The following conversation was recorded on September 24, 2025, and has been edited for clarity. You can listen to the conversation here.

Natalia Kopytnik: Our guest today is the former Polish Ambassador to NATO between 2019 and 2024, Mr. Tomasz Szatkowski. He has a long and distinguished career in government, the defense industry, and the think tank sector, serving as Deputy Minister of Defense between 2015 and 2019 and as President of the National Center for Strategic Studies in Warsaw.

He has also held key roles in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and is currently a fellow at the Brussels-based Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy. Ambassador Szatkoski, thank you so much for joining us today on The Ties That Bind.

Tomasz Szatkowski: Thank you very much for having me.

NK: You began your tenure as Deputy Minister of Defense shortly after Russia’s seizure of Crimea. You also played a critical role in the development of Poland’s Strategic Defense Review in 2017. And then you served as Ambassador to NATO at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Arguably, both of your times in service were incredibly transformative for Polish defense. How do you assess Poland’s most notable defense achievements and developments, both during your role as Deputy Defense Minister and as Ambassador to NATO?

TS: Well, I would say that Poland has been one of the champions of collective defense as the primary role of the Alliance. When we joined NATO in 1999, it was what we viewed as the primary role of NATO. However, at that time, NATO was transforming from a mostly defensive Alliance into something else, it was in search of its mission, of its purpose.

The prevailing view at the time was that NATO would become something like a mechanism, like a sort of toolbox to help stabilize different troubled areas around the world. With the area of so-called, you’re not out of area, you’re out of business, being we have to intervene in distant areas where our security has been decided at the valleys of Afghanistan and elsewhere. Of course, I’m already mentioning the Global War on Terror. This is something that Poland joined with the understanding that we have to share our burdens, we have to help each other being members of the Alliance, but at the same time, Poland’s concerns—[always being] aware of the threat coming possibly from Russia—were largely dismissed.

And even though, around 2000, there were still some residues of the old Cold War culture, they were fading away to the point that, around 2010, Poland had to bargain for contingency planning on an emotional level to be reestablished in the Alliance. To at least think of what would happen if NATO was to resort into its original task, its original mission, namely the collective defense of the territory of its Allies.

That all changed in 2014. Suddenly, everybody had to realize that the reality they were projecting in their minds was not exactly the reality we were living in, and that there were state actors that had aggressive ambitions and plans, and they were open and willing to use brute force in order to bring those plans into fruition.

Therefore, NATO also had to adapt. And so I indeed was able to witness almost the entire process of NATO’s adaptation and basically bringing back some of its original functions, collective defense with all its features—including the common structure, political-military relationship—but at the same time, adapting them to the times that we currently live in. We are no longer in the ‘80s or ‘70s; we have new communication means, new social phenomena.

Of course, we didn’t want to lose the expertise that was gained in NATO over time. But Poland, due to our consciousness of the threats coming mainly from the East, was one of the intellectual leaders of that process, even if that wasn’t always acknowledged, both in military and strategic domains. So you mentioned the Strategic Defense Review that I had an honor to lead back in 2016 to 17. At the time, we restored some of the notions that were actually foregone in other NATO militaries, that it isn’t just what was dubbed as quality, but it’s quantity of forces.

It is also not just an ability to project power outside, it’s also an ability to have a capacity to defend your territory, to have the power to withstand an attritional mode of fighting.

We were having all those notions in mind. We actually adapted, interestingly, a Russian or Chinese concept of anti-axis and area denial in order to build on what Clausewitz defined as the stronger form of warfare, which is defense. We thought it was a defensive alliance. We can actually build on these notions.

We then used this experience to influence the new strategic concept that was being developed in the Alliance. For instance, the very notion of deterrence by denial. So basically, instead of just being in a reactionary mode and sending forces, something happened: We would create conditions so that a possible adversary would not even consider conducting a surprise attack against NATO because of the high cost.

So, that was basically about bringing up notions like preparing the terrain, perhaps creating a mass of reserve personnel —something that was not very much discussed during the 2000s, and so on and so on.

We were able to cooperate with like-minded people, mostly military people. But there were also some very notable civilians in NATO military and civilian structures who still were, intellectually, able to [think] back to the end of the Cold War, but also went through the entire process of the previous adaptation—so, when NATO was adapting to those out-of-area threats—and were also able to use their expertise and work together on bringing those concepts about in the Alliance.

NK: As you touched on, since Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Poland has really emerged as one of Ukraine’s key allies, providing weapons, providing aid, providing refuge for people leaving Ukraine, and also as a key actor in rallying international support to defend Ukraine. I think something like 90 percent of weapons and aid for Ukraine go through the airport in Rzeszów in southeast Poland. I think this underscores the critical role the country plays in both NATO and European efforts to support Ukraine.

But yet, on the flip side, it does seem that often Poland is somewhat left out of these key summits, key discussions about the security situation, which, given recent events, the drone incursions, and the things that are happening on the eastern flank, as a frontline state that must be both concerning and also frustrating, right?

