Less than two years ago, after the last parliamentary elections, Poland was on the minds of all of Europe and beyond. In the middle of this year, Poles went to the polls again, this time for presidential elections. The result came as a surprise to many and may mark the end of a too-short “democratic success story” for Poland. How did this happen? What is the landscape of the Polish political scene after the 2025 elections? What impact could this election have on Ukraine and the European Union? Will Poland continue to support Ukraine? Is Poland’s membership in the European Union at risk? And finally, what awaits Poland in the next parliamentary elections in two years?

Democratic Success Story?

Sunday, Oct. 15, 2023 was not particularly sunny or warm in Warsaw, nor was it encouraging weather for long walks, but there was a sense of impending change in the air. Long queues could be seen on the streets leading to polling stations, and many people were in good spirits and peaceful moods. Although the first evening poll results did not immediately indicate a clear victory for the opposition, they showed numbers that very quickly added up to the only reasonable conclusion — a new government had been elected in Poland. The victory of the 15 October Coalition (named after the election date, comprising the Civic Coalition, Poland 2050, Polish People’s Party, and New Left) ended eight years of Law and Justice governance and put Poland back on a pro-European track. In addition to winning the election and forming a new pro-European government, the parties of the so-called Democratic Opposition achieved something much more important and unseen in previous years. This was the mobilization of voters and the resulting record turnout in the history of independent Poland, which reached 74.38 percent — and which, in the unanimous opinion of experts and the public, was the key to victory for the democratic coalition.

Even though Law and Justice came first with 35.38 percent of the vote, the Civic Coalition came second with 30.7 percent — which, combined with the 14.4 percent obtained by Third Way (Poland 2050 and Polish People’s Party) and 8.61 percent for the New Left, gave the coalition parties the opportunity to form a new government. The last party to enter parliament was the far-right Confederation, which obtained 7.16 percent of the vote. The new government began its term on a wave of strong public support, which manifested itself in mass public gatherings such as the June 4 March in Warsaw, which brought together up to 500,000 people and was preceded by numerous protests related to the stricter abortion law and threats to the rule of law. Poles wanted and needed change, and they went to the polls to get it. The new government had another advantage — a strong leader in the person of Donald Tusk, who returned to Poland as one of the leading politicians of the European Union (he was President of the European Council in 2014–2019 and President of the European People’s Party in 2019–2022). It is therefore not surprising that shortly after the handover of power, Poland very quickly returned to the mainstream of European politics, and E.U. funds for the National Recovery and Resilience Plan were soon unlocked.

Hopes for an improvement in the situation within the country itself and for Poland to emerge from the periphery of the European Union, where it had settled for years alongside Hungary, were therefore very high. The new government announced the implementation of reforms promised during the campaign, bringing to justice representatives of the previous government who had destroyed the Polish justice system over the years and had significantly violated the principle of the separation of powers and the rule of law, as well as ensuring a better position for Poland on the international stage. The wave of victory in 2023 was followed by further victories in local elections and the European Parliament elections in 2024. It seemed that the determination to return to the pro-European democratic mainstream was so strong that Poles would, at least for some time (perhaps even longer), push conservative circles into the background. The presidential elections scheduled for May (and June) 2025 were to be the final confirmation of this thesis.

