Foreign Policy Research Institute A Nation Must Think Before it Acts A Critical Analysis of the US Army’s Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror
A Critical Analysis of the US Army’s Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

A Critical Analysis of the US Army’s Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

 

Key Findings

  • The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. 
  • Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. 
  • Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten. 

Introduction

In 2014, the Iraqi army, into which tens of billions of American taxpayer dollars had been invested, collapsed in the face of an offensive by the terror group the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Only a major coalition intervention prevented the fall of Baghdad. In 2021, within just a few months of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Afghan National Army (ANA) collapsed in the face of an offensive by the Taliban. Between 2002 and 2021, some $88 billion had been invested in the ANA. In both cases, the U.S. military had devoted vast amounts of time and money to the training of the host-nation’s security forces. Yet, with a few notable exceptions (the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force and some units of Afghan commandos), both armies severely underperformed once they could no longer rely on extensive American air, ground, and logistical support. Why did the U.S. effort to train and advise these forces fail so spectacularly? 

The disorganization and lack of priority given to the training of host-nation forces by the military are major factors. The U.S. Army failed to prioritize the creation of permanent security force assistance (SFA) formations because, as an institution, its focus has always been on the conduct of large-scale conventional warfare. Even when it turned toward counter-insurgency missions during the War on Terror, the U.S. Army concentrated on its own fighting role rather than preparing host-nation troops to take charge. At lower levels, capable U.S. officers preferred and sought combat assignments leading U.S. forces rather than serving in advisory posts. Leaders also had incentives to place poorly performing personnel into advisor teams, effectively removing them from their units. All these factors combined to make the creation of a capable force to train and advise the Iraqi and Afghan security forces more difficult.

Security force assistance is not a new mission for the Army. From training the Philippine Constabulary, to advising the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, to assisting Salvadoran armed forces, the U.S. Army has substantial experience in building up foreign armies. 

Still, the Army’s task during the War on Terror was significantly more ambitious than its previous attempts to bolster host-nation forces. Since the Vietnam War, the Special Forces have had the primary responsibility to train and advise host-nation forces. However, the size of the effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a change in the mission of the Special Forces to include more direct-action operations, made this previous arrangement impossible. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the train, advise, and assist mission fell to the Regular Army for the first time in decades. 

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Image Credit: Natalia Kopytnik/FPRI 

This report was initially presented as a paper at the Post-9/11 Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned Conference in Annapolis, Maryland from September 17-18, 2024. The conference was sponsored by FPRI’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare and the Department of Defense’s Irregular Warfare Center.