Does Canada neglect the African continent? This question was raised in a 2026 interview with Radio-Canada by Amina Gerba, a Quebec senator and business leader whose public work has long emphasized the strategic importance of Canada’s engagement with Africa. Beyond the notion of neglect, the senator pointed to Canada’s difficulty in establishing itself as a sustained and credible long-term partner on the continent, at a time when several global powers are rapidly expanding their presence across Africa. Canada’s new government has emphasized its intention to diversify the country’s international partnerships amid growing geopolitical tensions. Yet, speaking at the 2025 G20 summit in Johannesburg, Prime Minister Mark Carney noted that while Africa is part of Canada’s diversification strategy, it does not currently rank among Ottawa’s short-term investment priorities—highlighting a potential gap between Canada’s stated ambitions and the practical hierarchy of its foreign policy priorities.

The African continent nonetheless presents several structural factors that could make it an increasingly attractive destination for investment. Africa is currently home to approximately 1.4 billion people, a figure projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050. This demographic expansion is accompanied by a notably young population—nearly 60 percent of Africans are under the age of 25—representing a significant long-term demographic and economic force. At the international level, the continent’s political weight is also growing. The African Union joined the G20 as a permanent member in 2023, and South Africa assumed the presidency of the forum in 2025. At the same time, the African Development Bank projects continental GDP growth of around 4 percent in 2026, underscoring the scale of the economic opportunities emerging across the continent.

At the same time, treating “Africa” as a single entity can obscure the continent’s complexity. Comprising 54 sovereign states (according to the UN definition), each with distinct political, economic, and security trajectories, Africa cannot be approached as a uniform economic or strategic space. Acknowledging these evolving dynamics, Ottawa launched its first Canada Strategy for Africa in March 2025, followed in December 2025 by a report from the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, calling for a stronger and more structured Canadian engagement on the continent. In this context, the key issue may no longer be whether Canada neglects Africa, but rather whether it is prepared to treat the continent as a strategic partner within its broader efforts to diversify its economic and diplomatic relationships.

Unlocking the Trade Potential Between Canada and Africa

 Trade between Canada and the African continent remains limited, accounting for just over 1 percent of Canada’s total merchandise trade in 2024. Bilateral exchanges reached approximately CA$15.1 billion, with nearly 40 percent concentrated in South Africa and Nigeria. Despite this relatively modest share, Canadian authorities emphasize the gradual strengthening of economic ties, noting that bilateral trade has increased by nearly 30 percent over the past five years. The scale of the unrealized potential in Canada-Africa trade relations is further illustrated by a 2020 study conducted by the Observatory of the Francophonie at the Université de Montréal. The report estimated that Canada’s annual trade potential with the continent could reach approximately US$381.5 billion in exports and US$137 billion in imports. Although such figures rely on theoretical projections, they nonetheless underscore the significant economic opportunities that remain largely underexploited in the Canada-Africa trade relationship.

As part of its efforts to integrate emerging and developing economies into its trade framework, Canada established the Least Developed Country Tariff (LDCT) program. This unilateral tariff regime grants duty-free access to nearly all products imported from eligible countries. The program currently covers 106 states, including 33 African countries, such as Benin, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Between 2019 and 2021, Canada imported approximately CA$2.9 billion in goods under the LDCT framework, of which 83 percent—around CA$2.4 billion—consisted of textile products, largely sourced from Asian economies. Canada’s overall imports from Africa remain largely concentrated in other sectors, such as precious stones and metals, mineral fuels and oils, fertilizers, or fruits and nuts, suggesting that the LDCT program has had only a limited impact in facilitating exports from African countries.

In comparison, China’s recent decision to eliminate tariffs on exports from 53 African countries appears to offer a more substantial trade facilitation mechanism for African goods entering the Chinese market (although analysts continue to debate the measure’s real economic impact). Without necessarily replicating the Chinese model, adjustments to Canada’s tariff policies, particularly by expanding eligibility and simplifying administrative procedures, could contribute to integrating African partners more effectively into Canada’s trade portfolio.

