad, with the support of Iran, its regional proxies, and Russia. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control the northern and northeastern energy-rich areas with the backing of a 900-strong US military deployment. Northwestern and parts of northern Syria are controlled by various, mainly Islamist groups supported by Turkey.

Syria continues to be a hub of Iranian regional activity and a transit point for weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has prompted Israeli airstrikes, particularly since the October 7 attacks. Damascus also has an unresolved territorial dispute with Israel over the Golan Heights, which has been under Israeli control since the 1967 War. Syria was a primary base of the Islamic State (ISIS) and has recently witnessed troubling signs of ISIS resurgence, reminiscent of the group’s rise in the early 2010s. The official rationale for the US military presence in Syria is to prevent the re-emergence of ISIS. Complicating matters further, Syria has become a site of ongoing tension between Turkey and Kurds, as Ankara considers the Kurdish elements within the SDF to be an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which it has been battling for nearly four decades.

Crafting a policy toward this complex landscape of regional and global interests is understandably challenging. In 2019, Trump ordered a partial withdrawal of US troops from the border areas between Syria and Turkey, enabling Turkey to launch incursions and occupy significant portions of Kurdish-majority areas previously held by the SDF. It remains to be seen whether a future Trump administration would take a similar approach.

Trump ally Robert F. Kennedy Jr. recently stated that the president-elect wanted to withdraw the remaining US troops from Syria to avoid them becoming “cannon fodder” in the event of a regional conflict between the Assad regime and Turkey. While the chances of an all-out war between Assad and Turkey are minimal, a US withdrawal would likely lead to further instability in Syria and result in a loss of critical leverage for the United States in both Syria and the broader region. Although the US military presence in Syria is small, it is strategically vital, yielding significant benefits by monitoring ISIS activity and limiting Iran’s regional expansionist efforts—the latter especially directly bearing on Israel’s security. Pulling out the troops would trigger a bloody struggle by various local and regional contenders for the control; of the SDF territory, sow chaos, and could potentially lead to the escape of hundreds, if not thousands, of captured ISIS elements and their radicalized family members from prisons and camps.

Thus, it is not far-fetched to expect that Republican foreign policy segments, more attuned to broader regional geopolitical interests, may push back against Trump’s potential withdrawal and the more isolationist factions within his administration. The outcome of this internal struggle is uncertain, especially given that the composition of the Trump administration is not yet fully known. However, National Security Advisor pick Waltz and State Secretary nominee Rubio on Syria strongly opposed Trump’s troops’ withdrawal from Syria in 2019. Overall, maintaining the partnership with the SDF while addressing Turkish concerns by diversifying the SDF’s composition to include Kurdish and non-Kurdish groups more acceptable to Turkey would better advance the strategic interests of the United States and its allies.

Iraq

The United States and Iraq continue to share an uneasy relationship more than two decades after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime and the rise of the current political order in the country. The growing dominance of pro-Iran groups within Baghdad’s state institutions has strained this relationship further. Groups straddling both official Iraqi security and political institutions and the so-called Iran-led Resistance Axis continue to attack US forces in Iraq and Syria as part of Iran’s broader strategy to undermine US regional influence. This has placed Iraq and the United States in a murky dynamic, where they are neither true allies nor adversaries, despite the Strategic Framework Agreement they signed in 2008.

Approximately 2,500 US troops are stationed in Iraq, advising Iraqi security forces on the critical mission of ensuring ISIS’s defeat. Iraq’s significance has grown amid the recent regional conflict since the October 7 attacks, as Iran-backed militias have targeted both Israel and US forces—with dozens of attacks on Israel in the past six weeks. These actions contradict Iraq’s official stance, which seeks to avoid becoming entangled in the conflict.

Recently, Iraqi and US officials reached an agreement for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026, with a small contingent remaining in the Kurdistan Region during the last year of this agreement to support the mission in neighboring Syria. This agreement awaits final approval from the US government. For Iraq, the priority is to see US troops depart and to strengthen economic and bilateral security ties beyond the anti-ISIS global coalition framework. The incoming Trump administration may find it tempting to withdraw US troops from Iraq either prematurely or in accordance with the scheduled plan. Or depending on the course of regional events and Iraq’s behavior in the context of the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict, it might decide to keep troops in Iraq.

Ongoing attacks on Israel could potentially make Iraq a target for the Israeli military, as has occurred with other members of the Iran-backed axis in Lebanon and Yemen. Washington has reportedly restrained Israel from adding Iraq to its list of targets, though this could change depending on US Middle East policy (under Biden or Trump) or the evolving calculations of Netanyahu’s government and Iran’s broader behavior. Iraq may also face sanctions due to militia activities, the continued smuggling of US-provided dollars to Iran and its proxies, and an Iraqi judicial arrest warrant for Trump following the killing of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a senior leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the umbrella group for predominantly Iran-backed factions. The possibility of Washington revoking exemptions that allow Iraq to purchase Iranian natural gas for its power plants is a tangible prospect, especially as part of its anticipated maximum pressure strategy against Iran.

Washington’s best course of action regarding Iraq may be to leverage current regional tensions to pressure the Iraqi government toward meaningful security sector reforms. This could involve curbing the influence of Iran-backed armed factions and further integrating the PMF into the state’s military-security structure. The United States could also alternatively maintain a long-term military presence in Iraqi Kurdistan to support the Syria mission, broader regional interests, and the containment of a resurgent jihadi threat. Washington’s fatigue with Iraq should not overshadow prudent policymaking concerning the challenges and opportunities the country presents.      

The Middle East in a Moment of Global Rivalries

The desire to reduce US engagement in the Middle East dates back to former president Richard Nixon’s administration, nearly half a century ago. This aspiration continued under both Trump and Biden, yet the region continues to demand US attention.

Although US policymakers have argued for a pivot to East Asia and focusing more energy on Eastern Europe to counter China and Russia, the Middle East remains integral to global rivalries. China has made substantial inroads through economic, energy, and trade partnerships and flexed its diplomatic clout by brokering the 2023 Iran-Saudi deal. The region is also central to global trade routes, as evidenced by initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to integrate the region’s vast energy resources.

From the perspective of some policymakers in Washington, the Abraham Accords and a surprising weakening of Iran and its Axis of Resistance in recent months offer a unique opportunity to reshape the regional order in alignment with US priorities. For Washington to maintain its influence, it would feel compelled to continue strengthening its allies, which necessitates some level of military presence or involvement. A leadership void due to Washington’s disengagement would likely invite interventions by China or Russia, or intensify regional rivalries among players like Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Turkey, and Iran.

Actors like Iran tend to design their policies in the region or their support for Russia against Ukraine as part of a broader strategy to erode US influence and challenge the US-dominated global order. Viewing the region through this “big picture” lens is essential to understanding the broader significance of regional events and the stakes involved.

Interpreted cautiously, despite Trump’s professed preference against deploying military power or involvement in global conflicts/crises, the selection of individuals for key foreign policy and national security roles suggests a lean toward a more engaged US presence in the region than retreat. This indicates continuity in the use of American power and influence, support for Israel, and harsher policy toward Iran, much like Trump’s first term. Nevertheless, future US policy could still reflect isolationist tendencies, both due to Trump and the general American public’s hesitation regarding troop deployments and overseas interventions. The future of US policy in the Middle East will likely reflect a struggle between activist and isolationist inclinations within the Trump administration and the Republican foreign policy establishment writ large. Neither side is likely to gain full control, suggesting US Middle East policy will likely experience shifts in both directions.

Image Credit: US Army photo by Spc. Tyler Becker