In the wake of Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza and beyond, the Middle East is undergoing a profound geopolitical restructuring. Spearheaded by Israeli initiative and broadly endorsed by Washington, a new tri-pillar regional order is emerging—centered around Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf states (primarily Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar). While these pillars have long been US allies in the region, the emergent architecture reshapes regional dynamics largely at Iran’s expense but lacks coherent intra-regional coordination or shared strategic purpose.

The crux of US policy toward this reconfiguration echoes the Cold War-era Nixon Doctrine and its Twin-Pillar policy of the late 1960s, when Iran and Saudi Arabia were designated to safeguard American interests in the Gulf. Today’s approach revives that logic but under vastly more complex circumstances: an emboldened and militarily assertive Israel, an expansive and revisionist Turkey, commercially ambitious but militarily constrained Gulf monarchies, and a Levant grappling with fragmentation and uncertainty. It reflects a broader recalibration that Washington supports as it seeks to minimize direct military entanglement and empower regional partners to lead on security, diplomacy, and economic affairs.

The core of this disengagement is closely tied to Washington’s pivot to Asia—initiated in earnest under the Obama administration—and its clear move away from large-scale deployments following the costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. President Donald Trump took it further. During his mid-May 2025 visit to Riyadh, Trump emphasized US disinterest in becoming entangled in new Middle East crises, signaling Washington’s readiness to grant a greater role to regional actors. “The gleaming marvels of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not created by the so-called ‘nation-builders,’ ‘neo-cons,’ or ‘liberal non-profits,’ but by the people of the region themselves… pursuing your own unique visions, and charting your own destinies,” he said.

Tom Barrack, Trump’s envoy to Syria and Ambassador to Turkey, reinforced this point when he said in late May: “The era of Western interference is over. The future belongs to regional solutions, not foreign mandates… We are standing with Turkey, the Gulf, and Europe—not with troops and lectures, but shoulder-to-shoulder with the Syrian people.”

Despite the rhetoric, the shift in US policy is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. For decades, US strategy has oscillated between intervention and partnership. The current moment emphasizes the latter, yet the fragility of the US-backed order reveals the limitations of solely relying on partner actors, particularly for security, in a region marked by enduring divisions.

While the United States envisions this tri-pillar structure as a sustainable substitute for direct intervention, cracks have already appeared. Deep-rooted rivalries, divergent threat perceptions, and competing ambitions among the three pillars raise serious questions about the internal cohesion and long-term viability of this model. Despite a shared interest in containing Iran—whose influence has waned significantly following the fall of the Assad regime and Israeli strikes on Iran and its regional proxies over the past couple of years—the pillars remain fundamentally misaligned on key strategic issues. These contradictions threaten to undermine the very order the United States hopes will stabilize the region in its absence.

Challenges of Sustaining This New Order

US-favored regional allies remain marked by contradictions and asymmetries in capability and ambition. Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf states each view the region through sharply different lenses. Israel leads in military capacity and regional initiative, driven by a willingness to act decisively and unilaterally to prevent the emergence of threats in its surroundings following October 2023 Hamas attacks. Its dominant role has not emerged from US delegation but from bold actions against both state and non-state actors—Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, the Assad regime, and the Houthis. This makes Israel indispensable, but also a challenge for Washington’s balancing act, given the gap between their strategic priorities and threat perceptions.

Turkey, for its part, brings demographic depth, strategic geographic reach, military strength as NATO’s second largest army, and a willingness for cross-border operations since 2015 through its strategic autonomy doctrine. Yet Ankara’s ideological and geopolitical posture—especially under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan—has strained relations with Europe and parts of the Arab world. By contrast, as far as the Gulf states are concerned their influence has been largely exercised through non-military power: diplomatic engagements, business investments, regional media, and at times religious outreach. The UAE and to some degree Qatar are partial exceptions, having backed armed actors in several conflicts in the Middle East and Africa.

This asymmetry results in either overreach or hedging. Israel’s dominance may provoke Turkish pushback or Gulf recalibration. Turkey’s assertiveness—tolerated by the Gulf in Syria—continues to raise concerns, especially due to Ankara’s past support for Muslim Brotherhood-aligned actors in Egypt and Libya. The Gulf, lacking assertive military capacity, has leaned heavily on US backing and Israeli deterrence against the Iran-led axis—with the former being uncertain and the latter generating unease given rising unpredictability, as witnessed during the 12-Day War against Iran and the recent clashes in Syria’s Druze-majority Suwayda.

