On July 26, only a year and a half after the most recent general election, Taiwanese voters will once again head to the polls. This time, however, the vote is not part of a standard election cycle. Instead, after months of gathering signatures, twenty-four legislators from the opposition Nationalist (KMT) party will face potential recall. Another seven will face recall votes in late August. In all, the fate of more than a quarter of Taiwan’s legislators—and more than half of the KMT contingent in the legislature—will be up for a vote, the first mass recall in Taiwan’s history.

The mass recall could shake up a political system that has become increasingly dysfunctional in the past year. Since last year’s election, partisan fighting has become so intense that it has brought the government to a standstill. Longtime political analysts say that the level of animosity and gridlock in Taiwan’s legislature is unprecedented, even in a political system that is often deeply polarized. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te won the presidency in 2024, but the DPP lost control of Congress. The KMT took control of fifty-two legislative seats to the DPP’s fifty-one, while the upstart Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) won eight at-large seats—enough to give them the power to tip the majority balance.

The KMT, working with the TPP, has used its newfound advantage to try to wrest power away from Lai and the DPP. Traditionally, Taiwan’s political system has empowered a strong executive, but the KMT pushed through a controversial set of bills to codify and expand the legislature’s power to investigate and oversee the president and force him or her to annually address the legislature and answer their questions. Large-scale street protests against the KMT followed. Then, in advance of the constitutional court ruling on the validity of these laws, the KMT passed new rules that raised the number of justices needed to judge cases and rejected the DPP’s nominees, effectively paralyzing the court. In the words of one keen observer of Taiwanese politics, since the end of 2024, Taiwan has been “on the brink of a constitutional crisis.”

The recall might offer a path out of this crisis—or it could exacerbate the problems. Each of the three possible outcomes of this recall process will affect both Taiwan’s domestic politics and its geopolitical relations. If the recall vote succeeds, subsequent elections to replace the recalled legislators could shift control of the legislature to the DPP, which also holds the presidency. Even a failed recall campaign in which the KMT retains its legislative advantage could shift the balance of power within the parties if voters unseat legislators with closer ties to Beijing. The outcome of the process unfolding over the next few months could revive a paralyzed government or further entrench its dysfunction—and it could introduce new challenges to already tense relations across the Taiwan Strait.

The Looming Presence of China

Although cross-strait relations are not explicitly on the ballot, relations between Taiwan and mainland China are central to the recall efforts. For many supporters of the recall, the fundamental issue is the cozy relationship between some KMT officials and leaders in mainland China. In April 2024, a handful of KMT legislators traveled to China and met with Wang Huning, Beijing’s chief theoretician and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, China’s most powerful political body. For many Taiwanese citizens skeptical of Beijing’s intentions about Taiwan, this visit raised fears that KMT leaders were taking orders from Beijing.

As part of the concerns around relations with China, support for the recall does not neatly overlap with existing party divides. DPP legislators were early proponents of the recall, and the party has provided support for the recall campaign. Still, much of the recall campaign has emerged from bottom-up grassroots activism among individuals concerned about Beijing’s role in Taiwan’s domestic politics. Individuals putting in the work to make the recall happen—canvassing for signatures, filling out paperwork, and mobilizing voters—have often been self-motivated, rather than working on behalf of the DPP, and represent demographics that are not typically engaged in party politics.

Moderate KMT supporters who dislike the DPP but are fearful of closer ties with mainland China have rallied in support of recalls to unseat legislators they view as too pro-Beijing. Observers have noted how members of pro-KMT factions, such as military veterans in the so-called True Blue Army, support the recalls and have criticized members of the KMT for cozying up to China. Moderate critics of Beijing and more radical pro-independence forces have found common cause in supporting recalls of KMT legislators who maintain close ties with mainland China.

President Lai did not play an active role in supporting the recalls at the outset. As the momentum for recalls targeting KMT legislators picked up, however—and the possibility of recalls successfully tilting the balance of power in the legislature toward the DPP—he began to use his voice to support the recall efforts. Since June, Lai has declared that civil society has pushed this recall, and therefore, the DPP should support the effort. He also launched a series of lectures on national unity, implying the need for DPP majority control of the legislature as well as the executive branch to break out of the gridlock. Lai’s fiery speeches, however, have further infuriated Beijing, which has openly expressed its disdain for him.

Three Potential Outcomes, All with Risks for Taiwan

The first round of recall votes on July 26 and August 23 is only the first stage in a longer process. In this first round, local voters will choose whether to keep or unseat KMT legislators in specific districts around Taiwan (At-large legislators, who include all TPP members, cannot be recalled). There are three possible ways the recall could unfold, each having major implications for Taiwan’s political system and its geopolitical relations.

Outcome I: No Recall and Entrenched Gridlock

For a recall to pass, at least 25 percent of eligible voters in a district must vote, and more voters must support the recall than oppose it. If recall votes in a given district fail to meet the minimum threshold or if more voters reject the recall, the legislator will keep the seat and cannot be recalled again before the next election.

