At the beginning of 2025, Poland assumed the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time in its history. The timing is quite symbolic as it follows the celebration of the 20th anniversary of Poland’s presence in the EU structures. This is also a time of volatile international situations and significant uncertainty regarding the future of the Old Continent as evident from this year’s Munich Security Conference and President Trump’s decision to freeze US aid to Ukraine. Europe is constantly struggling with the consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the ongoing war—particularly palpable in the eastern part of the continent where Poland is emerging as a leader—seems very likely to change the EU’s relations with Moscow for good. The real threat from Russia and the devastating war in the east have made it clear to all of Europe that it must prioritize security and cooperation in the near future. This is, therefore, the approach of the six-month Polish Presidency, the motto of which is “Security, Europe!”

Top Priority – Security

Security is the framework for defining the priorities of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the basis for deliberations and discussions on the future of Europe, the tone of which will be set by Poland. On the Presidency’s official website, we can read that: “Responsibility for future generations requires EU unity and a willingness to work with partners who share our values, in particular aspiring members. Furthermore, it obliges us to defend the values on which the Community is based, such as democracy, freedom and the rule of law. Therefore, the Polish Presidency will support activities strengthening European security in all its dimensions: external, internal, information, economic, energy, food, and health.”[1]

This approach can be seen in the seven dimensions of security that Poland wants to address in the near future. These are:

• Defense and Security – boosting defense readiness based on increased military spending, providing support for key infrastructure, such as East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line, and strengthening cooperation with NATO and non-EU countries (US, UK, South Korea, and others).
• Protection of People and Borders – ensuring an optimal level of internal security and proper functioning of the Schengen Area, seeking new solutions to address the challenges of migration, and enhancing Member States’ capacities for civil protection, disaster resilience, and humanitarian assistance.
• Resistance to Foreign Interference and Disinformation – increasing an ability to recognize and eliminate disinformation and foreign manipulation, strengthening civil society and coordination to improve the EU’s ability to prevent and mitigate the effects of hostile actions in cyberspace, and developing modern, secure digital services.
• Ensuring Security and Freedom of Business – solving challenges related to rapid technological change, green transition, and geopolitical tensions, deepening of the Single Market, removing barriers to cross-border activity, reducing bureaucratic burdens, and restoring a fair competition for EU industry in the global arena.
• Energy Transition – ensuring the reliability and certainty of the supply of energy resources, promoting actions aimed at a full withdrawal from the import of Russian energy, enhancing the security (and cybersecurity) of energy infrastructure, and reducing Europe’s dependence on imported technologies, components, and critical raw materials.
• Competitive and Resilient Agriculture – ensuring a solid farmers’ position in value chains and their stable income, ensuring a competitive and resilient European agriculture that provides food security for Europeans, and shaping a strong Common Agricultural Policy.
• Health Security – introducing a digital transformation of healthcare, improving the EU medicines security, diversification of medicines supply chains and support for their production in the EU, and improving the mental health of children and adolescents in the digital age.

From Frozen Aid To Heated Disinformation

The challenges that Poland will face during its Presidency of the Council of the European Union are many and varied. The upcoming months will be crucial for understanding the future not only of US support for Ukraine but also of the war in Ukraine itself. The first extremely active weeks of Donald Trump’s second term in office are mainly causing concern among European observers, while for Ukrainians, it is a brutal clash with the new reality of transatlantic relations. Trump’s decision to freeze US foreign aid for 90 days has called into question the safety of civilians in Ukraine and also the future functioning of numerous Ukrainian institutions that now operate thanks to USAID funding (not to mention aid to many other countries around the world). While the recent judge’s ruling forcing the president to temporarily lift the foreign aid freeze offers some hope, it may prove very elusive as Trump steadily and effectively seeks to restructure the administration, beginning his cleanup with layoffs and closures of agencies that specifically deal with foreign aid. American support for the Ukrainians has been one of the key factors in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities throughout the war. Now, after Trump’s decisions and the chaos caused by representatives of his administration in Munich, Ukraine’s future seems very uncertain.