Washington sees this tri-pillar setup as a path to a new regional equilibrium based on shared interests and growing economic interdependence. Yet its unwillingness to engage deeply and with patience—particularly in Syria—leaves fundamental tensions among partners unresolved. Diverging threat perceptions and strategic goals threaten the coherence of this post-Iranian moment.

Beyond marginalizing Iran, the three pillars lack a shared vision. Key points of friction remain: the Palestinian question continues to strain Israeli-Arab and Turkish-Israeli ties; Syria remains a contested arena of influence between all the three pillars; and the Kurdish issue is still central to Turkish-Israeli dynamics. While areas of cooperation exist, notably around countering Iranian influence, the broader structure remains fragmented and vulnerable to rupture.

Post-Assad Realignments: Syria as the Strategic Fulcrum

Syria is the strategic fulcrum of this new order, where diplomacy, commerce, and security ambitions converge. This explains why US envoy Tom Barrack has prioritized Syria as the linchpin for trilateral coordination. Barrack’s role as the top US diplomat for Turkish, Syrian, and Lebanese affairs is itself a testament to Washington’s approach to navigating the region’s challenges in the current circumstances.

Turkey seeks to shape Syria into a client state by supporting former opposition figures and expanding the territorial reach of their authority across the country. Turkey’s influence over Syria’s new rulers and its plans to establish a permanent military presence inside Syria have alarmed Israel. Israeli officials express concern over jihadi-linked factions gaining power in Damascus, their treatment of Syrian minorities, and their close ties to Turkey. A recent Israeli government-commissioned report warned of a potential war with Turkey stemming from these dynamics. Overall, Israel’s interest in Syria can be defined as preventing Iranian resurgence, halting Hezbollah rearmament, and maintaining military dominance over Syria’s air and ground theaters.

The Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, views Syria as both a security buffer and a commercial opportunity. They aim to exclude Iran, invest in reconstruction, and use Syria as a transit hub for energy exports to Europe. However, persistent instability and Israel’s assertive military actions risk deterring Gulf investment. There is also the difference in regional outlook between various Gulf states.

A key concern among US regional allies is that Israel’s expanding territorial foothold in Syria and its frequent airstrikes may destabilize the region and create new openings for Iranian and Hezbollah reentry. Ambassador Barrack echoed concerns held in some US circles when he accused Israel of preferring that Arab states remain weak. Overall, ongoing talks reportedly aimed at a non-aggression pact—or potentially a normalization deal, though the latter would be difficult to achieve—between Israel and Syria are important for reducing tensions. The recent intervention by Israel in mid-July on the side of Druze factions against the Syrian government demonstrates that Israel harbors serious misgivings about the new rulers in Damascus. Hence, any agreement short of full normalization is unlikely to assuage Israeli concerns about long-term threats emanating from Syrian territory, whether real or perceived.

As the critical hinge of the emerging regional order, Syria will likely determine whether that order holds or collapses. If cooperation holds, the order could crystallize in Damascus. If it breaks down, Syria will almost certainly be the fault line.

While the United States has a key interest in supporting stability in Syria and forging some form of understanding among its regional allies to advance this objective, it should not overlook the deep-seated domestic distrust and hostilities within Syria itself. US officials’ statements about not wanting to redraw the region’s map à la the European colonial experience of the early 20th century are commendable. But the United States should be under no illusion: If it seeks a stable Syria, it must help foster the emergence of a new, inclusive, and representative state—one in which various ethnic and religious communities, such as Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Christians, feel they have a meaningful stake. To that end, it should hold the Sharaa government accountable for its treatment of minorities to help prevent recurring massacres like those in Alawite and Druze areas in March and July. Otherwise, internal tensions could fracture Syria from within—as seen in the recent clashes between Damascus and Druze armed factions—drawing in Israel on the side of the Druze and risking the ignition of a broader war. Avoiding the exertion of leverage by Washington in the name of avoiding “nation building” can produce the opposite outcome—pushing Syria toward war, as each domestic actor may begin hedging its bets separately, and rely on rival regional actors for support.

