This report is published in collaboration with the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), also available on their website. 

Introduction

The 2024 Taiwan presidential elections marked a historic third consecutive win for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—the first time a party has achieved such a feat since the direct presidential elections began in 1996.^[1] DPP’s presidential candidate, Lai Ching-te,^[a] secured 40.1 percent of the popular vote in a three-party race, followed by Kuomintang’s (KMT) Hou Yu-ih, who secured 33.5 percent of the votes, and Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je, who garnered 26.5 percent.^[2]

The victory was tarnished by the split verdict in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, with the KMT, DPP, and TPP winning 52, 51, and eight seats, respectively. This fragmented outcome marks a new era of a divided government in Taiwan, with the ruling party for the first time in over 16 years not controlling the majority in the national parliament.

Therefore, while Lai Ching-te’s election indicates continuity on the most crucial policy issues, the joint opposition of the KMT and the TPP has increased partisan gridlock, slowing governance and policymaking.^[3] The two blocs differ on multiple important issues, notably the “1992 Consensus”, an agreement between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT asserting that only one China exists.^[4] Interpretations vary within Taiwan: the DPP rejects “the 1992 Consensus”, arguing it fails to consider the Taiwanese aspirations since it predates the island’s democratisation.^[5] However, as scholars Hass, Glaser, and Bush wrote in a 2023 analysis, former President Tsai Ing-wen adopted a pragmatic, moderate stance—without explicitly endorsing “the 1992 Consensus”—due to domestic political constraints she faced in the past eight years.^[6]

From his statements in the run-up to the presidential elections, and over one year into governance, President Lai appears poised to continue with Tsai’s pragmatic approach to cross-strait relations.^[7] However, he has had a pro-independence reputation, with the latest instances in July and August 2023, when he clarified that Taiwan is not a part of the People’s Republic of China.^[8] He maintained a similar line of thought in 2024 and 2025, as seen in his speeches.^[b],[9]

Similarly, the KMT, one of the parties to this agreement, adopted it as a policy in 2008 under Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. However, its position heading into the 2024 Taiwan elections remained ambiguous^[10]—especially after China tightened its grip on Hong Kong and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 2019 statement linking the “1992 Consensus” with “One Country, Two Systems.”^[11] In the past eight years, the KMT’s views on the “1992 Consensus” have fluctuated between Ma’s “rapprochement with respective interpretations” approach and former KMT Chairman Hung Hsiu-chu’s soft stand with no “respective interpretations” approach.^[12] Furthermore, as scholars Chen and Paris-Rodriguez have observed, since the DPP took office, the KMT has been headed by four chairpersons—Hung Hsiu-chu (2016-17), Wu Den-yih (2017-20), Johnny Chiang (2020-21), and Eric Chu (2021-present), with each having his own interpretation of the “1992 Consensus”.^[13] This is palpable in the party’s confusing approaches to a number of important policy issues.

The two blocs also have fundamental differences in dealing with the PRC. Historically, they have had different interpretations of Taiwan’s political status and its working relationship with China.^[14] Since the 1980s, the KMT has abandoned its anti-Communist policies and pursued engagement with Beijing. It introduced policies to facilitate Taiwan-China interactions, promoted closer economic ties, considered a peace agreement, signed the Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA),^[c] and resumed institutionalised cross-strait negotiations.^[15] Put simply, the KMT seeks security and deterrence through integration rather than confrontation. It advocates closer economic and political ties with Beijing, emphasising stability and dialogue under the framework of the “1992 Consensus”. It has also historically prioritised de-escalation and economic interdependence with China as a means of reducing tensions.

Conversely, the DPP’s stand on China has evolved—from its opposition role under Tsai’s leadership to her presidency. As party president during the KMT’s rule, Tsai criticised the Ma administration for recognising the “1992 Consensus”, opposed the ECFA, and campaigned in 2012 on replacing the “1992 Consensus” with a new Taiwanese consensus.^[16] However, after taking office in 2016, her position became more moderate. The Tsai administration refrained from publicly rejecting “one China”, avoided explicitly claiming independence, and acknowledged the “1992 Consensus” as a historical event.^[17]  Nonetheless, the DPP asserts that Taiwan is a sovereign entity separate from the PRC.

The “1992 Consensus” and Taiwan’s approach towards the PRC are just two examples of the fundamental policy differences between the island’s two main political blocs.

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^[a] Taiwan’s elected President, Lai Ching-te, was Vice President under President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration. Although he got 40 percent of the popular vote, it is much lower than the popular vote which former President Tsai Ing-wen received in 2016 (56.12 percent) and 2020 (57.13 percent).

