Shihoko Goto, Asia Program Director

As the first G7 leader to meet with President Donald Trump in the White House since the US attacks on Iran, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s ability to manage relations with the United States without sacrificing her country’s own national interests was closely watched by other US allies in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe. Takaichi faced the challenge of balancing two seemingly contradictory goals. On the one hand, she was tasked with maintaining her strong personal ties to Trump and ensuring continued US commitment to security in the Indo-Pacific through the US-Japan alliance even as Washington’s immediate focus remains on the Middle East and Ukraine. On the other hand, Takaichi needed to avoid embroiling Japan into a conflict that has come under severe criticism from Japanese voters. 

The end result has been heralded as a win by both sides, but for diverging reasons. For Takaichi, averting any specific commitment to secure the Strait of Hormuz without facing criticism from Trump is a political victory. Indeed, the prime minister reiterated after the meeting that a strong US-Japan alliance is critical to secure Japan’s national interest amid growing uncertainties across the world. She left Washington with her relations with Trump—and as a result, US-Japan bilateral relations—still intact, if not strong. 

Takaichi’s political win does not, however, change the fact that Japan is especially vulnerable to the cutoff of oil supplies through the strait. Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, Japan has focused on diversifying its energy supplies worldwide. Nevertheless, over 90 percent of its crude oil imports today come through the Strait of Hormuz. The agreement for more Japanese investment in the United States to secure domestic energy supplies can be heralded as a win-win for both sides. Of the $550 billion that Japan has committed to invest by 2029, Tokyo has now committed to six projects worth $109 billion, five of which are in the energy sector. Those investments will not, however, ease the immediate pressure of soaring energy prices hurting Japan now as a direct result of the US attacks on Iran. Moreover, the commitment to bolster Japanese foreign direct investment in the United States as part of the concession to lower US tariffs on Japan. 

Yet ongoing challenges to Trump’s tariff policies from within the United States mean that deepening Japanese investments in the United States will not necessarily safeguard the country from increased or new tariffs. By focusing on energy projects as well as advanced technology industries, however, Japan’s longer-term economic security relations with the United States are steadily becoming stronger and should be able to withstand the changing US political winds. 

Jon Metzler, Senior Fellow

The Takaichi-Trump summit was expected to highlight a second phase of projects in the Japan-US Strategic Investment Initiative, with the first batch having just been announced on February 18, and to maintain alignment before Trump’s visit to China. That plan went by the wayside with the US attacks on Iran. But the dramatic shifts also became an opportunity to amplify existing collaboration worldwide. 

For instance, given usage levels of US munitions supplies in the Middle East, could Japan provide additional manufacturing capacity? As oil and energy prices rise, would events in the Middle East lead to any new energy-related collaborations? And indeed, during the summit, Prime Minister Takaichi proposed stockpiling in Japan oil directly procured from the United States as an avenue of joint US-Japan collaboration, and one that would diversify Japan’s crude oil supply. Further, the post-summit statement from the White House highlighted that Japan would rapidly quadruple production of SM-3 Block IIA missiles in Japan, in addition to “scoping Japan’s role” in increased advanced medium-range air-to-air missile production capacity.

Three new projects were announced at the summit meeting, bringing the total number of projects under the Japan-US Strategic Investment Initiative to six. The latest additions were the construction of small module reactors (SMRs) by GE Vernova Hitachi in Tennessee and Alabama, with an investment of up to $40 billion, and the construction of natural gas generation facilities in Pennsylvania and Texas, with a combined investment of up to $33 billion. The Tennessee announcement likely refers to plans to construct the first BWRX-300 small modular reactor at the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) Clinch River utility site. TVA also operates nuclear power generating facilities in Browns Ferry, Alabama. The BWRX-300 nuclear SMR by GE Vernova and Hitachi is a boiling water reactor that can produce up to 300 megawatts. GE Vernova Hitachi states that the first power plant using the BWRX-300 SMR will come online in Ontario, Canada, in 2030. All these projects are described as being in the “pre–final decision” stage.

