In a move that has likely led to sighs of relief in London and Canberra, the Trump administration has reportedly reaffirmed its commitment to the AUKUS submarine pact, preserving a key pillar of the trilateral defense partnership between the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. The decision ensures that Australia will still receive three American Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) from the early 2030s, despite concerns that the arrangement could have fallen foul of President Donald Trump’s “America First” philosophy.

While the confirmation has cleared away some of the lingering cloud of uncertainty over AUKUS, it should also reignite questions about the health and capacity of America’s own submarine industrial base, a sector already struggling to keep up with domestic demands. At the heart of the matter is a simple but high-stakes question: Can the United States afford to give away some of its most advanced undersea assets while trying to outpace China’s military expansion?

The Pentagon’s recent review of the AUKUS agreement, led by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, was not merely a routine assessment. It was a political litmus test — one that sought to evaluate whether the transfer of strategic military technology to a close ally aligned with Trump’s revived nationalism. A central issue was whether the US Navy could afford to give up three to five Virginia-class submarines within the next decade without compromising its own operational readiness, particularly in the face of a potential confrontation with China. Yet despite these concerns, Pentagon officials have confirmed: “AUKUS is safe.”

Under the current AUKUS plan, Australia will receive between three and five second-hand Virginia-class submarines from the early 2030s to replace its aging Collins-class boats. These will serve as a bridge until a new generation of boats — the so-called SSN-AUKUS class — can be built collaboratively by the United Kingdom and Australia. The SSN-AUKUS will be based on a British design and include American technology. Australia’s versions will be built in Adelaide with British help and the Royal Navy’s boats will be built in the United Kingdom, while Rolls-Royce in Derby will manufacture the nuclear reactors for all of them. The timeline is ambitious: The first SSN-AUKUS is slated to be delivered to the Royal Navy in the late 2030s, followed by Australian-constructed boats in the 2040s. But filling that gap in Australian capability depends on whether the US submarine industry can climb out of its current production valley — and fast.

The US Navy has been procuring Virginia-class submarines since 1998. On paper, the Navy has been procuring two boats per year since 2011 — a pace theoretically sufficient to replace aging vessels and expand the fleet. In practice, however, the yards building these boats have struggled to meet those targets. Since 2022, the actual production rate has slumped to around 1.2 boats per year, leaving a backlog of boats that have been funded but not yet built.

During the Cold War, the mission was against Soviet submarines. Today, with China rising and Russia resurgent, the submarine force is being called upon once again to provide undersea dominance. Yet the fleet is about to dip into a valley, a projected shortage of available attack submarines caused by a slowdown in construction during the 1990s. By 2030, the SSN force is expected to bottom out at just 47 boats — down from 50 today — before slowly climbing to 64 or 66 by the 2050s. That forecast does not include the subtraction of up to five boats under the AUKUS transfer.

Submarines play an outsized role in America’s military posture. SSNs are the Swiss Army knives of the fleet — capable of launching cruise missiles, gathering intelligence, inserting special forces, laying mines, and hunting both enemy submarines and surface ships. Crucially, they can slip through China’s extensive anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks, enabling them to project power deep into contested waters. The Virginia-class submarines are arguably one of America’s most potent conventional assets. They excel at stealth, endurance, and firepower, offering a decisive edge in undersea warfare. Diverting even a handful of these submarines to Australia without replacing them in the fleet could expose a critical vulnerability during a period of heightened tension in the Indo-Pacific.

To bridge the production gap, the Navy is planning to refuel and extend the lives of up to seven Los Angeles-class submarines, the predecessor to the Virginia class. It’s also exploring “hull-by-hull” service life extensions to squeeze more years out of older boats. But these are stopgaps, not solutions. The long-term answer lies in expanding production. The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan envisions buying two new Virginia-class submarines per year starting in 2030 — eventually ramping up to 2.33 per year. That increase is meant to support US force structure goals and fulfill the AUKUS commitment, but hitting those numbers will require an industrial renaissance not seen since the Cold War.

Colby himself has long voiced concerns about exporting these boats before domestic production can be increased. It’s a sentiment echoed by Adm. Daryl Caudle, the incoming Chief of Naval Operations, who bluntly stated, “The only way we’ll ever make good on the AUKUS agreement is that we get to the 2.3 [build rate].”

The Australian government has not been blind to these challenges. In fact, it has already contributed $1.6 billion directly to support US shipbuilding efforts, a recognition that its submarine acquisition depends on America’s ability to build fast enough for both nations. Yet even with Australian funds bolstering the industrial base, the question remains as to whether the shipyards can ramp up quickly enough. Congress has appropriated billions over the last few years to expand submarine production — upgrading facilities, training workers, and modernizing supply chains — but the effects will take even more years to materialize.

For now, AUKUS lives. Its survival under Trump reflects the survival of a deeper bipartisan consensus in Washington: that strengthening Australia’s military capabilities is in America’s long-term strategic interest, especially as the Indo-Pacific looks set to remain at the center of great-power competition. But it’s a gamble — one that assumes the United States can rebuild its submarine fleet faster than its adversaries can erode its undersea advantage. If that bet doesn’t pay off, the United States could find its fleet in a very stretched position when it needs it the most.

The deal is still on course. The question now is whether the shipyards will hold.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Royal Navy