A Long and Exhausting Campaign

From the very beginning, the 2025 favorite was Rafał Trzaskowski, the candidate of the Civic Coalition, who defeated Radosław Sikorski (Minister of Foreign Affairs and, more recently, Deputy Prime Minister) in the November primaries. Besides him, a total of 12 other candidates ran in the election. This led to a broad public debate on increasing the requirements for candidates, raising the question of whether this is really what democracy is all about. In Poland, anyone who is a citizen of the country, is over 35 years of age, has voting rights, and has collected 100,000 signatures from citizens can run for office. The office can be held for a maximum of two terms. However, it was mainly the relatively low number of signatures required to register as a candidate in a country of almost 40 million people that caused the most controversy. So, without going into too much detail, let’s focus on the candidates who received at least 10 percent in the first round. These were Tzaskowski, Karol Nawrocki, and Sławomir Mentzen. As for representatives of other significant political forces, it is worth mentioning that members of the parties forming the ruling coalition received the following percentages: Magdalena Biejat of New Left got 4.23 percent and Szymon Hołownia of Poland 2050 got 4.99 percent. Adrian Zandberg, representing the strongly left-wing Razem party, obtained 4.86 percent, while the extremely controversial, far-right, anti-immigrant, and anti-Semitic Grzegorz Braun got as much as 6.34 percent.

The real battle for the presidency was, of course, to be fought between Trzaskowski (Civic Coalition) and Nawrocki (an independent candidate supported by Law and Justice). Trzaskowski has been the mayor of Warsaw since 2018, a former minister, member of the European and national parliaments, and vice-chairman of the Civic Platform (Tusk’s direct deputy). It was this last position, alongside his connections with Warsaw, that proved to be Trzaskowski’s biggest obstacle during the campaign. As is often the case, it was difficult for a representative of the big-city elite to win the votes of residents of small towns and villages, although the mayor of Warsaw certainly made a huge effort to gain them. Political opponents eagerly took advantage of his position in Tusk’s party (and his relationship with Tusk himself), calling him a politician who was completely dependent on Tusk’s will and unsuitable for the role of an independent, strong leader, so necessary in today’s unstable times. Therefore, Nawrocki was supposed to be his clear opposite. A candidate who was (at least in theory) independent, only supported by Law and Justice — a guarantee of independence, an uncompromising attitude, a defender of Catholic values and Poland’s borders against potential attacks from Russia and immigrants. With his experience in managing the Institute of National Remembrance, he was supposed to protect Poland’s good name at every step, all over the world, including in pursuing historical truth and bringing justice to the difficult historical relations with Ukraine. His cons were a clear lack of international experience, his suspicious past (which came to light during the campaign), and the fact that few people really believed that he was not a candidate of the Law and Justice party. Quite unexpectedly, a third candidate joined the two — Mentzen, from the far-right Confederation. A young member of parliament, entrepreneur, and tax advisor with a Ph.D. in economics, he was supposed to be an effective alternative to the first two candidates and reach primarily young voters, which he definitely succeeded in doing. He became so popular among business owners and workers that it soon turned out that he was fighting Nawrocki for a place in the second round. At one point, he even became uncomfortable for Trzaskowski, who was still confidently leading in the polls with a safe margin of at least 5 percent.

What Were the Candidates’ Election Promises and Slogans?

1. Trzaskowski referred to relatively rational ideas, promising to facilitate reforms thanks to the president and government from the same coalition, highlighting the need to maintain strong relations with both Europe and the United States, and strengthening the economy through, among other things, deregulation.
2. Nawrocki tended to use populist slogans, constantly emphasizing that he was an independent politician who cared about Poland’s welfare, promising security, prosperity, a normal life, and development.
3. Mentzen presented his vision of a strong and prosperous Poland in 20 points, which were quite general in nature and often lacked a clear plan for implementation. In the second round, he presented eight proposals that another candidate would have to sign in order to gain the support of his voters.