Palestinian/Gaza Question

The Palestinian issue remains a fundamental fault line. While its centrality has fluctuated over the years, it has consistently shaped Arab-Israeli relations one way or another. The Iranian ascendancy following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and during the wave of regional uprisings created a rare moment of alignment between Israel and Sunni Arab states, culminating in the Abraham Accords. However, the Hamas attack of October 7 and Israel’s devastating campaign in Gaza halted the momentum toward normalization, particularly with Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh, which had been inching toward diplomatic recognition of Israel, now demands a clear path to Palestinian statehood—a goal rendered more elusive by Israel’s continued military operations in Gaza and its assertive regional agenda. Public sentiment and regional optics make normalization politically untenable for a state like Saudi Arabia at present. As the perception of Iran as a threat fades due to its significant weakening over the past year, the Palestinian issue will reemerge as the primary lens through which Arab populations and governments view Israel. Without movement on Palestinian rights, regional integration will remain incomplete and fraught with tension.

Kurdish Issue

The Kurdish question is another pivotal challenge for the emerging order, particularly in Syria and Turkey. Ankara’s surprising decision in October 2024 to reopen negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) coincided with the Israeli campaign against Iranian allies/proxies and came shortly before the collapse of the Assad regime. Talks soon extended to Syrian Kurdish groups, suggesting a significant recalibration by Turkey.

Israel’s expressions of support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), coupled with its military assertiveness inside Syria, have alarmed Ankara. The prospects of future Israeli alignment with Kurdish forces have raised concerns in Ankara, where officials fear such a development would directly challenge Turkey’s influence—especially given the fragility of the ceasefire between Turkey, the PKK, and the SDF, and the vast geographical area that Kurds occupy across the region.

Statements by Turkish leaders during Israel’s war with Iran—such as those by Erdogan and his coalition partner Devlet Bahçeli—underscore the depth of Turkish anxieties over Israel’s assertive posture and its position as the main geopolitical shaper at the moment. Bahçeli went as far as claiming that Turkey was Israel’s “main target.” Regardless of how valid or realistic these fears may be, they reflect the logic shaping Turkey’s regional strategy and behavior. Should that fragile peace collapse, Syrian Kurds may turn to external actors for support, including Israel or Iran.

Iran maintains access to SDF-held areas via Iraqi militia groups and may use this to reassert its influence if Turkish-Kurdish hostilities reignite. The SDF’s ideological counterparts in Iraq are already operating officially under the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), dominated by Shia militias. As such, Kurdish dynamics will remain a critical variable in the regional landscape—particularly in the strategic calculations of Turkey, Iran, and Israel. Regional powers such as Turkey and Iran remain primarily focused on curbing Kurdish agency and capacity—seeking instead to harness Kurdish capabilities in service of their own geopolitical objectives.

Israel’s Assertiveness and the US Dilemma

While a long-standing ally of the United States, Israel’s dominant posture also presents a dilemma for Washington. As a geographically small state in a hostile region, Israel maintains a heightened sense of existential threat—not just from Iran and its proxies but other regional actors such as Syria’s new government and its backers in Ankara. This stands in contrast to Washington’s broader and more flexible strategic calculus, which does not have the same degree of threat perception toward Iran and views Turkey as an ally.

This divergence helps explain Israel’s unilateralism in recent conflicts. Israel’s determination to prevent Syria from becoming a military threat—especially under a Sunni Islamist regime—further amplifies the risk of escalation.

The tripillar regional order offers Washington an opportunity to reduce its footprint while maintaining strategic influence. But this vision depends on an alignment of outlook and balance of power among actors with deeply conflicting agendas.

The United States should realize that it cannot completely avoid interventions in the Middle East—as evidenced by its bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities in June. Intervention should not be dismissed wholesale. Not all interventions are military, and not all military engagements are open-ended or bound to be detrimental by default. Diplomatic leverage, economic tools, and limited tactical involvement can yield substantial returns, as evidenced in Syria and Iraq since 2019. Israel’s assertiveness, Turkey’s ambitions, the Gulf’s limitations, and unresolved regional disputes make this new order inherently fragile and strategic drift on Washington’s part could accelerate its unraveling.

As Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted during his January confirmation hearing, creating a safer and less chaotic world “will be impossible without a strong and a confident America that engages in the world.”

In a globalized world, threats transcend borders. The United States may no longer rely on Middle Eastern oil, but global oil prices still affect American domestic politics. As do major security challenges emerging in the region, as seen with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda before it. Washington might wish to disengage from the Middle East, and a relative disengagement might be indeed possible. But rushing the process or ignoring the region tends to create major problems down the line—often pulling the United States back in more forcefully than ever, as witnessed after October 2023.

Image: Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan welcomes President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan at the Presidential Palace in Ankara, Turkey, July 16, 2025. Mustafa Kamaci/Reuters