Sweden’s accession to NATO in 2024 and the successful completion of its first deployment to NATO’s Forward Land Forces (FLF) in Latvia in the first half of 2025 mark a strategic shift in the country’s defence posture. This move, from a longstanding policy of military non-alignment and UN peacekeeping to positioning within NATO’s deterrence and defense structures, is a notable contrast that builds on decades of Nordic-Baltic military cooperation.

What began with support for Baltic independence and the restoration of their armed forces, including initiatives such as the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL), has evolved into a sustained Baltic-Nordic military cooperation. Since the 2000s, this has included arms sales, joint operations in Afghanistan, and a shift towards territorial defense along NATO’s north-eastern flank.

Sweden Enters NATO’s Forward Land Forces

Sweden’s NATO deployment in Latvia coincided with NATO’s 2023 decision to strengthen its presence in the Baltic states and expand its multinational battlegroup in Latvia to brigade level from 2024. On Dec. 12, 2024, the Swedish Parliament approved long-term infantry battalion rotations in Latvia, sharing the commitment with 13 other NATO members.

The first rotation, commencing on Jan. 18, 2025, brought 550 troops from the 71st Mechanized Infantry Battalion, South Scanian Regiment. Soldiers equipped with CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, APC360 armored personnel carriers, and Stridsvagn 122 tanks formed a mechanized force. Some of the battalion’s elements remained in Sweden on high readiness. Sweden also provides staff officers to the brigade headquarters.

The six-month rotation concluded in June 2025 with the handover to Danish forces. Sweden is expected to resume its role after Denmark’s rotation. The entire multinational brigade in Latvia consists of about 3,500–4,000 troops, with numbers temporarily increasing during different exercises. In early 2025, Sweden was the third-largest troop contributor in Latvia, after Canada (1,900) and Spain (around 600, including a NASAMS air defense unit), while Denmark’s 2024 peak was 850 troops (see Table 1).

NATO deploys personnel for other operations in addition to the multinational brigade. According to Latvia’s minister of defense, Andris Sprūds, the total number of foreign military personnel in Latvia in 2025–2026 is about 5,000, including roughly 400 US servicemembers participating in Operation Atlantic Resolve. These units are also participating in various exercises such as BALTOPS 25.

The significance of the mission for Sweden was underscored by King Carl XVI Gustaf’s visit to Camp Valdemar at Ādaži military base, where Swedish troops are deployed. Notably, this was his fifth visit to Latvia since 1992, a clear indication of the strong ties between Sweden and Latvia.

Sweden’s Integration and NATO Deployment in Latvia

During the rotation, Swedish troops trained independently, bilaterally with other NATO allies, and in brigade-level operations. The deployment contributed to NATO’s regional readiness and enhanced Sweden’s territorial defense capabilities as well as interoperability with allied forces.

Two days after their arrival, preparations for NATO’s Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL) were underway for the NATO troops already stationed in Latvia as part of the Shield Strike exercises. Shortly before the evaluation, Swedish Army Chief Jonny Lindfors transferred command of the battalion to Col. Cédric Aspirault, commander of NATO’s multinational brigade in Latvia. While authority is transferred, the Canadian brigade commander has the same powers over the battalion in Latvia as a Swedish commander would have over a battalion in Sweden, with Sweden retaining employer responsibility.

In February 2025, over 2,000 personnel from 14 NATO states conducted the CREVAL exercise Oak Resolve to assess the battlegroup’s effectiveness as an integrated combat unit. The scenario simulated a defensive operation against a large, mechanized adversary, aiming to delay and disrupt enemy movement and conduct counterattacks. Units were tested across the full spectrum of combat tasks, including defensive preparations, delay operations, and maneuvers under fatigue, simulated losses, and unscripted developments requiring rapid decision-making. The exercise not only confirmed the battlegroup’s combat readiness and interoperability within NATO command, but also provided reassurance about the region’s security.