Although the election date was announced in January, the election campaign had been in full swing since the end of November 2024. As a result, by the time we reached the finish line in May, everyone was already exhausted by the fierce and often dirty political battle. Trzaskowski tried to win over new voters, sometimes forgetting about certain groups that had secured victory for the ruling coalition in 2023, and instead of the points mentioned above, he often focused on the argument that Law and Justice must be stopped and democracy in Poland defended. Nawrocki, on the other hand, emphasized his independence at every stage of the campaign, saying that Poland needed a strong leader in times of war, and that this was how he differed from Trzaskowski, who was dependent on Tusk and the European elites. Mentzen, meanwhile, was an alternative to both, often promising things that were not only almost impossible to achieve, but also certainly beyond the president’s powers. Trzaskowski’s lead was stable, and his campaign team began to focus more on choosing a rival candidate for the second round. However, everything began to change after the debate in Końskie on April 11, which was organized by Trzaskowski himself and in which he performed disastrously. The plan was for him to meet only with Nawrocki, which caused outrage among the other candidates, with Hołownia, a coalition partner in the government, leading the “rebellion.” The debate showed Trzaskowski focused solely on Nawrocki, revealing the excessive confidence, or perhaps even arrogance, of the Civic Coalition candidate. It was the other candidates who attracted more attention, gaining voter support and putting the mayor of Warsaw in not a very positive spotlight. He performed much better in later debates, but the incident in Końskie should give his campaign team cause for reflection. Mentzen, on the other hand, avoided any debates or meetings without a script he had written himself, and everyone will remember the image of the Confederation candidate running away from journalists on an e-scooter.

As predicted, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki made it to the second round. On May 18, the difference was only 1.82 percent in favor of the mayor of Warsaw. The second round took place on June 1, preceded by a final TV debate (with a slight advantage for Trzaskowski) and attempts to win over the votes of other candidates from the first round, primarily Mentzen. Both candidates met with him, with the Civic Coalition candidate again coming out on top. It was already clear at that point that the final difference in votes would be minimal and that society was strongly divided, almost perfectly in half. The first evening poll results after the polling stations closed indicated a narrow victory for Trzaskowski. In the morning, after the votes were counted, it turned out that Nawrocki had become the new president of Poland with 50.89 percent of the vote to 49.11 percent. Approximately 370,000 votes decided the outcome. Or maybe it was a different number? Shortly after the results were announced, it turned out that at least 13 electoral commissions had incorrectly filled out the result cards and some votes had gone to Nawrocki instead of Trzaskowski. Later, it turned out that there were a total of 250 commissions, but the difference was only a few thousand and had no impact on the election results. However, a bad impression remained.

Who Is the New President-Elect?

First and foremost, Nawrocki is another brilliant invention of Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Law and Justice party. A new political creation, launched at the perfect time, under perfect circumstances, and in an (almost) perfect style. This is similar to the case of the previous president, Andrzej Duda, whom Kaczyński pulled out of the party’s back ranks, making him a clearly defined and attractive opponent to Bronisław Komorowski — and who later became the ideal executor of the will of the Law and Justice party leader.

Nawrocki, born in 1983, is a Polish historian and a social and local government activist. In 2013, he received his doctoral degree in humanities at the University of Gdańsk with a thesis entitled “Social Resistance to the Communist Authorities in the Elbląg Province 1976–1989.” He worked at the Institute of National Remembrance in 2009–2017, then from 2017 to 2021 he was the director of the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk, only to return to the Institute of National Remembrance in June 2021 as its deputy president. The following month he was named president of the institute, and he held this position until his election win. In the life of the new president, sport was just as important as history. During his youth, he was a member of two teams: the KKS Gedania soccer team and the RKS Stoczniowiec boxing team. He even won first place in the Polish Junior Cup Boxing Tournament. In fact, the topic of Nawrocki’s sporting career came up repeatedly during the campaign, and not always in a positive light. In the first stage of the campaign, we could often see the candidate in the boxing ring and on the soccer field, and several advertising spots were based on the iconic scene from the movie Rocky, with Sylvester Stallone running through the streets of Philadelphia (here in a much less impressive style). Of course, this was no coincidence, as Nawrocki himself often appeared in a sports sweatshirt with the inscription “NOW ROCKY,” intended to link his surname with the name of the hero of John Avildsen’s movie.

