Over the past decade, the Wagner Group made significant inroads across the African continent. Despite the death of its financier and figure-head, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the mercenary outfit has remained a fixture in Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali. Now under the auspices of the Russian state and the banner of the Africa Corps (or Expeditionary Corps), it has expanded its operations in Africa’s Sahel region, opening missions in Burkina Faso and now Niger. Yet, despite the Kremlin’s rebranding and takeover, Africa Corps and its broader missions appear quite similar to those of its predecessor. For client states, relying on Russian private military companies (PMCs) is a costly proposition—one which will fail to produce desired security and instead is likely to generate or exacerbate grievances within the security sector.

As a quasi-PMC, Wagner spearheaded security deals with dictators and military juntas for money and access to natural resources. In Libya, it fought alongside the forces of Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army in hopes of acquiring access to Libya’s rich oil fields. In Sudan, it was contracted first by Omar al-Bashir to conduct disinformation operations and quash protestors in exchange for gold and act as a facilitator for Moscow’s ambitions to acquire a naval base at Port Sudan. In CAR it served as a praetorian guard for the Touadéra regime, as it gained access to lucrative mining operations and carved out its own economic projects from the timber trade to the alcohol industry. In Mali, it capitalized on anti-French sentiment, selling itself as the partner of choice for a nascent junta keen on breaking relations with Paris and in desperate need of counterterrorism support.

Following the death of Prigozhin in August of 2023, the Russian state engaged in a concerted effort to reel in the Wagner enterprise and fold the mercenary outfit into a new project under the command and control of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and specifically, the Main Intelligence Directorate. That project has had its own growing pains, but its expansion to Burkina Faso and Niger suggests progress. The latter mission has been billed as particularly worrisome for the United States, as the Russian outfit enters upon the drawdown of a decade-long American counterterrorism operation that saw the construction of a $100 million airbase and was a key hub for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance across the region.

As these new missions suggest, Wagner, and its successor organization, offer the Kremlin far more than mere economic exploitation across a host of countries. They afford Moscow geopolitical access and influence on the relative cheap. Jockeying for influence across Africa, Russia’s private military enterprise promises clients enhanced security with “no strings attached” and permissive environments that favor authoritarian entrenchment. Mercenaries train armies and fight alongside them without lectures on human rights and the importance of civil-military relations—a value proposition attractive to young military regimes fatigued by partnerships with the West that were riddled with moral guardrails. In reality, however, Russian PMCs come with different strings attached and a host of unintended consequences.

Short-Term Consequences: Civilian Casualties and Exploitation

Wagner was a welcome feature by several African governments marred in severe and enduring security crises. In CAR, where civil war has been boiling for over a decade, Touadéra relied on Wagner to repel a rebel offensive around the 2020 election. In Mali, Wagner personnel have supported the Goïta regime, engaging in counterterrorism operations against swelling Islamist insurgencies and helping the Malian Armed Forces reclaim territory from Tuareg separatists in the country’s north.

On the surface, Wagner’s counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns seem like success stories, at least to the buyers. Civilians in CAR acknowledge the brutality of Wagner’s tactics, but appear to welcome the enhanced security, however fleeting. Wagner’s efforts to shore up Goïta’s security in Bamako, willingness to support the Malian Armed Forces’ campaigns against the Tuaregs, and subsequent territorial gains have won favor with some Malians. Yet, closer inspection reveals Wagner’s true modus operandi—one which completely, if not intentionally, ignores the law of armed conflict where its personnel target civilians, encourage and participate in rape and sexual violence, and overall, practices a policy rooted in indiscriminate targeting. That is far from a recipe for enduring security and instead exacerbates insecurity while setting the stage for military disgruntlement.

Wagner’s indiscriminate tactical choices are not only brutal but have been questioned in terms of their effectiveness. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset, violence against civilians dramatically increased since Wagner entered the picture. This violence has included summary executions, even targeting children. In order to maintain plausible deniability, Wagner points to aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns that seek to promote stability as an explanation for civilian deaths. The vast amount of Russian propaganda and misinformation also work to preserve the reputation of Wagner. As one analyst noted, Russian PMCs have decided that action, even at the risk of mistakes, is more valuable than inaction. While it is worth noting that the trajectory of violence in both Mali and CAR was trending in a dismal direction before Wagner’s involvement, Wagner only accelerated those trends, and the Africa Corps will undoubtedly carry the baton.

