Russia’s Balkan Approaches

Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s involvement in Eastern Europe has garnered greater attention. Unlike the brutal territorial conquest and destruction seen in Ukraine, Russia’s methods in southeastern Europe are more subtle, using information and psychological warfare techniques rather than traditional military power. In the western Balkans, Russia has cultivated an alliance with the authoritarian president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, aimed at destabilizing the region’s fragile states and embarrassing or distracting NATO and the West. 

Provocative actions by Serbia, Russia’s main ally in the region, have affected countries across the Balkans. Serbia has repeatedly moved soldiers to the borders of Kosovo, causing multiple war scares. All this has helped escalate ethnic tensions within Kosovo, where ethnic Serbs have boycotted local elections and rioted against ethnic Albanian mayors. Riots by ethnic Serbs in Kosovo also injured more than 90 NATO peacekeepers in 2023. Russia has contributed to heightening tensions over Kosovo, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threatening that the West was to blame for “a major explosive situation … brewing in the heart of Europe.” 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb leader Milorad Dodik has made moves to secede from the fragile federal state that has maintained peace since the brutal Yugoslav wars of the early 1990s. The country has two autonomous entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska – as well as the Brcko District, that has its own local government. They also established a presidency which is held in rotation. The whole system is overseen by a high representative appointed by an international peacekeeping body, who has broad discretion to enforce the terms of the peace, including by vetoing legislation and dismissing government officials. In 2024, a report from the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence warned of an increased risk of inter-ethnic violence in the western Balkans. The warning highlighted Dodik’s “provocative steps to neutralize international oversight in Bosnia and secure de-facto secession for his Republika Srpska.” This, the report noted, “could prompt leaders of the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) population to bolster their own capacity to protect their interests and possibly lead to violent conflicts that could overwhelm peacekeeping forces.”

In 2023 Dodik enacted a series of laws that would remove Republika Srpska from Bosnia’s federal judiciary, tax system, and armed forces. In 2024, he went further, proposing a referendum on independence for the Serb entity from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dodik’s efforts to undermine the Bosnian state led to a clash with the high representative, who declared the laws unconstitutional. Though he has now been convicted for violating the constitution and banned from politics for six years, Dodik is only doubling down. Republika Srpska recently proposed legislation to withdraw from the court that found Dodik guilty. 

Dodik retains the close support of Vučić, who called the conviction “shameful” and “unlawful,” and President Vladimir Putin, who has cultivated fruitful ties with Republika Srpska. Putin has met with Dodik several times since the invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called Dodik’s conviction “a purely politically motivated move that targets Dodik personally and all patriotic forces of Serbia which is inadmissible.” The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Russia is trying “to neutralize threats to inter-ethnic dialogue, peace and stability” in the Balkans. Dodik’s secessionist aspirations were supported by Russia’s nationalist philosopher Alexander Dugin, who emphasized that Dodik is “under attack and has no solution but join Serbia.”

Putin and Dodik met in Kazan, Russia in February 2024. During this meeting Dodik stated that he is “trying to discourage any possibility of [Bosnia and Herzegovina] joining the sanctions against Russia.” After their meeting, Putin awarded Dodik the Order of Alexander Nevsky for his “contribution to the development of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Bosnia and Herzegovina and for reinforcing the partnership with Republika Srpska.” At another meeting, Putin told Dodik that, “We [Russia] are grateful to you for what you do in the spiritual sphere, and in supporting our ties through the foreign ministries.” Russia provides valuable political and diplomatic cover for Dodik in exchange for his continued service disrupting the fragile political settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Russian political warfare efforts in the Balkans are not limited to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia. Montenegro represent NATO’s soft, vulnerable underbelly as Moscow seeks to project influence into the Adriatic Sea. Russian agents were implicated in a 2016 coup attempt, and the main pro-Serbian political party has attempted to pass new citizenship laws that might complicate the country’s path into the European Union. Russia has been operating through the Russian Orthodox Church to manipulate the pliant Serbian Orthodox Church to sow ethnic discord among Montenegro’s ethnic Serb population and promote pro-Russian policies.

The Political Goals of Russian Political Warfare in the Balkans

Russia has several goals for interfering in the western Balkans. First, if Russia can stir up chaos at Europe’s southeastern edge, it can presumably help reverse or unwind any such conflict. This provides Russia with leverage over the West: If Russia’s cooperation is essential to conflict mediation in the Balkans, Putin can demand concessions from NATO, perhaps over Ukraine, in exchange for calming tensions in the Balkans. 

The threat of a conflict in the Balkans also adds tension to the already-strained NATO alliance. There is already division among the allies over how to respond to the war in Ukraine, and the level of support to be given to Kyiv. Another conflict, even closer to the heart of Europe, would make cooperation across NATO even more challenging, especially if it involved Kosovo, given that several NATO states do not recognize Kosovo’s independence. 

