Aaron Stein – President

Whatever you think of the substance, the new National Security Strategy is different than all that has come before it. The Europe section is quite the departure from the norm, but then again, it fits with the zeitgeist of Vice President Vance’s speech in Munich, Secretary Hegseth’s comments on European defense, and other key administration officials writings about how they see the “America First” mantra melding with actual policy.

What stood out to me was that the administration is framing Golden Dome as an American homeland defense tool – and not a tool for the broader protection of allies and partners. This is a departure from the framing of the Strategic Defense Initiative under Reagan and Bush – and a departure from how missile defense has been sold to the American and global publics ever since. What also caught my eye was this set of sentences: 

Managing European relations with Russia will require significant US diplomatic engagement, both to reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass, and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.

The wording frames how the administration views its role as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia to reach a ceasefire. However, I think it could also mean that the administration is leaning on a very old concept in American strategic thought: The pathway to escalation with Russia starts in Europe and that escalation ends with nuclear exchange that destroys large parts of America. 

I think they are saying that they want to build themselves – and just themselves – out of vulnerability from destruction with Golden Dome. And while doing so, to try and reach some agreement with Moscow to lessen tensions to prevent nuclear war. You can see how they could then pivot from Ukraine to some sort of handshake agreement on maintaining current numerical limits with Russia on nuclear weapons once New Start expires in February. And then making the case to decrease security commitments to Europe further.

Emily Holland – Director, Eurasia Program 

In this striking and often contradictory document, the Trump administration suggests that Russia is no longer a threat to either US or European interests. Instead, the NSS demonizes the European project itself. One central, if bizarre, bullet point calls for “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations.” Not only does it identify the Trump administration’s concern for the changing demographics of European states, but it also rejects cosmopolitanism and liberalism, two core tenets of the European project. This is an outright rejection of the liberal international order and the transatlantic relationship that has upheld this order since WWII. Even more surprising is the suggestion of US willingness to support regime change in Europe towards “patriotic” and nationalist European political parties. At the same time, the NSS expresses a sentimental attachment to the Trump administration’s vision of a formerly great European continent. The NSS largely ignores US- Russia relations, and the only core US interests related to Russia are reducing the risk of conflict between Russia and Europe, and reestablishing “conditions of strategic stability,” which indicates the Trump administration’s desire to work more closely with Moscow.

Nikolas Gvosdev – Director, National Security Program 

The 2025 National Security Strategy formally abrogates the attempt of its predecessor administration to set US national security policy upon a foundation of “climate geopolitics” meant to position the US as leader of a democratic community of nations against an emergent authoritarian axis. To the extent there is a clear replacement organizing principle, it might be termed “geo-technology”: the United States will re-order its priorities in seeking partnerships with countries for the raw materials, components, finance, technological infrastructure, and energy that will guarantee America’s continued economic and technological dominance which in turn creates the conditions for US security. The imperative that drove democracy promotion (that democratic states produce more reliable partners for the US) is replaced by an emphasis on dealmaking where a country is judged by its ability to fulfill its bargains more than how it chooses to  govern itself.  

Emma Salisbury – Non-Resident Senior Fellow,  National Security Program 

The National Security Strategy contains some deeply worrying language for those of us on the other side of the pond. The document’s identification of Europe’s problems as stemming from “civilizational erasure” and “loss of national identities” is straight out of the playbook of our own far-right political movements, from Reform to Fidesz to the AfD. Those movements are also overtly encouraged: “the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed gives cause for great optimism.” Most concerning is the loud dogwhistle to the far-right concept of replacement, the idea that white people will become a minority: “Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European.”

The strategy’s language on Russia is also concerning. The war in Ukraine is dealt with in the context of Europe’s “lack of self-confidence” and the continent’s “deeply attenuated” relations with Russia – attenuated, indeed, by the fact that Russia invaded a European nation and continues to wage gray-zone warfare throughout the continent, something that is glossed over in the strategy. The document focuses on a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, re-establishing “strategic stability” with Russia, and an implication that the people of Europe would want peace were our “unstable minority governments” not indulging in the “subversion of democratic processes,” concepts again straight from the far-right playbook.

An American strategy that gives succor to the far right and to Russia on our continent is not welcome and undermines the liberal-democratic values upon which our alliance is based.

Sam Lair – Non-Resident Fellow, National Security Program 

Two points from the National Security Strategy on missile defenses: First is the explicit inclusion of Golden Dome in the strategy. This solidifies the missile defense initiative as President Trump’s signature defense program, akin to how the Safeguard ABM program became President Nixon’s. However, there is no additional articulation of what Golden Dome will be; no elaboration of architecture or types of defenses involved. While its inclusion in such a high-level document as the NSS will be a useful tool for supporters of the initiative, advocates (and critics) of missile defenses will remain in limbo to some extent until the administration announces more details about the envisioned architecture. 

Second, and perhaps more interesting, the NSS framed Golden Dome as “for the American homeland.” Though allies were mentioned later, the strong conflation of President Trump’s signature defense initiative with homeland defense will likely raise some eyebrows amongst American allies. While the statement does not preclude the transfer of systems or technology related to the program to allies and partners, indeed such collaboration was a feature of the original Iron Dome for America Executive Order, it does indicate the main thrust of the program will be to shield the US from attack. Like much of the NSS, this phrasing will not assuage American allies and partners and might even hint that the administration is interested in building a “Fortress America,” which is no longer reliant on other nations for forward defense or security thanks in part to its high-tech missile defenses. 

