American allies in the Indo-Pacific are the cornerstone of the US strategy to maintain regional stability, deter aggression, and uphold a free and open international order. Through access, interoperability, and shared capabilities, these alliances extend American power and enable collective responses to emerging threats—especially from a rising China. Strengthening and modernizing these partnerships are essential to ensuring long-term US influence in the region.

Michael Beckley—Deepening Alliance Cooperation in Asia

As the Indo-Pacific becomes the epicenter of great power competition, the United States must do more than simply maintain its alliances—it must modernize, integrate, and expand them. This month’s expert commentary explores how Washington can work more effectively with allies and partners across the region to deter aggression, build resilient capabilities, and shape a favorable balance of power.

Nikolas Gvosdev highlights the strategic challenge posed by Indo-Pacific partners’ reliance on Russian commodities. Connor Fiddler argues against scaling back the expansion of US Forces Japan, warning that such a move would undermine deterrence and alliance coordination. Shannon Vaughn emphasizes the untapped potential of secure intelligence sharing to bolster regional stability. Jaehan Park unpacks recent tensions in the US-Republic of Korea alliance, while Takuya Matsuda makes the case for why alliances and partnerships still matter—even under an “America First” foreign policy.

Together, these perspectives offer a roadmap for smarter, more sustainable engagement in Asia.

Nikolas Gvosdev—The Uncomfortable Reality of Russian Supply Lines

Russian-supplied commodities are a silent factor in the capacity of many countries within the Indo-Pacific basin—particularly in South and Southeast Asia—to become more effective security, economic, and military partners to the United States. India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar noted this past December the critical importance for India—and other states in the region—of Russia as a major supplier of crude oil, uranium, coal, fertilizers, and other commodities. These commodity inputs—as well as energy-related technologies—are vital both for ensuring food security and for sustaining economic growth and development.

If the primary US strategic objective is to build a network of partners with robust capabilities able to contain and balance a rising China—and to have an alternative Asia supply chain ecosystem (Parag Khanna’s N+1 concept where vital manufacturing and technological ecosystems do not need to run through a China hub)—then the Russian connection becomes vital. For India, for instance, facing increases in fuel consumption of about 4 percent per annum, having access to increased Russian supplies that are offered at very competitive prices has been critical both in maintaining growth and in keeping inflation in check.

The challenge for the United States is that the robust trade between Asian countries and Russia complicates efforts to use economic sanctions as a way to pressure Russia to end its campaign in Ukraine. Yet, the United States cannot guarantee alternative sources of supply at acceptable quantities and prices—all at a time when China also benefits from purchasing discounted Russian commodities.

The US effort so far has been haphazard, swinging back and forth between wanting to tighten economic pressure on Moscow and then offering sanctions exemptions. Moving forward, as the United States assesses the capabilities and burdens it is asking of its Asian partners, it must assess the extent to which Russian commodities cannot be replaced easily or cheaply—and whether Russian commodities strengthen the capabilities Washington expects of its Indo-Pacific partners.

Connor Fiddler—Don’t Cut USFJ: Reinforce the Front Line in Asia

Recent reports suggest the Department of Defense is considering scaling back the planned expansion of US Forces Japan (USFJ) in an effort to cut costs. This would be a serious strategic misstep—one that would weaken deterrence, diminish US forward posture in the Indo-Pacific, and undercut the administration’s own stated priorities. Instead of cutting these initiatives, the Defense Department should reinforce and expand them.

China’s growing military capabilities and increasingly aggressive behavior make it essential for the United States to deepen integration with key allies like Japan in order to restore and sustain American primacy in the region. In July 2024, then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced a significant upgrade to USFJ, reconstituting it as a joint force headquarters. As part of this initiative, Japan committed to establishing its own Joint Operations Command, and both countries agreed to modernize their command and control (C2) frameworks to improve interoperability between US and Japanese forces. This transformation would elevate USFJ into an operational command, greatly enhancing its wartime effectiveness and peacetime coordination—akin to the structure of US Forces Korea.

First, the United States and Japan should coordinate closely to ensure their respective joint commands are parallel and complementary. Through collocation, peacetime military exercises, joint war planning, and C2 modernization, both countries can develop a seamless combined command structure capable of evolving over time.

Second, the Pentagon should fully empower the reconstituted USFJ with the necessary leadership and resources. Appointing a capable and forward-leaning four-star general—with the requisite staff and authorities—will be essential to make USFJ a true one-stop hub for managing the US-Japan alliance.

Third, the United States should raise the ceiling on alliance cooperation by expanding co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment of military platforms with Japan. The Biden administration had taken promising initial steps with plans to co-produce advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles and Patriot PAC-3 interceptors. Given the current challenges the US defense industrial base faces, deepening allied co-production is critical to ensuring capabilities are scaled, fielded, and sustained effectively.

The Trump administration has signaled that Indo-Pacific security will be a top priority over the next four years. Scaling back or cutting the planned reconstitution of US Forces Japan would directly undermine the president’s own strategic objectives.

Shannon Vaughn—Secure Intelligence Sharing: The Key to Indo-Pacific Stability

The Indo-Pacific is at a critical juncture, with rising geopolitical tensions fueled by assertive state behavior, cyber intrusions, and economic coercion. While military alliances have historically provided security, intelligence sharing presents a more flexible and politically viable mechanism for countering hegemonic threats such as China. However, concerns about data security, espionage, and unauthorized access have long hindered intelligence cooperation.

