Natalia Kopytnik: Hi everyone, I’m honored to welcome Dr. Ieva Berzina to the podcast today.

Dr. Berzina is a senior researcher at the Center for Security and Strategic Studies at the National Academy of Defense of Latvia, and she is also an associate professor at Vidzema University of Applied Sciences.

Ieva, welcome to The Ties That Bind, and thank you so much for joining us today.

Ieva Berzina: Thanks for inviting me. Lovely to be here.

NK: Now, I think it’s been clear to many people, especially in the last few months, that the Kremlin’s been engaged in an increased campaign of microaggressions against NATO. We’ve seen the drone incursions, we’ve seen the drone sightings in various European airports, we’ve seen telecom cables being damaged in the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea explosions, cyber attacks, and so on.

Obviously, one could think of all of these as isolated incidents, of course, but I think collectively they’re adding up to something more dangerous. And it seems clear that President Putin is trying to really break the unity of NATO Allies and sow discord about the Allies and how they respond to all of these individual incidents.

Now, I think Latvia has long found itself at the center of questions regarding NATO defense and has been aware and preparing and dealing with a lot of the same microaggressions that we see now, from drones crossing over the border, to water and undersea attacks off the coast, and Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Russian-speaking populations.

But it does seem like things are moving away from the abstract these days. So, how is Latvia preparing for these kinds of threats today? And what can you tell us more broadly about Latvia’s comprehensive defense model?

IB: I agree with you that Latvia and other Baltic states, and also Finland, I would say, have been among those NATO members that were aware of the threats Russia posed to neighboring countries and also the broader NATO Alliance a long time ago. Actually, even before Russia illegally annexed Crimea and started hybrid warfare in southeastern Ukraine in 2014, which was an eye-opener for broader Western audiences. But for us, it was a story that we knew before that, and then it gradually escalated.

Actually, in the West, we started to speak about hybrid warfare more broadly and in the context of risks posed by Russia after this 2014 event that I already mentioned. And since then, we can actually follow how the toolbox of hybrid warfare that Russia used against the West expanded. Because in 2014, when we spoke about hybrid warfare, the main focus was on the information environment, Russia’s activities in the information environment, of course, including cyber operations. That was our main focus.

The role model was the way they operated in Ukraine, [through] covert military operations, but when it concerned NATO and EU member states, it was primarily disinformation campaigns. Actually, I would add it was the construction of broader, long-term strategic narratives that aimed ideologically to challenge the global dominance of the West and to prove that democracy is not the only possible model, and it’s not the best one.

But then it gradually expanded, and what we can see nowadays is that what we call hybrid warfare, especially activities from Russia that have moved only from solely the information environment to the physical environment.

And in the context of Latvia, the first significant shift and the next level of understanding of hybrid warfare actually was after Belarus, the presidential elections in 2020. Because a year after that, when the opposition movement was violently suppressed and Belarus was under severe sanctions from the European Union, Belarus—and we can assume, and I think with a high degree of credibility, that it was also supported by Russia—started to breach our borders already in 2021.

It mainly concerned Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. And we saw this flow of illegal immigrants through our borders. So this expanded our understanding of hybrid threats.

The next level of tensions was after the full-scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022, and especially last year. This year, we see a lot of the spectrum of activities Russia is using. It has expanded, and also the intensity has grown. So indeed, yeah, this situation is escalating.

NK: And what can you tell us about how Latvia is thinking about its security through this comprehensive, whole-of-society defense model? Can you walk us through what that encompasses?

IB: Yeah, I would say the turning point was 2014, because then we really saw that actually Russia may carry out activities—either we call them asymmetric or we call them hybrid warfare—but actually these are the ones that can do us damage, they are under the threshold of NATO Article 5.

NK: Right.

IB: And so it meant that we need to be ready for any type of scenarios and also the ones that can be carried out covertly.

So, it means that we need to strengthen our self-defense capabilities. Since Latvia joined NATO in 2004, in our strategic defense policy documents, it was postulated that the cornerstone of Latvia’s defense policy is collective defense.

But like I said, after those events of 2014, the way we thought about strengthening our self-defense capabilities was the concept of comprehensive national defense or the other name of the concept, which is very similar, is total defense. And it was a defense concept that developed during and after the Second World War.

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, this security concept was mainly operated by countries that were non-aligned, the countries that in case of military aggression over a [shorter] period of time or longer period of time had to be ready to defend themselves in the conflict against potential aggressors which were much stronger military powers. And the typical cases of countries that base their security on the principles of total or comprehensive national defense in Europe are Switzerland, Finland, and other Nordic countries, so also Austria.

So then, after the Crimea annexation, Latvia started to think about how it can complement comprehensive collective defense with principles of total or comprehensive national defense. This is indeed a very specific situation in current circumstances because nowadays, we also have many NATO member countries that base their security on total defense principles. For example, we see Finland has joined NATO, and Finland is one of the typical total or comprehensive national defense countries.

