The following conversation was recorded on February 5, 2026 and has been edited for clarity. You can listen to the conversation here. 

Aaron Stein: Hello and welcome. Today I’m joined by Roland Theis. He is a member of the German Bundestag with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party and, for the purposes of this conversation, the committees that he is active on, which I think we’ll be talking about a lot, are the Defense Committee and the Committee on European Union Affairs. Welcome to the show.

Roland Theis: Thank you for having me. 

AS: It’s nice to actually have you up in Philadelphia. I know you started in Washington, and you’re on your way to Boston. And I imagine that on your trip, people keep asking how things are changing in Germany. I think it’s fair to say as we in the US look at the future of Europe, and we look at the future of defense in Europe,

We look at the German government, so we understand that you prioritized non-defense spending for decades after the Cold War. I think we all did, right? And then we obviously had major changes in 2022 with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

You sit in parliament. You sit on the committee. Tell us about the debates that have been going on in Germany, because this comes down to guns versus butter, and how your party and your government is thinking about the trade-offs and increased defense spending in an uncertain world.

RT: It’s true, and it’s fair to say that over decades Germany spent not enough for our own defense. And that’s true for almost every European country. We didn’t defend Europe as one and we didn’t meet our responsibilities. Because over the decades we were not used to having enemies.

When I arrived in December 1999 in the garrison where I had my military service at that time, they said to us, “Welcome, it’s nice to have you, but actually we don’t need you anymore because war in Europe doesn’t exist anymore. At least not in that dimension in which we need so many soldiers.” We were, as they told us then, encircled by friends, and therefore we had no threat assessment at all. The first mistake that Germany and other European countries made at that time was that we thought that we could outsource our security bill to the US taxpayer.

And it’s fair to say that wasn’t the right decision, and that was unfair in this transatlantic partnership. Since 2022—you mentioned that correctly—things have changed, and the mindsets of the Europeans and Germans have changed dramatically. Under the new government of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz we are really moving fast, finally. I would love to say that we are moving fast enough, but I’m not sure if we have to move faster. 

But in that regard, many things have changed. We changed our constitution so we can spend more money on the military and defense. We modified the debt break. So really, we can say today that we can spend whatever it takes to defend ourselves. We have doubled our military spending and we’re going to double it in the next five years again so we can meet our NATO obligations. We have in December passed a new conscription law making military service more attractive for young men and women. We will increase our personnel in the German army from 180,000 to 260,000, and we will double our reserve force from below 100,000 to 200,000 men and women. 

We are building our infrastructure, civil and military infrastructure. We are promoting military mobility in Germany and we are building a European industrial base for defense because we need it. And our commitment, a commitment which I think is strong, is that we want together with NATO and inside NATO, and together with our American partners, to guarantee peace and security in Europe, because unfortunately it’s in danger. And unfortunately, there is a Russian aggression that won’t go away so quickly. 

AS: So, that’s a perfect segue into my next question. Russia’s war in Ukraine has, I’d say, for everybody in the West [considerably changed] the relationship with Russia, but particularly with Germany, it famously ended the energy relationship.

Ties are frozen. And I actually know, because I have a very good friend in Germany today who says Germany is frozen. It’s very cold, just like it is in Philadelphia. And there are challenges, right? We’re looking at challenges to the future of European security as it relates to what’s been going on with Russia. 

I also think, unfortunately, it’s safe to assume that President Vladimir Putin isn’t going to be pushed from power. So, the war is not going to end with some decisive Russian defeat, perhaps that we all thought could be possible in 2023 or 2024 with some Ukrainian advances.

So there’s an uncomfortable position that’s going to have to take place, which is how do you or your country see the Russia threat evolving in the near to medium term? How do you appropriate funds to respond to this? And, perhaps, [what are] the debates about how you engage with a revanchist and militarized Russia?

RT: To be honest with you, Aaron, when it comes to Russia, in the last 30 years, we in Europe and we Germans in the first place made an enormous mistake, thinking that if we do enough trade and if we strengthen the economic ties with Russia that could lead to a peaceful cooperation with Putin, and maybe one day Russia will become a democracy and Putin liberal.

That was an enormous mistake because I think one could have known earlier, before 2022 and even before 2014, that Putin’s goal is not peaceful cooperation in Europe, but Putin’s goal is, and he said it, to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence as was in the Soviet times.

I think this is objective as a matter of fact: This goal is incompatible with a free and sovereign Germany and a free and sovereign Europe. Putin’s goal to reestablish this sphere of influence is simply incompatible with a free and sovereign Germany and a free and sovereign Europe. We are quite sure that this aggression will not stop in the long term if we do not deter Putin from continuing in other European countries, in the Baltics, in Romania, and elsewhere. Therefore, for us, I mean, this is the most important security issue in Europe right now.

Supporting Ukraine is not only a humanitarian motivation. It’s not only because we want to defend a democracy against an unlawful aggression by a modern dictator, but it’s in our own security interests. They’re just buying us time to prepare ourselves in Europe against further Russian aggression. Buying us time to build up our own deterrence against Russia, because I am convinced that this threat coming from Russia will not end with the war in Ukraine and will also not end with Putin, if there are not fundamental changes within Russia—which, honestly, I don’t expect so quickly.