However, other sports-related aspects of the new president’s biography proved to be significantly less inspiring. During the campaign, information began to emerge in the media about Nawrocki’s alleged involvement in so-called “ustawki,” or arranged fights between soccer hooligans. For a time, silence fell on the campaign team, but as more and more reports emerged, increasingly pointing to the candidate’s actual involvement in these illegal activities, Nawrocki himself finally decided to speak out. To the surprise of many, he admitted that he had participated in one fight and, as he emphasized, “he had fought with his fists all his life, but only with those who wanted to fight, according to agreed rules.” Thus, the candidate for the Polish presidency admitted his participation in illegal hooligan fights. However, even more surprising is the fact that this most likely happened during his work at the Institute of National Remembrance and that he lost no popularity in the polls because of this story. The same happened with other allegations that were made against him during the campaign. According to Polish media platform Onet, Nawrocki was involved in escorting prostitutes into the Grand Hotel in Sopot while working for a private security company in the past. Other accusations concern the suspicious takeover of an apartment from a senior citizen, for whom the new president had promised to care for the rest of his life, according to published documents. However, this did not happen — the elderly man was placed in a nursing home, and the apartment became Nawrocki’s property. Ultimately, after a media storm and public outrage, Nawrocki donated the apartment to a charity. The most recent suspicious behavior occurred during the final TV debate with Trzaskowski on May 23. At one point during the live broadcast, under the constant gaze of cameras and television viewers, Nawrocki reached for and used snus (tobacco pouches placed under the lip). This gesture caused embarrassment and suspicion among the audience that one of the candidates was using illegal substances. The matter was quickly clarified by Nawrocki’s staff, but it left some echoes in the public debate and open questions about whether a man who cannot resist his addiction during an important debate should hold such an important office. For his supporters, however, it was another sign of his human side.

However, regardless of the allegations and controversial statements that emerged during the campaign, it must be admitted that Nawrocki proved to be another candidate, after Duda, who was effectively created by Kaczyński. Firstly, he was a candidate only supported by Law and Justice, not a member of the party (even if he was fully associated with it and effectively linked to it). Kaczyński knew perfectly well that putting forward someone from the front ranks of Law and Justice would end in failure among more moderate voters, and there were no good candidates further down the ranks. Secondly, his alleged independence (repeated constantly to contrast him with the compliant Trzaskowski) and the views he sometimes expressed, which even representatives of Law and Justice were reluctant to voice, helped him win over voters with views close to the far right (about 20 percent in the first round). Finally, being relatively young, with a Ph.D. and experience in a state institution, Nawrocki, with his ambition and determination, may prove to be much more useful in blocking the work of Tusk’s government than the relatively inactive and highly defensive Duda.

Is Polish Support for Ukraine at Risk?

Many of Nawrocki’s statements on Ukraine, especially during the election campaign, have caused widespread controversy and could raise doubts about Poland’s continued commitment to supporting Ukraine. The president-elect, while still a candidate, said that he did not see Ukraine in NATO and that integration with E.U. structures should proceed more slowly, as well as referring to the need to normalize neighborly relations, particularly on the issue of the Volhynia genocide (his words on this are not surprising, especially considering his term as president of the Institute of National Remembrance). He also repeatedly used Donald Trump’s rhetoric about Volodymyr Zelensky’s ingratitude (not only towards the United States, but also towards Poland, whose role in helping Ukraine he emphasized at every turn). Therefore, could the new Polish president actually threaten further support for its eastern neighbors? It is unlikely, for two main reasons. First, it should be remembered that the first year and a half of the war in Ukraine occurred during the Law and Justice party’s term in power, and support for Ukraine flowed through all possible channels at that time. Even if, especially in the first months, it was primarily civil society, local authorities, and non-governmental organizations (including international ones) that mobilized on a massive scale, the support provided by the government and by Duda was unquestionable. It is rather unlikely that Nawrocki would actually want to break with this good tradition. His pre-election statements were mainly aimed at increasing his electorate and winning over voters who had voted for the far-right Confederation candidate Mentzen in the first round. Moreover, if we take a closer look at Nawrocki’s comments, we will also find pro-Ukrainian themes — like the natural presence of Ukraine at the negotiating table, or direct assurances of continued support (of course, with the proviso that Polish soldiers will not be sent). Ukrainian politicians also show understanding on this issue, as they tend to tone down the mood and hope to maintain the status quo, which is very much in Poland’s interest. “The elections may, of course, affect relations with Ukraine. The most important thing for us is to maintain the support for Ukraine by the two main parties in Poland. I am convinced that such support will continue, given that Ukraine’s victory in the war against Russian aggression is an important strategic interest for Poland. Responsible Polish politicians understand this very well,” said Oleksandr Merezhko, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Verkhovna Rada, to Interfax-Ukraine, commenting on the results of the presidential elections in Poland.

