The Baltic States have consistently recognized the threat Russia posed to their sovereignty, and now, with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic region finds itself at the forefront but with a different set of challenges and regional dynamics. Over the past three years Russia has exposed its military deficiencies, and its resilience to maintain a very hot war while sustaining hundreds of thousands of causalities. In the face of that, the Northern European countries are naturally becoming a unified center of gravity for security issues.

The Baltic States, in close coordination with their Nordic partners, are heavily investing both time and resources into their comprehensive defense systems and military sustainment. While facing unique challenges and opportunities in the region, within NATO, the Baltic States are the leaders on issues such as integrated civil-military strategies and comprehensive defense. However, there is still much to do and key issues that must be addressed as soon as possible.

The New Security Reality in Northern Europe

The threat environment has fundamentally changed over the past three years, with the Baltic and the Nordic States aligning more and more in terms of both security and foreign policy issues. This was boosted by Finland and Sweden joining NATO, increasing the interoperability of the region even more while mutually boosting security on both sides of the Baltic Sea. Swedish and Danish troops being placed in Latvia, Swedish fighter jets patrolling Baltic skies from Amari air base in Estonia, and Norwegian forces in Lithuania are clear indications that the Baltic States are key to the security of the Nordics. While all of the Nordic-Baltic nations are NATO members, for the Nordics, the security and independence of the Baltic States is also an issue of national security more than it is for other NATO members. The Baltic States already understand the issues they face, but with the Nordics needing the Baltics for their own national security, it naturally aligns the region.

On the other side, Russia has not sat idle in the region and is also expanding its presence. While its focus has been on Ukraine and most of the troops that Russia had stationed around its Northern European border fighting in Ukraine, some forces remain just as active and are even expanding structurally and numerically. The Russia Air and Space forces (VKS) have not been sufficiently degraded to the point of not being able to undertake combat operations, and both the Baltic and Arctic fleets have not been affected at all. Russia has also revived its Leningrad military district to better oversee and operationalize operations in the Baltic and Nordic regions, with additional forces allocated to it. Russia’s actions, way of warfighting, and plans to increase its presence in the north have adjusted the defense planning priorities for the Nordic-Baltic nations as well as highlighting that Russia, in a post-war Ukraine, will be a larger and more aggressive threat than it was before.

For both the Nordic-Baltic NATO members and Russia, the past three years have created asymmetric dynamics in understanding the threat. While the intent of both sides is rather clear, the “New Normal” is still being established in terms of what each side is ready to tolerate, how to react to each other’s activities, and what will be the means to achieve their intent.

Total Defense Beyond National Borders

In a head-to-head conflict with Russia, the real issue for the Baltic States is geography. The Western alliance cannot afford to fight the same way Ukraine has, as the strength of the alliance lies within its capability to rapidly deploy forces to defend any member of the alliance. However, for that to happen, the state under attack has to resist the initial shock of the attack, maintain a national C2 structure for the military and the government, and sustain lines of communication with the rest of the alliance. Ukraine has exemplified this, and there are many lessons that the region is learning from Ukraine. Purely professional militaries, as in most of the NATO member states, will not be able to defeat hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers. As was mentioned, Russia will place more forces on its western border as currently the Russian economy is relying on large military spending to sustain the economy, thus, they will not be able to shrink the size of the military.

The Baltics and the Nordics have already had this in mind for quite some time, especially Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland which directly border Russia. These countries have been pursuing comprehensive state defense for several years now and have been implementing measures to resist Russian hybrid activities and prepare for times of conflict. The countries hold national readiness exercises. For example, the Latvian yearly exercise NAMEJS brings together all the government agencies and branches of the armed forces to rehearse the necessary algorithms and methods of response in case of a Russian invasion. On the wider allied front, exercises like NATOs CMX25 test the resiliency of government institutions to react in times of crisis on an alliance-wide scale. These exercises, however, now need to be taken a step further in the regional dimension.