Therefore, stability in Europe—and this is, I think, the perspective for the years to come—is only possible and starts with a European deterrence of Russian aggression, hoping that one day a real dialogue about peace and stability in Europe with Russia will be possible again.

AS: It’s an uncomfortable topic because I think you indirectly referenced Putin’s famous 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference where he announced to all of us his broader intentions, and all of us sort of turned the other way.

But we’re also coming up on a year from what I think is another watermark speech that will go down in history in Munich, which is Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech last year.

Last year’s Munich Security Conference was, I think we can say, a little different than all that had come before it, especially the speech. So, walk me through how that impacted the government’s relationship with the United States and clearly [laid out] a different set of terms of engagement.

RT: Different is not necessarily always terrible, but certainly it was different than all those that had come before it. I want to start with a positive note because having been in D.C. the last three days and having met a lot of fantastic people on the Hill, but also in the State Department, for instance, I’ve met people who really believe in a good partnership between the United States and Europe. And that was reassuring.

Unfortunately, those we met who were reassuring in that regard were probably not the most powerful in D.C. because of the rhetoric—and you mentioned the vice president’s speech in Munich last year, but there are other examples, Greenland, Davos, etc. The rhetoric of the Trump administration is more than disturbing and is destroying a lot of the soft power of the United States. It’s destroying a lot of trust you have built up in the last 80 years not by acting, but by guaranteeing our peace and security, by being a loyal partner and by establishing a world order based on rules and by building up a NATO, which was a mutual cooperation between the member states.

I just want to give you my own private example. I was, I still am, and I want to be, really a true believer in a good partnership between the United States and Europe based on shared interests, based on common values for multiple reasons: because I know the history, because I was in Boston on 9/11 in 2001, so I lived that trauma the United States saw that day. I did all these beautiful programs the American people invested in to build up your soft power and trust in the United States. Much of that has been destroyed in the last 12 months. And if someone like me is questioning the reliability of the United States, you can imagine [where that leaves] the German and European public as a whole. 

I think this is a bad deal for the United States because you destroyed an 80-year investment in a few months. And what we want—and this is our perspective as Christian Democrats—as the government in Germany now, is really a good partnership. And for a good partnership, in my opinion, you need to be open to your partner and tell him what you expect. It’s like in private life. For a good partnership, you have to do what you have promised. And you have to respect each other. And all the speeches you have mentioned were not respectful at all. 

We as Germans and Europeans, we are sovereign countries. Europe doesn’t need lessons on how to run our democracies. That’s just none of the Trump administration’s business. And it’s helping the Chinese in their false narrative about being a better and more reliable partner for countries like us in the world. We want a strong partnership with the United States, strong transatlantic ties, and we are ready to do whatever it takes for it. But we are sovereign countries and we think that it’s in our own but in our common interest that we rebuild this true partnership.

AS: I do like to quote Bob Dylan every once in a while because times change, and that change may seem frightening to some, right? 

Perhaps what we just talked about is very uncomfortable for some—trust me, I feel it—and liberating for others in terms of how things may change amongst different subsets of people.

Whatever your perspective on the fallout from the Munich Security Conference speech last year, I think we can agree that the transatlantic relationship has changed, but it will continue to evolve. So, when you think about Germany’s role and how it changed Europe and its thinking about defense, how do you frame your thoughts? 

We’re in Pennsylvania. We’re a swing state. A lot of people look to us as sort of the harbinger of where the US election will go. I’ve certainly heard a lot of Europeans over the past year going, why would we outsource security to swing states in Pennsylvania?

I can understand that. But how should we all think about this and how does Germany see the future of the region, future of global order, and the future of the transatlantic relationship? 

RT: In that regard, for me, two aspects are crucial. The first is that European defense must be a European responsibility. We won’t make the mistake again to outsource our security bill on the US American taxpayer. That was unfair. And for us, this is a deeply European project. 

I know that many people in the United States expect Germany to be in a leadership position. That’s right. But for us, it’s not a German leadership. It’s a shared leadership of European states. We don’t want to dominate Europe. We are a strong country. But not strong enough—I think it is also a lesson of history that we shouldn’t try to dominate this continent. We want to be a good friend and a good partner to our European partners: France, Poland, the UK, etc. 

So, we want and we have to build up a co-leadership in Europe so we can protect Europe as one. The European Union calls that project Rearm Europe, and we have to take that literally. It’s not Rearm Germany plus Rearm France plus Rearm Italy. It’s Rearm Europe, and that means we not only have to promote and improve our military capacities but also to build a common strategic approach, common strategic strategic culture, so we can defend Europe as Europeans and not only as Germans and as Frenchmen, et cetera. That’s the first point. 

And the second point is we really must stick to the transatlantic partnership. For us, there is no alternative to that. Therefore, I think we have to do everything that strengthens cooperation and the transatlantic relationship in our common best interest. 

AS: Well, with that, Roland, thanks for taking time to speak with us. 

RT: It was a pleasure. Thank you.