So, we started to develop this idea, and the implementation of the system started in 2019, when our cabinet of ministers adopted the conceptual document which outlined Latvia’s model of comprehensive national defence.

And basically what it is is a defense concept that is based on two principles: whole-of-government approach and whole-of-society approach. The proposed whole-of-government approach, to put it in simple terms, means that national defense is not only the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, but that we need to look at all major areas of societal life as essential for security because healthcare systems, internal security, financial security, diplomacy, and many more are essential for providing national security and state defense. So, we need to look at them in a complex and comprehensive manner. And the other point, the other principle or whole-of-society involvement means that, as Latvia’s documents put it, state defence is the responsibility of every Latvian citizen.

But there is also a reasonable idea behind it because, like I said, historically, this defense concept grew from the situation of smaller nations having to defend themselves against stronger aggressors. And in order to be able to do it, it meant that all of society should stand up against the aggressor, and this way it gave a chance of increasing the cost of an attack. The Winter War in Finland is one example, and another example, actually, is how Ukraine is resisting Russia’s aggression nowadays. So, this whole-of-society principle means that we need to be involved in national defense, as large a part of society as possible.

NK: Right. And does that, because you mentioned, part of the strategy is that the defense of Latvia is on every Latvian citizen. Does education about that start early in school? Are there programs that support this? What kind of programming is there to involve [males] beyond the military age in this concept of total civilian defense?

IB: Historically, the way you can involve the whole society in national defense is actually compulsory military service. So, one thing Latvia did after full-scale aggression against Ukraine was the introduction of the National Defense Service in 2023, which expanded the [portion] of the population acquiring basic military skills. And also, before that, we started national defense education. So from 2024, it’s a mandatory subject in all of Latvia’s secondary schools. We expanded the number of people being aware of what national defence means and why it is important to stand up for your country in case of military aggression.

But before that, Latvia also had a very well developed voluntary system with the national guard. But in those security circumstances, where we shift from the rules-based order to power politics, it’s also important for a small nation like Latvia to be as strong as possible.

So, we also need to more broadly expand these basic military skills and willingness to defend the country among the population.

NK: Yeah, I mean, you mentioned that after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Latvia introduced mandatory conscription for its men above 18. But you can also apply voluntarily, and also women can apply voluntarily at the moment. So, that goes to my next question, because I think Latvia is a leader—with Estonia as well [within] NATO—in the female representation in military service across the branches of the Latvian military.

But right now there is no mandatory conscription for women. It’s all voluntary. Do you see that ever changing? I mean, I would assume it’s not a popular thing, but is there a conversation ongoing to include women, that if we’re talking about a whole-of-defense concept, half of the population seems like a sizable chunk to omit from that?

IB: Yes, it is a complex question. It’s a very hot debate in Latvian security discourse, but it’s pretty much a values debate.

That’s why it is a political debate and it’s up to political forces, so up to politicians to decide, because indeed there are pros and cons on both sides and it’s largely about the values and the ideologies, I would say. So it is a debate at the moment like I said, and it’s voluntary for women. How the debate will end, [though], depends on politicians.

NK: But women, if they want to, can go through the same process, they can be involved in [the military].

IB: Yes, both women and men absolutely can apply voluntarily, and when we had the first intake of conscription in this national defense service at the first round I think most of the participants, most recorded recruits were actually volunteers. Then this changed gradually: Among my people, among my friends, I know young men, sons of my friends, going to voluntarily join the National Defense Service too.

NK: I think there was probably a big spike in volunteers after the invasion. I would assume that the environment has brought a sense of urgency for those skills.

IB: Yeah, absolutely. Immediate military threat, it changes the mindset.

NK: Because we’ve seen over the last few weeks, months, this uptick in these incidents, right? And the EU, the Americans, NATO as a whole, but mostly I’m talking about European response, has been much more dramatic than in past months.

But in Latvia, do you feel like all of these events, the drones, all the things we’ve mentioned at the beginning of this conversation, does it feel like business as usual in the sense that this has been happening, and some people are just waking up to the fact that it’s happening? Here in the Baltic states, it seems like there is a higher level of alarm when you talk to people about everything that’s been going on.

IB: Yeah, I think we have experienced airspace violations before, but not in such an intensity. And I think it also raises concerns in our society.

NK: Because, when I’ve been talking to Poles, Romanians, there is this feeling that, “Yes, these things have been happening, but we’re ready.” Do you feel like, thinking about where all of this is going, right now, one could argue that Russia will not attack NATO because it’s militarily concentrated on the war and its war in Ukraine.

But if that conflict should freeze or if there is some sort of ceasefire or some negotiations—I mean, that hasn’t really amounted to much yet, but it could—that could potentially free up Russian resources to divert their attention to an incursion into NATO.

So, do you think that there is a possibility of direct military conflict between NATO and Russia over the next few years? Or do you think it’s more likely that Russia will just continue escalating this shadow campaign of microaggressions against NATO states? Is Latvia, in your view, prepared for these scenarios?