For Sweden, this was the first time its troops had operated under NATO command as part of the multinational brigade in the Baltic states. Battalion commander Lt. Col. Henrik Rosdahl noted that while Latvian terrain and training conditions are similar to those in Sweden, this was the unit’s first exercise involving a hypothetical adversary with diverse systems and force elements.

In March, Swedish soldiers continued practicing delay operations, but this time with the Latvian First Infantry Battalion (LATBAT) of the Mechanized Infantry Brigade. In May, Sweden’s 71st Battalion participated in Iron Spear 2025 at Camp Ādaži. The live-fire shooting competition focused on testing foreign combat vehicles, evaluating technical performance, and assessing crew skills. The battalion placed first in the combat vehicle category with its CV90s and third in the tank category.

That same month, Sweden joined Estonia’s annual Hedgehog 2025 exercise, part of the Steadfast Deterrence 25 series, involving over 16,000 troops from around a dozen NATO states. Sweden’s 71st Battalion and a platoon from the 414th Home Guard Intelligence Company deployed rapidly to Estonia and integrated into the Estonian Defence Forces. Later, Rosdahl emphasized the value of these drills for Sweden’s armed forces, noting that previous training in Sweden lacked realistic threat scenarios and did not involve engagement with capable adversaries.

The Swedish rotation to Latvia was not just a demonstration of commitment to collective defense, but also a valuable learning experience. Operating with a battlegroup of over ten nations, each with its unique military culture, presents coordination challenges for commanders. However, it also offered a unique opportunity to build interoperability between different weapon systems and units. For the military, this meant that troops rotating through NATO battlegroups in Eastern Europe returned home with a higher level of readiness than when they arrived.

Bilateral cooperation will continue beyond the NATO rotation. Sweden and Latvia have signed a letter of intent for the delivery of 18 Archer 8×8 artillery systems. Sweden will be leasing systems to Latvia until delivery, and both countries have agreed to form a joint Archer unit training for Latvian personnel. This comes in addition to the existing cooperation, where the Latvian military has for a long time acquired and exercised with Swedish-manufactured weapons systems, such as the recoilless rifle Carl Gustav and the man-portable short-range air defense system RBS-70 NG.

Sweden Joins NATO Operations Beyond the Baltics

Another milestone for Sweden in NATO was the deployment of six JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets to Malbork Air Base, Poland, for its first participation in NATO’s Enhanced Air Policing mission. The two-month operation supported Baltic airspace surveillance, intercepting aircraft without flight plans or active transponders, and formed part of NATO’s integrated air and missile defense. It also contributed to securing arms shipments to Ukraine via Poland. Within weeks, Swedish jets intercepted a Russian IL-20 Coot signals intelligence aircraft. This is the first time a Swedish fighter division has operated from a foreign base under NATO command for surveillance.

Sweden, Finland, and Denmark continued joint air operations over the Baltic Sea, including an exercise where a joint Nordic Air Tasking Order coordinated a simulated strike on hostile forces in Swedish territory with Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTACs). This is a key area where the Nordic countries could provide significant added value to Baltic JTAC training and cooperation, strengthening regional capabilities across the wider Nordic-Baltic area.

Sweden contributed a Södermanland-class submarine to the annual BALTOPS 25 exercise, which was led by NATO Allied Maritime Command. It involved 16 NATO members, over 50 ships, 25 aircraft, and 9,000 personnel. Under the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) framework, the Swedish Navy has monitored undersea infrastructure and tracked military shipments to the Baltic states. Sweden remains active in countering hybrid threats, reflected in a recent E.U. Memorandum of Understanding with the Baltic Sea states, Norway, Iceland, and E.U. institutions on protecting critical undersea infrastructure.

Finally, Sweden’s accession to NATO has improved the alliance’s ability to coordinate defense planning for the strategically important island of Gotland, located in the central Baltic Sea. In April, NATO’s rapid reaction force conducted a reconnaissance visit to Gotland, which involved assessing the island’s geographical features, existing military infrastructure, and potential reinforcement options. As a NATO member, Sweden now benefits from allied defense planning for the island. While it is not the only island in the Baltic Sea, it is usually referred to as one of the most strategically critical islands for Baltic Sea control.