Natural Resources and the Politics of Extraction 

Africa is widely recognized for the scale and diversity of its mineral resources, which play an important role in the continent’s economies. The continent is estimated to hold roughly one third of the world’s mineral reserves, including approximately 80 percent of coltan, 60 percent of cobalt, and 40 percent of gold. In this context, the mining sector occupies a central role in Canada’s economic engagement across Africa. In 2023, 45 percent of Canadian foreign direct investment on the continent was concentrated in the mining industry. Canadian mining assets in Africa—held by approximately 100 companies—were valued at nearly CA$39.1 billion, making the continent the second-largest destination for Canadian mining investment after the Americas. Significant increases in asset values have been recorded in several countries, including Zambia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Ghana.

In several African countries, foreign mining investments have faced growing scrutiny. Governments and local stakeholders increasingly argue that the economic benefits generated by extractive activities remain limited at the national and community levels. As a result, a number of external actors—including China, France, the United States, and Canada—have been accused of pursuing extraction arrangements perceived as unequal and of delivering insufficient returns for local development.

Mali provides a notable illustration of these dynamics. The Loulo-Gounkoto mining complex, operated by the Canadian company Barrick Gold, was historically structured with 80 percent ownership by the company and 20 percent by the Malian state. Since the transitional government led by Assimi Goïta came to power, Malian authorities have introduced a series of reforms aimed at increasing the national share of mining revenues, leading to tensions with several foreign operators. As part of this broader effort to reassert control over natural resources, the Malian government announced the nationalization of a mine previously operated by the South African company AngloGold Ashanti and the Canadian firm Iamgold. More recently, the authorities also revoked 90 mining permits as part of a wider restructuring of the sector.

These developments do not necessarily reflect a rejection of foreign partners, but rather a broader effort by governments to rebalance the terms of economic engagement. Transitional authorities in Burkina Faso, for example, have indicated that they remain open to international partnerships, provided they are based on more equitable terms.

In this context, expanding domestic resource processing capacity could offer a meaningful avenue for cooperation. Many African countries still export raw materials in unprocessed form due to limited industrial infrastructure, which restricts the share of value added retained within local economies.

Critical Minerals and Strategic Supply Chains

Among strategic resources, rare earth elements are increasingly central to contemporary geoeconomic dynamics. These 17 metals are essential components in a wide range of advanced technologies, including electronics, renewable energy systems, and certain defense systems. Their extraction and processing remain technologically complex and expensive. China currently dominates the global rare earth supply chain, from extraction to refining. As a result, many countries are actively seeking to diversify their supply sources and reduce strategic dependencies.

Africa is estimated to hold roughly 18 percent of global rare earth reserves, drawing growing attention from international investors. In Malawi, the Songwe Hill deposit is being developed by the Canadian firm Mkango Resources, illustrating this emerging interest. In Burundi, the Gakara deposit—initially operated by the British company Rainbow Rare Earths—has seen its activities suspended following a dispute with the Burundian government.

Canada also possesses notable technological capabilities in this sector. Several rare earth exploration and development projects are currently underway domestically, supported by facilities dedicated to mineral separation and recycling. The Saskatchewan Research Council operates one of the few rare earth processing plants outside China, while Torngat Metals is developing the Strange Lake project in Nunavik, aimed at producing both heavy and light rare earths alongside a planned separation facility. This expertise could provide a basis for cooperation with African countries seeking to strengthen their position within global mineral value chains.

Energy Infrastructure and the Green Transition

Beyond the mining sector, the development of energy infrastructure represents another strategic area for cooperation between Canada and African countries. Access to reliable electricity remains one of the continent’s most pressing development challenges. According to the International Energy Agency, roughly 600 million people in Africa still lack access to electricity. At the same time, the continent possesses considerable renewable energy potential. Canada’s Africa Strategy notes that Africa accounts for nearly 60 percent of the world’s solar potential, offering significant opportunities to expand electricity generation capacity. Hydropower also represents a promising avenue for cooperation. Canada possesses internationally recognized expertise in this sector as one of the world’s leading producers of hydroelectric power. Several African countries also have substantial hydroelectric potential, although large infrastructure projects can sometimes be shaped by regional political dynamics. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), for instance, has generated diplomatic tensions among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over the management of the Nile River.