^[b] In his inaugural speech in May 2024, National Day speech in October 2024, and New Year speech in 2025, he maintained the same stance, resulting in a strong reaction from Beijing in the form of criticism, military exercises, and increased diplomatic pressure. See: https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6816; “President Lai Delivers 2025 New Year’s Address,” Office of the President of the Republic of China, January 1, 2025, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6893. For instance, in his 2024 National Day speech, he said,

“The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other…and the PRC has no right to represent Taiwan”. See: https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6816.

^[c] ECFA was a free trade agreement between the PRC and ROC aiming to reduce tariffs, commercial barriers and create cross-strait integration. It was signed on June 29, 2010, in Chongqing, however, was terminated by the PRC in December 2023 – a month before the most recent Presidential elections.

^[1] Tommy Lin, “DPP Needs Partners to Fulfill Lai’s Ambitions,” Taipei Times, February 7, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/02/07/2003813184

^[2] “The President’s 10 Key Questions: Where will Taiwan Go?,” The Reporter [報道者], January 16, 2024, https://www.twreporter.org/topics/2024-election

^[3] Lev Nachman and Wen-Ti Sung, “Lai’s Victory isn’t the Full Story. Here are Five Deeper Takeaways from Taiwan’s Election,” Atlantic Council, January 22, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/lais-victory-isnt-the-full-story-here-are-five-deeper-takeaways-from-taiwans-election/

^[4] “An Overview of Cross-Strait Relations [九二共識 — 史實與效益],” Straits Exchange Foundation, https://www.sef.org.tw/files/869/51D01BB5-1941-423B-9615-8D24254096FE.​

^[5] Jessica Drun, “The KMT Continues to Grapple with the 1992 Consensus,” Global Taiwan Brief, Global Taiwan Institute, September 21, 2022, https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/09/the-kmt-continues-to-grapple-with-its-1992-consensus/

^[6] Ryan Hass, Bonnie S. Glaser and Richard C. Bush, U.S. Taiwan Relations, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2023); Dean P. Chen and Kiely Paris-Rodriguez, “The Role of the 1992 Consensus and Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Elections,” East-West Center, January 2024, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/role-1992-consensus-and-taiwans-2024-presidential-elections

^[7] “President-elect Lai Ching-te Promises to Maintain Cross-Strait Status Quo,” Focus Taiwan, January 14, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202401140001#:~:text=%22I%20will%20act%20in%20accordance,%2Dold%20president%2Delect%20said.

^[8] Lina Arvidsson, “Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election and the Cross-Strait Relations: Consequences for the European Union,” Swedish National China Centre, 2023, https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/other-publications/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-and-cross-strait-relations-consequences-for-the-european-union.pdf

^[9] “Inaugural Address of ROC 16^th Term President Lai Ching Te,” Office of the President of the Republic of China, May 5, 2024, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6726; “President Lai Delivers 2024 National Day Address,” Office of the President of the Republic of China, October 10, 2024, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6816; “President Lai Delivers 2025 New Year’s Address,” Office of the President of the Republic of China, January 1, 2025, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6893

^[10] Yu-Jie Chen and Jerome A. Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-examined: The ‘1992 Consensus’ and Cross-Strait Agreements,” University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 14, no. 1 (2019): 1–39, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss1/1.

^[11] Jessica Drun, “The KMT Continues to Grapple with the 1992 Consensus,” Xi Jinping; “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification,” [習近平在《告台灣同胞書》發表四十週年紀念大會演講（英文稿）], (Speech, Beijing, April 12, 2019), http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201904/t20190412_12155687.htm

^[12] Jessica Drun, “The KMT continues to Grapple with the 1992 Consensus.”

^[13] Dean P. Chen and Kiely Paris-Rodriguez, “The Role of the 1992 Consensus and Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Elections.”

^[14] Mumin Chen, “Embracing or Resisting the Giant Neighbour: Debates between KMT and DPP on the Mainland Policy,” China Report 49, no. 4 (2013): 399-411, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0009445513506649?icid=int.sj-full-text.similar-articles.8

^[15] Chen, “Embracing or Resisting the Giant Neighbour.”

^[16] Yu-Jie Chen and Jerome A. Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-examined: The ‘1992 Consensus’ and Cross-Strait Agreements,” University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 14, no. 1 (2019): 1–39.

^[17] David G. Brown, “Are DPP and KMT Views on China Converging,” Global Taiwan Institute, October 21, 2020, https://globaltaiwan.org/2020/10/are-dpp-and-kmt-views-of-china-converging/

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