Secondly, although the president of Poland is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, represents the country on the international stage, has the right of veto and legislative initiative, and must sign bills passed by parliament for them to come into force, he is not in fact able to conduct the country’s foreign policy on his own. Cooperation with the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs is essential here — which, by the way, will certainly not be the easiest in the coming years, but this means that such an arrangement should rather eliminate the risk of jeopardizing further support for Ukraine. However, this does not mean that there will not be significant divergence in Poland’s foreign policy. This should come as no surprise, and we need only recall the recently concluded presidential term of Duda during the government of the 15 October Coalition. The first foreign interview may already point us in the direction that Nawrocki will try to follow, continuing the work of Law and Justice. This interview appeared, unsurprisingly, in the Hungarian weekly Mandiner. In fact, during this interview, the president-elect announced that “Poland will continue to support Ukraine strategically and militarily, but he himself is opposed to the rapid integration of this country into the European Union.” In addition, he emphasized the importance of strengthening cooperation within the V4 format (which has recently been moving towards V2+2, due to the increasingly clear division into pairs of Poland and Czechia, and Hungary and Slovakia) — this is one of the guiding principles of Law and Justice foreign policy. He also mentioned NATO’s eastern front — although here we have been observing a fairly natural shift in the center of gravity and significance for some time now. What can already be stated with certainty is that efforts to maintain good relations with the Trump administration will continue. During the election campaign, Nawrocki traveled to Washington and even managed to meet with the president himself, who allegedly supported his candidacy. His victory certainly pleased Trump, who is definitely closer to Nawrocki than to Tusk, and he recently shared his satisfaction with the election results in Poland on social media.

The New Old Government and a Final Test in Two Years

Little remains in Poland after the reversal of the general trend of strong (or promoted as such) individuals coming to power and the growth of support for populist options focused mainly on domestic policy. The severe defeat in the presidential election was certainly a significant setback for the 15 October Coalition, which was evident in the behavior of its politicians in the weeks following the election. Finally, in July, the government was rebuilt, which was supposed to be the first step towards regaining the trust of voters. However, at this stage, further problems arose within the coalition itself, which delayed the entire process of changes in the government by a full two weeks. Ultimately, on July 23, the announced reconstruction took place, which in reality turned out to be nothing more than a lifting. Two ministries were closed, reducing their number to 21, and some ministers were replaced by secretaries of state from the same ministries. The main changes affected the Ministry of Justice, where Adam Bodnar was replaced by Waldemar Żurek; the Ministry of Health, where Jolanta Sobierańska-Grenda replaced Izabela Leszczyna; and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where Marcin Kierwiński replaced Tomasz Siemoniak. Changes also occurred in the ministries of agriculture, state assets, culture, and sport. Miłosz Motyka took over the new Ministry of Energy. In addition, Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski was promoted to the rank of deputy prime minister. According to various polls, Poles do not believe that the government reconstruction will change anything.