Russia also sees the western Balkans as a means for complicating the narrative around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Russia points to the Western support that led to Kosovo’s independence as an excuse for his occupation of Ukrainian territories. If NATO was justified in protecting Kosovo from Serbia, then Russia must be justified in protecting Russians in Crimea and the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics. This diplomatic “whataboutism” may be absurd, given that Russia has never recognized Kosovo’s independence, but that is beside the point. This narrative helps the Kremlin muddy the waters about its illegal invasion of Ukraine. 

Instability in the western Balkans presents Russia with a win-win scenario. If the status quo drags on, NATO and the European Union are unable to stop the chaos and instability there and appear powerless and unprincipled. If they are forced to bring Russia to the table, Putin will leverage the region for concessions elsewhere. Alternatively, should a hot war erupt, and should NATO rise to the challenge, intervening successfully against Serbia or its proxies, that would still constitute a serious distraction from the defense of Ukraine and benefit Russia’s military position there. 

Russian Political Warfare Methodology in the Balkans

Russia’s involvement in the western Balkans is not backed up by traditional military force. There is no occupying army; there are no territorial claims. Instead, Russia uses the information space as its means of manipulation.

The Russian Ministry of Defense defines “information war” as the confrontation “between two or more states in the information space with the goal of inflicting damage to information systems, processes, and resources, as well as to critically important structures; undermining political, economic, and social systems; carrying out mass psychological campaigns… in order to destabilize society and the government.” Drawing on its institutional experience from the Cold War, updated for the 21st-century internet and social media, Russian information operations have become even more widespread and effective. 

Serbia has welcomed Russian media onto its airwaves. Not only do the Russian state media outlets Sputnik and RT operate in the country, but Serbian media have picked up and amplified many of their claims. These include the outright lie that Ukraine attacked Russia in 2022, as well as conspiracy theories about US-run “biolabs” in Serbia. Russia also operates via social media platforms, especially Telegram.

These narratives are particularly useful to the Vučić government as it faces down one of the largest anti-government and anti-corruption protest movements in Serbian history. Sparked by a building collapse in November 2024, a large, loosely organized protest movement has emerged that encompasses students, farmers, teachers, and broad segments of Serbian society. In March, somewhere between 100,000 and 325,000 people converged on the capital, Belgrade, from all around the country, demonstrating on the streets for days. Pro-government media outlets have consistently sought to demonize the protesters as foreign agents and imply that they are working at the behest of Western powers. Russia has repeatedly spread rumors, bolstered by the Serbian authorities, that Western powers are plotting to carry out a “color revolution” or a “Maidan-style coup” in Serbia, referring to a wider conspiracy theory that US influence was responsible for pro-democracy movements in Ukraine in 2004 and 2014. Russia and Serbia have merged and enhanced their paranoia about Western interference, justifying their hostility towards the West. Russian officials have offered political support to the Serbian government. Sergei Shoigu, secretary of the Russian Security Council, has met with Serbian deputy Prime Minister Alexandar Vulin multiple times over the course of the crisis, and publicly affirmed Russia’s support for “security cooperation” in the face of a “color revolution.” This is not a new phenomenon, though it has deepened in recent years: During a previous outbreak of protest in 2021, Serbian officials were joined by Nikolai Patrushev, head of the Russian Security Council, and made a joint statement affirming their opposition to “color revolutions.”  

Russia also provided cover for the illegal use of sonic weapons against demonstrators by the Serbian police by sending Federal Security Service (FSB) officers to Belgrade to investigate the incident. Naturally, according to Vučić, the FSB “investigation” cleared the Serbian police of any such violation even though the use of a sonic weapon was demonstrated worldwide in numerous videos of the event.  

Russia’s information operations find fertile ground in Serbia because Russian interests fundamentally align with those of Vučić and his right-wing nationalist supporters, including the Serbian Orthodox Church. High on the Serbian nationalist agenda is the return of Kosovo, home of ancient Orthodox monasteries and site of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Field, a founding moment in the Serbian national mythos. Many Serbian nationalists echo the Russian concept of “Russkii mir” (Russian world) with a “Srpski mir” (Serbian world), which would unite all the Serb-populated areas located in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other neighboring states. 

Even short of accomplishing these goals, Vučić sees domestic political benefits in aligning with Russia. The Russian narrative, that Western powers are trying to interfere to unseat them, allows them to smear any opposition as foreign agents. Serbian nationalists can portray themselves fighting alongside Russia in defense of traditional Orthodox values against “the decadent West.”

It is therefore no surprise that the Serbian Orthodox Church plays a central role in Russia’s information operations in the Balkans. Since the 1990s, it has provided justification for Serbian nationalist violence across the former Yugoslavia and it retains significant power in the western Balkans. In April, Patriarch Porfirije of Serbia, head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, visited Moscow, meeting both Putin and Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church. The leaders praised one another for their commitment to traditional values allegedly abandoned by the West. Porfirije also expressed his hope that the “Serbian world” would join a “new political regrouping” with Russia in the future. This “Serbian world” includes Serbs outside the borders of Serbia, so Porfirije further thanked Putin for supporting Serbia’s claims on Kosovo.

