A nation must think before it acts.
Under the Biden administration, there have been a number of extraordinary events that have had a significant impact on US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands, New Zealand, and Niue. Among other things, the Pacific Partnership Strategy changed the higher-level planning priorities of particular relevance to the Cook Islands, New Zealand, Niue, and Tokelau, while the establishment of US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands and Niue fundamentally changed the delegated responsibilities of the US Embassy and Consulate in New Zealand, the Cook Islands, and Niue. It is, therefore, remarkable that the Integrated Country Strategy for New Zealand has never been updated to account for these major changes in the operating environment of the US Embassy and Consulate in New Zealand, the Cook Islands, and Niue. That oversight not only raises questions about the performance of the country team; it also underscores the widely held criticism that the Biden administration has insufficiently delivered on its commitment to reform and modernize the US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development. Prior to the second inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump, members of Congress may therefore want to consider the issues raised by recent developments in the US bilateral relationships with the Cook Islands and Niue.
On April 26, 2022, the mission strategic plan of the US Embassy and Consulate in New Zealand, the Cook Islands, and Niue was approved for release. The Integrated Country Strategy for New Zealand set the whole-of-government priorities in New Zealand and its dependencies and areas of special sovereignty. At that time, the Department of State recognized the Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Niue as dependencies and areas of special sovereignty. However, the mission strategic plan only made three explicit references to the Cook Islands and Niue. As a matter of policy, a mission strategic plan is to incorporate “higher level planning priorities” (Foreign Affairs Manual vol. 18, 301.2). Among other things, the Integrated Country Strategy for New Zealand is linked to the higher-level planning priorities articulated in the Joint Strategic Plan, the Joint Regional Strategy for East Asia and the Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
On September 28–29, 2022, the Biden administration hosted the US-Pacific Island Country Summit. According to the Department of State, the event was intended to demonstrate the “deep and enduring partnership” between the United States and the Pacific Island countries. Prior to the summit, the White House elected not to extend invitations to either the Cook Islands or Niue. That decision was met with protests from regional leaders who argued that the US government should have extended invitations to all of the member states of the Pacific Islands Forum. Ultimately, the Biden administration reversed course. The US government extended belated invitations to the Cook Islands, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Niue. At the summit, the White House released the first-ever Pacific Partners Strategy, which articulated a set of national planning priorities for the Pacific Islands region.
On September 25, 2023, the Biden administration hosted the US-Pacific Island Forum Leader’s Summit. According to the Department of State, the event was intended to reaffirm the strategic commitment of the US government to the region. During the summit, President Joseph Biden announced that the US government now officially recognized the Cook Islands and Niue as independent states. That ended their classification as dependencies and areas of special sovereignty. The US government also established diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands and Niue. The Department of State labeled the establishment of these new diplomatic relations as a historic achievement. Prior to those developments, it was widely reported that the White House would be announcing new embassies in the Cook Islands and Niue at the summit. However, those reports proved to be unfounded; when the White House released the official fact sheet for the summit, it only made mention of a future embassy in Vanuatu.
At present, it has been over two years since the release of the Integrated Country Strategy for New Zealand. In that period, a number of extraordinary events have shifted the context of US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands, Niue, and New Zealand. Not only did the release of the Pacific Partnership Strategy alter the higher-level planning priorities for the Cook Islands, Niue, New Zealand, and Tokelau, but also the establishment of US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands and Niue fundamentally changed the delegated responsibilities of the US Embassy and Consulate in New Zealand, the Cook Islands, and Niue. Both of those extraordinary events had knock-on effects. Among other things, they shifted the bilateral expectations of the Cook Islanders and Niuean peoples. It is therefore remarkable that the US Embassy and Consulate in New Zealand, the Cook Islands, and Niue has failed to revise the Integrated Country Strategy for New Zealand. At a minimum, the country team should have immediately renamed it the Integrated Country Strategy for the Cook Islands, New Zealand, and Niue following the establishment of US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands and Niue.
As the US Congress weighs reforms to the management of American foreign policy by the executive branch, members may want to consider the following issues:
Strategic Plans: The management of US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands and Niue begs important questions about the strategic plans of US diplomatic missions:
Regional Summits: Under the Biden administration, regional summits for US and Pacific Island leaders have had a significant impact on US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands and Niue. However, they also beg important questions about the management of these events:
Regional Organizations: Under the Biden administration, the prioritization of bolstering the Pacific Islands Forum has had a significant impact on US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands and Niue. However, it also begs important questions about the US pivot to Pacific regionalism:
Diplomatic Posture: Under the Biden administration, the US government has made an effort “to place more diplomatic staff throughout the region.” This has included the opening of three new embassies in the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. However, the US Department of State still has not opened an embassy or consulate in the Cook Islands and Niue. That begs important questions about the US diplomatic posture in the Pacific Islands region:
Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty: The management of US diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands and Niue begs important questions about the political statuses of other dependencies and areas of sovereignty, including the Faroe Islands and Greenland:
Author’s Note: This article was written in memory of the author’s mentor, Ambassador Steven McGann, who served as the US Ambassador to the Republics of Fiji, Nauru, Kiribati, and the Kingdom of Tonga and Tuvalu.