Beyond the steep consequences of Wagner’s tactical choices in the security realm, the organization leverages its access in the region to extract resources in a brazen display of neocolonial tendencies. Wagner’s business proposition promulgates regime security for access to resources. Fledgling regimes benefit from the enhanced security, or the promise of it, while the Wagner network of shell corporations gain a stake in the extractive industries of client states. In CAR, Wagner subsidiaries like Lobaye Invest and Midas Resources are key players in the gold and diamond industry, helping cover Wagner’s bill, enrich Russian oligarchs, and aid the Kremlin’s sanctions-busting regime. Though less successful in Mali, Wagner tried to inject itself into Mali’s gold mining sector. That trend has continued, with Bamako and Moscow signing an agreement late last year that would lead to the construction of Mali’s largest gold refinery. The predatory nature of this resource extraction can benefit the Kremlin’s war-fighting efforts elsewhere.

Potential Long-Term Costs of Contracting Russian PMCs: Intra-Military Dynamics

While the immediate effects of Wagner are fairly observable, the seismic shifts impacting militaries in the region have gone largely under-explored by observers and scholars. Our ongoing research examines the potential implications for state forces when leaders pursue a policy of contracting PMCs. Several recent anecdotes point towards fracture, disruption, and low morale among state militaries as a direct result of Wagner’s operations in the region. Despite marketing itself as a better partner than the West, Russian PMCs are setting the stage for enduring intra-military conflict.

To date, research on outsourcing to PMCs has largely focused on the downstream effects of contracting, with most studies focused on how partnerships with these particular actors influence conflict dynamics like intensity, duration, and recurrence. Yet, the injection of PMCs can also influence the military in unique ways. Wagner’s arrival in places like CAR and Mali, for instance, was packaged as a godsend for militaries facing extensive security challenges. However, outsourcing security, especially when that decision is associated with significant investment devoted to outside agents, has the very real potential of generating significant grievances amongst rank-and-file soldiers. These grievances may be particularly likely to take root in places that face severe resource constraints or unfavorable conditions for soldiers. This unique confluence of conditions—limited material resources and unfavorable, dangerous conditions for personnel countering multi-pronged insurgencies—currently defines the Sahelian landscape, making these militaries especially susceptible to rebellion and fractures. Such risks are only amplified with the introduction and continued presence of PMCs.

Put simply, reliance on PMCs like Wagner can aggravate the armed forces just as much as it can aid them. Besides the obvious cost-related grievances where a government’s decision to spend on PMCs may divert resources away from the military, a country that deems it necessary to contract a PMC can degrade morale. Whether there is an actual need to seek outside assistance, or the perception of it, some members of the armed forces may see such contracting as a vote of no confidence and, in accordance, act out in ways that overtly signal their discontent. In short, they may mutiny.

Mutinies are military protests intended to send a sharp signal about collective grievances. Mutinies are often an early indicator of military discontent that if left unchecked can erupt into more dramatic events like coups or mass defections. Wagner’s operations in CAR appear to have generated some rifts across segments of the security sector. Reports from humanitarian watch dogs suggest that friction between the gendarmerie in CAR and Wagner, a byproduct of Wagner’s indiscriminate tactics, led the military police to mutiny in a show of discontent. The event brings into focus the ways in which Wagner’s tactical choices are undermining institutions in the region.

Additionally, dissatisfaction with and/or suspicion of Russian PMCs may lead some soldiers to defect and/or desert. In CAR, anecdotal evidence points to Central African Armed Forces experiencing such defections, reportedly as a direct consequence of Wagner. According to reports, former rebels that had been drafted into the army by Wagner defected to (re)-join the main opposition rebel group, the Coalition of Patriots for Change. Their motivation stemmed, in part, from rumors that Wagner was training and reallocating soldiers to other fronts in Mali and Ukraine. In an interview, one of these defecting soldiers stated, “Our colleagues who disappeared are not in Bangui nor in Berengo, whereas we were told they had been moved to the capital for further training. Perhaps they are right now in Ukraine to serve as human fodder to the Russian forces.”