In this context, investment in energy infrastructure could become an important driver of deeper Canada-Africa economic engagement. Canadian financial institutions have already begun to position themselves in this sector. FinDev Canada, the country’s development finance arm, recently announced a US$100 million loan to the Africa Finance Corporation to support sustainable infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. Beyond improving access to electricity, such investments are also closely linked to the broader global energy transition. The expansion of renewable energy systems and the electrification of economies are expected to significantly increase demand for critical minerals, many of which are abundant across the African continent.

Financing Growth: The Role of Development Finance

Finance could represent another important lever for structuring economic relations between Canada and African countries. In this area, one of Canada’s primary instruments is FinDev Canada, the country’s development finance institution established by the federal government to support private sector investment in emerging markets.

FinDev reports that approximately 40 percent of its portfolio is currently exposed to the African continent, representing close to US$611 million. The institution operates with local financial institutions, investing in African banks such as CRDB in Tanzania, Access Bank in Nigeria, and FirstRand in South Africa, which subsequently channel financing to their clients. FinDev also supports regional financial institutions operating across multiple countries, including the Trade and Development Bank (TDB) in East Africa and the West African Development Bank (BOAD). These institutions play a central role in financing large-scale projects in sectors such as energy, agriculture, and infrastructure.

Several avenues could further expand the impact of these investments. FinDev could, for instance, strengthen its guarantee mechanisms in order to facilitate access to credit for African SMEs. The institution could also increase direct financing to smaller firms or participate in lending mechanisms denominated in local currencies. Such instruments could help mitigate risks associated with fluctuations in the dollar or euro while strengthening the financial resilience of several African economies.

These financial considerations also intersect with broader debates surrounding monetary sovereignty on the African continent. In recent years, the CFA franc has become the subject of increasing discussion in West and Central Africa. For some policymakers and economists, the challenge lies in enhancing the autonomy of national monetary policies and better aligning financial systems with domestic economic priorities, particularly in the context of a currency inherited from the colonial period. Within this evolving landscape, international partners may play a role in providing technical or institutional support during potential financial transitions. Given its experience within international financial institutions and the role of its development finance actors, Canada could support financial transformation processes—while remaining attentive to avoid any perception of interference in the sovereign policy choices of the states concerned.

Diplomacy in a Contested Strategic Landscape

As part of its broader strategy to diversify economic partnerships, Canada has recently sought to strengthen ties with several major emerging economies, notably China and India. While these efforts reflect Ottawa’s intention to expand its global partnerships, they also highlight the relatively limited place that Africa still occupies within Canada’s diplomatic priorities. In its report, the Canadian Senate pointed to several structural challenges, including limited institutional expertise on Africa within the Canadian foreign policy apparatus, an insufficient diplomatic network to effectively cover the continent’s 54 states, and the need to train more diplomats specialized in African affairs.

Despite these limitations, Canada maintains a relatively structured diplomatic presence in certain parts of the continent. In West Africa, Ottawa operates through a network of embassies and high commissions that serve multiple countries simultaneously, including embassies in Dakar, Abidjan, Ouagadougou, and Bamako, as well as high commissions in Abuja and Accra. These diplomatic ties are complemented by significant economic relationships. Nigeria, for example, became Canada’s second-largest trading partner in Africa in 2024, with bilateral trade reaching approximately CA$2.9 billion. Canadian exports to Nigeria largely consist of cereals, vehicles, and industrial machinery, while Nigerian exports to Canada include petroleum oils, cocoa, and soybeans. Côte d’Ivoire has also emerged as an important partner, ranking as Canada’s fourth-largest trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa, with bilateral trade reaching CA$894.5 million in 2024.