Rebecca Pincus – Senior Fellow, National Security Program 

Shihoko Goto – Vice President of Programming and Director, Asia Program 

Unlocking the economic power of the Indo-Pacific has been identified as key for the United States in the latest National Security Strategy (NSS). What’s more, the Trump administration recognizes the need to build up partnerships across the region to safeguard its economic future in the region. That includes maintaining strong ties with India, as well as with Australia and Japan that make up the Quad. Yet Washington remains unwavering in its belief that it will continue to be the single most trusted partner for Asian nations. Such pronouncement should have reassured US allies in the region. The reality, however, is that the United States’ Asian partners continue to reel from the lack of certainty about US moves in pursuit of its America First agenda. The policy to impose tariffs on friends and foes alike will undoubtedly remain, while Washington will expect long-established allies including Japan and Korea to invest more into the United States to further US economic resilience. Meanwhile, the NSS lacked clarity about how Washington views China as an economic challenge. The US strategy to press for an economic alliance of like-minded countries is a valid one. The way forward to encourage partners to join willingly, however, remains murky at best. 

Michael Beckley – Head of Research, Asia Program 

The new National Security Strategy reads less like a strategy than a mash-up of campaign brochure, culture-war manifesto, and half-digested realism. It personalizes US foreign policy around Trump, elevates immigration and “civilizational” angst to core security threats, announces a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere, downplays Russia’s aggression, and treats China mostly as a commercial competitor rather than the hub of an autocratic bloc.

From my perspective, it gets three big instincts right and then weaponizes them in self-defeating ways. It is correct to say the United States must stop trying to police the entire planet, rebuild its industrial base, and force allies to shoulder more of the burden. I’ve argued for years that American power is structurally overwhelming but politically under-organized, and that we need to move from universalist liberal hegemony to a tighter economic-security community of capable partners. 

But instead of turning US leverage into a disciplined bloc that can out-produce and out-innovate China, Russia, and their motley crew of partners, this NSS points inward to hemispheric enforcement and profit-seeking deals, and outward mainly to punish or humiliate traditional allies. It squanders America’s advantage in alliances, technology, and finance, and offers no coherent plan for organizing the “free world that works” I’ve called for—a networked coalition that hardens supply chains, integrates defense industries, and sustains credible military deterrence in Europe and Asia.

Chris Estep – Non-Resident Fellow, Asia Program 

The NSS is important. But what makes each presidential administration’s NSS matter the most is how the US government implements it. This will prove true of how the second Trump administration’s NSS directs US defense priorities in the Indo-Pacific. Two areas in the document require closer attention.

First, the 2025 NSS details US objectives in the Western Hemisphere before describing US goals in the Indo-Pacific—a departure from the last two administrations. But the new NSS also reaffirms a “free and open” Indo-Pacific as Washington’s goal in the region, consistent with the previous two NSS documents. How can the US government resolve this strategic incongruity going forward, especially its implications for US military posture and resourcing in the region?

Second, the 2025 NSS alludes to China as a “competitor,” but refrains from pointed characterizations of Beijing’s historic military buildup and coercive activities toward its neighbors. Meanwhile, the 2022 NSS identified China as the US military’s “pacing challenge,” and the 2017 NSS clearly described China as a “competitor” and a “challenger.” What does this apparent strategic departure actually mean for how the Pentagon seeks to deter aggression by Beijing in the Indo-Pacific? 

Several upcoming events will stress-test the new NSS. At the Pentagon, the National Defense Strategy will further illuminate Washington’s regional defense priorities. The administration’s proposed defense budget next spring will show even more. Importantly, President Trump is slated to visit China next April, and US officials will engage regional counterparts throughout 2026. These events, combined with the grueling daily work of the government, will decide whether the new NSS comes to life in the Indo-Pacific.

Ambassador Charles Ray – Chair, Africa Program 

The Middle East and Africa, especially Africa, are given short shrift in the NSS, with the adoption of a policy of transactional realism that ends the era of nation-building and human rights conditionality. Under the new strategy, the United States will accept the regions, their leaders, and their nations, “as they are.” This indicates US acceptance of authoritarian partners, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), that prioritize stability and energy security over political reform.

The NSS views Africa as a “battleground for resource competition with China,” focusing on critical minerals essential to the energy transition and the defense industrial base. While this means that specific US initiatives in Africa will receive attention, the continent as a whole, and the issues inhibiting social, political, and economic development, will be ignored. The Lobito Corridor, a railway project to transport minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to the Atlantic coast, will be supported, bypassing Chinese-built routes. Efforts to resolve conflicts, such as the DRC-Rwanda conflict and the civil war in Sudan, will be undertaken to achieve the stability required for resource extraction. And the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) will be repurposed to focus on reciprocal trade agreements.

The aforementioned notwithstanding, a review of the NSS leaves the impression that Africa is viewed as an asset in the supply chain, with no regard for the continent’s social and economic development, even though it will constitute 25 percent of the global population by 2050. The transactional emphasis on commercial interests is short on details describing how the NSS goals will be accomplished. In a 33-page document, Africa is relegated to a half-page at the very end.

Image credit: White House