IB: Yeah, I think it’s very difficult to predict what Russia will do because as we see, well, it depends on how you view it. Some argue that it’s pretty rational what Russia is doing. Some would say it’s irrational, but anyway, I would say we are in a situation of unpredictability.

Personally, my opinion is that it’s better to prepare for the worst-case scenario, and I would say that it’s better to overreact than not to react in this case. So, I would say we need to get ready, and that’s why there are many steps taken by Latvia to increase our possibilities to resist aggression, including strengthening our border, including developing our military industry, and doing all other things.

NK: And one of those steps is that Latvia, along with the other Baltic nations and Poland, and I think Finland, withdrew from the Ottawa Convention, which bans the use of anti-personnel mines.

So, Latvia withdrew from this, arguing that mines would potentially be a strategic security, guaranteeing an additional layer of security. But the international response to this was not positive, I would say, arguing that the main issue is that the vast majority of victims of mines are civilians, not military.

How was this viewed domestically? Was it controversial? Because it does seem like there is this push and pull between making smart national decisions about your own security, but also, the mine issue, I think, is obviously a humanitarian issue. Latvia obviously is closely committed to upholding humanitarian values, et cetera. So how is that seen here domestically?

IB: Yeah, I would say there have been political debates, and some political forces [from the opposition] have used it and have tried to oppose it. But my estimation is it was a minor [debate], though I haven’t measured it sociologically and haven’t studied it.

But my overall feeling is that generally I think we support this decision because we have this historical memory of Soviet occupation, and what was typical for Russian armed forces and Soviet armed forces is this incredible brutality and violence. We have this in our historical memories, so, I would say the majority of society demands from our government: “Let’s make our defenses strong and strengthen our border including creating obstacles for occupation armed forces to enter our territory.” I think that’s one [way] how we view it. There are humanitarian issues, but how do you measure them?

If we imagine Russia occupying some part of Latvian territory, the suffering, I mean, that would be a real huge humanitarian catastrophe because let’s face it clearly: What is the ultimate aim for Russia in Ukraine? It’s to destroy its statehood and to destroy its national identity. And I think the same principles also apply to Latvia. It’s an existential question.

NK: Well, the question of historical memory is a good segue to the last portion here, which is thinking back on Latvia’s accession into NATO in 2004. So it’s been over two decades now.

What did it mean then for Latvia to join as a society? What was the feeling and how has it changed now? Do people still feel the same way?

IB: I will start with the fact that NATO is one of the institutions that Latvian society trusts, that the level of trust in NATO is high.

And it happened (accession to NATO) at the same time that we entered the European Union. Basically, it was very—in a way, apart from security matters, it was also a symbolic act that we really have joined the community of Western democratic countries and that we belong through them. Because what is the West? One way of how we define it is, it’s NATO member states and EU member states. That’s one way of defining Western countries, values, and this community of countries. So, we joined it. And at the end of the day, throughout the way Russia’s relations with the West have deteriorated over time, this NATO security umbrella has protected us, obviously.

And I think people understand that very well in Latvia, and we really appreciate it. And that’s why I think we Baltic states are the ones that increase the percentage of GDPs that we pay to NATO, for defense to NATO. I think we are the first of the countries that has as large a share as required.

And also, there is generally, if you look at society’s views, they are positive and support this.

NK: I ask this question because I remember when the invasion of Ukraine started in 2022, a lot of the discourse, especially in American media, was questioning whether allowing Central European states, Baltic states into NATO provoked this war. And that’s why I ask this, because obviously each country, each person has their own choice, and they make that choice, to be a part of the Alliance. So, I’m always just interested to hear the perspective of someone from the country that chose the West, as you said, Western values.

So, my last question, which is my favorite question, because this is geared towards an American audience, is: What would you like Americans to understand about Latvia’s role in transatlantic security and why continuing to invest and support alliances like NATO is still so important till this day?

IB: Yeah, very good question. Indeed we are small nations. We are very committed nations to democratic values and to belonging to the West.

We understand Russia very well. We have experienced it, we know what it means. We have our competence, and being attacked by Russia is very dangerous. And we strongly believe that our NATO membership can deal with this issue and [help] to protect our sovereignty and national identity in the long term. That’s what’s very important for us.

But also, I would like to add that the Soviet experience was that we were occupied, and there was a division line between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Nowadays, I think there is maybe a temptation to think that, “Well, these are small states, not so important,” but what the Western audiences and particularly American audiences have to understand is that it would not be just one chunk that Russia would take away from NATO. It would [spread] further, like a cancer.

So, I think it’s very essential, as NATO defines, to defend every inch of NATO territory, wherever it is.

NK: Couldn’t agree more. Well, Ieva, thank you so much for joining us today and for sharing your insights. It’s been a pleasure speaking with you.

IB: Thank you very much. It was my pleasure as well.

Photo: Flickr | Latvijas armija