Former President Duda, with whom you served, was quite vocal about his frustration over the years about Poland being left out of key international discussions on this topic. And generally, it seems that Polish leadership over the last few years has been quite vocal about having more NATO in Poland and more Poland in NATO. So certainly, as you’re in your tenure, in both of your government roles, you were kind of instrumental in working to see more of a NATO presence in Poland.

What is your assessment of the situation today in terms of Poland’s both influence and leadership within the Alliance? I mean, [we] touched on that, but we didn’t expand much on the fact that indeed the NATO presence has grown much during the last ten years in Poland.

TS: It was something that was unthinkable years before. Poland and other eastern flank countries were sort of seen as a buffer zone within the Alliance. There was this provision of the Declaration of Strategic Partnership with Russia—which was called the NATO Russia Founding Act—which basically was seen as limiting the ability to deploy NATO forces into those countries, even though this wasn’t exactly the case.

We were able to change the paradigm of thinking on that, but when it comes to more of the political role, more of the agency, indeed, there is still much work to be done. I would say the old stereotypes [and cultural perceptions] don’t die, don’t go away easily, and there is still a tendency to think of countries from the eastern flank as the newest members.

Poland has been in NATO for 26 years, and I don’t think that other NATO countries after 26 years in the Alliance were the “final new members.” Of course, nobody’s using that term but there is this notion perhaps that the countries from the eastern flank are more recipients of security rather than donors of security, which I think perhaps is particularly misleading in case of Poland, which possesses one of the largest military within the Alliance and is quite critical in terms of providing security for number of its neighbors and possibly also beyond.

For instance, I remember one situation where there was a discussion in a narrow circle in the Alliance of “How can we help Turkey?” because at the time, it felt it was being abandoned. Then somebody said, “Well, I don’t think that you can contribute, but maybe you can think of something.” I was like, “Well, we actually can contribute.” And another point [is Poland] was one of the few countries that could contribute by sending a contingent of maritime patrol aircraft, plus some specialized troops.

Those stereotypes change more rapidly in the military domain because many people are more aware of what Poland and other countries are actually capable of. But for many of my colleagues and for people who work in NATO but on a political level, I would say many of them have insufficient military expertise or they would have to check the numbers and then sometimes do not realize what is the actual role of my country. This is, for instance, represented by the result of the stereotypes, by the fact that I would say Poland is insufficiently represented at the top echelons of the NATO headquarters.

And then there is also the issue of decision making. Of course, everybody knows that we have our own views, and we also can sometimes assertively express them. We actually, I think it’s not very well known, almost blocked the NATO communique from being adopted during two subsequent NATO summits because we thought that our views, which were legitimate, were not sufficiently taken on board. But it isn’t always a habit to bring Poland on board early or within some sort of initial decision-making on a strike. On one hand, people will say, “Well, of course, Poland is one of the largest countries, we’re in the Alliance, one of the largest Allies,” but somehow, I wouldn’t say this is [enough].

The makeup of the NATO headquarters leadership also represents this fact. NATO headquarters is made up of political leadership, but it’s also an administration. There’s a civilian administration, there’s a military administration. Civilians are called international staff. There were a number of cases where I was representing Poland at the Alliance—Poland was more than twenty years already an Ally—and I had to make a precedent where I would actually convince some of the leaders or some of those divisions of the international staff that there needs to be some people from Poland actually represented in those divisions.

And some of them [the divisions] were really critical for defense policy and planning divisions, where prior to my service in the headquarters, Poland had nobody out of 80 people working there.

NK: I really liked how you said that it’s a lot of beating the stereotypes of Poland being a recipient versus a provider of security.

And Poland is on track to meet 4.7 percent of GDP on defense spending this year, which is the highest in the Alliance, higher than the United States. So it feels like the capacity for being a provider of security is outpacing the rate at which the stereotypes can change.

TS: Indeed, and also, in other domains. Let me just add, I had the privilege of teaching a course this semester to a group of American students from one of the renowned universities, and we were having a discussion on the adaptation of NATO, and they said, “Well, there are certainly some problems. We heard there’s infrastructure in the East, and it isn’t developed.” I was like, “What kind of infrastructure are you talking about? Have you been to Poland? Have you seen Polish highways and Polish railways?” I mean, you can compare it to a number of other countries in the old sort of Europe. So, there’s a tendency to just basically assume that somehow the eastern part of the Alliance is more backward, less developed and everything, which isn’t always the case. In reality, sometimes there are areas where some eastern-planned countries are more developed, actually, both in infrastructure and capabilities.

And also, I would say in terms of strategic thinking, much of the culture has faded away in the western part of the European continent.

NK: Yeah, definitely. I think if you ever actually go to any of these countries, you realize that perhaps maybe the infrastructure is a little bit more advanced than even in the US in some instances.

But going back to the security conversation, you wrote an article for the Center back in April where you—we’ll link it for listeners in the show notes—outlined the history of US-Polish defense cooperation specifically. And you outlined several scenarios that might influence the trajectory of these relations going forward, including, of course, the increased American engagement in the Indo-Pacific, President Donald Trump’s general approach to Europe—which kind of is in flux at all times—but also some domestic factors. But it’s going in a positive direction as we were able to witness during the last United Nations General Assembly, which happened just yesterday. We’re recording on September 24.