Advancements in cybersecurity architectures, such as Zero Trust frameworks, encryption, and granular access controls, provide a compelling reason for nations to feel confident in sharing sensitive intelligence—even in contested regions. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Zero Trust Data Format (ZTDF) ensures that intelligence remains protected at the individual data-object level by embedding security directly within shared documents. Unlike traditional perimeter-based security models, ZTDF allows nations to share intelligence without relinquishing control, ensuring that only authorized recipients can access specific pieces of data.

Given these advancements, several key areas should serve as starting points for a regional intelligence-sharing framework:

• Maritime surveillance: The South China Sea remains a flashpoint, with contested waters exploited for illegal fishing, resource extraction, and military maneuvers. A Zero Trust–enabled intelligence-sharing ecosystem would allow participating nations to pool surveillance data securely, reducing the risk of leaks or compromise.
• Cyber threat intelligence: State-backed cyber actors increasingly target critical infrastructure and government institutions. A regional cybersecurity intelligence-sharing hub would enable Indo-Pacific nations to detect, analyze, and respond to cyber threats in real time, all while maintaining strict data sovereignty.
• Countering disinformation: Intelligence-sharing agreements should also focus on neutralizing disinformation campaigns designed to destabilize democratic societies. Through controlled data-sharing agreements backed by self-enforcing encryption policies, nations can collaborate to track and mitigate foreign influence operations.

By embedding security directly into the data itself, intelligence sharing becomes an asset rather than a liability. Nations in the Indo-Pacific can enhance stability, counter threats, and strengthen regional cooperation without compromising their sensitive information.

Jaehan Park—A Rift in the US-ROK Alliance?

In January, the US Department of Energy (DOE) designated the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a “sensitive” country, effective as of mid-April. While both sides quickly announced that there would be no negative impact on science and technology cooperation, the DOE’s move has resulted in much speculation.

Predictably, the decision caused acrimonious political debate in Seoul. The Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), the country’s main opposition party, claimed that the Yoon administration’s flirtation with nuclearization, combined with the martial law fiasco, led to the DOE decision. On the other hand, the ruling People’s Power Party (PPP) suggested that the current situation resulted from America’s distrust of the DPK’s “pro-China, anti-US” stance. Later, the Foreign Ministry clarified that the move had been prompted by a security breach at a DOE-affiliated research institute.

Similarly, foreign observers quickly chimed in. A senior scholar with a state-controlled think tank in China attributed the DOE’s decision to “the crisis of undercurrents in the alliance,” arguing the Republic of Korea “needs to fundamentally review its strategic thinking . . . and rebuild a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy.” The unmistakable subtext is that the Yoon administration’s move to strengthen its ties with Washington and Tokyo is not in Beijing’s interest. Beijing sees Seoul as the “weak link.” Flipping it would be an “enormous geopolitical prize.”

What might pass as a one-off event is taking place against the backdrop of critical developments at home and abroad. Internationally, Seoul is paying close attention to Washington’s strong-arming of allies and partners. The ordeal of Ukraine spurred a usually pro-American Chosun Ilbo to note that Seoul should re-think about nuclear rearmament. Domestically, there’s a looming possibility of a new progressive administration, which will likely attempt to improve relationships with Pyongyang and Beijing.

Many of the Trump administration’s Asia hands are experienced professionals. They have a delicate task of carrying out their chief executive’s directives, which can be unorthodox at times, while serving long-standing US security interests to maintain “geopolitical pluralism” in the Old World. To that end, a stable relationship with Seoul will be pivotal.

Takuya Matsuda—Why Allies and Partners Still Matter for the Trump Administration

The Trump administration appears doubtful about the role of alliances in US foreign policy. However, military alliances are a key enabler in preventing a catastrophic great power war from occurring in the Indo-Pacific, which could also seriously derail the Trump administration’s agenda to champion American prosperity, implicit in his “America First” policy. It may be useful to revisit the unique operational and strategic values that military alliances and partnerships offer in bolstering deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, US allies and partners such as Japan and the Philippines offer access to areas that are uniquely close to Taiwan where the US military has plans to deploy high-mobility artillery rocket systems in case of a contingency. These assets could make a quick and decisive victory unattainable by restricting China’s freedom to maneuver.

More importantly, the development of multilateral defense partnerships among US allies and partners—often referred to as a “latticework”— is not merely a platform for order-building. It also carries substantial operational benefits for the United States, especially in a protracted war. The trilateral defense relationships such as those between the United States, Japan, and South Korea or the Philippines are crucial in denying China the option to turn a major conflict in the region into a regional conflagration. As parts of the western Pacific are now contested space, a closer defense relationship with Australia enables the United States to disperse forces, which contributes to enhancing force survivability. In addition, as a grouping of four major naval powers, the Quad could play a key role in developing the capacity for US allies and partners to endure and prevail in a war of attrition.

Instead of simply being a means for the United States to project power, alliances are increasingly becoming an invaluable platform to jointly create military power and to shape the opponents’ strategic calculations. It is, therefore, important to build on the ongoing efforts to modernize the network of US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific that uniquely contributes to preventing a great power war from happening in the region.

Image: Republic of Korea army soldiers assigned to 5th Engineer Brigade, pulling security on a M3 bridge vehicle as part of Freedom Shield 25/Combined Wet Gap Crossing training March 20, 2025 in South Korea. US Army photo by Pfc. Wilfred Salters.