A Nation Must Think Before it Acts
FPRI Experts React | Regime Change in Venezuela
A nation must think before it acts.
FPRI Experts React | Regime Change in Venezuela
Aaron Stein, President
The rapid JSOC-led operation has drawn considerable comparisons to previous American operations in Central and Southern America, beginning with the invasion of Grenada (Urgent Fury) and then Panama (Just Cause). These missions have become routine, based largely in part on the history of Global War on Terror and the nightly raids USSOF conducted in support of the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan and then for high-value operations, such as those that killed Osama Bin Laden and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. It is always worth remembering how institutions change and evolve, especially in response to failure. Urgent Fury was an operational nightmare. Just Cause was better executed, but enabled by the American presence in Panama and US forces did not escape unscathed.
This latest operation was better executed. And there is a reason for that. What has now become routine is anything but. And these operations are built on a history of similar events; not all of which were successful. The tendency, therefore, is to pat ourselves on the back for tactical acumen, or flag wave about how “only the United States can do this.” However, it is worth remembering failure, especially when thinking about how other countries learn from similar disasters. Here I am thinking about Russia and the early days of Ukraine. Putin tried a version of what JSOC just did near Kyiv. The operation failed. However, rather than sit back and think about the disparity between US and Russian capabilities, I think one should consider how spectacular failure allows for militaries to learn and evolve — and to think through how American adversaries can take their own lessons learned from American practice, understand lessons learned from their own failures (or successes), and then figure out how to integrate equipment and capabilities into their own operational concepts to pull off similar acts in the future.
Emily Holland, Director, Eurasia Program
The US ouster of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro has serious implications for Russian foreign policy, both in and outside of the Western hemisphere. The failure to sustain an ideological ally in Latin America is a yet another blow to Moscow’s ambitions to project power outside of the former Soviet Union. A decade ago, Moscow had interests and a limited ability to prop up friendly regimes in Syria and Venezuela. Today, Moscow has lost its ability to act freely in both states and must adjust its policies to remain active in more competitive arenas. In Venezuela there was little Moscow could have done to protect Maduro, but that is a continuation of its opportunistic approach to foreign policy: Moscow supports regimes when it is convenient for them and abandons them when incentives shift and commitment becomes costly. At the same time, US action in Venezuela supports Putin’s view that powerful states should be free to do what they want within their own established spheres of influence.
As a result, events in Venezuela pose a dilemma for Ukraine and Europe. If Europe supports US action, then it risks undermining the legal and ideological principles that guide its opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. If it condemns these actions, it risks alienating the US and further straining transatlantic relations during peace negotiations in the Ukraine war. However, it is unlikely that Maduro’s capture in Venezuela will meaningfully change Russia’s maximalist position in Ukraine. If anything, it may calcify Moscow’s unwillingness to meaningfully engage with the Trump administration, potentially slowing down the recent momentum of peace talks.
Shihoko Goto, Vice President of Programs, Director, Asia Program
China has been aggressive in voicing its opposition to the US capture of Nicolas Maduro, arguing that Washington has violated international law and the sovereignty of Venezuela. Key US allies in the Indo-Pacific, however, have been far more measured in voicing their concerns publicly about the Trump administration’s actions. The official response from Japan, for instance, has been to emphasize the need to coordinate with G7 and other nations on future actions to restore stability in Venezuela.
Meanwhile, US actions are highly unlikely to embolden Beijing to take any action towards Taiwan in the near term. Nevertheless, as the PRC remains unwavering in its view that Taiwan is simply a renegade province of China, Maduro’s ouster may well give further ammunition for Beijing to justify its claims over Taiwan in the longer term.
Instead, the immediate concern across Asian capitals about the fall of Maduro is its impact on oil prices and Washington’s plans for its reserves. Nearly 80 percent of Venezuelan oil is exported to China, and the shutoff of a steady supply of affordable crude will be a blow for the Chinese economy. But as the United States mulls the future of Venezuela’s oil industry which will require vast investments to reach its full potential, staunch US allies in Asia that are energy poor including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan will be especially concerned about Washington’s plans to control Venezuela’s resource wealth.
Maximilian Hess, Senior Fellow
Tim Ball, Non-Resident Fellow
The raid leading to the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro is a tale of caution. As news of the raid broke, the majority of the text messages sent to me by friends and colleagues could be summed up with, “I may not agree with this, but it’s amazing we have the capability to do this.” Herein lies the problem. Having a capability is far less important than knowing when to use it, and when not to.
The targeting and execution capabilities of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) were on full display in Venezuela. The talent of the men and women of JSOC – from the intelligence analysts to the assaulters themselves – is unquestioned. With skills honed by more than 20 years of counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond, they are simply very good at what they do. But they are not policy makers, nor are they responsible for what comes next in Venezuela.
The United States has a long and often embarrassing history of executing regime changes with devastating consequences. These regime changes have come in different forms, ranging from CIA-sponsored coups to the conventional military invasion of Iraq. Often, the execution of the regime change itself is prematurely declared a success, only to have things fall apart quickly (see: Iraq) or several decades later (see: Iran). Unfortunately, the current administration does not seem to be aware of any of this. For now, it seems they are calculating the removal of Maduro will allow them unfettered access to Venezuelan energy resources, and that was enough to authorize the operation.
In the hands of competent policy makers, the capability of deploying an assault force to kidnap a dictator from his own home could be a small part of a grand strategy to deal with a legitimate national security threat. In the hands of the current administration, whose plans for the future of Venezuela come across as incoherent at best, it is likely to lead to another disastrous foreign policy fiasco. The “JSOC machine” can be deployed with devastating effects, but it doesn’t stay behind to ensure peaceful transitions of power or stabilization of toppled regimes. There is still much to be determined when it comes to the future of Venezuela, but history is not on the side of an administration that has yet to be able to articulate what the plan is, now that the assault force has returned to base.