The close ties between religious and ethnic identity in the western Balkans mean that such issues quickly meld into one another and add to the region’s political instability. Shortly after the meeting of the patriarchs in Moscow, Bosnian Serb leader Dodik sparked renewed outrage by suggesting that Bosnian Muslims should “return to the Orthodox faith” as a solution to the country’s political divisions. 

What the West Can Do

Despite his close ties to Russia, Vučić has frequently succeeded in promoting an image of himself as a moderate, walking a tightrope between Russia and the West. Indeed, Serbia has reportedly sold weapons to Ukraine and voted against Russia in the U.N. General Assembly. However, these largely symbolic measures are far outweighed by Serbia’s cooperation with Russia.

Serbia has become a significant conduit through which Russia can evade the sanctions placed on it by the United States and European countries. For example, one investigation in late 2023 found that since February 2022 Serbian companies had sent over $71 million worth of exports to Russia. These exports include vast increases in electronics and telecoms equipment immediately after the outbreak of the war and imposition of sanctions. The European Union has repeatedly grappled with Serbian complicity in sanctions-busting; its most recent round of sanctions, the 17th since February 2022, includes measures against some Serbian companies. The Serbian government have issued passports to dozens of Russians with ties to the Kremlin, Russia’s defense industry, and its intelligence services.

Symbolically significant is Vučić’s decision to attend Putin’s 2025 Victory Day celebrations on May 9. The European Union had condemned Vučić’s plan to attend, saying that it constitutes support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and that it would place Serbia in violation of E.U. membership criteria. In response, Vučić posted images from Moscow on his social media accounts, saying that he “gave his word” to Putin that he would attend, and that “I did what I said.”

The West must realize that Vučić’s pro-Western moves are mere window-dressing: He is glad to talk the talk about moving closer to the European Union when it can bring economic aid, but he has no interest in complying with European standards of democracy or rule of law. Therefore, all his pro-European Union actions are half measures, aimed at stringing the West along and strengthening his regime’s power.

Instead of attempting to win Serbia over with promises of E.U. membership, the West must take a tougher line, threatening sanction on key officials. In Bosnia, Dodik and his allies are particularly vulnerable, with Putin distracted in Ukraine and Vučić dealing with a major opposition movement at home. The opportunity will not last forever: Western powers must act decisively. 

NATO has strengthened its forces in Kosovo and the European Union is increasing the size of its peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the West needs to take the fight to the information space. Rather than merely taking defensive actions against Russian influence operations, NATO hybrid warfare teams should target Serbian nationalists, driving a wedge between them and their Russian patrons. They should emphasize that Russia will be of no help as an ally if a war breaks out; Putin is far too distracted by his own war in Ukraine to materially assist Serbia in a conflict with NATO. The comparison with Armenia is instructive. A treaty ally of Russia, Armenia had even greater reason to expect assistance from Putin, yet it was essentially abandoned in two disastrous recent wars with Azerbaijan.

Recent developments between Russia and Serbia offer another line of attack. In May 2025, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) accused Serbia of “an attempt to stab Russia in the back,” claiming that Serbia’s defense companies of supply weapons to Ukraine  with “one obvious purpose: to kill and maim Russian servicemen and civilians.” The SVR statement accused “Serbian defense contractors and their patrons” of profiting “from the blood of their brother Slavic peoples”. They appealed to a sense of shared history, listing several examples of how Moscow helped Serbia, including “the liberation of Serbia from the yoke of the Ottoman Empire, the prevention of a national catastrophe during World War I, the fight against the fascist occupiers and their henchmen during World War II, the NATO bombing of Belgrade, and the Kosovo tragedy.”

Although Russia tries to portray itself as a protector of its “Slavic Brother,” SVR’s statement is far from the truth. The West should use information operations to target the nationalist audience in Serbia who still believe in  ethnic unity between Russia and Serbia.

They should remind the Serbs that Russia participated in the NATO-led peacekeeping mission to Kosovo abandoning it only in 2003. NATO information warfare teams should ask Serbian nationalists, “Where was Russia in 1999 to protect its Slavic brothers from NATO?” Yugoslavia’s requests for military support from Russia were answered with incomplete S300s that were not even functional. Serbian nationalists should be reminded that in May 1992 Russia voted for a UN Security Council resolution introducing sanctions against Yugoslavia. Moscow also provided weapons to  Croatia during the Yugoslav wars and, in 1999, it was Moscow’s disapproval that prevented Yugoslavia from joining the Slavic Union between Russia and Belarus. Information warfare teams should do all they can to confront nationalist Serbians with the reality of Russia’s ambivalence towards Serbia’s actual fate.

In June 2021, US President Joe Biden signed an executive order allowing Washington to impose sanctions against anyone who destabilizes the western Balkans, and Washington should not be shy about using them against individuals who “threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity” in the region. For American sanctions to have maximum effect, the United Kingdom and the European Union should join Washington’s efforts. 

Only by moving decisively to counter Russia’s political warfare in the western Balkans and dealing firmly with the Vučić government will the West be able to preserve the fragile peace there, guarantee the democratic future of the region, and deter Putin’s chaos.  

Image credit: REUTERS/Amel Emric