You outlined these scenarios, but ultimately you argue in this piece, that no matter which of these scenarios happens, Poland will always be a linchpin of European security and that its contributions will only continue to increase. Can you walk us through why you think that this is inevitable, regardless of how other things in the world play out?

TS: Well, you already mentioned the word linchpin. So geographically, when you look at where Poland is located, indeed, it connects the northern flank, the northeastern part of the so-called eastern flank. It also connects us to the southern flank as the southern part of the eastern flank. So, basically, Poland is key to defending the Baltic states. Poland is key to maintaining control over the Baltic Sea. Poland sits on the most traditionally used corridor in terms of different major wars that have happened. Unfortunately, I mean, I’m not sure that there were many fronts going back and back, and this is partly due to geography. Poland is in a corridor of the Northern European Plains. And basically, if you want to control either Europe or you want to expand into North Asia, you will have to go through Poland. That sums up the geographical, geostrategic role of Poland.

It is a fairly large country for European standards, again with a fast-improving infrastructure. Poland now helps to connect those different regions of the Alliance. And of course, Poland has quite a capacity in terms of military. We have managed to keep one of the largest land-centric armed forces within the Alliance. We are [supplying] together more tanks than the UK, Germany, France, and perhaps even Italy can [provide].

As I said, it’s a largely land-centric military, but in terms of the components, this is the component that decides the course of the war in the eastern part of Europe. We’ve also preserved military culture where most Poles know that there is an obligation to actually defend our country—we also have to share the burden, meaning if we expect security, if we expect help from others, we also need to contribute. I think these are the factors that contribute to the role of Poland.

NK: That ties in perfectly to my second-to-last question, which goes back to the genesis of this project. We started this project last year as an exercise in reflection about the state of transatlantic relations 75 years after NATO’s founding, which NATO celebrated last year, and to revisit why this Alliance still matters today.

Now, when Poland joined NATO in 1999, then Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, in his first address to the North Atlantic Council, said, “Poland does not enter NATO with empty hands. We contribute not only to our territory, but also our people. You can count on us. You can count on Poland.” So, I wanted to ask you a little about how you assess Poland’s time in the Alliance since 1999. Do you think this pledge, “you can count on us”—you just underscored that Poles feel that sense of duty of defense and that they are not expecting any kind of free handouts.

Do you think that approach still has fueled or come to define Poland and how it views its place within NATO?

TS: Well, absolutely. Also I mean, this is one of the slogans from the time when Poland was fighting to regain its freedom: It was “for your freedom and ours.” I think it resonates well in the United States. So this is an affinity in terms of the values.

It’s an affinity in terms of this perception that in order to have freedom, we need to sometimes sacrifice. We need to be ready for sacrifices, for our freedom and for the freedom of others. And I think we’ve already proved that, very early on in the Alliance and actually prior to joining the Alliance.

We’ve been a loyal ally in a number of missions, regardless of whether those missions were the correct decisions looking in hindsight like the, you know, the Iraq war of 2003, 2009, we were there with the US. We were in Afghanistan from the beginning to the end. And also we were one of—and this is something that comes back in almost each of my conversations with the US military—where they always say, “Well, we were in Afghanistan. We remember that Poles were one of the very few Allies that did go with us everywhere.”

So there were nations that had caveats on the use of force. Poland didn’t, Polish forces didn’t—our troops were ready to fight alongside the US allies. So we’re ready to be with our allies through good and bad.

We’re ready to, as I said, share the bargain also economically. You mentioned the level of spending. It’s also important that we also understand that we have an economic dimension and one that has a very tangible effect here in the United States where I think thousands of jobs are being maintained thanks to the purchases of the Polish military: equipment worth tens of billions of dollars in the US. This is because we want to be interoperable with the US.

But I would say there’s also an understanding that we cannot only exclude US companies. This is the business of our key allies, so, in a way it’s kind of fair that some of our spending goes to our friends and allies on the other continent.

NK: Yes, definitely. And I think to tie it into my final question here, one of the things that I’m asking all of our guests this season—because one of the aims of this season is really to kind of foster understanding between our American listeners, our audience, and to get some regional perspectives—what would you like the American public, to understand about Poland’s contributions and role in transatlantic security and ultimately the importance of preserving NATO as an Alliance?

TS: Well, I would say Poland has already demonstrated that it is key to preserving Ukraine’s fight, as you mentioned in this conversation. Poland is very critical to NATO’s defense of the eastern flank, and Poland is a loyal ally that, in peacetime and in times of war, is ready to share the burden and shed blood together. I think this is something that I hope your [listeners] understand and I will continue to understand and believe.

NK: Thank you for sharing your insights and taking the time to join us today on the Ties That Bind.

TS: Thank you very much.

Image: Ukrainian tank crews climb out of Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks following a live-fire training at the Polish Army’s Combined Arms Training Centre (CAT-C) in Zagan, Poland. (NATO)