These intra-military dynamics are a symptom of a much larger problem, one that could be exacerbated by the presence of Russian PMCs. Outside of CAR, there is potentially a profound impact on state security should the militaries of a growing list of Russian PMC clients in the Sahel experience desertions, defections, low morale, and mutiny. A state is only as strong as its military is resolute. The very thing that Wagner/Africa Corps was contracted to supply—security—is the very thing that it may jeopardize.

Outside of tactical choices leading to aggrieved soldiers, intraorganizational friction, may also ensue when a state contracts a PMC whose personnel then assume positions of authority over the rank-and-file. Subservience to outsiders can generate grievances that threaten organizational cohesion, and with it, military effectiveness. The ongoing case of Wagner/Africa Corps in Mali is illustrative of this dynamic, as researchers note that despite shared attitudes on counterinsurgency strategies, some members of the Malian armed forces are growing disgruntled with Russian mercenaries. Issues with command and control, lines of authority, and even racism have each been cited as key features leading to disgruntlement. Though perhaps too early to tell, the reported friction may ultimately lead to buyer’s remorse, and with it, military revolts.

While information is sparse, the reality is that Russian PMCs are sowing the seeds for client’s future civil-military challenges. As the above cases illustrate, there is real (and growing) potential for Wagner’s tactical and operational choices, along with the cost of their contracts, to threaten intra-military cohesion. And with the Africa Corps expanding to more Sahelian states with recent histories of fragile civil-military relations, the risks are even more likely. Contracting Wagner may have solved a short-term security challenge for new juntas, but that solution has the potential to create serious and lasting internal challenges that will manifest as military mutinies at best and more serious civil-military crises at worst. While such friction may be limited to date (or at least limited in terms of what is publicly known), it is worth paying attention as relationships between Africa Corps and state militaries evolve. As the expression goes, familiarity breeds contempt.

An irony here is that in cases such as CAR and Mali, Wagner was/is as much a “coup-proofing” remedy as it was a counterinsurgency force. As scholars have shown, foreign recruits can have a dampening effect on the likelihood of coups, creating significant barriers to coordinating a putsch. But while relying on PMCs like Wagner may insulate regime leaders from the most serious threats to their reign, such partnerships lay the foundation for security sector frictions that come with a whole different set of problems.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

This analysis is not the first to consider the many ways that Wagner is more adept at providing regime security than human security in the face of insurgent threats. Indeed, others have argued that Wagner could be aggravating insurgency across the region. Instead, this analysis explores a new pathway through which grievances are likely to manifest moving forward, specifically through Wagner jeopardizing the institutional interests of the state’s military.

Wagner’s effect on African militaries is an important element of the Kremlin’s broader global influence. The West and International Organizations like the United Nations, Economic Community of West African States, and the African Union have sought to develop anti-coup norms that curtail military takeovers. Norms are foundational understandings that guide behavior in important ways, and in this instance, in a way that reinforces democracy. The anti-coup norm has already been jeopardized by Wagner’s direct, tacit support of coup-born leaders. That anti-coup norm could be tested even more as Sahelian militaries grapple with the aggravations of integrating with Wagner and accommodating the organization’s costly tactical choices. As these norms deteriorate further, the international community may have only observed the first step in a larger crescendo of destabilization.

Despite limited evidence to date of Wagner/Africa Corps fueling intra-military friction, it isn’t hard to imagine a reality in the not-so-distant future where client state militaries become increasingly disgruntled with their Russian security partners, or with other segments of the armed forces who may be more closely aligned with or supported by Russian PMCs. Though far from analogous, one needs to look no farther than the Wagner mutiny in June 2023 to see that the recent track record of Russia’s Ministry of Defense is one where intra-military and paramilitary disputes have created serious challenges.

Our understanding of the effects of Wagner’s operations in central Africa and the Sahel is virtually developing in real-time. Because of this—and given the evolving nature of the organization and the maturation of its activities in the region—it will be critical to closely monitor the interactions between Africa Corps and rank-and-file soldiers. Doing so will not only be prudent for countering Russian PMCs and their narrative that they are better partners, but can also be instructive for any future security force assistance.

Image: Reuters/Justin Makangara