The regional uniqueness of the three Baltic States is that, in a state of war, they will have to operate as one operational area, and national borders will need to become more fluid so militaries, emergency services, and other agencies are interchangeable and operate seamlessly with each other. The groundwork for this has already happened; for example, in 2022 NAMEJS and the Estonian exercise SIIL played a scenario of a Latvian unit being pushed into Estonia where the Estonians supported them, tore them away from combat, and allowed the Latvian unit to return through the Estonian area of responsibility. This also needs to be exercised on a Nordic-Baltic level where troops coming in would need to be accustomed to the same flexibility as much as it is between the three Balts. The good news is that this is already being initiated. Exercise JOINT PROTECTOR 24 was executed by the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and took place in Liepāja, Latvia. This needs to be further institutionalized yearly and in multiple scenarios.

The next step in this would be to coordinate the civilian infrastructure needed for the military to function. Emergency services, NGOs, and government agencies need to practice this interchangeability as the military side will only be able to function if the civilian side is. For example, in a state of war, many refugees will be fleeing the West and crossing borders, potentially even the Baltic Sea. Civil plans need to be formed around this idea, and emergency services can support the other nation with little or no notice as needed.

Military Sustainment as a Strategic Imperative

Among the many lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, two stand out: Russia can sustain a high intensity, multiyear war, and any land it occupies is very difficult to retake. Thus, operational planning needs to consider this and the comprehensive defense models in each country. Currently, the Baltic States only have a land connection to the rest of NATO through the narrow Suwałki corridor that Russia will aim to block. If that is taken out of the equation, the Baltic States will serve as a bridgehead of sorts; therefore, the Baltic Sea needs to be owned—not contested, not retaken, owned—by NATO. The entirety of the Baltic States would be mobilized in case of war and the supply lines through the Baltic Sea need to remain open. To do that, assets must be positioned and ready in the region to serve as a wartime capability and as a deterrent against Russia. Sweden has the most potent naval capabilities in the Baltic Sea region and will serve as a deterrent when combined with the rest, but they need wider allied support. The US can play a large role in this.

There is an ongoing discussion about the US lowering its force presence in Europe, yet there is one place where the US can benefit with relatively little cost. Deep strike capability and air defense are key assets that the Europeans are missing, and Ukraine has demonstrated that air defense is paramount for any operation. Placing air defense assets will prevent Russian strikes on critical infrastructure and allow domination in the Baltic Sea. Since the argument is true that we will never have enough air defense to protect every asset, air defense assets need to be backed up with deep strike capability that can strike inside Russia and prevent air attacks from even taking place. This also supports NATO’s Madrid summit decision to defend every inch of the alliance, and this can only be done if it is backed up by deep fires that can take the fight into Russia. By supporting the region with these assets, the US invests in capabilities to boost its own industrial base, creates a deterrent against Russia, and lowers its troop presence. All aspects that the current administration is focusing on

Some of the work on this has already been done by the Scandinavians signing joint basing agreements with the US that would allow the stationing of US assets and troops in Swedish bases, but this now needs to be backed up with capabilities. The presence of forces and the capability to efficiently move them will serve as a deterrent against Russia’s goal to land grab and negotiate. Robust logistics and employment speed will deter this notion.

Implications for NATO and Transatlantic Security

The biggest issue for the alliance at large is the sustainment and production of munitions. While NATO has some of the most cutting-edge weapons in the world, their sustainment in long-term combat where they need to be used in large quantities is less than adequate as even stated by generals in the US armed forces. Russia’s greatest weapon in war is the volume of weapons, both expensive and cheap, it can throw at a target. NATO members must balance their production lines and maintain the high-end assets they currently possess. They also need lower-end, cheap assets that can be produced in high volume and quickly moved around the theatre. This is a difficult task, but it can be approached from a different angle as well. If the production and development lines are slow to catch up, NATO members must plan the option of taking out Russian capabilities before they are fired. This would be a very hard sell in many capitals, but it is a viable option and will serve as a large deterrent. Targeting assets and letting Russia know that their assets are being targeted could deter their use to begin with.

This all needs to go hand in hand with regional cooperation and integration. The Nordic-Baltic countries serve as a textbook example of this as all of the countries share the same threat picture, the same understanding of the adversary, and an understanding that cooperation is the only way to overcome their challenges. 

Image: Flickr | SHAPE NATO