The Takaichi-Trump summit also highlighted collaboration in the field of critical minerals. The US-Japan Critical Minerals Investment Ministerial was held March 14, 2026, in advance of Prime Minister Takaichi’s visit. The memorandum of collaboration (MOC) issued by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry and the US Department of Commerce on March 19 highlighted establishment of a Japan-US working group on deep sea mineral resource development. This built on a critical minerals framework between Japan and the United States announced in October 2025 and also reflects Japan’s investment in a deep-sea rare earth extraction project conducted by the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology in February 2026 near Minamitorishima, a Pacific atoll in the Ogasawara Islands and Japan’s easternmost territory. Specific projects in the United States highlighted by the critical minerals MOC include one in Arizona and two in Indiana: the Copper World copper mine project in Arizona, which has 30 percent ownership by Mitsubishi Corporation; a secondary smelter with Exurban in Indiana, with investment from Mitsubishi Materials and Rio Tinto; and a collaboration between Mitsubishi Materials and ReElement Technologies Corporation, LLC, a subsidiary of American Resources Corporation in Indiana. The MOC also highlighted a collaboration between Alcoa and Japan Australia Gallium Associates, a joint venture between Japan’s Sojitz and the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security in Australia.

With the possible exception of natural gas projects, where US data center builders (at least, those with access to turbines, which themselves can be in short supply) have displayed surprising speed in getting projects online, all these projects involve relatively long-term investment and development. In some cases, the announced projects acknowledge existing collaborations, such as GE Vernova Hitachi with the TVA, or Mitsubishi Materials and Exurban. As a whole, they highlight clear synergy in the fields of energy and critical minerals. It will take time for these projects to impact supply chains and local economies.

Mirna Galic, Senior Fellow

What would be asked of Japan to assist the United States in its attacks against Iran? That was the key question ahead of Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s meeting with President Donald Trump at the White House. Given Japan’s reliance on the Strait of Hormuz for the shipping of the majority of its crude oil imports, Trump has publicly called on Tokyo, along with other allies, to join the United States in sending ships to reopen the strait. Japan excels in naval demining—the self-defense forces have specialized units and assets dedicated to minesweeping and neutralization, a capability Trump reportedly wants for the mines Iran has purportedly deployed in the Strait of Hormuz. Japan is legally prohibited from deploying minesweeping vessels as long as active conflict persists, however, due to the complex regulations governing its use of force. Removing the mines before a ceasefire has been agreed to by the parties to the conflict would be considered a use of military force; doing so in the current situation, in which Japan has not been attacked by Iran and is therefore not acting in self-defense, would be a case of collective self-defense, which is permitted only under narrow circumstances not met by the current crisis. Japan was certainly prepared for an ask and joined with nineteen other US allies and partners to somewhat preempt the request by issuing an advance statement that noted their “readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the Strait,” signaling an intent to be helpful without offering any real details. 

In the end, no specific ask was publicly made. From the security and defense side, therefore, the Takaichi visit seems fairly inconsequential at first blush. When the best outcome is no immediate negative outcome, the bar is pretty low—and that bar was met, making the visit, in that sense, a success.

Three details are worth noting, however. First, although Japan avoided being pigeonholed during the visit into any specific commitments on its support for the US-Israel war on Iran, the issue is far from resolved. During his press conference with Takaichi, Trump revealed that he expects Japan “to step up” on the Strait of Hormuz. His statement was not further clarified, but it leaves room for the United States to call on Japan to do something specific regarding shipping traffic in the strait at any point—and if the war drags on, Trump may yet press Tokyo to do something it cannot agree to. Indeed, it is not clear how much the legalities of Japan’s position would register with or matter to the US president.

Second, the White House announced via a post-visit factsheet plans for US-Japan co-production of the AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM). This is good for Japan, which has been interested in co-production as a more reliable way to ensure its supply of the missile than procurement from US stocks. Co-production of the AMRAAM is an initiative inherited from the Biden administration, however, not a new move under Trump. A new ask that Japan has made of the Trump administration—now already a year ago—and that has not yet been addressed is the idea of co-production of the SM-6 missile, which Japan considers important for use with AEGIS-equipped assets. 

Finally, despite the overwhelming focus on Iran in the public discussions, Takaichi did manage to extract a statement from Trump regarding China and Beijing’s increased truculence toward Japan stemming from her November statement on Taiwan. Trump noted that he would “be speaking Japan’s praises when I’m in China with President Xi,” which would be a welcome statement of support amidst the tensions between Beijing and Tokyo. Whether that is still on his mind by the time a Xi meeting actually occurs remains to be seen, but it was a win for Japan under the circumstances. This is especially true in that the main impetus for a mid-March visit was so that Takaichi could speak to Trump and set a tone on China before his meeting with Xi—a goal that the current war threatened to derail. 

Image: Flickr | The White House