Political polls, on the other hand, show different results. According to some, the Civic Coalition has gained an advantage over Law and Justice, with 30.1 percent to 28.7 percent, while others say that Law and Justice is ahead with 28.3 percent to the Civic Coalition’s 25.8 percent. However, what may prove crucial for the next parliamentary elections in two years’ time are the other parties in the ranking, specifically the third-placed far-right Confederation with numbers ranging from 14.6 percent to 17.4 percent. The New Left party is oscillating around 7 percent, with the rest of the parties struggling to exceed the 5 percent electoral threshold. The most alarming thing is the constantly growing support for extreme groups. This year’s presidential election showed that Poland is not free from anti-immigrant, anti-European, and, most concerning, anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. What is even more unsettling, however, is that the recent elections showed that such slogans can be used to gain significant political capital. It is therefore not surprising that, based on the results of the presidential election and the rise in support for extreme right-wing parties, foreign observers are beginning to wonder whether Poland will continue to support Ukraine. As I mentioned earlier, fortunately nothing should change in this regard. A free Ukraine is not only a guarantee of security for Poland, but for the entirety of Europe. Furthermore, as shown in the latest U.N. Refugee Agency report, refugees from Ukraine contributed as much as 2.7 percent to Poland’s GDP. The next question is about Poland staying in the European Union. The election results and polls mentioned above are definitely a bit worrying. Could a possible future coalition government between Law and Justice and Confederation pursue this goal? It is possible. However, would such a government be able to function, given the significant tensions that already exist between the leaders of these parties? It is difficult to judge at this point. However, the road to leaving the European Union is very long and rather unlikely in the near future. And although no scenario can be ruled out long-term, it is impossible for the moment. This is mainly due to Polish society, which rates E.U. membership very positively — in July 2025, as many as 81 percent were in favor.

From Democracy to Instability in Under 2 Years – What Did We Do Wrong and What’s in the Future?

Why, then, despite so much controversy and the promotion of ideas that are completely contrary to those that led to the victory of the 15 October Coalition in the last parliamentary elections, did Poles decide to elect Nawrocki as president just over a year and a half later? This question is especially pertinent when we consider the coalition’s two victories in the local and European Parliament elections in 2024. But what if there was never really a great victory for the so-called democratic movement? In fact, the situation is still at a crossroads, as illustrated by the results of this year’s presidential election.

Let’s look more closely at the results of the 2024 elections. In the April local elections, Law and Justice actually won nationwide, although it did lose control in some regions (specifically, 3 voivodeships, leaving it with 6 out of a total of 16) to the Civic Coalition and, as usual, lost in the larger cities. In the European Parliament elections two months later, the Civic Coalition won with 37.06 percent, narrowly ahead of Law and Justice with 36.16 percent. The difference was minimal and began to point to possible future troubles for Tusk’s coalition, especially when we consider the result of the third-place far-right anti-European Confederation (12.08 percent). And this came with a record turnout for European Parliament elections of 40.65 percent, although this result should by no means be considered a source of pride, as it shows that too many Poles still treat the European Union as something good, but not necessarily worth going to the polls for. Meanwhile, in last year’s local elections, turnout was 51.94 percent in the first round and 44.06 percent in the second, representing a decline compared to the previous elections in 2018. This fluctuating voter engagement and the results of the European Parliament campaign should have encouraged the governing coalition to be more careful and vigilant in preparing for this year’s presidential campaign. However, this did not happen, and Tusk’s government made the same mistake as in 2015 (leading to a double defeat in the parliamentary and presidential elections) — they believed too much in their winning streak and were unable to sufficiently mobilize their voters while discouraging other groups. Furthermore, many voters from 2023 are simply disappointed with the work of the 15 October Coalition government so far and decided not to support Trzaskowski.