At the same time, West Africa is experiencing important geopolitical shifts. The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—bringing together Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—reflects an ongoing reconfiguration of regional alliances. These developments occur in a broader context of deteriorating security conditions marked by the expansion of armed groups and recurring terrorist attacks. Such instability has direct implications for regional economic prospects and may affect foreign investment, including in the mining sector, where several Canadian companies operate.

For Canada, this evolving landscape presents a diplomatic balance. While relations with several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) remain strong, the emergence of the AES introduces new political dynamics that Ottawa must navigate carefully. The Senate report has suggested that the Sahel should become a priority within Canada’s peace and security engagement in Africa, particularly through initiatives aimed at supporting dialogue and conflict prevention.

Further east, the Horn of Africa represents another strategic region characterized by persistent geopolitical tensions. The maritime corridor connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean—particularly around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—remains a critical artery for global trade but also faces security challenges linked to piracy and terrorism. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in late 2025, combined with Somaliland’s reported offer to grant the United States access to natural resource development, has further intensified regional geopolitical maneuvering, illustrating how maritime security, regional rivalries, and diplomatic competition increasingly intersect in the region. Canada maintains an important diplomatic foothold in East Africa through its mission in Nairobi, described by Global Affairs Canada as the country’s largest diplomatic mission on the continent. Ottawa has also invested more than CA$11.7 million in counterterrorism programs in East Africa since 2019.

Africa continues to experience several regional tensions. In the Great Lakes region, the ongoing tensions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda remain a major source of instability. In North Africa, relations between states—as well as with France, the region’s former colonial power—are also marked by recurring political frictions. Within this evolving geopolitical environment, some observers suggest that Canada could strengthen its diplomatic role on the continent by supporting multilateral initiatives, engaging in diplomatic mediation, and deepening partnerships with key regional actors, such as South Africa.

Human Mobility as a Strategic Link

Relations between Canada and African countries are also shaped by human mobility and social connections. One of the most frequently cited barriers in this regard is the difficulty of obtaining visas, with long processing times, high refusal rates, and complex administrative procedures. Resource shortages in certain visa offices across the continent, which contribute to longer processing times and unequal access to mobility opportunities, have also been highlighted by civil society organizations.

Despite these challenges, demand remains strong. According to Global Affairs Canada, nearly 100,000 African students held study permits in Canada in 2022, representing roughly 10 percent of all international study permit holders that year. This growing presence constitutes an important channel for influence, skills development, and long-term partnerships. The expanding African diaspora in Canada plays a key role in strengthening economic, cultural, and institutional ties.

At the same time, recent shifts in migration policies in Western countries may reshape global mobility patterns. The United States, for example, announced an expansion of entry restrictions affecting several African countries in late 2025, followed in early 2026 by temporary suspensions of visa issuance for certain nationalities. In this context, Canada could potentially enhance its attractiveness to African students, researchers, and entrepreneurs, particularly given its bilingual environment and reputation as an open destination for international education.

Conclusion 

The question of whether Canada neglects the African continent does not lend itself to a simple answer. Canada maintains relationships with several African countries, yet its engagement still falls short of the economic, diplomatic, and strategic potential represented by the continent.

Africa is emerging as a growing arena of strategic competition among international powers. The Canadian Senate report highlights the expanding influence of external actors in several African states. Russia has increased its presence in several regions through arms deliveries, military support, and influence campaigns. China has established itself as the continent’s leading trading partner and a major investor, particularly through infrastructure projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative. Türkiye has also pursued an increasingly active diplomatic strategy, contributing to intensifying competition for influence across the continent.

In this evolving context, the challenge for Canada may not simply be to expand its presence in Africa, but to develop a more coherent and sustained strategy toward the continent. As Africa assumes an increasingly important role in global economic and geopolitical dynamics, the question is no longer whether Canada should engage with the continent, but rather how far it is willing to go in positioning itself as a long-term strategic partner.

Image credit: Prime Minister of Canada Mark Carney greets President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa during the welcome for Outreach partners at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, Tuesday, June 17, 2025. (AAP Image/Lukas Coch)