The most recent polling suggests that the majority of Taiwanese citizens oppose the recall. A poll from the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF), conducted in mid-July, found that nearly 48 percent of respondents opposed the recalls compared to 41.7 percent who supported them. In terms of voting behavior, more respondents to the poll said they would vote to keep legislators in their seats than would vote in favor of a recall.

Despite the cross-cutting coalitions driving recall efforts, many citizens express reluctance to support recalls. They are wary of undercutting the results of the prior democratic election by attempting to unseat legislators so soon after the last vote. Proponents of the recall also cast the vote in terms of protecting Taiwan from the existential threat of Beijing’s meddling, arguing that recalls are necessary to preserve Taiwan’s democracy and autonomy. But the TPOF poll found that more than half of respondents did not think the recall was of major concern to the future survival of Taiwan.

If few to no recalls succeed, the KMT will keep its legislative majority, and the status quo of the legislative balance of power will not change. Legislators who survive the recalls, however, are likely to be even more hardened in their opposition to DPP governance than before. Any possibility of compromise is likely dead on arrival. Perpetual dysfunction in domestic politics raises concerns about the government’s ability to handle geopolitical challenges: domestic political leaders caught up in partisan bickering will struggle to mount an effective strategy for dealing with pressure from Beijing, and they will not be able to navigate increasingly fraught relations with Washington.

Outcome 2: Partial Success and Intra-Party Realignment

Even if this first round of recalls successfully unseats current legislators, the ultimate political balance of power depends on the subsequent by-elections to elect new legislators. Many of the KMT legislators facing recall represent districts with a strong partisan lean toward the KMT. It is possible—even likely—that even if the first round of recalls succeeds, many of the winners of the by-elections will also be from the KMT.

Political scientist Nathan Batto, who has rigorously parsed Taiwan’s elections, categorized the differing vulnerabilities of legislators facing recall. While about one-third of legislators are in districts that could be considered “toss-ups,” other legislators in strongly KMT areas may be at risk of recall for their controversial public statements or support of questionable legislative actions, rather than because of strong DPP opposition. If the recalls succeed in ousting these legislators, voters are likely to elect another KMT candidate to succeed them.

If recalls succeed and the winner of a by-election is also from the KMT, the overall partisan balance in the legislature will not shift. Yet there may still be a profound effect on Taiwan’s domestic gridlock. The partisan challenge is not only between the KMT and DPP (and TPP), but also within the parties. Replacing more controversial or pro-Beijing legislators with new KMT figures may shift the balance of power within the KMT toward moderation, which could open up new areas of cooperation and tone down some of the distrust underlying Taiwan’s current crisis. More likely, of course, is that nothing will change and the parties will continue to fight—but the internal dynamics of the KMT may be more malleable than party labels suggest.

Outcome 3: Full Recall and Consolidated Power

To regain an outright majority in the legislature, the DPP will need to successfully recall at least six legislators and flip the seats to the DPP in the by-elections. While many analysts were skeptical of such an outcome when the recall campaigns first launched, the failure of the KMT to recall any DPP legislators and growing momentum for the movement have raised the prospects for a fundamental shift in the balance of power. Polls show that at least a few candidates in highly competitive districts are polling underwater in the recall campaigns.

If the DPP does manage to flip enough seats, it will change the dynamics of Taiwan’s politics. DPP control of both the executive and the legislature will kickstart the gears of government and break through the paralysis and gridlock plaguing Taiwanese politics. The DPP will also be able to boost spending on its priorities, including national defense. But DPP control also comes with geopolitical risks. Dominance of all branches of government will inevitably increase tensions with Beijing at a time when relations are worse than ever. Chinese leaders are deeply mistrustful of Lai and believe he is personally trying to push Taiwan toward independence, and Lai’s speeches during the recall campaign—which included rhetoric describing the defense of Taiwanese democracy as similar to ridding metal of “impurities” while forging a sword—have hardened Beijing’s position toward Lai and the DPP. Regardless of their policy agenda, an emboldened and empowered Lai-led DPP will have to act much more carefully than they have done so far to dial down tensions across the strait.

No matter how the recalls unfold, they will reshape the next stage of Taiwan’s politics and its international relations. It is, as one Taiwanese political analyst described to me, a huge gamble for civil society. If the recalls pass and the DPP wins enough by-elections, the government will be able to pass major legislation, and grassroots supporters of the recall will feel more empowered in their Taiwanese identity and opposition to the KMT’s relationship with mainland China. Yet it risks quickly and irrevocably increasing tensions with Beijing, with few checks on DPP power. On the other hand, if the recall fails to flip even a small number of seats, it will further entrench the mutual distrust that plagues intra-party politics in Taiwan—preventing Taiwan from crafting a coherent and unified strategy to deal with its mounting geopolitical challenges.

Perhaps the most muddled outcome—a partial recall without changing the overall balance of power—is the most likely and the one with the most unclear implications. Replacing more Beijing-friendly KMT legislators with moderates would not change the overall balance of power in the legislature, but it would validate the recall and potentially change the internal politics of the KMT. True inter-party cooperation is unlikely, but it could shift dynamics around the edges. Each of the options carries major risks; how the parties respond to the eventual outcomes will determine how well Taiwan is prepared to handle its growing geopolitical challenges.

Image: Facebook | 護國大遶境