As a new NATO member, Sweden has assumed a significant role in the security of the northeast region. Soon, Sweden will acquire a new role as the framework nation for NATO’s planned FLF in Finland (with contributing nations such as Denmark, France, Iceland, Norway, and the United Kingdom). This battlegroup will support deterrence and defense in the wider Nordic-Baltic area. Moreover, Finland’s 1,340km border with Russia adds strategic significance.

However, Sweden is confronted with the daunting task of expanding its manpower alongside technological modernization to meet these growing commitments. As of 2025, the Swedish Armed Forces include approximately 10,200 professional officers and 6,900 continuously serving group commanders, soldiers, and sailors. They are supported by 11,400 civilian employees, who play crucial roles in administrative, logistical, and technical support; 4,800 part-time group commanders, soldiers, and sailors; and 5,800 reserve officers.

In wartime, Sweden can mobilize a substantial number of additional reserve personnel for territorial defense. These personnel, primarily trained through conscription, are continuously prepared, and their numbers are planned to reach 26,500 by 2025, and increase further by 2030 and 2035. In addition, the Swedish Home Guard consists of around 26,500 trained civilians. For overseas operations, however, the armed forces rely on a core force of over 20,000 professional soldiers, distributed across the land, sea, and air domains.

Conclusion

NATO’s rotational deployments provide more than symbolic reassurance. They build operational familiarity with terrain, local procedures, and NATO’s multinational command structure, enabling faster redeployment in a crisis. A rotational presence of larger, combined Nordic land forces could further strengthen deterrence, although Finland and Norway may be unwilling to commit at a higher level. In practice, deeper Swedish-Danish cooperation with simultaneous deployments would be a strong starting point, enabling the rapid reinforcement of Nordic forces in the Baltic states. The close geographic proximity of Sweden and Denmark provides rapid reinforcement capabilities, unlike Canada, located on the opposite side of the Atlantic.

Sweden’s first NATO rotation in Latvia marks a clear break from its traditional strategic culture. After the Cold War, Sweden focused on total defense at home, along with overseas peacekeeping and capability building. It now deploys mechanized forces to Latvia with offensive potential. However, the operational survivability of these units depends on strengthened regional air defense. This shift aligns Sweden with the broader expectation that Nordic states should take greater responsibility for security in the Baltic Sea region.

In this new role, Sweden acts both as a capability provider, bringing advanced systems and expertise, and as a frontline contributor integrated into NATO’s force posture. Moreover, its forces serve not only as a defensive asset but also as an active instrument of coercive diplomacy, signaling resolve to adversaries and reassurance to allies.

Recommendations

Short-term Baltic security challenges remain focused on hybrid threats, while long-term deterrence against Russia must address conventional risks. The Baltic states now benefit from a more substantial NATO presence. Increased allied troop numbers have partly shifted the former tripwire posture toward a “trapdoor” effect, though the strategy still depends on rapid reinforcement. The Baltic Defence Line project and recent exercises reflect regional readiness for delaying operations along the eastern borders. Nevertheless, for long-term defense and deterrence, several areas still require regional improvement.

• Align Denmark-Sweden Rotations: Keep 6-month cycles with some overlap to strengthen battlegroup integration.
• Nordic Brigade: Assess a joint mechanized unit from all Nordic countries for regular Baltic deployments and fast reinforcement.
• Step Up Exercises: Raise the frequency and scale of multinational drills in the Baltics.
• Strengthen Regional Air Defense: Integrate Nordic-Baltic air assets via joint exercises and standard procedures.
• Enhance Nordic Air Cooperation: Extend joint air drills to Baltic airspace; improve JTAC training and coordination.
• Expand Joint Naval Operations: Boost Nordic-Baltic maritime cooperation, including naval drones for infrastructure security.
• Hybrid Threat Monitoring: Deepen EU and JEF collaboration on seabed infrastructure protection; expand JEF to include all Baltic Sea coastal states.

Image: Latvian and Swedish soldiers in March of 2025. (Flickr | Latvijas armija)