Since the very beginning of the Russian aggression, Poland has been at the forefront of countries helping Ukraine. The government, especially local governments and Polish society, has shown exceptional organization and cooperation. Many international aid organizations have also stepped in to help Poland’s efforts on the ground, and Poland has become a new hub for humanitarian aid. Further sustained and unwavering political, military, and financial support for Ukraine and its reconstruction is one of the priorities of the Polish Presidency, during which efforts will be made to convince other member states to increase their support and to continue and tighten sanctions against Russia. This is a fact that has been emphasized after the recent events at the Munich Security Conference and that Poland has already pointed out on several occasions.

When discussing Polish support for Ukraine, it is impossible to ignore the issue of migration. A total of 1.9 million refugees from Ukraine were registered in Poland. In just the first months of the war, the number reached 1.5 million. According to UNHCR data as of January 14, 2025, the current number of refugees from Ukraine in Poland is 998,070 (out of a total of 6.3 million in Europe). The controversial (for many countries) Pact on Migration and Asylum, which sets new rules for managing migration and establishing a common European asylum system, has already become one of the main topics of discussion in the EU. It will be necessary to find a solution that is fair to all member states exposed to additional risks from a potential migration crisis, and Poland will try to present new proposals to break the deadlock. The migration strategy for 2025–2030 recently presented by the government of Donald Tusk, which includes the temporary territorial suspension of the right to asylum, has not yet received a negative reaction from the EU, although everyone should be interested in regulating these issues as soon as possible. Poland has the difficult task of proposing a Europe-wide solution that satisfies different groups of member states, which often have very different approaches to the issue of migration and the security of the EU’s external borders. Poland, particularly affected by the migration crisis related to the war in Ukraine, especially at the beginning, had to face many problems related to the influx of millions of people from across the eastern border. It is important to highlight the problems that arose such as the availability of housing and the increase in rental prices, which have worsened an already difficult market situation for buyers; the integration of Ukrainian children with their Polish peers and the availability of school places for all; and learning the Polish language as a factor in finding employment and a better match between job offers and education and skills. Luckily, after three years, we do not observe social tensions and complaints about refugees from Ukraine; moreover, their presence has so far only had a positive impact on the Polish economy. We could strive for greater integration into Polish society, but the process is not over yet. However, it is important to develop such mechanisms in the EU that, in the event of further crises or developments, will help apply effective and well-targeted measures to member countries within the EU framework.

Another key area of Polish activity during the Presidency will be the enlargement of the EU. For years, Poland has supported the countries of the east in their democratic transition and efforts to become part of European structures. In addition to the obvious focus on making progress on Ukraine’s accession, Poland will also seek to accelerate the accession process in the case of Moldova and the Western Balkans. The chances are very good, especially if we look at the recent impressive progress made by Montenegro. Poland will also seek to support the pro-European aspirations of Georgian society. Related to the above, Poland’s other ambition will be to reinvigorate the Eastern Partnership (EaP)—a project initiated by Poland with the support of Sweden in 2009, which defines the eastern dimension of the EU’s policy under the European Neighbourhood Policy. The war in Ukraine and the emerging importance of the eastern part of Europe are conducive to such a decision. As Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski has already announced, Poland will work to update and reinvigorate the format. With its success story of democratic transition, a pro-European government, and 20 years of positive membership experience, Poland can act as a very effective promoter of the EU for EaP countries of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine wishing to join the European Union. The EaP initiative has become even more relevant since Armenia, a country that previously chose to abandon its relationship with the EU, has returned to the pro-European path, choosing to adopt a bill aimed at starting the process of joining the European Union in the parliament’s voting in February 2025.

The issue of green transition and diversification of energy sources is also on the agenda. After the fiasco of the European Green Deal (Poland will certainly try to revise its guidelines and focus on more achievable short-term goals), it is high time to propose and quickly implement effective and viable solutions. In this respect, Poland has a good chance to show initiative, and there may already be some kind of breakthrough in the next months.  The most controversial issue from the Polish perspective is the new emissions trading system—ETS 2—to cover the construction and road transport sectors. Therefore, the goal of the Polish Presidency will be to push for a delay or at least a softening of the terms of the new system. A chance for delay has increased in recent days following the European Commission’s presentation of the Clean Industrial Deal, a strategy aimed at supporting the competitiveness of EU industry while accelerating decarbonization. Important for Poland, the plan also includes a revision of ETS 2. Why is ETS 2 so important? Some countries are concerned that the fuel price increase caused by the new system will be too fast for the citizens and uncontrollable. Therefore, it is said that price-stabilization mechanisms should be strengthened as a potential safeguard. This will be requested primarily by Central and Eastern European countries, with Poland in the lead. Another area of increased Polish activity is certainly the shift away from Russian energy. In this field, we are already seeing considerable success, which is undoubtedly the connection of the Baltic States to the EU network and their departure from the Russian energy system. This is another important step, especially as the EU wants to accelerate the complete withdrawal from Russian gas. Commissioner Kadri Simson believes that the EU can live without Russian energy, and Poland will emphasize these words even more strongly during its Presidency. Although, there is still no shortage of takers for Russian gas in Europe.

