The multi-state dispute in the South China Sea has enveloped the region for decades, with no signs of abating. Much of the media attention on the region has recently focused on coercion and aggression conducted by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and China Coast Guard (CCG) against the Philippines. In August 2025, a CCG cutter pursuing a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel collided with a PLAN ship. The PCG ship, which escaped unscathed, documented the embarrassing and dangerous incident.

Despite the focus on the regular CCG-PCG interactions in the South China Sea, another player in the dispute—Taiwan—rarely figures into the broader regional discussion. That changed in early September after Andrew S. Erickson, Jason Wang, Pei-Jhen Wu, and Marvin Bernardo released a report at the Jamestown Foundation on PRC oil structures around Taiwan-occupied Pratas/Dongsha Island—within the island’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Since May 2020, the PRC has placed at least “seven ‘jackets’ (steel space-frame substructures of fixed offshore platforms that that support the weight of an oil drilling rig), three floating production storage and offloading (FPSOs—converted oil tankers with an oil refinery built on top), and five semi-submersible oil rigs.” The structures had been near Pratas for five years, and Taiwan’s presidential office only acknowledged them and pushed back against their presence after the report’s publication, calling on the PRC to “immediately cease illegal deployment and exploitation activities in the economic waters of countries in the region, including Taiwan.”

The revelation of these oil structures’ presence exposes key issues related to Taiwan’s position in the South China Sea and, perhaps more importantly, President Lai Ching-te’s South China Sea policy. Since Lai took office in May 2024, neither he nor his administration has released a clear statement or strategy on the South China Sea.

What President Lai Has Said

Throughout Lai’s campaign and presidency, he has discussed countless critical national security and cross-strait issues. However, he has generally avoided any substantive discussion of the South China Sea since launching his bid for the presidency. He did not mention the South China Sea issue in his inaugural address. And when discussing Taiwan’s territory and sovereignty vis-à-vis China, a glaring omission is Taiping and Pratas Islands.

In his first National Day address on October 10, 2024, Lai mentioned the different locations that the people of Taiwan have “defended” and have established “roots.” He said, “Though we arrived on this land at different times and belonged to different communities, we defended Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. We defended the Republic of China. . . . The Republic of China has already put down roots in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.” These sentences are technically correct as the islands only represent military bases and not formal, civilian communities, and Taiwan has not fought any battles against the PRC to maintain control of either island. But, the same could theoretically be said about Penghu and Taiwan. And defending the Republic of China should include maintaining long-standing outposts on the fringes of the region, should Lai take a maximalist approach to defensible territory.

In a related speech commemorating the seventy-fifth anniversary of Taiwan’s victory over the PRC at Guningtou, Lai again omitted the South China Sea as a part of national territory. In two separate instances in the speech, Lai emphasized what he considers the territory that must be defended. “We cannot, and will not, allow any external force to change the future of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, right?” He also said, “[We] will not yield an inch of ground in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to firmly defend our homeland.”

From his Guningtou speech, one could argue that Lai does not consider the South China Sea islands as locations outside of the “homeland” and islands whose future is up in the air. Now, Lai is likely only bringing up places with civilian populations, but then he should have mentioned places such as Orchid and Green Islands, as they have civilian populations and are not disputed. The omissions in these speeches of various parts of Taiwan are puzzling, especially since Lai has not been shy about defending Taiwan’s territory and sovereignty from external forces—the most formidable of which is the PRC, which Lai labeled as a “foreign hostile force” earlier in 2025.

It was not until the 2025 Ketagalan Forum that Lai mentioned the South China Sea issues in a highly publicized address. In the speech, Lai said, “China’s military activities in the Taiwan Strait and East and South China Seas pose unprecedented challenges to the rules-based international order.” The sentence is vague and does not address the issue of sovereignty or defense, but it serves as a general critique of PRC behavior in the broader region.

Based on these speeches, one must ask: Does Lai consider Taiping and Pratas a part of the country, or something else?

What the Lai Administration Has Said

While Lai himself has been vague about his views on the South China Sea, his administration has provided a clear viewpoint. The Ministry of the Interior—the government department responsible for the administration of Taiping and Pratas—provided a clear statement when asked about the Lai administration’s policy on the South China Sea. The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) department of international affairs did not respond to a request for comment. On August 1, the Ministry of the Interior stated,

The position of the ROC (Taiwan) on South China Sea issues is as follows:

1. The South China Sea islands are part of ROC (Taiwan) territory. That the ROC (Taiwan) is entitled to all rights over the South China Sea islands and their relevant waters in accordance with international law and the law.
2. The ROC (Taiwan) supports freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. It strongly maintains that disputes should be resolved peacefully in accordance with international law and the law of sea (including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and that it should be included in related multilateral dialogue and dispute settlement mechanisms.
3. The ROC (Taiwan) will uphold the four principles and five actions. On the basis of setting aside differences and promoting joint development, it is willing to work with all countries to safeguard and advance peace and stability, as well as to jointly protect and develop resources, in the South China Sea.

The emailed statement clarifies the Lai administration’s South China Sea policy. However, it does not solve everything: Does “the South China Sea islands” refer only to Taiping and Pratas, or to all of the historically claimed islands? And considering the revelations about the PRC oil structures within the EEZ of Pratas, it is unclear how much manpower or resources Taipei will spend to defend these parts of “ROC (Taiwan) territory.”