The disappointment stems primarily from the very slow (or lack of) implementation of the announced reforms, as well as the delayed and excessively lengthy investigations aimed at bringing to justice many representatives of the previous government, who often abused their power and placed themselves above the law. Women in Poland, who were one of the main forces behind the victory in 2023, are particularly disappointed with the current government. In fact, none of the announced changes to the abortion law have come into force, which is partly due to the lack of consensus within the coalition between the New Left and the Third Way (Poland 2050 and Polish People’s Party), who hold different positions in that matter. First, in 2024, the Speaker of the Sejm, Hołownia (Poland 2050), used the upcoming local elections as an excuse and decided to postpone work in parliament, then the Polish People’s Party refused to introduce changes to the law, and finally Tusk announced that with the current parliamentary majority, it was not possible to reform abortion law in Poland. As a result, the same women with whom the ruling coalition politicians were very eager to protest before the 2023 elections have now been left with unfulfilled promises and the very same problems. Another group of voters who may feel disappointed are young people, who were primarily hoping for an improvement in the housing market. However, this did not happen. It is therefore not surprising that in this year’s presidential election, the majority of young voters voted for candidates from extreme parties — Mentzen and Braun from the right, and Zandberg from the left, who together garnered 26 percent of the votes in the first round. This was also influenced by the fact that people who do not know Poland without the devastating political conflict between the Civic Platform and Law and Justice parties have reached voting age. They therefore voted against the main political forces, and in the second round their votes were more effectively captured by Nawrocki — who was, after all, an independent candidate, officially only supported by Law and Justice.

In many ways, this year’s presidential election in Poland may resemble the recent election in the United States. For a long time, polls suggested that the Democrats would win, but they were too confident and, failing to effectively campaign for voters, especially those from the periphery and smaller urban centers, they ultimately lost, and lost badly. In Poland’s case, the Civic Coalition tried to learn from the past, but their efforts to win over additional voters were too chaotic, and they relied too heavily on their faith in Trzaskowski, who five years earlier had almost achieved the impossible by entering the race very late and nearly defeating Duda. This time, he lost, despite having a 6–7 percent lead over Nawrocki in the polls in May and comfortably winning the second round in all candidate configurations. What is noteworthy is that this happened with a record turnout in the presidential election — 71.63 percent in the second round. However, perhaps another 3–4 percent was missing, which would very likely have tipped the scales in Trzaskowski’s favor. Most likely, they were missing due to the aforementioned disappointment with the current government, which may have been counting so much on its candidate’s victory in the presidential election that it planned to introduce most of its reforms after Aug. 6, 2025, the date of the new president’s inauguration, without the risk of a veto and obstructions from Duda. The problem, however, is that Tusk’s government did not even try to push through certain changes and laws during the previous president’s term, and now it may find it much more difficult to do so.

These are the virtues of democracy: Sometimes one side wins, sometimes the other, everyone has a voice, and every group is represented. Democracy in Poland is alive and well, as we continue to see movement and change on the political scene. However, there are two facts that emerge clearly from this year’s presidential election that cause the most concern. First, Polish society is deeply and almost equally divided into two camps, which unfortunately are unable to reach an agreement, and the level of frustration with this situation is likely reaching its peak. This also leads to another concerning fact: a significant and gradual increase in support for extreme parties, especially on the right. This could lead to social tensions, instability at the borders (recent incidents at border crossings with Belarus and Germany), and a change in attitudes towards immigrants and refugees (especially Ukrainians). However, this is something we should all try to avoid at all costs in Poland, as we know very well who is delighted with such a turn of events — Russia. After all, an internally united, strong, and internationally respected Poland, with its growing importance in NATO and its return to the mainstream of the European Union, as well as its continued support for Ukraine, is a guarantee of security for the entire region. The key to achieving it, though, is certainly society and reaching out to it with democratic values. Every country has its minor and major problems, whether it is Poland or the United States, but it is worth remembering the words of American writer James Baldwin, often quoted during Bruce Springsteen’s Land of Hope and Dreams Tour, which encourage us to believe in people, who are always in the center of democracy: “In this world, there isn’t as much humanity as one would like, but there’s enough.”

Image: Presidential inauguration of Karol Nawrocki, August 6, 2025. (REUTERS/Aleksandra Szmigiel)