Another important issue is certainly the digital future of Europe and the opportunities and risks it brings. The further development of artificial intelligence and related regulations such as the AI Act with the purpose to ensure equal access to new technologies, the ethical use of AI, while effectively preventing the use of new technologies to spread disinformation and influence democratic elections in Europe. As a fast-growing country in the new technologies sector, Poland will be keen to prove its position in this area as well. Potential obstacles include the dynamic situation in the field of AI (such as the growing rivalry between the US and China), or the use of algorithms to influence election results, as well as the still unclear role of Elon Musk in the US administration and his growing interest in Europe, while the EU is sometimes too slow to come up with solutions. However, there is no time to waste in the fight against cyber threats and omnipresent Russian disinformation, and a prompt and effective European response to these threats is more than necessary, as the recent case of the Romanian elections has shown.

Munich – Paris – Warsaw?

Following the chaos created in Munich by the words of Vice President JD Vance and Special Presidential Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg, French President Emmanuel Macron almost immediately convened an extraordinary meeting of (a select group of) European leaders in Paris to draw up a joint European strategy to help Ukraine and boost Europe’s defense capabilities. The special summit was attended by the leaders of France, Germany, Poland, the UK, Italy, Spain, Denmark, and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. The exclusive nature of the meeting drew criticism from representatives of other EU members who were missing from the meeting. Yet, Europe’s quick response was supposed to show its unity. For precisely this reason, Poland’s role in the coming months may prove extremely important. As a country that is now a leader in the eastern part of Europe, with a prime minister who is respected and popular among European elites, it can use the Presidency to guide further talks on security in Europe with the participation of all 27 member states and their partners. The very fact that Poland was among the elite group of the Paris meeting indicates that it is now considered one of the leaders of the Old Continent and, due to its physical proximity to the war, certainly one of the most keenly interested in further support of Ukraine alongside the Baltic States and Scandinavia. It is therefore not difficult to imagine that the path laid out in Munich, leading through Paris, may soon bring European leaders to Warsaw.

Poland, with its aspirations to be the EU’s new leader, already boasts a lead in the defense expenditure, which is extremely important in light of recent events. In 2024, Poland spent 4.2% of its GDP on defense, while in this year’s budget, Polish Council of Ministers decided to allocate 4.7% of Poland’s GDP to defense spending. Poland is setting a trend in this regard, one that the rest of the EU countries want to follow, as European defense spending has already been increased to 326 billion euros, or 2% of the EU’s GDP, in 2024 across the EU. Between 2021 and 2024, an increase of 30% has been recorded in this field. Meanwhile, after the Paris meeting, Donald Tusk announced that defense spending would be removed from the EU’s excessive deficit procedure.  The next step is the announcement (and quick adoption) of the ReArm Europe plan, which calls for up to 800 billion euro for armaments and security on the Old Continent. This unprecedented project is to be the EU’s response to the American turnaround and the rapid need to rearm Europe and help Ukraine. The five points of the plan include loosening EU spending rules by member states (as announced by Prime Minister Tusk), the allocation of 150 billion euro in loans for defense purposes, the possible reallocation of cohesion policy funds, the mobilization of private capital, and the use of European Investment Bank resources. What we can see is a true breakthrough in Europe’s approach to security.

Thanks to these and other measures implemented by the pro-European government, Poland will have the chance to prove its aspirations to be one of the leading countries in Europe. Aspirations that are justified in the sense that recent years, and especially the period since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, show the growing importance of the eastern part of Europe and Poland as a leader in this area. What can already be seen in the case of NATO and the systematic shift of the center of gravity to the eastern flank can also happen in the EU, and the Polish Presidency can certainly help.

Image: Adam Szłapka, Poland’s Minister for the European Union, speaks to the press during the General Affairs Council in Brussels, March 18, 2025.

[1] https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/programme/priorities/