The “four principles and five actions” refer to a Tsai Ing-wen administration policy from July 2016. The first part of the emailed statement is almost directly copied from that policy page. The Tsai-era policy clarifies how a DPP president perceives the South China Sea issue. It claims that Taipei “will firmly safeguard the ROC’s territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.” However, it only specifically mentions Taiping Island, not Pratas Island, as “an important base from which Taiwan makes concrete contributions to regional peace and stability.”

The four principles and five actions were released in the aftermath of the arbitration award in favor of the Philippines against the PRC. Tsai—inaugurated only two months prior—faced immense pressure to reject the ruling and give a strong stance against Taiwan’s exclusion from the process and the tribunal’s expansion of the ruling that diminished the status of Taiping Island to a “rock,” denying it the right to an EEZ. Tsai’s principles and actions call for Taiwan’s inclusion in dispute resolution mechanisms, the right of freedom of navigation and overflight, and promises to expand collaboration in science, humanitarian assistance, and international law.

Beyond the Tsai-era policy, Taiwan’s Coast Guard, which administers the islands, has a policy dated from August 2016 that provides a specific rationale: “The situation in East China Sea and South China Sea is becoming tense and, in regard to controversial waters such as Diaoyutai Islands and South China Sea, surrounding countries have increased maritime patrol capability to ensure their success in international negotiation.” The mission of the Coast Guard, among other things, is “to fortify exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and high seas fishery patrol and protection, defend our sovereignty and fishing right, and fulfill our responsibilities to international fisheries . . . [and] to flexibl[y] use our assigned responsibility and authority to seize Mainland China’s trespassing fishing boats and protect our marine resources.” Considering the developments outlined in the report by Erickson, Wang, Wu, and Bernardo, the Coast Guard has not kept up with this part of its mission by failing to publicly disclose the PRC structures in a timely manner and by failing to sufficiently fortify Pratas’ EEZ from PRC influence.

It has been almost ten years since the 2016 ruling, but neither Tsai nor Lai updated their respective administrations’ South China Sea policy. Given Lai’s frequent omission in mentioning Taiping and Pratas Islands, it may be time for his administration to develop its own policy given current events and expanding PRC pressure and coercion on Taiwan’s South China Sea islands.

What Taiwan’s Coast Guard Has Done

While the Coast Guard failed to prevent the erection of PRC structures within Pratas’ EEZ, it has pushed out illegal PRC fishing boats while CCG vessels have begun to regularly encroach inside Pratas’ waters.

In February-March 2025, the Taiwan Coast Guard announced that it had kicked out illegal PRC fishing boats from Pratas in an effort to protect the marine ecosystems as these fishermen have a history of conducting “destructive behavior such as indiscriminate fishing and even butchering protected species like green sea turtles.” By sailing into restricted waters, the CCG has endeavored to assist the fishing vessels in avoiding Taiwan Coast Guard law enforcement efforts. However, the Taiwan Coast Guard has boarded and even seized several illegal fishing vessels to achieve its mission. During the first three months of 2025, the Taiwan Coast Guard reported having “repelled 77 instances of Chinese fishing vessel intrusions and detained 6 small boat[s].” By May 2025, that number had increased to 111 instances.

Perhaps most notably, the Taiwan Coast Guard utilized one of the CCG’s most frequently used tactics in the South China Sea against a PRC fishing vessel: a water cannon. In May 2025, the Taiwan Coast Guard filmed itself using a water cannon to push an illegal PRC fishing vessel out of its waters. The CCG uses this tactic against the PCG regularly to keep the Philippines from staking its claims and enforcing its sovereignty in the South China Sea.

In addition to civilian fishing vessels intruding near Pratas, the CCG has increased its incursions there throughout 2025. The increase in CCG patrols and incursions around Pratas is notable because only three reportedly occurred in 2024, compared to at least twelve in 2025. A new practice for the vessels is to turn off their automatic identification system (AIS) when close to Pratas to avoid tracking. Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute regularly tracks developments in this space.

What’s Next?

The PRC has begun to increase its pressure on Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea as a next step in its coercion of the island nation. How quickly the number of vessels around Pratas or Taiping increases is important to watch, as well as how assertive or aggressive the CCG gets. In September 2020, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense began releasing maps and reports of PRC military aircraft flying within Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). The flights primarily occurred near Pratas in the South China Sea. Now, five years later, these incursions have moved into the Taiwan Strait proper, with aircraft regularly crossing the median line of the strait. The PRC used various pro-Taiwan activities to change the location and scale of the incursions. The same can easily—and quickly—occur in the South China Sea. And Taiwan would be disadvantaged given the long distance between southern Taiwan and Pratas and Taiping Islands. If the CCG begins to support the swarming of the restricted waters of either island, there is little that the Taiwan Coast Guard could do against a significantly larger number. Taiwan’s outposts in the South China Sea—and by extension, its waters—are vulnerable to PRC pressure and coercion. The trends point to the fact that Taiwan’s presence in the South China Sea will soon look like its ADIZ: de facto protected but in practice regularly challenged and undermined.

Considering the lessons of the recent past, it is incumbent upon the Lai administration to update Taiwan’s South China Sea policy. Defending the seas will be harder than combating ADIZ incursions given the addition of an illegal civilian fishing presence seeking to take Taiwan’s natural resources. PRC-Taiwan tensions in the South China Sea will not be limited to a military-to-military issue; they will include law enforcement and civilians. Lai needs to clearly communicate his views on where Pratas and Taiping sit within his vision of Taiwan, including the defensibility of the islands and their waters. Considering the more immediate and close threat that Taiwan faces in the Taiwan Strait, how much personnel, money, and resources Taipei is willing to spend in the South China Sea will directly impact security in other parts of Taiwan.

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