Much has been said about a perceived steady decline of U.S. influence in the Middle East, and American weakness in the world more generally. Though there is some truth to the assertion that the United States’ ability to project power and assert influence in the Middle East has waned since it first sent occupying forces to the region in response to the attacks of 9/11, this does not necessarily equate to a black-and-white dichotomy of former might and current powerlessness. America’s activities in Iraq in particular have led to some second and third order consequences that it will be dealing with for some time. While the empowerment of Iran is likely the most dominant negative consequence to emerge from America’s activist foray into the region, the galvanizing of a strong pro-Western geopolitical alliance bloc poised to confront Iran and other subversive actors in the region is surely its most positive consequence. As this article will demonstrate, the ability of the United States to capitalize on opportunities created by the latter development have improved its strategic position in the region, and its maneuverability within it beyond what many have acknowledged.